1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 26 OLIVER BERRY A/K/A CHRIS TUCKER,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	February 09, 2016
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
16	Appearances:
17	ERICA HORWITZ, ESQ.
18	APPELLATE ADVOCATES
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20	New York, NY 10038
21	RONA I. KUGLER, ESQ. QUEENS DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
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24	Meir Sabbah
25	Official Court Transcriber

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Next, number 26 on the calendar, People v. Oliver Berry, also known as Chris Tucker.

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Good afternoon, Ms. Horwitz.

MS. HORWITZ: Good afternoon, Your Honors.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Would you like some rebuttal time?

MS. HORWITZ: Three minutes, Your Honor, for rebuttal.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Very well.

MS. HORWITZ: Erica Horwitz from Appellate Advocates for Appellant Oliver Berry. In an effort to impermissibly bolster what was otherwise a one-eyewitness ID case, the People called a man who had been arrested at the scene, knowing full well from his own attorney that he would invoke the Fifth Amendment, that he would disavow a prior statement that implicated the defendant, and he would testify that he didn't see the shooting. The People called him anyways - - - they called him, and from the moment he took the witness stand, they started impeaching him using every tactic imaginable.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, would there be a difference if he didn't invoke the Fifth Amendment; if he just was called to testify and told this other

1	story? What's the difference there?
2	MS. HORWITZ: I'm sorry, I don't
3	JUDGE GARCIA: So
4	MS. HORWITZ: He wouldn't have
5	JUDGE GARCIA: He didn't invoke because
6	here maybe I'm reading the record wrong, but he
7	invokes the Fifth Amendment, right?
8	MS. HORWITZ: Yes, Your Honor.
9	JUDGE GARCIA: Several times, or a number
10	of times, and either the judge overrules the
11	assertion and directs him to answer, or the People
12	offer immunity; is that right?
13	MS. HORWITZ: Yes, your but, Your
14	Honor, the jury is the case law is pretty
15	settled here. You can't call a witness just to
16	invoke the Fifth Amendment. This was a witness who
17	had a legitimate Fifth Amendment privilege, as it's
18	known
19	JUDGE GARCIA: To some extent, right?
20	Because some of the answers are directed by the
21	judge.
22	MS. HORWITZ: Yes, but the judge
23	there was an objection to the judge probing this at
24	all. We have to remember that nobody is in the dark
25	here as to who this witness is and what he's going to

say. This is a re-trial. You have the same prosecutor, you have the same trial judge. You now have a counseled former - - - someone who had previously been arrested and taken into custody and he says, my understanding is that he's going to testify about what the defendant looked like and he's going to say that this is - - - that this picture represents what the defendant looked like at the time.

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JUDGE GARCIA: But the harm here is that the prior statement comes in, right? That's the - - the complaint.

MS. HORWITZ: Well, there's more than that,
Your Honor. I mean, but it starts with the Fifth
Amendment and the court is - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But put aside the Fifth

Amendment for a second. They invoke the Fifth

Amendment, the testimony comes in one way or another.

He either is directed to answer or he gets immunity

for it. Right? So the complaint then is the prior

statements brought in to impeach.

MS. HORWITZ: Well, certainly, that was very powerful and improper impeachment. But the way that it starts with the - - - the People used as inferences - - - and they used it in summation - - -

that the jury should consider the fact that this is a 1 2 witness who is trying to hide something. He's taking 3 the Fifth Amendment, and there is this back and 4 forth, and until he's directed to answer, he doesn't 5 say anything. The implication, not only he's trying 6 to protect himself, but he's trying to protect his 7 friend because, of course, the very first thing that 8 the prosecutor does when this witness takes the stand 9 is go into how close their friendship is. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: But isn't all that true? 11 MS. HORWITZ: What, excuse me? 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: Isn't all that true? 13 MS. HORWITZ: That - - -14 JUDGE PIGOTT: I mean, it's not like the DA 15 was trying to get something out of this witness that, 16 you know, was a lie or that was overblown, or 17 whatever; he was not under any prosecution at all, he's - - - he's invoking the Fifth Amendment as to 18 19 everything except his middle name, and - - - and the 20 Judge is saying, you got to answer that question, and 21 they're giving immunity when it's close - - -22 MS. HORWITZ: Except - - - except this - -23 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and all he did was

25 tell the truth.

MS. HORWITZ: But in this case, Your Honor, the court has held in Burg and other cases, you can't - - - I mean, he's forced to answer questions without immunity for which he does have a Fifth Amendment privilege, some of these are without - - -

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, he didn't; that was kind of the point. I mean, you say you have a Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate yourself, not to not testify. So if they say, you know, are you sitting in a chair, you can't say, I invoke my Fifth Amendment rights not to - - you know, against incrimination. Obviously you're sitting in a chair, so you've got to answer that question.

And it seemed to me as I went through this, the Judge was telling him, answer the questions that are not incriminating. The guy - - - you know, I don't want to call him recalcitrant, but for some reason he decided he wanted to do what he did, and then when he was given immunity, he testified, presumably, to the truth. What's the problem?

MS. HORWITZ: Well, they say it - - - the

People insist that he did not testify to the truth;

they force him to - - - to testify, they call - -
call him knowing full well - - - and this happened in

Russ; this case is really on all fours with Russ - -

1 - and - - - in which one of the witnesses takes the 2 Fifth Amendment - - -3 JUDGE PIGOTT: I get that. 4 MS. HORWITZ: - - - and is given immunity. 5 I'm sorry. 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, I get that part when -7 - - you know, when you know the only reason you're 8 calling somebody is to do that, is to say obviously 9 he's quilty because he's - - - you can't do that. 10 But that was not the purpose here. The purpose - - -11 this - - - he wasn't in any jeopardy whatsoever, they had already arrested him, questioned him, and found 12 13 out that he wasn't the shooter. MS. HORWITZ: Well, they could have charged 14 15 him, there's no statute of limitations on murder, 16 Your Honor; he was obviously - - - at least he had 17 accomplice liability. I mean, he's - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: I didn't - - - I didn't see 18 19 that either, I - - -20 MS. HORWITZ: Well, he's - - - when the 21 witness - - - the surviving witness says he sees them 22 originally, they're standing 100 feet away. Then the 23 police, who hears shots, see two men in the middle of 2.4 the street, at the car, shooting; he's standing right

next to the shooter - - - assuming he isn't the

1 shooter; I mean, he says he's not the shooter, but 2 the police - - - and then they are running together 3 side by side. 4 JUDGE STEIN: Well, he gave a statement, 5 though, and the police let him go, so - - -MS. HORWITZ: Well, first they - - - the 6 7 other - - - the - - - yes, when he gives the 8 statement implicating our client, they release him, 9 and the DA in this case makes a lot of hay of that. 10 Really, what - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: But even defendant's witness says that - - - I'm sorry, no, the witness that was 12 13 in the car says that it wasn't him. MS. HORWITZ: Well, it says he is with the 14 15 shooter and the police arrested him anyway. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: He says he's not the 17 shooter. 18 MS. HORWITZ: He's not the shooter, he's 19 with the shooter. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: But he's with the shooter. 21 MS. HORWITZ: And they arrest him anyway, 22 and they take him in, and handcuffs, and they hold 23 him for a significant amount of time, and they give 2.4 him his Miranda warnings, and they interrogate him,

and then he implicates the defendant, and then they

release him, and none of this should have come in front of the jury.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: You make it - - - you make it sound like - - - isn't that what they're supposed to do? I mean, if somebody is dead, you know, they - - they arrest somebody, they give him his Miranda warnings - - -

MS. HORWITZ: No, that's what they're supposed - - - but, Your Honor, at this trial - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Then they let him go because he says it was the other guy, so they say, okay, you're gone, and they go pursue the other guy. And then they find the other guy and they put him on trial, and they - - -

MS. HORWITZ: Well, there are - - - it's long settled - - - they know, the People - - - and this case is on all fours, as I said, with Russ, in which this court held that as in Fitzpatrick, you can't call a witness knowing that he's not going to support, or she's not going to support, your case simply to get in an otherwise inadmissible damaging statement.

JUDGE GARCIA: But isn't that point not that they're going to take the Fifth, it's that they're going to lie, right? Because there's a

different rule, you can't call someone you know
they're going to take the Fifth, as I understand it,
and then argue they wouldn't answer, they wouldn't
answer, what are they hiding. But your rule is - - because that would mean anytime someone says they're
going to take the Fifth, then you can never call
them, but what happens here is, the People's argument
is they lie. It's not that the fact that they take
the Fifth leads to these things, right. Isn't there
a difference here? It's not the Fifth Amendment here
that's the problem for this witness, it's that he's
immunized or he's directed to answer and then he
lies.

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MS. HORWITZ: Well, he's not - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: So the People would have to make the two-step jump. One, that he's going to be directed to answer - - - we're going to - - - or three steps. Or were going to immunize, and he's going to lie, and then were going to get the statement in, right?

MS. HORWITZ: Well, there were different - different means of trying to impeach the witness.

They used a whole series of things. I mean, the
first was simple bias, and you're not supposed to
show bias by your own witness, and defense counsel

objected on those grounds. Then they move into the Fifth Amendment and the established law in this state says you can't call him. They didn't give him immunity before, and the understanding with his lawyer was that they were going to ask some very limited questions. The People claimed they had - - they acted in good faith. If they had acted in good faith, they would have asked four questions. would have asked in the areas that defense counsel thought - - - Mr. Kirven's counsel thought they were going to ask. They would say, did you know the defendant, Oliver Berry, in July of 2002? Yes. this picture represent the way he looked at that time? Yes. Is this - - - to show your acquaintance, is this his - - - did you have his phone number in your address book? Yes. Is this it? And he would have been off the stand. They said those were the legitimate areas of inquiry and they admit that his -- - his - - - that he had a privilege at least as to four of the seven times he invoked. Then even though he did not - - - the court has made clear that a witness has to affirmatively damage the People's case. Not simply not support it, not help the People's case, not give as good testimony as they - -- as they hope, before they impeach with the prior

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inconsistent statement.

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JUDGE STEIN: Let me ask you about that. There's one bit of his testimony that I - - - I think at least creates a close question on that, and that is his testimony that only one shot was fired.

MS. HORWITZ: Well, they called him, Your Honor, in order to be, basically, an identification witness. This - - - they had already called - - - the only witness they called had been a crime scene officer who testified there were seven shells found at the scene. And this is witness that clearly doesn't remember - - it was really inconsequential whether or not he - - - whether he heard one shot or several. Even after he's pinned down by the prosecutor to say one, the Prosecutor refers to several shots, what did you hear, what did you do when you heard the shots, and he responds - - - the witness himself refers to shots.

It didn't affirmatively damage the

People's case on who fired those shots, and that's

why they called him, and they'd had already

established by - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, but if they established who fired the shots, then doesn't it damage their case as to the - - - the charges of the attempted

1 murder and - - -MS. HORWITZ: Well, they had all the 2 3 ballistics evidence, that wasn't really - - - I mean, they can't sort of try and catch a witness and tie 4 5 him down on an incons - - - on a fact - - -6 JUDGE RIVERA: You say regardless of 7 whether he's said one shot, the evidence was 8 otherwise, so it wouldn't of mattered; is that what 9 you're saying? 10 MS. HORWITZ: It really didn't matter, they 11 tied him down to that - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: He's not quite sure of what 13 his recollection is. 14 MS. HORWITZ: It was really a pretext; it 15 was an inconsequential mistake. JUDGE FAHEY: But didn't he testify on - -16 17 - didn't he testify on the key question of identification? Wasn't he asked whether or not - - -18 19 did you see the defendant fire a gun? And he said, 20 no? 21 MS. HORWITZ: He said - - - they started 22 out by saying they've been told he wasn't going to -23 - - he was going to say he didn't see the shooting, 2.4 and he testifies did you see a white car, which is

what was shot at, no. Did you see the defendant

shoot at a white car? Which is an improper - - - and he says, no.

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JUDGE FAHEY: Well, now, okay. So he didn't see the defendant fire a gun at the car.

Isn't that inconsistent with his prior statement?

MS. HORWITZ: Well, the first question, I mean, what he's really saying is he didn't see anything - - - he didn't see the shooting - - - he doesn't see the - - - the first question is, did you see a white car? No. Did you see the defendant shoot at a white car? No. And on cross - - - and they've been told - - - I mean, I think the DA's formulating at this rate because the DA's been told he's going to say he never saw the shooting. He was told beforehand the defense counsel said he made abundantly clear he would testify that he did not see the shooting, and under the case law here, that's considered neutral testimony.

JUDGE FAHEY: So the correct way to do this, then, would be what? To do what was maybe in Vargas, where you take the testimony ahead of time and then the court makes rulings on it outside the presence of the jury, and then you go forward from there? Because otherwise, it's just what Judge Garcia said, that you get to decide whether or not

you could even - - - you have to come in and testify.

The mere threat to use the Fifth Amendment means you

don't have to testify. That can't be the rule were

going to - - - that can't be our rule.

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MS. HORWITZ: In Russ - - - in Russ, they asked her beforehand; she said she didn't see it, and they called her anyway. Here, a lawyer represented he's going to say he didn't see it, he's going to disayow the statement - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Nonetheless, nonetheless, I think you're going to - - - it's going to be hard for us to create a rule that says, you threaten to use the Fifth Amendment and we don't - - - and we're not going to ask you any questions.

MS. HORWITZ: Well, this goes far beyond the Fifth Amendment, Your Honor, they used every - - - he was ridiculed, it was released, it was used for its truth over and over; the whole implication - - - they had a police officer testify to say basically, yes, I released him, because the police believed it and it was used in summation that way, and there was no way, as defense counsel argued, that the jury could possibly confine it to credibility.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, I see your light is on, but I just have one (indiscernible)

1	MS. HORWITZ: Yes, of course.
2	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: You haven't addressed
3	the expert.
4	MS. HORWITZ: Yes, I planned to.
5	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I really I
6	really would like to hear something about that and
7	maybe Chief Judge will let you do it in rebuttal, but
8	I just wanted to something.
9	MS. HORWITZ: May I address it very
10	briefly, Your Honor?
11	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You can do it now.
12	MS. HORWITZ: Now, rather than in rebuttal?
13	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yeah.
14	MS. HORWITZ: It was clear in May of 2009,
15	when this trial was held, the courts in New York and
16	around the country had held that the negative <u>e</u> affect
17	of stress on the accuracy was an accepted phenomenon,
18	that it had a negative impact. And 2016,
19	Massachusetts had said there's near consensus on
20	this.
21	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So is this an abuse of
22	discretion, is that what you're saying?
23	MS. HORWITZ: Yeah, the court, I mean
24	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And this, is it
25	was it harmless?

MS. HORWITZ: Certainly not, Your Honor, 1 2 because this court has expressed concern about 3 allowing such testimony to correct misconceptions 4 about factors that lay people hold. And here - - -5 JUDGE STEIN: Well, she - - - the expert was allowed to talk about a lot of things about - - -6 7 MS. HORWITZ: Things - - -JUDGE STEIN: - - - about the effect of the 8 9 gun and a whole lot of things that to me sound like 10 stress, even though that word wasn't perhaps used. MS. HORWITZ: Yes, but then - - -11 12 JUDGE STEIN: What else would - - - would 13 she had testified to that really didn't come in to evidence? 14 15 MS. HORWITZ: Well, all the evidence - - -16 I mean, this is a DA who started. This was the big 17 issue at the first trial, that when you're under great stress - - - and in voir dire in this case, the 18 19 DA voir dire tried to elicit the absolute 2.0 misconception that stress engraves the memory on your 21 mind, that strong emotions - - -22 JUDGE STEIN: But what stress other than 23 the stress that was testified to about, about the gun 2.4 and the other circumstances - - -

MS. HORWITZ: Yeah, but the District

1 Attorney gets assurances from the jury before the 2 evidence starts that strong emotion will increase 3 accuracy. That's never corrected, there - - everybody - - - it's in fact opposite, the absolute 4 5 opposite of scientific studies that it impairs - - -6 impairs - - -7 JUDGE STEIN: Was those scientific studies did - - - were they accepted at - - -8 9 MS. HORWITZ: Yes. 10 JUDGE STEIN: You said that there was - - -11 you know, that it was - - - it was pervasively known 12 at that time. 13 MS. HORWITZ: Well, there were five cases that this court has cited that had been decided 14 15 before this trial. Lots and lots of cases since, 16 they all applied to this case. The studies go way 17 back; they're Federal cases from the 70s and 80s. JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so we wouldn't need 18 19 a Frye hearing is what you're saying. 2.0 MS. HORWITZ: No. 21 JUDGE FAHEY: It doesn't need to go back 22 for a Frye hearing, they need to be allowed to 23 testify against the identification. 2.4 MS. HORWITZ: On standing, and the defense

counsel - - - the defense expert, the jury never

1	heard expert testimony about the studies that show -
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3	JUDGE STEIN: Did defense counsel offer
4	this make a proffer of what these studies were
5	or what would what would be shown?
6	MS. HORWITZ: Well, defense counsel put it
7	as its number one subject that he wanted the expert
8	to testify, but and then he
9	JUDGE STEIN: I know, but did he offer the
10	court a basis, I mean, we're talking about all of
11	these cases, and all of these studies
12	MS. HORWITZ: Defense counsel said she
13	- I'm sorry, Your Honor,
14	JUDGE STEIN: Yeah.
15	MS. HORWITZ: She said she can testify
16	about all the statistics and everything about it the
17	same way they did about the weapon focus. I mean,
18	they the People had their expert come in.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: When did the dispute come up
20	when did the People when at what
21	point do the People indicate to defendant
22	MS. HORWITZ: Oh, when the judge
23	JUDGE RIVERA: oh, all of a sudden I
24	have a problem with the stress evidence.
25	MS. HORWITZ: Not until the judge not

1 until the judge said, I won't allow it. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: Before that, the 3 understanding - - -4 MS. HORWITZ: The day before the judge - -5 - the DA said, well, the expert can't testify about something about a lineup, and they didn't like the -6 7 - - but everything else is fine, it's allowed under 8 LeGrand. And they clearly prepared their expert to 9 testify to that; he kept on trying to sneak stress 10 into it. So it was the day before - - - says all of 11 this is allowed under LeGrand, the other stuff, but I 12 don't like - - - and objected to one thing in 13 particular, and then the next day when the judge 14 says, well, there's a Westchester case, the DA says, 15 oh, yes; no good, no good. 16 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. 17 MS. HORWITZ: I'm sorry. Thank you for the 18 extra moments. 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome. 20 MS. KUGLER: Good afternoon, Your Honors. 21 May it please the court, I'm Assistant District 22 Attorney Rona Kugler. I represent the office of 23 Richard A. Brown, Queens County District Attorney. 2.4 The People here properly called Kevin

Kirven as a witness despite his attorney's warning

that Kirven intended to invoke the Fifth Amendment. As the court stated in Namet v. United States, the prosecution, the People are need not accept at face value every assertion of an attempt to claim privilege.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Was there a reason you didn't grant him immunity?

MS. KUGLER: There were a few reasons why the People did not give entire transactional immunity, but rather question by question. First of all, it was to avoid overly brought immunity.

JUDGE PIGOTT: What's wrong with overly brought immunity? I mean, you're not going to prosecute him. It would seem to me it would have been an easy thing to do and then you can ask him all the questions you want.

MS. KUGLER: Well, you know, Your Honor, before this witness came to - - - before we started the trial, the prosecutor had met extensively with Mr. Kirven. And his story, even at that point, was all across the board; it was in one direction, it was another, they really didn't know what was going to come in their mouth - - - out of his mouth when he got to testify. And based on that, it was prudent for the prosecutor to actually decide after each

1 question, determine - - -2 JUDGE RIVERA: Apparently the one you 3 thought that was accurate and truthful was the 4 original statement. Because that's the one you kept 5 asking about, right? 6 MS. KUGLER: Yes, Your Honor, we had every reason to believe. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, so then if you don't 8 9 think he's involved, why not give him the 10 transactional immunity? And if the witness says 11 that's not the shooter, why aren't you giving him 12 transactional immunity? 13 MS. KUGLER: Well, although that would have 14 been a possibility, we're not required to do that, 15 it's not an appropriate - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: I don't - - - the question 17 is, what did you think you might still prosecute him 18 on? 19 MS. KUGLER: Well - - -2.0 JUDGE RIVERA: Is there - - - let me put it 21 another way; is there something you still could have 22 prosecuted him on, apart from perjury? 23 MS. KUGLER: Apart from perjury? 2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: Sure. 25 MS. KUGLER: As far as I see on the record,

it doesn't look like there was anything else. Well, I mean, actually yes, Your Honor; there actually absolutely is. Because there could have been some sort of accomplice liability that we were unaware of, and Mr. Kirven could have brought something out. We have no information about that, I'm not saying that we did, but he was present - - -

and it just - - - you know, the point is made that you can't - - - you can put a witness on that you know is going to invoke the Fifth Amendment. I mean, it's a constitutional right, you have a right to do it and it just seemed to me, you know, why this piecemeal approach that every time he says something, you know, that to a jury would sound like you don't like, you'll say, okay, we'll give you immunity for that, and then he invokes again, and he invokes again, and it just seemed very troubling. For a jury to be put in that position seemed difficult to me; I just didn't know why you did it.

MS. KUGLER: Well, Your Honor, the one thing that you said, though, you said that we knew; we really didn't know. It was his attorney's statement that he intended to. We really didn't know

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1 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, what I - - - what I was 2 saying is you were just making - - - while we weren't 3 really sure, you know - - - well, of course you were 4 sure. You knew you weren't going to indict him, you 5 knew you weren't going to - - - you knew you were 6 going to use him as a witness, and then in using him 7 as a witness, you knew you were going to confront 8 this and I would have thought that somebody would 9 have said, by the way, if he invokes the Fifth 10 Amendment, we got an issue here, you know. And 11 somebody decided that incremental Fifth Amendment 12 invocations are okay. 13 14

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MS. KUGLER: Well, that's just - - - our office decided to confer, but the law states that we're entitled to grant immunity as a question-by-question basis.

JUDGE STEIN: Didn't - - - didn't you also say that you were afraid that he was going to, you know, take the blame for his friend and then nobody would get convicted?

MS. KUGLER: Absolutely, Your Honor, that's exactly what the ADA said at court; he could say I did everything - - regardless of the fact that we have other evidence that would negate that, he - - - there's nothing to stop him if we give him full

transactional immunity from getting up there and 1 stating, I did it, I shot him. 2 3 JUDGE RIVERA: The reasonableness of it is pretty slim considering the rest of the evidence, 4 5 right? That's the whole point. MS. KUGLER: Right. And Your Honor, as 6 well, you know - - -7 8 JUDGE RIVERA: But wait, let me go back to 9 this question - - - this issue of - - - that you said 10 no, we weren't sure, we just had his attorney's statement. Well, why isn't the attorney's 11 12 representation good enough? 13 MS. KUGLER: Well, Your Honor - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: If he is representing to 15 you, my client informs me of the following, why - - -16 why is that not good enough? We often say that we 17 rely on the representations of counsel and we hold 18 the clients, too, at those representations of 19 counsel. 2.0 MS. KUGLER: Because human nature, people 21 change their mind, they change their stories, they do 22 it all the time on the stand, as he did here going 23 back and forth. JUDGE FAHEY: Well, isn't it - - - I guess 2.4

it was the Russ case, right, that we were talking

about before, hope springs eternal, isn't that the theory that the Judge out there—? It seems that - - - in my mind, it seems like the procedure that was followed here didn't make much sense, because normally you would take these questions outside the presence of the jury, and then determine where immunity would be granted, and then the questions where immunity was granted, then you can do those in front of the jury and those questions could be asked. Why wasn't that procedure followed here?

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MS. KUGLER: Well, Your Honor, first of all, the defense never asked for it at that trial.

JUDGE FAHEY: The People would have asked for it, I would have thought, to protect his rights too. You would have had an obligation also, it isn't just their obligation; it's your obligation too. And that's - - that's one of the things I find disturbing about it and I don't want you to get down before you talk about the Frye issue too, so let's not forget it, all right? Okay.

MS. KUGLER: Okay. I also want to point out that there were many good faith reasons or bases for the prosecutor to call Mr. Kirven. So beyond the fact of his intent, there were many reasons that he was legit - - - a legitimate witness and should have

1 been called in this case and it was necessary to call 2 him. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, but for very limited 4 areas, I mean, that's the whole point, right, of the 5 adversary - - - your adversary's point. Even she 6 concedes that there were these areas that you could 7 have explored and then you should have sat down; 8 that's her argument. 9 MS. KUGLER: Right. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: Why - - - why didn't you 11 have to sit down? MS. KUGLER: Well, because he - - - he adds 12 13 so many other - - - we - - - first of all, as I said, 14 we had so many reasons to believe that once he got up 15 there and he took an oath, that he would tell the 16 truth, and he does have not - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, that's very hard - - -18 it's a very hard analysis for me to accept on your 19 part because he has an attorney making the statement 2.0 that that is not what is going to happen. 21 MS. KUGLER: But he does, Your Honor - - -22 back to your question a moment ago about what could -23 - - what could we legitimately bring from him. There 2.4 were other areas too, not just the address book, not 25 just his conversations with the detective Kirven

(sic). You know - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Fuzzy, the name Fuzzy and so forth.

MS. KUGLER: Right, and he corroborates defendant's appearance on that date, he - - - he also adds legitimacy to the identification that we have from the surviving victim. The surviving victim, two years later, picks out of a lineup the defendant, who has altered his appearance, you know, and this happens to be the same person who is friends with the person that the police Kirven- - - that the police apprehend fleeing from the scene.

So this is other very legitimate areas as well that we were entitled to go into, and it was reasonable to question him as well.

Let's see, right now, since Your Honor mentioned the Frye hearing, I guess we'll move to that at this point. And I want to explain - - - start off by saying that the court properly exercised its discretion here in precluding the expert to testify - - any expert testimony based on this very discrete issue of stress in this case.

JUDGE FAHEY: Kind of a strange set of circumstances. So where the court at first seems to say that yes, the expert can testify as to all the

1 issues, and then after, I think, the People rested, and - - - before - - - then the Court made a second 2 3 ruling afterwards and say, well, I've researched the 4 issue and I've changed my mind on this issue and I've 5 gone the other way on it, and limited it. And there 6 was - - - I think a Frye hearing was requested, I 7 don't know if one is really required now; it might 8 have been then because we're talking '09, I guess, 9 the first trial. 10 So - - - I've never seen that sequence of 11 circumstances where the Court would deny an expert to 12 testify at that point; it seems unusual. 13 MS. KUGLER: Well, in the issue - - - not 14 as that the Court denied the expert to testify, but 15 on this one discrete - - -16 JUDGE FAHEY: Right, on - - - on 17 misidentification based on stress, right. 18 MS. KUGLER: Right. Well, I mean, there's 19 a few factors here and this case perhaps is a little 20 different than your standard. First of all, the 21 defendant failed in his burden to establish that this 22 was generally accepted in the scientific community. 23 He never made a formal - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: You think it's generally

accepted that if somebody is under stress, that it

makes an indelible mark in their mind, that they 1 would never forget a face like that? You think 2 3 that's common knowledge? MS. KUGLER: Well, Your Honor, there's two 4 5 prongs to this. Number one is, what was the proof 6 that he put before the judge that this was generally 7 accepted? JUDGE PIGOTT: You think it's common 8 9 knowledge that people that are under stress and see 10 something like this would never forget a face? 11 MS. KUGLER: Well, then I have to move to 12 the second point; this isn't a stress case, Your 13 Honor. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well no, well, the - - -14 15 well, the point - - - the point I'm trying to make is 16 as the defendant is saying is that the DA in his - -17 - in jury selection and everything else made a big deal out of the fact that - - - that you're going to 18 19 remember a face when you're under stress. And now they want to produce somebody that says that's not 2.0 21 true. 22 MS. KUGLER: Well, there's also the fact 23 that they didn't use that word "stress" in every 2.4 different point; as one of the other justices pointed

out, there are a lot of other areas that all - - -

that were allowed in that kind of fly around, or hover around the same areas of stress, like flash - - - flashbulb, gun focus - - -

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Was the People's expert allowed to testify that there is a correlation between stress and identification of witnesses?

MS. KUGLER: Your Honor, I don't believe stress was an area that was permitted to go into in this trial by either side. And that's because, first of all, there - - - so going back, the court here was entitled to go on the cases and the studies that were in front of it; there were no studies. And we're - - we have to look at what the law was at that time that was in front of that judge when we're making this determination as to whether the court was correct in limiting the area that the witness was able to be questioned on.

And the - - - the evidence that was in front of them, you know, was with no cases, no statistics, no studies; just a midtrial application for payment for witness that didn't have any case law with it. So the Court was able to rely upon what it understood as generally accepted at that time, and this was not, in New York, generally accepted. And the Court was entitled to rely upon that.

And in any event, the facts of this case established that this wasn't - - -

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DUDGE RIVERA: Well, they said that the day before, the prosecutor took a different position and put the defense in a very difficult, vulnerable situation, and then the Court doesn't allow them to proceed with a Frye hearing, to at least put forward to the court what you say they failed to do because they were under their understanding that there was no problem with this expert's testimony in this particular area.

MS. KUGLER: Well, there's two things with that. First of all, the record - - - the prosecutor doesn't go out and say, oh yes, I think we should do this; the pro - - - the defense is talking about what areas they're going to go into and the prosecutor mentions as one of the areas that they're discussing, they fill in one of the blanks and they used the word stress. That's all that's said; it's not a full discussion on the prosecutor saying, yes, we can discuss stress here.

JUDGE RIVERA: Did you raise an objection to any of the areas that the expert was going to cover at that point?

MS. KUGLER: Some of the areas they were

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MS. KUGLER: And - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.

MS. KUGLER: - - - without any case law, what the record shows is the next day, the court and the prosecutor - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: No, no - - - I'm asking about - - - no, I'm asking about the representations from the prosecution. What was your position? Did you not object to some of the areas and say, we don't want the expert to go into that area?

MS. KUGLER: The prosecutor did not specifically say, I don't want that, on that day. The prosecutor - - - the first day that they're discussing it. But the prosecutor did discuss - - they were discussing certain areas. It doesn't look like it was completely finalized at that point, so for the defense to say they were blindsided the next day, it doesn't seem genuine when it was - - - these were subjects - - - areas they were discussing.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Maybe I misunderstood, I thought defense was making the argument that at jury selection and in - - - and in the earlier parts of the trial, there was a big emphasis made on the fact

1 that stress did almost the opposite. That if you're 2 in - - - you know, if you're in one of these 3 situations, an ID becomes indelible, and you're more 4 likely to remember than not. 5 MS. KUGLER: The prosecutor, during the 6 voir dire, did mention several areas about how the 7 identification would be affected. I don't believe 8 that the prosecutor's voir dire emphasized stress as 9 being an area that affected this identification. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Yeah, as was said - -11 12 - it wasn't - - - the term stress wasn't used; 13 memorable events were used. 14 MS. KUGLER: Being emblazoned upon 15 someone's memory. 16 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Yes, yes. 17 MS. KUGLER: You know, and there's a 18 distinction, especially when you're dealing with so 19 many different areas that are so closely surrounding 2.0 how an identification will be reliable, so that's 21 correct, Your Honor. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but counsel may 23 have approached it that way, but I believe the 2.4 adversary - - - your adversary's argument is, no, no,

there's actually scientific data on this and we

wanted the opportunity for the expert to testify to
this, and we weren't given that opportunity.

MS. KUGLER: Well, they - - - they could

have been - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: You may have wanted to describe it whatever way you want, but her point is, but you're wrong, and I have an expert based on the science who is going to testify to why that's wrong.

Why - - why can't they do that?

MS. KUGLER: Well, because it wasn't timely. They didn't make a motion in limine, they didn't put this in front of the court; all they did, like I said, was that in that application for fees, in the middle of the trial, they then say - - - when suddenly they think they're not going to be allowed to go into this area - - - that they never made it an accurate - - - an adequate offer of proof beforehand. Now they want to throw things out to the court, but they've never told the court at this point specifically what it was - - - they don't give that to the court and the court, at that point, is entitled to rely upon what is, before it.

JUDGE RIVERA: LeGrand didn't already suggest that this would have been an appropriate area?

1 MS. KUGLER: I'm sorry. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: For expert testimony? 3 weren't prior cases already that said that? 4 MS. KUGLER: There - - - there was nothing 5 JUDGE RIVERA: That this - - - this - - -6 7 MS. KUGLER: - - - at New York, at that time there was no case law that said this is 8 9 generally accepted, and the court was allowed to rely 10 upon that at that point and not have to hold a 11 hearing. 12 My time is up; thank you, Your Honor. 13 MS. HORWITZ: In fact, there were five 14 cases there in our - - - then, and they're cited in 15 our brief: Beck - - - Brooks, Beckworth (sic), I 16 think Douglas (ph.) is the name of one of them; they 17 date back to the - - -JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Smith and Drake. 18 MS. HORWITZ: Drake - - - there - - - there 19 2.0 were five cases that had been decided before then, 21 there were no cases that said that stress wasn't 22 accepted - - - in all of those cases it was accepted, 23 and the only case the court relied on, Banks, they 2.4 said it wasn't proven in that case because the study

on which the expert relied had not been introduced

into evidence, but it's never been cited for the proposition that stress wasn't accepted. This defense counsel was certainly sandbagged here, and the People said on - - -

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I'm surprised it's an issue. I mean, it just seems to me so often people testify that, you know, when the accident happened, I would - - I got so excited I didn't even look to see who was driving the other car.

But one of her points is that you delayed.

You didn't - - - you didn't make any application for this type of testimony until the middle of the trial.

MS. HORWITZ: Well, they asked for appointment of and - - - and the - - - the expert is going to testify on these subjects, and the very first one is stress, and the DA says on A594, I've read the LeGrand decision and I object to that last part which is about - - is about people in lineups and how they react; I object to that last part, I don't believe that's something the courts have allowed. But the other three things he mentioned, one of which was stress, the Grand decision, I've read, you know, the Grand decision - - - meaning LeGrand - - and those things were permitted.

And it's really only the next day, and - -

- and there's nothing untimely about this, and - - - and the defense has their - - - their expert, and the prosecution has their expert, and the defense counsel says, we could have had a Frye hearing; he's not given the opportunity. He says, Judge, I'd like to show that. No, it's not accepted, we're going to deal with the things that are - - - that are relevant, and this was - - -

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Would there have been any prejudice to the People in holding a Frye hearing in the middle of trial? Has that never been done before?

MS. HORWITZ: No, it has. I've cited the cases which said it's been done, this court, it of - of course has held that - - that it's entirely unnecessary, and you could just have the expert - - the testimony of the expert about what those studies are, and that's what happened with the other areas here, and they had another expert which was disputing it and saying, I've got these studies, and she was saying, I've got those studies about weapon focus and other subjects.

But really - - - and given the facts of this case, stress was the number one - - - number one issue, and he was not given the opportunity - - - the

1 defense counsel - - - to have his expert establish 2 that it was accepted, it had been accepted in New 3 York; there was nothing late about this. 4 I would just say - - - I want to say one 5 thing about the first point. I want to remind the court that, first of all - - - that this was - - -6 7 the DA was absolutely intent on getting the prior 8 statement in whatever way she could before the jury, 9 and you get to summation, and not only is there 10 comment using it for its truth, but it is projected 11 up on a screen, it is read line by line, it is - - -12 the emphasis that was given to it and the way in 13 which it was described and the seeing it during the 14 PowerPoint presentation unquestionably had the effect 15 which was intended, that it was evident in chief - -- evidence-in-chief and this was a two-person ID 16 17 case. 18 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. 19 MS. HORWITZ: Thank you. 20 (Court is adjourned) 21

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CERTIFICATION

I, Meir Sabbah, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Oliver Berry a/k/a Chris Tucker, No. 26 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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