1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent, (Papers Sealed)
6	-against- No. 29
7	SEAN JOHN,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street
LO	Albany, New York 12207 February 10, 2016
L1	
L2	Before: CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
L3	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
L4	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
L5	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
L6	Appearances:
L7	DINA ZLOCZOWER, ESQ.
L8	APPELLATE ADVOCATES Attorneys for Appellant
L9	111 John Street, 9th Floor New York, NY 10038
20	SHOLOM J. TWERSKY, ADA
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23	
24	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcriber
. , !	ULLICIAL COURT TRANSCRINAR

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Next on the calendar is number 29, People v. Sean John.

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Counsel, would you like rebuttal time?

MS. ZLOCZOWER: Four minutes, please.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Four? You'll have your four.

MS. ZLOCZOWER: May it please the court,
Dina Zloczower from Appellate Advocates for Appellant
Mr. Sean John. After he was arrested, handcuffed,
and placed in a police car, an officer entered the
basement of appellant's residence and searched a
closed container labeled Smith & Wesson without a
warrant or consent. Appellant had standing to
challenge that search. The People have not come
forward with a single reason why residents of a
multifamily brownstone don't enjoy the same kind of
privacy expectations that people who live in a
single-family home do.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, other people have access who live there to their - - - to their basement. That's - - - that's one difference between people who own single-family homes. Why doesn't that make a difference? How does - - - how does he show an expectation of privacy to begin with in the basement where, you know, there - - - there's no,

1	like, separate units, there's no locks, there's no -	
2	I mean, it's just looks to me like a dirt	
3	floor, an open space with some partitions and, you	
4	know, there it was.	
5	MS. ZLOCZOWER: As to the first part of	
6	your question, just because we share premises doesn't	
7	mean that the protections of the Fourth Amendment	
8	disappear. That would mean that all of us who live	
9	in apartment buildings would be exposed to searches	
10	by the police.	
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: Would we all have standing?	
12	MS. ZLOCZOWER: In depend we	
13	do, Your Honor. Just because we live in in	
14	community, just because we're social beings, doesn't	
15	mean that the police gets to search	
16	JUDGE STEIN: Well, no, no, in your	
17	apartment, of course. Nobody else has access to you	
18	own apartment, your own space. That's something	
19	completely different. But if if there was a -	
20	you know, a hundred-unit building with this oper	
21	basement, that wouldn't make any difference?	
22	MS. ZLOCZOWER: This isn't an a	
23	hundred-unit building. This is a very small	
24	brownstone	

JUDGE STEIN: Well, where do we draw the

line?

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MS. ZLOCZOWER: - - - with a basement that was used for storage, the - - - the court below found, that was - - - had a lock on it, that had a - - - that was only accessible through the interior of the building, as opposed to a large building where, you know, there's a separate entrance for the basement.

JUDGE STEIN: So you're saying you only lose the expectation of privacy if it's open to the world, to the public?

MS. ZLOCZOWER: Under the definition of Powell by this court, privacy is when the - - - the antithesis of privacy is when the public has access. In a large apartment building with a lobby and - - - and front doors that aren't locked, the public has access. In this small building where the basement was only accessible through the - - - through the interior and only through the locked - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But putting - -
putting aside the privacy issue, counsel, is there
- - was there consent given by the neighbor, who also

lived in the building, for the police to get into the

basement?

MS. ZLOCZOWER: The People concede that she

1	did not verbally consent, so that's number one. She
2	didn't specify what
3	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What if she pointed
4	them
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Expressly consent, not
6	not
7	MS. ZLOCZOWER: She did not expressly
8	consent.
9	JUDGE RIVERA: something that she
10	said and and her
11	MS. ZLOCZOWER: Nothing she
12	JUDGE RIVERA: her actions might have
13	suggested consent.
14	MS. ZLOCZOWER: The People
15	JUDGE RIVERA: You mean expressly said, go
16	into the basement, I let you go, I'm giving you
17	consent.
18	MS. ZLOCZOWER: That's correct.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: That's what you mean.
20	MS. ZLOCZOWER: That's correct. She did
21	not expressly consent, and the People are now arguing
22	that she implicitly consented. However, the officer
23	did not inquire at all of her as to whether or not
24	she
25	JUDGE RIVERA: Did he need to?

MS. ZLOCZOWER: Yes - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Did he need to based on what she had already done and said? If he had already determined that she's giving me consent, does he then have to turn around and say, you are giving me consent, correct?

MS. ZLOCZOWER: This court in Adams and Gonzalez and in other cases has held unequivocally that absent exigent circumstances or an emergency, a police officer must acquire - - inquire, even when the person asserts an - - an authority over the premises. In Adams - - -

isn't there a second part here, though? Let's - - - let's assume for a second that there - - - that the entry into the basement was allowable. The - - - the question in my mind is - - is was the search of the - - - of the gun case allowable, and as I understand it, this was an unlocked case marked "Smith & Wesson". And I think the People rely on a - - - a case called Sanders - - - which I might be wrong on what the People are relying on, I don't want to mischaracterize their argument - - - but it - - - nonetheless, it seems to me that the law has moved beyond Sanders and that - - - that the - - - a good

argument can be made here that the plain view

exception simple doesn't apply because this case -
the object in the case wasn't readily identifiable

by the case itself. I think that's where you should

be going.

MS. ZLOCZOWER: That's exactly right, Your

Honor. Even assuming he - - - the officer did

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MS. ZLOCZOWER: That's exactly right, Your Honor. Even assuming he - - - the officer did receive consent and he was lawfully inside the basement, the gun inside the gun box was not in plain view. It simply wasn't. This was a closed container. There's no evidence, in fact, that it could be locked.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, so - - -

MS. ZLOCZOWER: And the - - - it - - - the - - - the gun was simply not visible to the officer when he entered the basement. And the People are relying on the fact that the - - - that there was a label on this box, on this - - - on this blue box that was not transparent, that said "Smith & Wesson", and they equate "Smith & Wesson" with rendering this gun visible.

JUDGE RIVERA: What if it had said "Sean John's gun"?

MS. ZLOCZOWER: You know, even if it had said "Sean John's gun" the officer would not be able

to see the gun. It's as simple as that. Plain view doctrine requires that the contents be visible, and the contents in this case simply wasn't. The label didn't render it visible. The Supreme Court in Walter held that labels simply don't do that. And so even if she - - - even if she did consent, even if consent could be implied, the officer could not know what was inside the container until he looked inside.

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JUDGE FAHEY: The second - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Your argument is about the seizure - - excuse me, about the search, not the seizure. Do you concede that he could have seized the box and then got a warrant?

MS. ZLOCZOWER: At most, Your Honor, he could seize the box. At most, he had probable cause to seize the box. There was absolutely no reason why he couldn't wait for a warrant to open it. Time wasn't of the essence here. As I said earlier, the defendant had already been arrested. He was, in fact, handcuffed and in the police car. There was plenty of time to wait for a warrant.

JUDGE FAHEY: The second part of your argument is a very interesting argument about the - - the DNA evidence and - - and who has to come in

and testify and that and the expert testimony. Just

- - - just to go for that for a second, because what

strikes me is - - - is that first off, it - - - it

seems like the Williams case in the Supreme Court is

very difficult for us to apply, and I'm not sure it

says what you say it says.

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But the other part of that is - - - is - -- and more importantly, as a policy matter, most of the exonerations that take place in New York State of what - - - within the last few years, there have been a record number - - - are based, at least in part, on DNA evidence. And if as a policy we are going to say that DNA evidence would not be admissible unless we could produce every analyst who had handled the DNA raw data to put it together before an expert could come and testify, it seems to me that we would be severely hamstrung in any case more than a few years old because people move on, they're in various place. It's - - - it would be difficult for the defendants, the person who had been wrongfully accused, to be able to compile the people necessary to put that DNA evidence in. And wouldn't the policy implications of what you're arguing work against your side of the - -- of the v. or the defendant's side of - - - of the argument?

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MS. ZLOCZOWER: No, Your Honor. The

Supreme Court has refused to prize convenience over

the Constitution. And also - - also to various - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, no, I don't - - - I don't think we're talking about convenience over the Constitution. We're not talking about that, because here we're talking about the compilation of data and then the analysis of data. Experts analyze it, technicians compile it. And Judge Sotomayor talked about that distinction, a relatively experienced jurist at that point who had done a lot of criminal work, and it - - - it seemed to be a rational distinction. And so the problem I had with - - - of course, Williams is a parallelity in - - - in and of itself, and - - - and our - - - and our decision that came out at the same time, in Carcione (ph.), pointed to the same kinds of problems, but more importantly, the fundamental problem of the wrongfully convicted would be undermined by the policy that you're advocating.

MS. ZLOCZOWER: DNA evidence has the ability to both inculpate and exculpate. That doesn't mean that it's not subject to cross - - - that the analysts who conduct the - - - the testing

aren't - - - shouldn't be subject to cross-examination.

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JUDGE FAHEY: So you wouldn't see this as an extension at all of what would be required to be admissible?

MS. ZLOCZOWER: No, Your Honor. This is - no, no, Your Honor.

JUDGE FAHEY: I see.

MS. ZLOCZOWER: Quite the contrary. In fact, any witness who makes observable facts is subject to - - - to cross-examination. This court has held that - - -

this isn't exactly a fair question but - - - so if you - - - if you're not comfortable with it, don't worry about it, don't answer it, but it seems to me that - - - that data that's compiled in DNA evidence is quite often compiled in a manner that was referred to as a double blind. In other words, the technicians working on it don't know what exactly they're working on. In - - - in that situation, it seems to preserve the integrity of the compilation of the data. Normally that's done with DNA evidence and then it's put together by an analyst at the end. But would you say that - -

MS. ZLOCZOWER: The - - - the - - -1 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - that those people 2 3 should still be examined, they should still verify 4 the work they did? 5 MS. ZLOCZOWER: Absolutely, Your Honor. The record evidence in this - - -6 7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What is - - - what is the testimonial value of that information, I 8 9 collected the DNA? What is that? It doesn't say, 10 and this DNA matched your client. It only says I 11 collected the DNA. MS. ZLOCZOWER: I'll answer that question 12 13 in just a moment. I'll just answer Judge Fahey's question which is that this - - - the record evidence 14 15 here establishes that the analysts did know the identity of - - - of my client, so they did not 16 17 operate under a veil of ignorance. They - - - they full - - - were fully aware of the - - - of the 18 19 charges against my client and of his role as a 20 suspect. 21 In terms of the testimonial nature of the -22 - - of the evidence, the record evidence here 23 includes comparisons of DNA - - - of the DNA profile. 2.4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But that's the 25 analysts. I'm talking about the other - - - my

1 understanding is you want everybody involved in this 2 to be available for cross-examination, correct? 3 MS. ZLOCZOWER: Yes, Your Honor. 4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So what is the 5 testimonial value of having someone say, I - - - I 6 collected the DNA, when that person is not saying, 7 and the DNA that I collected matched your client? 8 MS. ZLOCZOWER: What the - - - what - - -9 what the confrontation clause requires is not that 10 the evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 11 tested through cross-examination. We want to know 12 what this analyst actually did. The record - - -13 JUDGE STEIN: Well, as a practical purpose here, the - - - the evidence shows that - - - that 14 15 these - - - these analysts collected - - - you know, 16 they - - - they did little pieces and they did a lot 17 at once and - - - and that - - - as a practical 18 matter, it seems to me that you wouldn't get anything 19 out of cross-examining these people because they 20 would have no recollection whatsoever of having done 21 this particular test. 22 MS. ZLOCZOWER: Your Honor, all sorts of 23 factual witnesses can come to the stand and say, I 2.4 can't remember. That's not - - - doesn't stop us

from being - - - that we must cross-examine them.

These analysts here, their work involved human 1 judgment. We need to test whether the work was done 2 3 properly, and the only way to do that in our system is through cross-examination. 4 5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So each of the forensic scientists testing, is that testimonial in 6 7 your view, each one of those in - - - along the chain? 8 9 MS. ZLOCZOWER: Let me just clarify that 10 we're not asking that the People come up with ten of 11 the analysts. It's the - - - it's the - - - the 12 People who decide to test this evidence with ten 13 people. We're not - - - we're not asking to bring up everyone. It's their decision. Their burden is 14 15 really created by them because they decide that ten 16 people must do these tests. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying they have an alternative? 18 19 MS. ZLOCZOWER: They do have an 20 alternative. 21 JUDGE RIVERA: That they could have - - -22 they could retest. 23 MS. ZLOCZOWER: Precisely, Your Honor. 2.4 Justice Sotomayor in the concurrence in Bullcoming

discussed that, Justice Ginsberg discussed it.

fact, defense counsel here suggested that Ms. Hyac (ph.) retest the sample and come back and testify as to her own personal knowledge as - - - as to what she did so that there could be a proper assessment of whether the work was done correctly.

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JUDGE RIVERA: That won't get you to - - - I'm sorry. I know you have a red light, with the Chief Judge's permission, just this one question.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Of course.

JUDGE RIVERA: It - - - it strikes me that what your - - I - - - I get that point, but that doesn't get you to what I thought was your other issue, which is the possibility of incompetence and - - - or - - - and not intentional, or of just human error through the raw data collection process because you've already got the DNA. All you're asking is for someone to now actually compare it and review it as opposed to just take someone else's numbers and compare it. But you can't have that anymore because the DNA's already been collected. So you're - - - you're willing to concede that that part, you can't cross on?

MS. ZLOCZOWER: Actually, the person who collected the DNA from the gun sample testified.

That was a police officer and the person - - -

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, in this case but	
2	MS. ZLOCZOWER: Yes.	
3	JUDGE RIVERA: talking about the rule	
4	that you're asking us to adopt.	
5	MS. ZLOCZOWER: The rule I'm asking you to	
6	adopt is that when DNA is tested for the purpose of	
7	evidence at trial, the people who did the actual	
8	testing are the ones that have to come to court.	
9	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Every scientist in	
10	the chain that participates in the process?	
11	MS. ZLOCZOWER: Every scientist in the	
12	chain, but it is the People's doing that it requires	
13	ten analysts to come and and test. That's not	
14	something that, you know, I'm asking them I'm	
15	not asking them to have ten people test the evidence.	
16	But what the rule does require is that the people who	
17	are involved or the single analyst who is involved	
18	must come and testify. The People have not shown, by	
19	the way, why it requires ten people	
20	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.	
21	Counsel.	
22	MR. TWERSKY: Good afternoon. My name is	
23	Sholom Twersky, and I represent the respondent.	
24	Regarding	
25	JUDGE RIVERA: So so why why	

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so why - - - why

1 follow a process where you need so many people along the way? Is that - - - is that the - - - I know that 2 3 [Hy'-ack], I think that's the way her name is 4 pronounced - - -5 MR. TWERSKY: Yes. JUDGE RIVERA: - - - does testify that this 6 7 is normal course, this is regular protocol. But is there another way to do this that avoids this 8 9 problem? 10 MR. TWERSKY: Your - - - Your Honor, I'm 11 not a scientist. I can only rely on what she testified to. 12 13 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, I understand. MR. TWERSKY: But she said that there were 14 15 only 150 analysts who work at OCME and they have 16 8,000 cases a year. There is no way that they'd be 17 able to - - - to deal with that volume unless they 18 parsed out to - - - separately, to all these 19 different analysts, where they're doing - - - they're 20 batching the samples because that's the only way they 21 can do it. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, why doesn't the alternative work? In the few cases - - -23 2.4 MR. TWERSKY: Yes.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - where you're going to

need the DNA but the DNA is going to be in dispute or there's a reason that you've got to have one person, as she's arguing, to go through it all, why not then in those cases do the retesting? Why isn't that a viable option? I understand the finance issue. I understand the convenience. But those are not going to get you over the constitutional rights.

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MR. TWERSKY: Well, yeah, but there's one other issue that's - - - that's even more important and that's the reliability of the testing, the validity of the testing. They - - - one of the things Ms. Hyac talked about was with the exemplar, that was with the defendant's DNA, that they need to do - - they do duplicate testing, and if you look at the - - if you look at the appendix, you'll see all these lists, DUP, DUP, DUP. They literally are having different analysts testing the exact same exemp - - not the same one, but another cut of the defendant's DNA to see if they come out the same. That's one of the internal controls that they do in order to make sure that the results are valid.

JUDGE RIVERA: I see your point, because her point is I want to get to all of them and - - - and figure out if there's human errors or what they did along the way and I do that through cross. But

1 your point is well, they do this so many times; if 2 they're all coming up with the same result, that gets 3 you a standard of reliability that the court should 4 recognize. 5 MR. TWERSKY: Exactly, but, you know, just to keep in mind that testimonial is not the nec - - -6 necessarily the same thing as reliable. The - - -7 8 the courts have rejected that as being - - - as being 9 synonymous. Testimonial has a very specific 10 definition, and this court has held in Brown and 11 Meekins that these DNA analy - - - analysis reports are not testimonial. OCME - - -12 13 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, is it your 14 position that the DNA report relating to the DNA on 15 the gun is not testimonial? 16 MR. TWERSKY: The only report that's 17 testimonial is the report of Ms. Hyac saying, this 18 DNA profile from the gun and this - - - and 19 defendant's DNA, I compared it and it's a match. 20 the other individual testing that leads her to that 21 conclusion is not testimonial. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: Then you insulate all of 23 that, don't you, and if there's error along the way, 2.4 she never - - - she never gets to cross it.

MR. TWERSKY: Your - - - Your Honor, this -

there might be procedural problems with DNA analysis doesn't mean it's testimonial. What makes it testimonial is number one, was it a law enforcement official who was doing it? In Rawlins it was, in Meekins it wasn't. It - - it wasn't here because OCME's not a law enforcement agency. Was the statement being made to a law enforcement official like a statement made as a result of police interrogation? No, it was from one analyst to another analyst and then finally - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Is her only recourse to get to the - - - I think the point she's trying to make to somehow get access to this DNA and have an independent DNA test and put on her own expert to say you're wrong?

MR. TWERSKY: Your Honor, the - - - the assumption that Ms. Hyac or these - - - I mean, Ms. Hyac was - - she literally signed the bottom of every single page in both of those reports. She was reviewing every single thing they were doing. She wasn't observing it, but she reviewed the results.

And - - and the fact is, these analysts, because of their volume, because of the batching, they're doing twenty to sixty at a time. They're going to come in

a year later at trial and they're going to be able to tell you and remember exactly what they did in any particular case, or are they going to rely on their reports and say - -
CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, did Mr. John

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, did Mr. John get the opportunity to cross-examine the person who said that his DNA was found on that gun?

MR. TWERSKY: He - - - Mr. John got a - - - got an opportunity to cross-examine the person who took the sample from the gun, he got an opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Hyac, who took the samples once they were received by OCME and cut them up and put them into test tubes, and then he got an opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Hyac who said that she saw - - - that based on the reports of this DNA sample from the defendant and the DNA sample from the crime scene, they are a match.

JUDGE GARCIA: And just to make sure I have the answer to the Chief Judge's question, so there was an opportunity to cross the custodial witnesses?

I took the gun, I took the swab, and I put it into the - - -

MR. TWERSKY: There was an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. That's correct.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And Ms. Hyac, you said

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1 that she signed off on each page, and does that mean 2 that she actually performed the analysis or - - -3 MR. TWERSKY: No, no. 4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So what - - - what 5 does it mean that she signed off on the - - -MR. TWERSKY: She testified that the way it 6 7 works is they all get the same training. She had 8 done every single one of those type of procedures 9 herself so when she looked over their data and their 10 reports - - - and by the way, if you look at - - - if 11 you look at the reports themselves, you see witness 12 with an initial, you see interpreting analyst with -13 - - with an initial. These are all these internal controls to make sure that all these results are 14 15 reliable, that she was signing off to see, did she 16 agree with the results that these analysts were 17 coming up with. 18 But she was the only one to compare them 19 and determine that there was a match, and that's why 20 it's her testimony that's testimonial because she was 21 the only one that was actually directly linking the defendant to the crime. 22 23 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - -

MR. TWERSKY: And that's what testimonality

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is.

1	JUDGE RIVERA: So let me ask you about this		
2	Exhibit 7 approved by a Eugene Lene (ph.), I think is		
3	what it says.		
4	MR. TWERSKY: What what page is that,		
5	Your Honor, in appendix?		
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Appendix 704. "Forensic		
7	biology case file table."		
8	MR. TWERSKY: This is the comparison chart		
9	that Ms. Hyac prepared where she is preparing		
10	where she is comparing the the results of the		
11	defendant's DNA, the exemplar, to the DNA sample		
12	taken from the gun swabs.		
13	JUDGE RIVERA: So at the top, when it says		
14	"approved by" and then it has a name which is not her		
15	name		
16	MR. TWERSKY: So that		
17	JUDGE RIVERA: what role did he play		
18	in this?		
19	MR. TWERSKY: So and I'll I'll		
20	just		
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.		
22	MR. TWERSKY: Before I answer that, you see		
23	on the bottom right? That's that's her hand -		
24			
25	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. No, I see that.		

1	MR. TWERSKY: and when you see that -
2	right.
3	JUDGE RIVERA: That's I understand.
4	MR. TWERSKY: He approved her, or it's he
5	was on a higher level than her, so even she had to
6	get her result approved and reviewed. That's how
7	many layers of of review they do at the OCME to
8	to try to ensure the reliability of these
9	results.
10	JUDGE RIVERA: So then this is her
11	handiwork?
12	MR. TWERSKY: That's correct.
13	JUDGE RIVERA: She chose these numbers, she
14	put in these numbers
15	MR. TWERSKY: That's correct.
16	JUDGE RIVERA: and then sent it to
17	the person who's named at the top and he reviewed and
18	and has this "approved by".
19	MR. TWERSKY: That's correct. That's
20	correct.
21	JUDGE GARCIA: Coun counsel, what
22	about the laboratory report? Did that go into
23	evidence, this laboratory report dated October 1st,
24	2010? I think it's 647 of your appendix.
I	

MR. TWERSKY: Just one second, Your Honor.

Yes, that came in - - - that came into evidence, and to the extent, like in Meekins, that it's unclear who the source of this was - - - now the fact is, it is the same date as Ms. Hyac's comparison where she drew the conclusion and let everyone know that there was a match, so there is an excellent chance that this simply was just sort of parroting what she had determined. But to the extent that it's unclear from this lab report, just like they said in Meekins, this would be harmless error, this one page. This could not - - - this is simply cumulative. It could not have made a difference to the jury.

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JUDGE GARCIA: It's certainly testimonial, though, right?

MR. TWERSKY: I'm sorry?

JUDGE GARCIA: It's a testimonial report, right? It says I found a match.

MR. TWERSKY: We - - - that's correct.

Like I said, there's - - - there's an - - - the

presumption is that the only person it came from was

Ms. Hyac because she was the one to make the

determina - - - determination of the match, but in

Meekins you had the exact same thing where you had an

e-mail just confirming the match, unclear what the

source was. So I'd be glad to say that it's simply

harmless error and that it could not have made a

difference, particularly in light of the argument we

made in our brief as to the overwhelming evidence in

this case, but even more importantly, in terms of her

testimony was the - - - was the testimonial testimony

and that's why her testimony had to be subject to

cross-examination.

Your Honor, before my time is up just to get to the - - - briefly to the Fourth Amendment issue, clearly it's the defendant's burden to establish standing. He couldn't establish standing in a common basement. It was shared with - - - by at least one other tenant. We don't know who lived on the third floor. There could have been - - - she could have gone into the basement, she could have had visitors going into the basement. The - - - the door

JUDGE STEIN: So your view is that whenever an area is open to more than one person who's maybe not a member of your household or whatever, then it's - - there's no expectation of privacy.

MR. TWERSKY: That would - - - that would be our position, Your Honor. And - - - and we have even more - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Shared entrance. Why - - -

1	why can't it be slightly diminished on the fact that
2	you recognize someone else, the other tenant in this
3	brownstone, also gets to walk into that basement?
4	MR. TWERSKY: At at best, Your Honor,
5	a diminished expectation of privacy.
6	JUDGE FAHEY: So if it
7	MR. TWERSKY: But still
8	JUDGE FAHEY: So if it's a shared basement,
9	could they go in and go through every single box in
10	the basement?
11	MR. TWERSKY: Your Honor, it it
12	depends on what the basement looks like. Are there
13	any delineations between the the different
14	tenants.
15	JUDGE FAHEY: So in other words, it would
16	be the uniqueness of this box, not the basement that
17	we're talking about?
18	MR. TWERSKY: That's right. That's right.
19	And just to
20	JUDGE FAHEY: So the plain view exception -
21	
22	MR. TWERSKY: Yeah.
23	JUDGE FAHEY: you would argue,
24	applies here?
25	MR. TWERSKY: Well, first of all, with the

1 2 JUDGE RIVERA: So wait a minute; let's go 3 back to that. 4 MR. TWERSKY: Okay. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: So you're say - - - if she's 6 the one who gives consent, does that mean she's only 7 consenting to whatever's in the basement - - -8 MR. TWERSKY: Right, we're - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that belongs to her? 10 MR. TWERSKY: - - - we're not saying that 11 her consent allowed the police to open - - - to open 12 his box. That's - - - we're saying that her consent 13 - - - which was absolutely implicit and there's 14 really no - - - it's very persuasive in terms of the 15 - - - the contact between she and the officers that 16 this was knowing and voluntary consent when she 17 called the officers over, she told them I saw him 18 bringing something downstairs, something was in his 19 hand; and then she tells them exactly how to access 20 that location. So clearly, that gave them the 21 consent. But in terms of the plain view, Your Honor 22 23 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah. 2.4 MR. TWERSKY: - - - first of all, I - - - I

want to make sure - - -

1 JUDGE FAHEY: Concerned about the box. 2 This - - - this is not a box - - - except for the 3 name on there and - - - and I don't think the case 4 law really supports your position exactly that "Smith 5 & Wesson" allows you to open up the box. 6 MR. TWERSKY: But before I argue the 7 merits, Your Honor - - -8 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 9 MR. TWERSKY: - - - this claim is not 10 preserved for this court's review. They did not 11 arque - - -JUDGE FAHEY: Well, you know, I thought 12 13 about that. The problem with that argument was - - -14 is that the Appellate Division seemed to have gotten 15 it so they seem to implicitly - - - implicitly 16 decided stand - - - that - - - that he did have 17 standing to raise the issue as to the box. 18 Therefore, there's no Concepcion problem. Therefore, 19 we're stuck with it; we've got to address it. 20 MR. TWERSKY: Well, Your Honor, but in 21 terms of the - - - it's a little bit unclear exactly 22 what they were ruling on, whether it was standing - -23 2.4 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 25

MR. TWERSKY: - - - or - - or simply the

plain view doctrine, but the fact is that the defendant, under 470.05(2), he had - - - the court has to either be notified of - - - of their claim that the defendant, if he had the authority to go into the basement, he didn't have the authority to open the box. The - - - never - - - the - - - the defendant never notified the court of that issue and that court never expressly decided whether the defendant had the right to open the box or not.

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Because that's - - - the defendant was only talking about getting into the basement, the - - - the police had no right to get into the basement, so this issue - - - that's why none of this about whether it's immediately apparent or not was even discussed down below at the - - - at the hearing court level because the hearing court didn't have an opportunity to address it and that's why this - - - it's beyond the review powers of this court.

But even so, Your Honor, this wasn't simply a label. I understand the picture of the case did not go into evidence at the hearing, but based on the officer's testimony, he said, that's the same box that my gun came in. So what do we glean from that? This was a box that's - - - that was created by the Smith & Wesson - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So if it didn't have - - -1 2 MR. TWERSKY: - - - manufacturer. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: So if it didn't have the label, nothing on it that says Smith & Wesson, and 4 5 the officer goes and - - - and looks at it and says, 6 that looks just like my gun box so it must have a 7 gun, is that okay? MR. TWERSKY: That would be a harder 8 9 question. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, what makes it harder? 11 MR. TWERSKY: Because the question is 12 what's immediately apparent and who's the eyes that 13 we're talking about, is it only the experienced officer? In this case, we don't have to limit it to 14 15 that because Smith & Wesson - - - in Brooklyn, that's a very - - - that's a very well-known gun 16 17 manufacturer. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but you might use the 19 box for other purposes, right? 2.0 MR. TWERSKY: That's true, Your Honor, but 21 it doesn't have to be - - - my opponent keeps talking 22 about it wasn't transparent. It doesn't have to be 23 transparent. It has to be immediately apparent. And 2.4 the fact is, if you have a - - a Smith & Wesson box

that comes from Smith & Wesson - - -

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
2	MR. TWERSKY: and is blue
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
4	MR. TWERSKY: and is sitting there in
5	an open area of a basement, the defendant has no
6	standing.
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Do they make anything other
8	than guns?
9	MR. TWERSKY: I'm sorry?
10	JUDGE RIVERA: Do they put anything else in
11	these Smith & Wesson boxes that are not guns, not
12	weapons? Do they put anything else together?
13	MR. TWERSKY: I mean, I'm not aware of
14	that. If you again, it didn't come out at the
15	hearing
16	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
17	MR. TWERSKY: but if you see the
18	picture from the trial, you'll see that in the bottom
19	of it it's literally the shape, the the gun has
20	to sort of fit into the bottom of the box.
21	JUDGE FAHEY: And they put the ammo
22	MR. TWERSKY: This was a gun box.
23	JUDGE FAHEY: They put the ammo in them,
24	too, usually.
25	MR. TWERSKY: That's right. And and

ammo, as was in - - - as was in this case. 1 2 JUDGE FAHEY: Right. 3 MR. TWERSKY: But, Your Honor, in terms of Arkansas v. Sanders, I mean, that footnote 13 talks 4 5 about a gun case. JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, the problem with it the 6 7 case is dated. I - - - I don't think that footnote 8 13 is applicable anymore. But I understand your 9 argument. Thank you. 10 MR. TWERSKY: Right. The fact is there had 11 been subs - - - there had been other federal courts 12 and other courts that have adopted it. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: Can I - - - can I ask you, 14 if it says "Smith & Wesson", let's assume it's got 15 exactly what he has and he adds another label to it that says "Sean John's poker cards." Can you open 16 17 it? MR. TWERSKY: Same box, it just - - -18 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Same box, Smith & Wesson 20 label is still on it. Mr. John adds another label to 21 it. Let's say he's got a collection of these boxes and he wants to make sure he knows that this box has 22 23 his poker cards. Can the police officer open it? 2.4 MR. TWERSKY: Harder question, Your Honor. 25

I would say yes. I would say yes because if the

1 nature of the box itself - - - you don't need it to 2 be transparent. According to the cases, it looks 3 like you need probable cause to believe that there's contraband inside the box based on its exterior. 4 5 maybe - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 7 MR. TWERSKY: Thank you very much. 8 JUDGE STEIN: Counselor, before you get 9 right into - - -10 MS. ZLOCZOWER: Okay. 11 JUDGE STEIN: - - - the substance of your 12 argument, there - - - there's just one thing I want 13 to clarify with you. As I read your papers, it 14 doesn't - - - it looks like you're only asking for a 15 retrial on the weapon possession charge, not the menacing charge; is that correct? 16 17 MS. ZLOCZOWER: That's correct, Your Honor. JUDGE STEIN: And - - - and does that mean 18 19 your client affirmatively wouldn't want a new trial 20 on the menacing charge? 21 MR. TWERSKY: No, Your Honor. But the 22 menacing charge involves a display of a weapon and 23 the issues we're raising here don't go to that issue. 2.4 JUDGE STEIN: Okay.

MS. ZLOCZOWER: But we are asking a remand

for resentencing as to that issue.

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Couple things; the first thing is, contrary to Mr. Twersky's assertion, Ms. Hyac, in fact, did not generate Exhibit 26 - - - Exhibit 7. If you look at the record on A-36, she is asked, "Do you recognize Exhibit 7?" And she says "Yes." "What is that?" And she says, "This is actually a page out of the file. And it is basically a table of the results for the DNA testing." This Exhibit 7 was generated by the analysts who did not come and testify. It is exactly why we need them to come appear.

JUDGE RIVERA: Is that that analy - - - is that the person named at the top where it says "approved by" or we don't know?

MS. ZLOCZOWER: We don't know, Your Honor. We don't know.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Did she ever say that she didn't generate it? She said it's from the file, but did she say I didn't generate it?

MS. ZLOCZOWER: She said that it was - - - she says that she didn't generate the documents in the file. She's not specifically asked as to Exhibit 7, but if you look at the - - - if you actually look at the exhibit, you can compare it to - - - if you give me one second - - - if you look at the record,

1 page 704, which is Exhibit 7, and then compare it 2 with page 668, they're identical and Ms. Hyac said 3 she did not generate page 668. And is asked whether 4 she - - - you know, where Exhibit 7 is from and she 5 says it's from the file. She just simply didn't 6 generate this record. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry, what page did you give on the record where she says - - -8 9 MS. ZLOCZOWER: Well, on the record it's A-10 326. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: A-326, thank you. MS. ZLOCZOWER: Yes, Your Honor. As to the 12 13 - - - as to the notion that, you know, OCME has to -14 - - has to analyze 8,000 samples, other jurisdictions 15 have adopted the Supreme Court law on this issue - -16 - West Virginia, Delaware, the Eleventh Circuit, all 17 these jurisdictions present the - - - the analysts 18 who actually did the testing and their system hasn't 19 broken down. I don't see why that would happen in 20 New York. 21 Is there alternative there JUDGE RIVERA: 22 also to do a retest if the analysts and/or the 23 several analysts are not available? MS. ZLOCZOWER: I don't know whether these 2.4

jurisdictions actually make that possible, but the -

- - the analyst who testified here said that the OCME, as a matter of course, preserves the sample, so there's no reason that those can't be retested in New York.

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The internal controls my colleague was talking about in fact indicate that - - - that this is subject to error. That's why there are internal controls and that's why we need to cross-examine the analysts. As to - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, what makes that raw data collection testimonial, though?

 $$\operatorname{MS.\ ZLOCZOWER}\colon$$ Well, the - - - when you say raw data collection you mean the actual taking of the sample - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: These analysts that you're - I'm sorry. Let me make it easier. These
analysts that you say should have been called or
should have been available to trial defense counsel
to cross-examine.

MS. ZLOCZOWER: These DNA reports reflect observable facts that Ms. Hyac didn't observe but that these analysts observed. They then communicated their observations in the reports. These observations accuse my client of a crime - - - crime. They make them testimonial. And the fact that he was

1 a suspect before the testing even happened makes it 2 testimonial. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: But it doesn't matter 4 whether they realize that that's how it may be used? 5 MS. ZLOCZOWER: Someone made a comparison, 6 other than Ms. Hyac, based on Exhibit 7, comparing these two samples and - - - and - - -7 JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but you're 8 9 suggesting that we should have a different result 10 They're testimonial if - - - if there was a here. 11 suspect identified but not if they weren't? 12 MS. ZLOCZOWER: I'm saying that any - - -13 when the purpose, the primary and sole purpose, is to use the evidence at trial, the evidence is 14 15 testimonial. That's Crawford 101. 16 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 17 MS. ZLOCZOWER: May I just respond to one or two issues from the Fourth Amendment? 18 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: I'm going to give you 2.0 one more minute. 21 MS. ZLOCZOWER: Okay. I think preservation 22 is key here. This issue was - - - was preserved. 23 The court below ruled that the officer equated the 2.4 Smith & Wesson box with a gun and so it was

appropriate for him to seize it. Those are the words

of the court, so the court is - - - the - - - the court below equated the - - - the box with the gun and felt that those were one and the same thing. They simply aren't. The gun was in a closed container. As to the issue of the Smith & Wesson label, if my Nike shoebox at home stores my correspondence, I can't go to my friend's house and say I have a Nike shoebox, so your Nike shoebox in your home also contains correspondence. That simply goes to the officer's probable cause to seize the item on the basis of him actually having the same box doesn't mean that he can open it. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. (Court is adjourned) 2.4

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CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Sean John, No. 29 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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