1	COURT OF APPEALS	
2	STATE OF NEW YORK	
3		
4	HUTCHINSON,	
5	Appellant,	
6	-against-	NT- 144
7	SHERIDAN HILLS HOUSE CORP.,	No. 144
8	Respondent.	
9		
10	ZELICHENKO,	
11	Appellant,	
12	-against-	N. 145
13	ORIENTAL BOULEVARD, LLC,	No. 145
14	Respondent.	
15		
16	ADLER,	
17	Appellant,	
18	-against-	N. 146
19	QPI-VIII, LLC,	No. 146
20	Respondent.	
21		
22		20 Eagle Street
23		Albany, New York 12207 September 17, 2015
24		
25		

CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY  APPEARANCES:  BRIAN J. ISAAC, ESQ. POLLACK, POLLACK, ISAAC & DECICCO, L. Attorneys for Appellant Hutchinson 225 Broadway Suite 307 New York, NY 10007  KEVIN J. O'DONNELL, ESQ. KAUFMAN DOLOWICH & VOLUCK, LLP Attorneys for Respondent Sheridan 21 Main Street Suite 251 Hackensack, NJ 07601  DAVID M. SCHWARZ, ESQ. WINGATE, RUSSOTTI, SHAPIRO & HALPERIN, Attorneys for Appellant Zelichenko 420 Lexington Avenue Suite 2750 New York, NY 10170  LISA L. GOKHULSINGH, ESQ. GANNON, ROSENFARB, BALLETTI & DROSSM. Attorneys for Respondent Oriental 100 William Street 7th Floor	
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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We're going to start
with number 144, Hutchinson v. Sheridan Hill. Good
morning.
Would you like any rebuttal time, Mr.
Isaac?
MR. ISAAC: Yes, Your Honor. I'd like
three minutes, if I could have it, please.
CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Three minutes. You
have it, go ahead.
MR. ISAAC: Your Honors, my name is Brian
Isaac, and I represent the appellant in this case.
Before I start, just one generic word. I think I
probably speak for everybody here, but I'll let
everyone else speak for themselves. I've done a
whole lot of these cases, and I don't know what
CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I'm not surprised,
Mr. Isaac. Go ahead.
MR. ISAAC: And and you're probably
not surprised that I don't know what a trivial defect
is or isn't. I I just don't. I know the words
CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You might be
surprised; we're not sure we know, either. We'll try
to find out. Go ahead.

MR. ISAAC: Let - - let me - - let me

1 see if I can - - -2 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: We know it when we see 3 it, Mr. Isaac. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, we know it when 5 we see it, right. MR. ISAAC: Lisa said exactly - - -6 7 Jacobellis against Ohio; she told me exactly the same 8 thing before. It's true, but it doesn't really help 9 - - - it really doesn't help you, and we're supposed 10 to help you. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, tell us, in your particular case with this metal whatever-it-is 12 13 coming out of the sidewalk, how does this whole 14 concept - - - if there is such a concept, a trivial 15 defect - - - relate to what's a screw, part of a screw, whatever it is? How does it fit into this why 16 17 we box these three cases, because they're similar 18 issues, at least as to that concept? 19 MR. ISAAC: Yes. I - - - I would suggest 20 to you that having looked at all the cases, my case 21 is a little different. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How is it different? 23 MR. ISAAC: Because you're never going to

see - - - and at least I've never seen, and I work in

New York City - - - I've never seen a pristine

2.4

sidewalk with that little metal nut sticking up; it's just something I've never seen. I suspect everyone here has been in New York City; I suspect you haven't seen - - plenty of defects, but not that kind of defect. But let me try to make my argument easier.

2.4

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.

MR. ISAAC: I tried to actually give you a holding, because I knew the cases were bunched, and I did it on page 17 of my brief.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yep.

MR. ISAAC: I'm not as good as you are, so forgive me, but this is how I would do it were I a judge on the Court of Appeals.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.

MR. ISAAC: "A defect on a" - - - and I'm quoting, "A defect on a public way is not trivial as a matter of law where it is not to be expected by a pedestrian, not readily seen in the ordinary course, inconsistent with its surroundings, firmly fixed in the ground, and of an abrupt or uneven nature, such that it is capable of catching a pedestrian's shoe, causing him or her to become unbalanced." Now, why does this fit within the Trincere definition of a defect that's not trivial as a matter of law?

Simple; it's unexpected, and if you look at this case

1 from the prism of summary judgment jurisprudence - -2 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. MR. ISAAC: - - - the defendant's own 4 5 statements, defendant's own pictures, the defendant's 6 own words support my claim that it's a trap or a 7 What's a trap? Something that's unexpected; snare. 8 something that you can't negotiate; something that 9 comes up without you knowing it. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How does - - - how do 11 their own words support your case? MR. ISAAC: Well, let's tal - - - let's 12 13 talk about their witnesses, and I'll try to give you 14 the page references if I can, also. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: First of all, tell 16 us, do - - - do you know how big this? You know, 17 there are different things in the record about it. 18 How - - - how big is it, or was it, or what? 19 MR. ISAAC: It's around five-eighths of an 20 inch in diameter, and it looks like it's three-21 sixteenths of an inch in height. It looks like it's 22 a nut; it looks to me like it's got five or six 23 sides. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How do we know what 25 you're just saying is true?

1	MR. ISAAC: Well, from defendant's
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: From what it's
3	MR. ISAAC: The defendant's the one who
4	measured.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They're telling you
6	that that's the sizes?
7	MR. ISAAC: Yeah, yeah, and if you want to
8	see the photos they actually put in some great
9	photos
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, we've seen
11	them.
12	MR. ISAAC: 96 to 109, where they
13	measured it with that little MetroCard there. You
14	can see it's a nut; it looks to be clearly visible,
15	okay. Now, one of the reasons that it's it's
16	this snare is because of this contrast. If you're
17	walking on a New York City street, like, say, at 225
18	Broadway where I am between Barclay and Vesey, there
19	are seven million defects. But pedestrians don't see
20	them because pedestrians
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is it possible
22	MR. ISAAC: don't look for them.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: that we haven't
24	noticed that these kinds of things may be when
25	you say you've never seen it, I don't know, I've

1	never seen it either, but maybe it's there and we
2	just don't notice and they're not they're not
3	hazardous to anybody.
4	MR. ISAAC: But they are hazardous because
5	their own witness said it was. It's hazardous if you
6	can't see it and it has the ability to stop you cold,
7	and remember, the second
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How do we know that
9	it has the ability to stop us cold?
10	MR. ISAAC: If
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is it the size of it
12	that
13	MR. ISAAC: It's the size; it's the
14	configuration; it's the fact it's embedded in the
15	ground; it's the fact that you can't avoid it, and
16	you can't see it. They're
17	JUDGE STEIN: You can avoid it. I mean, if
18	
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If you saw it.
20	MR. ISAAC: If you saw it.
21	JUDGE STEIN: Saw it, yeah, right.
22	MR. ISAAC: Right, and and
23	JUDGE STEIN: But but does
24	foreseeability play any part in this?
25	MR. ISAAC: I I my

answer to that, Judge Stein, is I don't think so.

And I think the - - - the easiest way that I can help you to try to understand what seems to be like a mishmash is this. My adversary has accused me of essentially speaking out both sides of my mouth at the same time, not a great thing for an appellate lawyer to do; I don't think I did it. Let me tell you why I didn't.

2.4

What he says is, listen, plaintiff, you didn't see it, and by the way, all of my witnesses says this is so small and so insignificant that we didn't see it. Therefore, you don't have notice of it. Well, there are a couple of responses to that. The first is since you were the one who did the repair on the sidewalk, if you left it there, notice isn't an issue because it's an affirmatively created condition.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And - - - and you say that because they - - - they say they didn't do it but some - - - some other entity did the sidewalk and they're not responsible because - - -

MR. ISAAC: They - - - they are, though, if they did it for them. That's Wright again - - - that's Wright against Tudor, that's Klemperer, that's - - - I mean, that's black letter precedent, but I

don't even want to go there because I don't have to.

I want to tell you why I think that analogy is wrong.

2.4

There is a huge quantum difference between notice that goes to the comparative negligence of a person who traverses a public way and notice that goes to the failure on the part of the defendant's agent to see that which he is expected to see when he is doing an inspection. They are not congruent, they should not be conflated; and were you to do that, in my opinion, you'd be changing 200 years of settled law.

Let me give you your cases. This goes back to Clifford against Dam, that's 81 NY; Congreve against Smith, 18 NY; McFarlane's, 247 NY; and - - - and Delaney against Philhern Realty is 290 (sic) NY. What those cases have said is that one who traverses a public way has a right to assume an - - an - - - assume that it is free from defects and doesn't have to anticipate that's a defect.

In 1944, the Second Department took those cases and said that a plaintiff is entitled to a charge to that effect and in 2011, in a case called Normandy against Lowenstein, the First Department came to the same effect when the plaintiff walked out of a restaurant and walked into an open trapdoor.

1 Now - - -2 JUDGE STEIN: So is this - - - is this 3 strict an absolute liability then? 4 MR. ISAAC: Absolutely not. 5 JUDGE STEIN: Why not? 6 MR. ISAAC: I'm not saying - - - I'm not 7 saying I get summary judgment. They can make all the 8 arguments in the brief that they made to the jury. I 9 may win; I may lose. But I shouldn't be losing - - -10 JUDGE STEIN: But you're saying 11 foreseeability - - -MR. ISAAC: - - - as a matter of law. 12 13 JUDGE STEIN: - - - is irrele - - - is irrelevant and - - - and if - - - let's say they 14 15 didn't create the defect. Let's just say but they -16 - - but it was - - - they couldn't fin - - - I mean, 17 here, they sent employees out to look for it and they couldn't find it. Why - - - how can we hold - - -18 MR. ISAAC: Simple. 19 20 JUDGE STEIN: - - - the defendant liable? 21 MR. ISAAC: They're very - - - they're very 22 Tho - - - the cases that I cited about the 23 pedestrian, all that means - - and I'm going to try 2.4 to use a Jacobellis against Ohio analogy here myself,

it won't be as good - - - is that when people walk,

1	they don't look down at their feet. It just doesn't
2	happen. You look to the right, you look
3	JUDGE RIVERA: No, they're looking down at
4	their phone.
5	MR. ISAAC: You're looking touche.
6	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But you said it
7	yourself, Mr. Isaac, sidewalks are not perfect.
8	MR. ISAAC: They are not.
9	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And and they're
10	not defect free, so should every defect in a sidewalk
11	now become actionable?
12	MR. ISAAC: Absolutely not, and that's not
13	what I'm saying. I'm saying just I'm just
14	trying to win my case. I I know you have it a
15	little bit different than this one is one that
16	I I should be winning because
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What supports your
18	case? What they've said, in and of itself, supports
19	your case
20	MR. ISAAC: Right.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: enough to get
22	you to the to the finish line?
23	MR. ISAAC: Yes, and I see my light is on.
24	I know you don't want me
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Finish the answer to

1 that question. MR. ISAAC: Can I just make one more point? 2 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes. 4 MR. ISAAC: The - - if you're looking for 5 something, though, if you're doing an inspection, 6 that's a different story. That's Weigand against 7 United Traction Co., 1917 case from your court. It is - - - the - - - the - - - the statement that one 8 9 doesn't see what one should see under the 10 circumstances is not exculpatory. It's inculpatory. 11 So if you have two porters - - - and I'm taking this 12 directly from adversary's brief - - - two porters who 13 say they look every day for this - - -14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. 15 MR. ISAAC: - - - sidewalk for defects and 16 this is there, they can be negligent for not seeing 17 or they can be negligent for not looking, or their 18 testimony can't be true. 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If it's something 20 that they can be negligent for. 21 MR. ISAAC: I would ask you just to look at 22 the photos. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. We've - - -2.4 we've seen them.

MR. ISAAC: I can see it. If I can see it,

1	then someone who's looking for it should be able to
2	see it too.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
4	You'll have your your rebuttal.
5	MR. ISAAC: Thank you so much.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's hear from your
7	adversary.
8	Counsel, what what about the test
9	that your adversary lays out? What would be wrong
10	with that test
11	MR. O'DONNELL: Good afternoon to the
12	court.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: on trivial
14	defect?
15	MR. O'DONNELL: The that test would,
16	as the court has has suggested, basically open
17	the doors to to cases regarding every sort of
18	every imaginable defect that could possibly exist
19	-
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, let let's
21	take your case.
22	MR. O'DONNELL: with respect to a
23	liability.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's take your case.
25	MR O'DONNELL: Okay

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's assume that
2	it's enough to hurt somebody and let's assume that
3	you look for it or your your agent looks for it
4	and and doesn't find it and should. They get
5	to the jury?
6	MR. O'DONNELL: No. They they do
7	not. Absolutely not.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not?
9	MR. O'DONNELL: The the trivial
10	defect test that this court laid down in Trincere is
11	a two-part test.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yep.
13	MR. O'DONNELL: And the size of the defect
14	is critical. It it may there might not
15	be
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's say let's
17	say the size passes the test, and you go, inspect for
18	it, look for it, don't find it. They get to the
19	jury?
20	MR. O'DONNELL: Absolutely not, Your Honor.
21	Because there's a
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: Absolutely what?
23	MR. O'DONNELL: Absolutely not. There's a
24	
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: All right.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why - - - why not? MR. O'DONNELL: Because there's a second 2 3 point to the test what ask - - - which asks the court to look at the - - - the circumstances of the 4 5 surroundings and the time and place of the - - - of the location of the accident. And in this case - - -6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Location is on a street in the middle of Manhattan, and this can hurt 8 9 somebody. Let - - - assume it could hurt somebody. 10 You look for it and don't find it. He gets to the 11 jury? 12 MR. O'DONNELL: Absolutely not. That would 13 be fundamentally un - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What else does it add 14 15 to this that would make - - - allow him to get to the 16 jury? 17 MR. O'DONNELL: If the - - - if the - - if it was large enough, which it was not. 18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's assume it's 20 large enough. Assume it's large enough that it could 21 hurt somebody. 22 MR. O'DONNELL: Okay, and the circumstances 23 were such that he should - - - that he should not 2.4 have anticipated it. Argenio was a particular case 25 that - - - that has been cited in the briefs.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: What, in your view, is large
3	enough?
4	MR. O'DONNELL: Pardon me?
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: What, in your view, is large
6	enough?
7	MR. O'DONNELL: In in in my
8	view, it would have to be closer to an inch in height
9	and substantially wider. Now
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: So your argument would be if
11	it's three-quarters of an inch and it's in the middle
12	of the sidewalk, as this one was, and you knew it was
13	there and you went out and you measured it and said
14	it's only half an inch, we can leave this, it's no
15	big deal, that there would be no liability if people
16	tripped on it or or anything else?
17	MR. O'DONNELL: If it was only a half of ar
18	inch?
19	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.
20	MR. O'DONNELL: I I think that
21	that would be a different question, for sure. That's
22	
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: No, you said you said
24	if it's a trivial defect, it doesn't make any
25	difference, absolutely not, can't go to a jury.

MR. O'DONNELL: Well, I - - - I think that

it - - - you know, in this particular case, the

trivial defect doctrine and the notice doctrine are 
- - are hand-in-hand.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I'm asking you that

because if - - - the way you seem to be saying it is

if it's a trivial defect, in your view - - - which in

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because if - - - the way you seem to be saying it is if it's a trivial defect, in your view - - - which in your view is three-quarters of an inch - - - you can leave - - - you can leave things like this out on your sidewalk and say we can put twenty of them out there, they're all trivial, and therefore, we have no liability and let's have fun and see who steps on them.

## MR. O'DONNELL: Well - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, it seems you got - - you got a - - - a two-part test to me here. Let's
assume there's constructive notice, that the porters
were shoveling the sidewalk, and they didn't see it;
they should have - - - should have seen it. So
assume there's constructive notice. But that's not
really your motion. Your motion is it's a trivial
defect, right?

MR. O'DONNELL: Well, my - - - my - - - my motion is both notice and defect, Your Honor.

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay, well, I'm not giving

1 you notice. 2 MR. O'DONNELL: Okay. 3 JUDGE FAHEY: So I - - - I think - - - I 4 think you're wrong about notice. 5 MR. O'DONNELL: Okay. JUDGE FAHEY: But - - - but - - - but let's 6 7 go to the second part of it, which is the more 8 difficult part for the plaintiff, I think. You have 9 both the size of the defect, which is the triviality 10 of it, and then its trap- or snare-like 11 characteristics. It seems to me that - - - that - -- that's where you are. Now, the Trin - - - Trincere 12 13 case was a half-an-inch elevation in the cement slab, 14 so we've already said that that's trivial, so any - -15 - anything smaller than that is trivial. And so this 16 may be trivial, but it still could have the 17 characteris - - - characteristics of a - - - of a shar - - - of a - - - of a trap or a snare. 18 MR. O'DONNELL: Well - - -19 20 JUDGE FAHEY: And that's where you get into 21 a problem. I think that's the toughest part of your 22 case is because it's out in the middle of a - - - a

sidewalk; it's the kind of thing where, my God,

who will walk by that thing in a day. So - - -

you're in Manhattan; there could be 100,000 people

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MR. O'DONNELL: Well, Gaud - - - the - - -1 the court in Gaud v. Markham described what a trap or 2 3 a snare was, or at least gave the court some guidance 4 as to what to look for when trying to find out if an 5 object does constitute a trap or a snare. And it 6 says you look to the location, whether there's adverse weather conditions or adverse lighting 7 conditions. Now - - -8 9 JUDGE FAHEY: But they've also said things 10 like sharp edges and uneven surfaces, and that would 11 benefit you, then, wouldn't it, because this is a 12 round object? 13 MR. O'DONNELL: This is - - - this is a 14 round object. I submit to the court it's not a nut; 15 it appears to me - - - I've been to the location 16 myself, it appears to me - - -17 JUDGE FAHEY: But it's - - - it's - - -18 this is not one of those things where you have to 19 click off a - - - a four-part test and meet each 20 part. We have to look at them and kind of say it - -21 - it's more of a feel than - - - than a 22 perfectly mathematical objective test. 23 MR. O'DONNELL: Understood. 2.4 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah.

JUDGE STEIN: Does it depend upon our

plaintiff also? Here we have a plaintiff that - - -1 that was familiar with this area? 2 3 MR. O'DONNELL: Abs - - - absolutely. JUDGE STEIN: A bright and sunny day, I 4 5 mean, all - - - all of these things figure into it, 6 right? 7 MR. O'DONNELL: They - - - they all do, absolutely. And this was his street; he had walked 8 9 by this particular location hundreds - - - hundreds of times before. 10 11 JUDGE STEIN: Is he going to - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So if he trips and -12 13 - - and hurts himself no - - - no recourse? MR. O'DONNELL: Not if the defect is 14 15 trivial. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Because you're saying 16 17 it's a little too small? Gee, he's been in this area 18 before; he should have seen it or looked at it if 19 it's there? What - - - what's - - - what's the 2.0 recourse? If - - - isn't it - - - isn't it a weird -21 - - your adversary was saying it's kind of a weird 22 thing that he's never seen and maybe the court may 23 never have seen. Isn't the fact that it's kind of a 2.4 weird thing go towards at least exploring further

what went on here at a trial?

MR. O'DONNELL: I - - - I disagree, Your

Honor, and I'd just submit that it's the test - - 
CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The unusual thing

coming out of the ground. I - - - let - - - let's

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coming out of the ground. I - - let - - let's assume there's some characteristics enough that would be designed, some kind of snare or whatever you want to call it; I trip and fall on it. We just say as a matter of law it can't be - - huh-uh, it's a half an inch or three-quarters of an inch instead of an inch or three-quarters of an inch, therefore - - yeah, it's - - it's funny that it's there but not our fault, even though someone may have, you know, put this there - - I assume by accident - - who's your agent?

MR. O'DONNELL: Well, the other cases that also, you know, interpret the trivial defect doctrine in the First Department and the Second Department involving uneven cell - - - cellar grates and raised projections of drainage ditches and things like that, they're all very - - - they're all very analogous in that sense where they - - - where they would not be anticipated and even if the plaintiff were looking for it, would have difficulty locating them.

JUDGE STEIN: Do - - - do - - - do you think that there is a - - - a bright-line rule, as

your adversary suggests, that we can - - - that we 1 can define once and for all what is trivial as a 2 3 matter of law? 4 MR. O'DONNELL: Unfortunately, I do not 5 think there is such a rule, Your Honor. I think you have to look at the facts and circumstances. I think 6 7 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it's case-by-case? 9 MR. O'DONNELL: I think Trincere really 10 lays it down, and it - - - it's - - - it's worked for 11 about twenty years now, and I think it'll continue to serve that function into the future. 12 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, we have three 14 cases on today that might lead one to believe we 15 don't know what it is. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, could you - -16 17 - you mentioned earlier that the defect and the 18 notice go hand-in-hand or the - - - you know, the 19 triviality and the notice go hand-in-hand. Could you 20 explain what you meant by that statement? 21 MR. O'DONNELL: I - - - what I meant by 22 that, Your Honor, is it's really a matter of fairness 23 here, you know, for my client. This is a - - - an 2.4 object that we had no idea existed. We do our due

diligence every day. We clean the sidewalk, we

1 shovel it from snow, and nobody was ever aware that -- - that it existed, and that's because of the nature 2 3 of the object was - - - was so small that it could 4 not be readily observed. And as my - - - the record 5 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So if it's - - - if 6 7 it's too small, then you have no notice; is that what 8 you're saying? 9 MR. O'DONNELL: And it's trivial. 10 - exactly. JUDGE PIGOTT: No, but you - - - I think 11 12 you need both. In - - - in other words, it's 13 trivial. The idea isn't, I know that it's there but I'm - - - I'm deciding it's trivial and so I don't -14 15 - - you know, now that I've said, that I don't have to worry about it. It seems to me it's more that it 16 17 just doesn't deserve your attention, and if it 18 doesn't deserve your attention, when something 19 happens, you say geez, but for that, I wouldn't have 2.0 known. 21 MR. O'DONNELL: Well, I don't think that it 22 doesn't deserve our attention. I think that once 23 it's brought to - - - to our attention, we should

JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.

certainly - - -

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1	MR. O'DONNELL: do something to
2	rectify it.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But it's not your
4	fault is what you're saying?
5	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And that's what you
6	did here?
7	MR. O'DONNELL: No, it's certainly not.
8	No, it's it's not our fault.
9	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Essentially, is
10	is that what you did here?
11	MR. O'DONNELL: It's because it would
12	not be fair for us to be held liable for a defect
13	like this which we could not have known about.
14	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, is that what you
15	did here? Because I think plaintiff's expert went
16	there couple years after the accident and said that
17	this had been filed down to the sidewalk?
18	MR. O'DONNELL: That's correct, Judge.
19	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Yeah.
20	MR. O'DONNELL: It had been removed.
21	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So once you got notice
22	of it, you dealt with it
23	MR. O'DONNELL: That's correct.
24	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: is what you're
25	saying?

MR. O'DONNELL: That's correct.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.

MR. O'DONNELL: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks.

Rebuttal, counsel.

MR. ISAAC: Your Honors, I'm going to try to go fast because I went over a little bit. I - - before you decide the case, I'd just like you to take a look at an Appellate Division case which deals with some of these issues. It's called Cronson; it's cited in my brief, C-R-O-N-S-O-N, against Town of North Hempstead; the cite is 245 A.D.2d 331. It's a Second Department case. Doesn't deal with trivial defect; it deals with primary assumption of risk where there was a person playing on a tennis court, and there was a defect that was readily apparent, and in addition to moving for summary judgment on primary assumption of risk, perfectly li - - - perfect claim under Morgan, Maddox, Fell, the rest of them. The person - - - the - - - the person in charge also said that it was pristine; no - - - no defect at all. And victory was snatched away because the Second Department said well, if one person says it's there and then another person says it's not there, you have a question of fact.

1 My point here is very simple. It is 2 hazardous, it is a trap, it is a snare if it's there 3 and their people don't see it if they're inspecting it every single day. I just checked - - -4 5 JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but are you saying 6 that everything that could possibly cause someone to 7 trip would then be - - -8 MR. ISAAC: I - - - I'm not - - -9 JUDGE STEIN: - - - be able to go a jury? 10 MR. ISAAC: Judge Stein, I am not asking 11 you to overrule Trincere. There will be cases that 12 the court's going to find that defects are trivial. 13 The reason that this one isn't is because it is so 14 unexpected. A trivial defect, I think, when you even 15 go back to Loughran and Jaybro was something - - -16 and as Judge Lippman said, isn't - - - and Judge 17 Pigott - - - isn't really deserving of any treatment. 18 You know, you're not going to have perfect sidewalks 19 in New York. There's going to be some bumps; there's 20 going to be some elevations; there's going to be some 21 gaps. 22 JUDGE STEIN: But what makes this so 23 unexpected? 2.4 MR. ISAAC: Because you can't see that nut;

that nut is solidified in the ground. It is so

inconsistent with the rest of the sidewalk that nobody - - -

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: There's so many other defects that are so solidified in the ground. We're talking the Bronx; everybody says it's Manhattan, but we're talking the Bronx.

MR. ISAAC: Oh - - - oh, absolutely.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But it's als - - everywhere, there are just so many little things in
the ground, a little tree - - - you know, the - - the root from a tree or something like that. I mean,
there's - - -

MR. ISAAC: But you know - - - you know,

Judge Abdus-Salaam, everybody forgets the second line
in the Trincere decision - - I'm not going to

forget it because it would be malpractice for me to
do so - - where you - - you said absolutely

clearly that as a general rule - - because we have
a Constitutional right to a jury trial in New York - - the issue is generally one of fact. So when you
say to me well, we have a lot of defects, yeah, we
do, and it's generally a question of fact.

And as a policy matter - - - I should have said this before; I apologize - - - this is not a big policy issue anymore, because remember, practically

1 every municipality has a prior written notice rule. 2 The City has a prior written notice rule. 3 problem here was the City of New York, twenty billion 4 miles of roadway, what do you want us to do, look at 5 a two-inch slab in a tertiary road in Staten Island 6 that we're never going to see? It's not a problem 7 anymore. 7-210 is good so the City's not liable for 8 sidewalk defects anymore, only in one-, two-, or 9 three-family homes that are owner-occupied, and 10 according to First Department precedent, which I 11 believe is correct, even in that situation, you still 12 have to have prior written notice and Big Apple 13 Pothole Commission's out of business. 14 So this is something that you're going to 15 16

be imposing liability on property owners to look at a hundred yards of their property - - - a hundred yards of their property, and say if there's a defect there, fix it. That to me is not a big deal.

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JUDGE RIVERA: That does - - - is that what matters, how much property you have to watch over?

MR. ISAAC: It doesn't, but there - - there is - - - there is - - - listen, I would wish -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying that a - - that a reasonable framework is something you're

1	going to hold someone
2	MR. ISAAC: Yes.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: responsible for
4	as opposed to a municipality that has hundreds,
5	thousands
6	MR. ISAAC: Correct. And and
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: of miles. So -
8	so with a a private person, that is some
9	kind of rational
LO	MR. ISAAC: It it keeps it without
L1	bounds. And, you know, Judge Rivera, I have to tell
L2	you the truth. Obviously, trivial defect in its
L3	original incarnation dealt with municipalities. That
L4	I think is out in 2015 where it wasn't in 1930, 1945.
L5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
L6	MR. ISAAC: And 1980.
L7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
L8	MR. ISAAC: I'll go, and I'll sit down and
L9	let everybody else talk to you. Thank you.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thank you,
21	counsel.
22	All right. Let's go to Zelichenko.
23	MR. SCHWARZ: My case, as you know, doesn't
24	involving a tripping hazard in the sidewalk. My case
25	involves a missing piece of a step.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. It's the
2	second step from the bottom; is that what it is?
3	MR. SCHWARZ: Yes. Yes, and there are
4	pictures
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Was it a violation of
6	the Administrative Code?
7	MR. SCHWARZ: Yes, and and the
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In what sense? Go
9	ahead.
10	MR. SCHWARZ: And the Multiple Dwelling Law
11	also. It says
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What does the code
13	say?
14	MR. SCHWARZ: It says that tread depths
15	have to be uniform, and when there's a chunk like
16	this missing, the depth from the front to the back is
17	not uniform. And our guy has a
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How big does it
19	matter how big it is that's missing?
20	MR. SCHWARZ: Well, in this case there's a
21	difference of fact, by the way. The defendant's
22	expert said it was a half an inch in depth back from
23	the front to the back, and my expert said it was one
24	inch, and that doubles the size. And this is weight-
25	bearing surface; this is not something over which

someone can really stub their toe or stumble. And
the expectation of someone on stairs - - - marble
stairs in an apartment house, terrazzo stairs in an
apartment house, in a nice area of Brooklyn - - - he
doesn't expect the steps not to support his weight at
the time.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, so one second. Do you want rebuttal time?

MR. SCHWARZ: Oh, yes, please. Can I have three minutes also?

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Three minutes. Keep going. Sorry we distracted.

MR. SCHWARZ: And as - - - as Mr. Isaac said, the trivial defect was born because - - - well, let's look at Esther Trincere. In 1991, Esther Trincere slips and - - - trips over slightly more than a half-inch, and the Second Department cites fifteen cases and says we're going to adopt a mechanistic rule. And then the case in 1997 comes before this court, and this court, says mechanistic rule, no; you've got to consider more than the height, the depth, the - - - the width; you've got to consider other factors. And I submit that the

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is there a notice

1 issue here, counsel? Is there a notice issue in this 2 case at all? 3 MR. SCHWARZ: I think not. The super, who lived at the stairs, at the top of this set of 4 5 stairs, testified he went up and down it a hundred 6 times a day. He was shown a photograph - - - and 7 there are several photographs in the record; there's no issue with the existence of this chunk, right. 8 9 It's there and nobody really - - - you know, while it 10 may not be measured to the millimeter, it's clearly 11 there. And he was shown it and he said, I never saw 12 that; it's not a problem. My expert said that it had 13 to be there, because it had been worn. So I don't 14 think that notice is an issue, or - - - and the lower 15 - - - and the - - - the Appellate Division didn't 16 reach notice; the Appellate - - - the Second 17 Department just said trivial as a matter of law. The lower court said issue of fact as to notice. And - -18 19 20 JUDGE STEIN: Do you have to reach notice 21 if it's trivial as a matter of law? 22 MR. SCHWARZ: If it's trivial as a matter 23 of law, you stop. No question. 2.4 JUDGE STEIN: Okay.

MR. SCHWARZ: However, you - - - I was just

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          asked by Her Honor about - - -
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                    JUDGE STEIN: Sorry, go ahead.
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                    MR. SCHWARZ: - - - notice, and the answer
          is I think notice is an issue of fact. I don't think
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          the defendant proved beyond a doubt that there was no
          notice. So I don't think notice is a factor for this
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 7
          court to consider in this particular case, because
 8
          it's not applicable.
 9
                    JUDGE FAHEY: So you - - - your client - -
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                    MR. SCHWARZ: I think it's a give - - -
                    JUDGE FAHEY: - - - your client wasn't a
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13
          resident of the building, was he? Wasn't he somebody
14
          coming in looking for an apartment?
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                    MR. SCHWARZ: That's right. He went to see
16
          the - - - the name of a - - - you know, there's a
17
          registered agent in every - - -
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                    JUDGE FAHEY: Right, right.
19
                    MR. SCHWARZ: - - - multiple dwelling in
20
          New York.
21
                    JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.
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                    MR. SCHWARZ: He was looking for a
23
          telephone number to call.
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                    JUDGE FAHEY: No, I know; I got that.
25
          Okay.
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MR. SCHWARZ: Yeah, he was a stranger to 1 the premises. And - - -2 3 JUDGE FAHEY: So it wasn't like - - -4 wasn't like your case where - - - where he had gone -5 - - he had walked over the same area maybe a hundred 6 times? 7 MR. SCHWARZ: Correct. 8 JUDGE FAHEY: That's not what happened 9 here. 10 MR. SCHWARZ: That - - - that's absolutely 11 correct. 12 JUDGE FAHEY: All right. 13 MR. SCHWARZ: This man was not familiar with it, and there's a difference between steps and 14 15 sidewalks, forgetting the fact that the steps are not 16 subject to the forces of nature. I mean, it - - - it 17 - - - the Appellate Division in Trincere, the Second 18 Department, said we can't expect the - - - a 19 municipality to have noticed this defect. That 20 doesn't apply here to stairs. There was seventeen-21 and-a-half square feet of stairs. In my motion for 22 leave to come here, I pointed out that the Department 23 of Transportation of the City of New York says on its 2.4 Web site that there are 12,000 linear miles of

sidewalk in the City of New York. If you multiply

12,000 times 5,280 feet in a mile times - - - just 1 pick ten foot, just because it's a round number - - -2 3 there's 500 - - - 633 million square feet of sidewalk 4 to inspect. Here there was seventeen-and-a-half 5 square feet of - - - of tread to inspect in a 6 multiple dwelling where the super lived at the top. 7 JUDGE STEIN: Well, they've got a whole 8 building. I mean to be fair, that's not - - - that's 9 not the only thing they have to focus on there. 10 MR. SCHWARZ: But again, that's still different than the City of New York. 11 12 JUDGE STEIN: Right. 13 MR. SCHWARZ: You know, you - - - we 14 couldn't walk, in our lifetime, every inch of the - -15 - of the steps of this - - - of the - - - of the 16 sidewalk of the City of New York. But I could, in a 17 day, in an hour, walk up and down the halls and up and down the stairs. 18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 19 So their - - - their 20 - - - they have, as their responsibility, to be 21 checking these stairs to make sure they comply with 22 code and that there's nothing dangerous there? 23 MR. SCHWARZ: Yeah, I think so. Yes.

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absolutely do.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Assuming it's a - - -

it's a reasonable, relatively finite - - -1 2 MR. SCHWARZ: I - - - I think it's a 3 reasonable burden. I absolutely do. I thin - - and also, I think I pointed out that there were many 4 5 states, there are seventeen - - - there are fifteen states that send everything to a jury; they're listed 6 7 in - - - in ALR. I know for sure, I read the Alabama case that says there is no trivial defect doctrine in 8 9 Alabama. Also, I pointed out that in Illinois and 10 Ohio, they have, by judicial fiat, said the trivial 11 defect option does not apply to private indoor 12 premises. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So there's no such 14 thing - - - or you don't think there should be such a 15 thing - - -16 MR. SCHWARZ: I think - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - as a trivial defect - - -18 19 MR. SCHWARZ: Again - - -2.0 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - in the context 21 of your case? 22 MR. SCHWARZ: Well, that's radical. I 23 would be happy - - - you asked Mr. Isaac - - -2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: Did you make that below? 25 Did you make that argument below?

1	MR. SCHWARZ: Oh, yeah. I did. I I
2	would be happy if this court would add some factors
3	to make Trincere a little more solid, because the way
4	I look at it and I read 120 cases and analyzed
5	them in my motion for leave to come here and
6	Trincere is uniformly cited, uniformly quoted, but
7	when the Appellate Division Second Department just
8	says well, yeah, these are the factors for us to
9	consider, but it's trivial as a matter of law,
10	they're not applying it right. They should consider
11	what's the reasonable expectation of the person. Is
12	it steps, is it subject to the forces of nature?
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You would you
14	would you would like us to set out a more
15	definitive rule that would or
16	MR. SCHWARZ: I'm sorry?
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You would like us to
18	set out a more definitive rule, or is your position,
19	as you were indicating earlier
20	MR. SCHWARZ: Well, if I if I had
21	-
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: you just have
23	to take it case-by-case?
24	MR. SCHWARZ: a wish, you would adopt
25	the law you would adopt the same reasoning as

1	Illinois and Ohio and say no trivial defect, indoor			
2	defects. People tell me that's not likely.			
3	JUDGE RIVERA: And what what would -			
4				
5	MR. SCHWARZ: I can pray that it is, but -			
6				
7	JUDGE RIVERA: What would be the measure of			
8	reasonableness? You said there's a reasonable			
9	expectation.			
10	MR. SCHWARZ: Well, I think			
11	JUDGE RIVERA: What would be the measure of			
12	reasonableness?			
13	MR. SCHWARZ: as Mr. Is			
14	JUDGE RIVERA: Would that would that			
15	vary based on the space or the weather? What			
16	what what would affect that?			
17	MR. SCHWARZ: All of these factors. I			
18	mean, you know, the the fact that the stairs -			
19	stairs			
20	JUDGE RIVERA: Is it subjective or			
21	objective?			
22	MR. SCHWARZ: Well, it's subjective. I			
23	mean it has to be, I think. So			
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Inside is different			
25	than outside?			

1	MR. SCHWARZ: Sure. And stairs don't
2	you have a greater potential if you get fall
3	down a flight of stairs to suffer a a worse
4	injury than on a level sidewalk? I mean, not that
5	you haven't seen horrible injuries on a
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Trincere does mention
7	elevation, or do you think that's referring to
8	something else?
9	MR. SCHWARZ: I think I think that
10	the fact that stairs can be more dangerous and the
11	fact that stairs are the subject of all these
12	regulations via the Multiple
13	JUDGE RIVERA: The multiple elevations?
14	MR. SCHWARZ: Yeah, Multiple Dwelling Law
15	says tread depths uniform, riser heights uniform.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
17	You'll have your rebuttal.
18	MR. SCHWARZ: Thank you.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's hear from your
20	adversary.
21	MS. GOKHULSINGH: Good afternoon, Lisa
22	Gokhulsingh for 301 Oriental Boulevard.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, isn't this a
24	almost obviously dangerous situation? Using the word
25	"trivial" in certain contexts makes some sense. What

1	about in this context where you have a little piece
2	of the stair? Isn't that, by any common sense
3	standard, dangerous?
4	MS. GOKHULSINGH: I don't believe that this
5	one was dangerous.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not?
7	MS. GOKHULSINGH: In part because of the -
8	the nature of the defect as well as the location.
9	I think it'd be
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Tell us the nature
11	and the and the location, why it's not
12	dangerous.
13	MS. GOKHULSINGH: So when you look at the
14	Trincere case in terms of its width and depth, it was
15	three-and-a-half inches wide; its depth was, from
16	front to back, half-an-inch.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So
18	MS. GOKHULSINGH: As measured.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: if it was five-
20	and-a-half inches wide
21	MS. GOKHULSINGH: Three-and-a-half.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I'm saying if
23	MS. GOKHULSINGH: Oh.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: it was five-
25	and-a-half then it would be dangerous?

1	MS. GOKHULSINGH: Well, I think
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Where do you
3	where do you draw the line?
4	MS. GOKHULSINGH: I think it would also
5	depend on, as this court said in Trincere, the other
6	factors, you know, whether it was an irregular type
7	of defect, whether it was
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Was it an irregular
9	type of defect?
10	MS. GOKHULSINGH: It wasn't; it was
11	actually smooth. And in fact, the plaintiff's expert
12	added in opposition that it was completely smooth.
13	This
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's a smooth defect,
15	meaning what? That there's a chunk missing, but it's
16	smooth?
17	MS. GOKHULSINGH: But it's smooth; it has
18	been worn down so that you don't catch your foot on
19	it. There's no
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You don't catch
21	as a matter of law, you don't catch your foot on it?
22	MS. GOKHULSINGH: Well, one of the
23	one of the factors that I would say in if this
24	court is considering, for example, modifying Trincere
25	one of the things that I would think is an

1 important factor is usage. So in the sidewalk case, 2 in my case, and in the third case, as well, if you 3 have a building that has been operating for many, many years and no one has complained about this 4 5 condition, no one has fallen - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How long did this 7 particular condition, in your view, exist? MS. GOKHULSINGH: It's unclear, because no 8 9 one - - - the super had been there - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So if it's unclear, 11 how can you make the argument that if there've been -12 - - if people have gone up and down for twenty years 13 14 MS. GOKHULSINGH: Correct. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - but this thing 16 just appeared in the last three weeks - - -17 MS. GOKHULSINGH: Of course. Of course. 18 Well, the plaintiff's expert indicated that because 19 it was smooth, the edges were smooth, that it had 20 been there for some appreciable amount of time; that 21 it had smoothed over the years, essentially. So you 22 have a sidewalk case where thousands of people are 23 walking on the sidewalk, no one gets injured expect 2.4 the plaintiff, you know, in this one odd occurrence

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two years in.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But again, where do you draw the - - - is it a month that it became 2 3 smooth; is it three months that it became smooth; is 4 it three days? When - - - when is it your 5 responsibility? MS. GOKHULSINGH: Well, I believe that - -6 7 - that notice and triviality go together, and so to 8 that end, if you have a condition that develops - - -9 you know, in 2007, for example, in the Hutchinson 10 case, you have the sidewalk going in in 2007, and we know that for sure. And you don't have any accidents 11 12 until 2009; that's two entire years. Well, is there 13 notice of a dangerous condition if no one has fallen 14 and thousands of people have traversed? And it's the 15 same thing in my case you have - - -16 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is that - - - is that 17 the test, counsel, that you have to know the 18 condition is dangerous, not that you have to know 19 it's there? 2.0 MS. GOKHULSINGH: Well, I think - - -21 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: For example, here the 22 super says that he saw this every day, but he didn't 23 think it was dangerous so he never - - -2.4 MS. GOKHULSINGH: That's correct.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - reported it to

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the - - - the company. So - - -
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 2
                    MS. GOKHULSINGH: Right.
 3
                    JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - are you saying
          you have - - - the notice has to be that the
 4
 5
          condition is dangerous, not that it - - - it - - - it
 6
          exists?
 7
                    MS. GOKHULSINGH: It - - - absolutely. It
          has to be that there is some condition that would
 8
 9
          cause an accident. I mean, if we're talking about
10
          the reasonable man standard, that's really what it
11
          goes to is - - -
                    JUDGE STEIN: Well, doesn't the expert here
12
13
          say - - -
                    MS. GOKHULSINGH: - - - it reasonable.
14
15
                    JUDGE STEIN: - - - that this is such a
16
          condition?
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                    MS. GOKHULSINGH: My expert says that - - -
                    JUDGE STEIN: No, no, the plaintiff's
18
19
          expert. We're talking about whether there's a
20
          question of fact here.
21
                    MS. GOKHULSINGH: Right. Well, the
22
          plaintiff's expert - - - I mean setting aside the
23
          fact that they didn't go to the site, didn't look at
2.4
          the site, the - - - our expert said that there was
25
          ten inches of tread on which the plaintiff could have
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1 stood. JUDGE STEIN: Well, I know what your expert 2 3 said. I - - - I'm just saying - - -4 MS. GOKHULSINGH: Yeah. 5 JUDGE STEIN: - - - and you may be right. 6 Their expert may be less credible than your expert, 7 but credibility is - - - you know, is - - - is always 8 a - - - a jury question. 9 MS. GOKHULSINGH: Right. Well, but their 10 expert - - - I think the problem is that he also 11 assumes in evidence that the plaintiff stepped on it in no particular manner, in which the plaintiff 12 13 didn't testify to. So it - - - so there - - -14 JUDGE FAHEY: But there's a - - -15 MS. GOKHULSINGH: - - - there are a number 16 of problems. 17 JUDGE FAHEY: It seems that there's a line 18 of cases in the Second Department that defects on the nose tread of stairs are - - - are inherently 19 20 trivial. 21 MS. GOKHULSINGH: That's correct. JUDGE FAHEY: Which is different than some 22 23 of the other departments, which is probably one of 2.4 the reasons why this case ended up here, this

particular case ended up here. And, you know, in

1 looking at the photographs and you're looking at a 2 foot, it's hard to - - - for me to conceive how the 3 average person wouldn't be stepping near the nose 4 tread, you know, where the - - - the stair comes to 5 an end, when they're stepping down. And I - - - of course it could happen, but it seems like the 6 7 quintessential question of fact then. And - - - and 8 the decision here in the Second Department was made 9 as a matter of law. So on what basis, would you say, 10 they were able to make that determination as a matter 11 of law and not on a question of fact? 12 MS. GOKHULSINGH: I think that they were 13 able to use the plaintiff's deposition testimony as 14

MS. GOKHULSINGH: I think that they were able to use the plaintiff's deposition testimony as well as the photographs, so they looked at the size, the location, the width. They also considered plaintiff's testimony in terms of the lighting, that the lighting was adequate, that the building was otherwise properly maintained.

JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.

MS. GOKHULSINGH: They looked at Mr.

Alvarez's testimony that, you know, he probably had
seen it; he walks these stairs every day.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does it matter if it's a code violation?

MS. GOKHULSINGH: Well, it wasn't a code

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violation, because this wasn't an Administrative Code 27-375 staircase, which is an exit staircase, under this court's decision in Cusumano.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does it matter if it could be a violation of law?

MS. GOKHULSINGH: It would matter, as it would, for example, if it was a 7-210 violation and it was, you know, more than a half an inch. Then it would be a different case, obviously, because then you can define it as a defect. But in this case, that's not - - that's not the case because there isn't a provision that says this is defective or not defective; this, you know, criteria must be examined or not examined.

JUDGE RIVERA: What - - - what about your adversary's point that it - - - it's one thing to have the exact same kind of defect on a flat sidewalk but it's another thing for this to be a defect on the staircase and that that is what should have been given further consideration here?

MS. GOKHULSINGH: Well, I think that the part of the staircase where - - - for which there are no defects is the tread, and that is where - - - the Second Department has consistently said that is where we anticipate that someone will be putting their foot

1 when they're walking down the stairs. You don't 2 really anticipate that someone is going to be putting 3 their foot on the nosing or on the very edge of the 4 step, and that's where this minor defect, this 5 gradual defect, was. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: Does it matter what location - - - other than that, does it matter if it's at the 7 8 center of the step, to the left or right, and if 9 there are, you know, handlebars, whatever you want to 10 call it - - -11 MS. GOKHULSINGH: Yeah, I mean there - - -12 there - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - a bannister on the 14 side? 15 MS. GOKHULSINGH: Yeah, there's at least 16 one case that basically says that, that in - - - in 17 essence, if it's right underneath the handrail where no one is probably walking, then in that situation, 18 19 obviously, it's a trivial defect. But if you have 20 this situation, as - - - as I mentioned before, you 21 have traffic walking in this particular location and 22 no one else has had an accident. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: I don't understand that. 2.4 You - - - you - - - you said that your client knew

that there was this defect, and you said he knew and

1	he and and and you said and all
2	kinds of people are using them and there's no
3	accident. And then you said well, nobody expects
4	people to be stepping on the nose part of the thing
5	that you they expect them to be on the tread.
6	All of that seems inconsistent to me.
7	MS. GOKHULSINGH: What Mr. Alvarez said is
8	that he looking at the photographs, he did not
9	consider that to be a defective condition, and he had
10	not
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I assume it is because
12	it's not I mean, it's defective.
13	MS. GOKHULSINGH: Well, he had not received
14	any complaints about it, there were no code
15	violations pertaining to it, and there'd been
16	you know, because there had been no accidents
17	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, counsel, if
18	there's a
19	MS. GOKHULSINGH: in all of these
20	years.
21	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: If if there were
22	
23	MS. GOKHULSINGH: There was no defect.
24	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, if there were
25	at the bottom of the stair one of these missing tiles

or a hole here and Mr. Alvarez didn't think it was 1 2 dangerous, would that make it trivial? 3 MS. GOKHULSINGH: No, I - - - that would be 4 -- - that would be different. I think, again, you 5 would have to go back to the Trincere case and you would have to look at the test; does it meet the 6 7 criteria of Trincere? Mr. Alvarez's testimony is not the be-all-and-end-all of this case. It is - - -8 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, you were - - - you 10 were saying - - - well, okay, never mind. 11 MS. GOKHULSINGH: It - - - it's just - - -12 it's one of the factors that the Second Department 13 was able to consider, what is the defect and, you know, what was the - - - what was the reasonable care 14 15 being taken? What did Mr. Alvarez think of this condition of - - -16 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: He - - - but in his opinion, it was a not defect? 18 19 MS. GOKHULSINGH: In his opinion it was not 20 a defect. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: And in your opinion people 22 were going up and down the stairs all the time and 23 nobody fell. 2.4 MS. GOKHULSINGH: That's correct. 25 JUDGE PIGOTT: And then you said, but

nobody expects anybody to step on the nose of the thing; they expect them to step on the tread part.

MS. GOKHULSINGH: Well, people were, obviously, stepping on the nose because it was worn, but there had been no accidents there.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.

MS. GOKHULSINGH: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel.

Let's have rebuttal.

Counsel.

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MR. SCHWARZ: I don't know if Your Honors can see this, but if this is looking down at the tread, this is the chunk that's missing. This is a jagged edge; it's this face which would, of course, followed the contour of this that was smooth, but this was jagged. Second, there's a case by the name of Orlick and Granit Hotel that stands for the proposition that proof that there were no prior accidents, proof there were no prior complaints, isn't proof as a matter of law that a condition is not dangerous. It may be a factor for a jury to consider, but it doesn't entitle someone to summary judgment.

Second of all, her - - - my adversary's

1 comment that 27-32 - - -JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, that - - -2 3 counsel, that would be true if - - - if this is really a trivial defect or that it was - - - if it 4 5 was a quarter-inch by a quarter-inch, even with this 6 maybe jagged edge. MR. SCHWARZ: But it's not. It - - - it 7 8 didn't support my man's weight. My man has rods, 9 plates, and screws; he has comminuted spiral 10 fractures, open reduction, internal fixation. This 11 is not a trivial injury. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, my understanding 12 13 of how this accident occurred was he didn't step down 14 on that nosing, he - - - his - - -15 MR. SCHWARZ: Well - - -16 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - his leg went - -17 MR. SCHWARZ: - - - the other side's expert 18 19 says it's not trivial because he could step over it. 20 But that doesn't - - - that means if it is - - - it -21 22 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Did he step on it? 23 MR. SCHWARZ: - - - oh, it's not dangerous 2.4 because he could step over it. That means it's 25 dangerous when he doesn't step over it.

1	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Right, does
2	MR. SCHWARZ: The Grosswork (ph.)
3	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Did he step on it, is
4	that what you're saying? Did I'm I'm not
5	clear how the accident occurred. Did he step on it
6	or
7	MR. SCHWARZ: The accident happens when a
8	man puts his foot down on this step where there is no
9	step, and it doesn't support his weight, and he goes
10	down and his foot twists
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that what happened
12	here?
13	MR. SCHWARZ: and then his heel gets
14	caught.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that what you are
16	presenting as happening here?
17	MR. SCHWARZ: Yes, that's what the
18	plaintiff's testimony was.
19	JUDGE FAHEY: So just just to follow
20	up. He stepped on the tread where the defect was
21	located?
22	MR. SCHWARZ: Yes well, it's in the
23	nosing, though. There's no question that the
24	JUDGE FAHEY: I understand that.
25	MR. SCHWARZ: Okay.

1 JUDGE FAHEY: But that's the tread he 2 stepped on. 3 MR. SCHWARZ: Yes. 4 JUDGE FAHEY: The photographs we have, we 5 have a photograph with - - - it shows the defect and then there's a foot above it. It's in the record. 6 7 MR. SCHWARZ: Yeah. 8 JUDGE FAHEY: He actually stepped on that? 9 MR. SCHWARZ: Yeah. 10 JUDGE FAHEY: He didn't try to step over 11 it? MR. SCHWARZ: No, he stepped where there 12 13 was no - - - and in fact, there's a circle around the 14 part that's missing and that - - -15 JUDGE FAHEY: I see. Thank you. 16 MR. SCHWARZ: Now, this Grossworth case to 17 which you alluded, which is a Second Department case, 18 I analyze that in my brief, and - - - and it was my 19 opinion, and I hope the - - - the court shares it is 20 that there was erroneous reasoning there. They 21 accepted an opinion of a super in that case that the 22 man didn't step - - - or - - - or that the nosing is 23 not to be stepped on. My expert says it is, and I 2.4 think it's pretty well-settled law that witnesses can

testify to facts but their opinions are not

1 admissible. 2 Mr. Alvarez is merely a lay witness. 3 can't - - - you wouldn't hear him testify as to his opinion were this case to be tried in front of you. 4 5 All the more true on a motion for summary judgment. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 6 7 Thanks. 8 MR. SCHWARZ: Thank you. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We'll take now 146, 10 Adler. 11 MS. HAMBOUSSI: May it please the court, 12 Your Honors, I'm Georgette Hamboussi. I represent 13 the appellant in this case. I'm also asking for three minutes rebuttal time. 14 15 Your Honor, our case - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead, counsel. 17 MS. HAMBOUSSI: - - - is further down the line. It deals with a step, but here the court 18 19 summarily and mistakenly decided that it - - - it was 20 trivial based on photographs alone. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's with - - -22 JUDGE STEIN: What about her testimony? 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead, counsel. 2.4 MS. HAMBOUSSI: The simply testimony that 25 the - - - that the plaintiff stated was when she was

shown these three horrible pictures, really - - - does it represent the step where you fell; yes. Does it represent the clump that you fell on? She said yes.

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JUDGE STEIN: What about the fact that she had traversed these stairs many, many times; she was very familiar with it; she, you know - - -

MS. HAMBOUSSI: Well, here's where we - - 
JUDGE STEIN: The light, there was no

problem with the lighting. All - - all of these

things don't - - aren't these related to the

Trincere factors?

MS. HAMBOUSSI: Well, here is where we get to the trivial; your - - - your Trincere says that you should look at all the circumstances surrounding the accident, okay? And in one other case

Parkchester - - - Tineo v. Parkchester says, and the defendants claim, that it wasn't a trivial accident or - - or a trivial defect because it wasn't camouflaged or hidden, and here in this case it was completely a trap because it was painted over. She described it as a crumpled piece of paper in the middle of a step and that that was painted over. So here we have a defect that is not only the size of a ruler, a one-foot - - - you know, twelve inches, or

1 thirty centimeters long, but also something that is 2 in the middle of a narrow stairway that she 3 absolutely - - - and most people would absolutely - -4 - step on in the center of the step. 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: A photo can be 6 enough, right, to - - - to - - -MS. HAMBOUSSI: Well - - -7 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - make something 9 a matter of law? 10 MS. HAMBOUSSI: - - - Your Honor, a photo 11 can be and may be used; the court has said that 12 plenty of times. But it must be used together with 13 all the circumstances of the - - - the defect, the -14 - - the depth, the elevation, the width, and the surr 15 - - - surrounding circumstances of how the plaintiff 16 got injured. 17 Here we have a major defect in the middle 18 of the step that was camouflaged, painted over, so is it a trap or a nuisance if the court were to find it 19 20 trivial? It does have the same characteristics of a 21 trap or nuisance as said in Argenio. It's an uneven 22 surface, and like I said, painted over, which makes 23 it even harder to see.

JUDGE FAHEY: And is there anywhere in the

record where the dimensions of the defect are set

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1 out? 2 MS. HAMBOUSSI: There were no - - - nowhere 3 in the records where the dimensions were set out as 4 to height. 5 JUDGE FAHEY: By either party, either by 6 you or - - -7 MS. HAMBOUSSI: By - - -JUDGE FAHEY: - - - by the defense? 8 9 MS. HAMBOUSSI: By either party. 10 JUDGE FAHEY: I see. 11 MS. HAMBOUSSI: And I think the court also 12 erred in the fact that they - - - they just took 13 those pictures alone and didn't look at the rest of 14 her testimony where she said that despite - - - you -15 - - we - - - first of all, they don't even get to the analysis of constructive notice, right, where there 16 17 has to be some proof provided by the defendant that they inspected the area in some time - - - and - - -18 19 and records of the inspection or testimony in some 20 time relative to the accident. Here they produced -21 22 JUDGE STEIN: But if - - - but if it's 23 trivial as a matter of law, do - - - do we have to 2.4 get to the notice question?

MS. HAMBOUSSI: The court has held that if

it's trivial as a matter of law, then they can 1 2 dispose it summarily. But like I said, all the cases 3 that were discussed here - - - and the court is clear 4 when it says that. It says that when you're looking 5 at whether something is trivial or not, and the 6 Trincere case says this too, generally it's something 7 to go to the jury, and it's surrounding the peculiar 8 circumstances of every accident. 9 JUDGE STEIN: I'm - - - I'm just - - - I'm 10 interested in what you - - - you said that the court 11 didn't look at the rest of her testimony. What - - -12 what - - - what was it that you think the court 13 missed here?

MS. HAMBOUSSI: Her testimony where she says that - - - just they don't - - - they don't consider the fact that she mentions that it was camouflaged, that it was painted over.

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JUDGE STEIN: That wasn't reflected in the decision?

MS. HAMBOUSSI: That wasn't reflected in the dec - - in the decision at all. They never said, oh, that this consists - - - they just say it's trivial - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But you can see that when you look at the photograph.

1 MS. HAMBOUSSI: You can see it. In fact, 2 she says the stairway was all painted battleship gray 3 and so was that step, and it was recently painted, 4 according to the testimony of the superintendent that 5 was - - -JUDGE STEIN: But is that one factor alone 6 7 enough to make it nontrivial? MS. HAMBOUSSI: Well, that's the thing; the 8 9 court has never addressed whether or not something -10 - - for instance, a step that was painted over. So 11 here we have a cement clump, and it's painted over. 12 They do say that considering all the factors, you 13 must look at whether or not there is - - - whether or 14 not you can reasonably see the defect or one could

reasonably see the defect and - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: So your - - - your position would be is if there - - - if one factor exists, then it - - - it can't be trivial as a matter of law; it must be a question of fact for the jury?

MS. HAMBOUSSI: Yes, because in the case of Argenio - - - and there's other cases, too, that talk about sharp and jagged edges, enough to catch the heel of, you know, one's - - - one's foot or trap the toe - - I'm sorry, a sandal. And in the case of Tineo v. Parkchester, the plaintiff couldn't even

identify where exactly they fell, but there was one crack in the sidewalk, and they said that because the elevation was pointed or jagged, that was enough.

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In this case here we have not only the defect being not flat but - - - unelevated, we also have the fact that it was painted over, and I believe that should definitely be an issue the court could look at or should look at when deciding whether something is not only - - - if it passes the trivial test but whether it's something that con - - - is considered a trap or a hazard to the plaintiff. And here - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But isn't that just one of the factors? I mean, is - - - isn't the point of Trincere that - - - that there is no one determinative factor that - - - that decides whether it's trivial or not trivial; that we have to look at all the circumstances, and that sometimes when we do that, it can be trivial as a matter of law?

MS. HAMBOUSSI: Sure, but here - - - and - - - and they tell you look at the width; look at the depth; look at the elevation; look at whether or not this is a - - - the irregularity of the defect, and here, not only do you have that it's painted over and that we know that it's - - - bit - - - a bit bigger

than the size of a standard ruler, which is one foot, but also that where it stands on a step, that elevation in the middle of the stairs, which - - - the plaintiff described the hallway to be a small hallway. And the hallway itself would lead you for you to believe that if holding that bannister, you're going to step into where the middle of the step - - - I mean, that's the purpose of the step.

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And if you look at the pictures as well, it's not only that it's in the middle of the step, but the - - - the length of it takes up the whole entire length of the step, so it's not something that the plaintiff could have even stepped over. It's something that almost is set up to be a trap, a nuisance, or a snare.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks, counsel.

MS. HAMBOUSSI: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Reb - - - counsel.

MR. HOROWITZ: May it please the court,

Joseph Horowitz for the defendants in this case.

This was not camouflaged. Despite plaintiff's

accusation, she admitted in her deposition - - - it's

in the record page 107, 108 - - she noticed the

condition previously, she didn't know how long it was

there for. She knew it was there. This isn't something that was camouflaged.

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In addition, look at - - - looking at the picture of the defect, page 191 of the record, this doesn't cover the entirety of the stair; it's in the middle of the stair. There's the picture; the picture speaks for itself.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, but I think what the judge at the nisi prius court said that there was no testimony from the owner; it - - - all it was was an attorney's affidavit and a picture. We nev - - we - - - we never heard from the defendant.

MR. HOROWITZ: Okay. Well, that - - - again, that goes to the notice question, something that we've all been discussing this whole afternoon. The issue here is that you have the photographs, you have the plaintiff's testimony.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, but I think one of the points is - - and reason why there's three of these, is to be - - we're worried that the Appellate Divisions are - - are just blowing these off, if I can use a vernacular. And the idea that a lawyer says here's a picture, I win, can trouble, you know, a - - a judge.

MR. HOROWITZ: I would be troubled by that

1 too, but this isn't what's going on here. I mean, 2 what you have here is you have a picture, you have 3 plaintiff's testimony, you have the entirety of the 4 circumstance. If you have - - - you have the - - -5 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let - - - let me ask 6 you - - - this is the same I asked - - - question I 7 asked the other side. You got a photograph and a 8 lawyer's affidavit, did you have anybody measure it? 9 MR. HOROWITZ: No, and neither did 10 plaintiff. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, it's your burden. 11 12 JUDGE FAHEY: The burden is yours, as Judge 13 Pigott just said right now. MR. HOROWITZ: There is, and - - - and - -14 15 - and I - - -16 JUDGE FAHEY: And so - - - so the answer to 17 that is no, you didn't have anybody measure it, but if it covers most of the stairs, it's certainly more 18 19 than a half an inch. 20 MR. HOROWITZ: Okay. The - - - the - - -21 the length - - - again, it's - - - it's not covered -- - it's - - - it's not - - - it's not measured, but 22 what we have here is a situation where there are 23 2.4 numerous cases in the Appellate Divisions indicating

that even without measurements - - - even without

1	measurements, if the photographs and the deposition
2	testimony taken together reflect that this is a
3	gradual shallow defect without any without any
4	sharp edges
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: You see, "gradual, shallow,
6	without any sharp" sound very subjective, wouldn't
7	you agree?
8	MR. HOROWITZ: It does, but again, this is
9	something where if you look at it and you see it,
10	there's no defective condition here. There's
11	something in the middle of the stairway. This
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What is it? What do
13	you describe it as?
14	MR. HOROWITZ: Well, in
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You agree it's a
16	clump? What is it?
17	MR. HOROWITZ: You know, I I would -
18	I would okay, I would adopt plaintiff's own
19	description of it; if you want to call it a clump,
20	that's fine. It was her conjecture that it was
21	something painted over. Again, no nothing
22	- nothing
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: Was it painted over?
24	MR. HOROWITZ: Was it painted over?
25	Possibly, I guess.

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: Where's the owner? 2 MR. HOROWITZ: Where's - - -3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Where's - - - where's the superintendent; where's somebody saying - - -4 5 MR. HOROWITZ: Super - - - the super's 6 testimony is in the - - - in the record. 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, no, you - - - yours 8 was an attorney's affidavit and a picture, as I 9 understand. That's what the Supreme Court said, a 10 bare allegations by - - - by an attorney with a 11 picture is not enough; didn't they say that? MR. HOROWITZ: Right, and - - - but we do 12 13 have the test - - - the - - - the testimony of the 14 superintendent. And I - - - I agree with you that, 15 again, a bare affirmation clearly would not be 16 enough. But again, that's not what we're dealing 17 with here. We're dealing with a situation where we 18 have the testimony of the plaintiff, the picture 19 reflecting a condition that doesn't have any sharp or 20 jagged - - - jagged edges. And - - -21 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But it's - - - it's It looks - - - from the photo that I'm 22 raised. 23 looking at, counsel, it looks like this thing is 2.4 raised and - - - and your adversary keeps saying it's

over a foot long. I - - - I see a ruler here.

1 MR. HOROWITZ: Right. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I don't know that it's 2 3 a foot long, but it's certainly pretty long. I - - -I mean, it takes up almost the whole ruler. 4 5 MR. HOROWITZ: Right, and if you look at 6 the other picture on page 191, you can see the entire 7 stairway and the - - - and the - - - the 8 fact that there is, if anything, an appreciable 9 height difference; it's a - - - it's a miniscule 10 mass, maybe we'll call it that. It's a miniscule 11 mass that we have on the stair over here. Maybe that's a good way of - - - of - - - of defining it. 12 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 14 Anything else? 15 MR. HOROWITZ: Unle - - - unless there are 16 any further questions. Thank you. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks, 18 counsel. 19 Rebuttal. 20 MS. HAMBOUSSI: Your Honors, I just want to 21 go to the fact that she had said - - - just to 22 clarify, the fact that she had said she had gone up 23 and down those stairs many times. In the case of 2.4 Rivas v. Crotona Estate, there was a - - - the

plaintiff's heel got caught on a hole from missing

tiles, and the plaintiff said that they had traveled almost every day upon - - - over that area where the hole was. And the court said that that fact alone does not defeat the fact of whether or not there was a dangerous condition there. It would go more to something at trial that would say whether or not there was a duty to warn or it goes to whether or not - - - the open and obvious effect.

2.4

Here, the fact that she had used the stairs and said she might have seen it - - - it didn't say that she recalled exactly where it was, on one - - - what step it was, and like I said, it doesn't delineate the fact that they had a duty to keep those stairs safe, a main stairway that goes from one floor to the other. And in my opinion, I don't see it as de minimis; I see it as a defect that was well in size and right in the middle of the stair, right where somebody should be expected to be using that stairway. Okay.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks, counsel.

MS. HAMBOUSSI: Thank you, Your Honors.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank all of you.

Appreciate it.

(Court is adjourned)

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## CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Hutchinson v. Sheridan Hills House Corp., No. 144, and Zelichenko v. 301 Oriental Boulevard, LLC, No 145, and Adler v. QPI-VIII, LLC, No. 146 were prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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