1	COURT OF APPEALS	
2	STATE OF NEW YORK	
3		
4	SEAN R.,	
5	Appellant,	
6	-against-	No. 3
7	BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,	NO. 3
8	Respondent.	
9		20 Eagle Street
10		Albany, New York 12207 January 04, 2016
11		Uanuary 04, 2010
12	Before: ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F.	DICOTT ID
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA A	Y RIVERA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE	E. STEIN
15	TIDEOCTITIE CODEL HOCHNE	
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Official Court Transcriber

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1 JUDGE PIGOTT: Case number 3, Shawn R. versus BMW of North America. 2 3 MR. PHILLIPS: And, Your Honors, with your permission I'd like to reserve six minutes and use 4 5 nine minutes for my initial comments. 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: Six minutes, yes, sir. 7 MR. PHILLIPS: May it please the court, I'm 8 here on behalf of the Reeps family. This case has 9 been extensively briefed and there are many reasons 10 why we believe reversal is called for. But given the 11 limited time for oral arguments, I'd like to focus on 12 two issues, if I might. Of course, if Your Honors 13 have questions on other issues, I know you won't be shy or hesitate to let me know about it. But - - -14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Fewer, but no slower - - -16 MR. PHILLIPS: Fair. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - in questions. 18 MR. PHILLIPS: Fair enough. Thank you, 19 Judge Rivera. 20 Your Honors, the first question, which I 21 think is the central one, relates to the question of exposure and whether or not there is in the record a 22 23 sufficient basis to conclude, under the Frye

standard, that both as a methodological and as a

factual matter, there was a showing of sufficient

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exposure to comport with this court's ruling in the Parker case. And I'd like to share with Your Honors, when we filed this case, I was keenly aware, practicing in this area, of the Parker holding; and took pains, we thought, to comport with what Parker required.

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JUDGE STEIN: Can we talk about that for a minute, because it seems to me that there is a - - - that there's some melding of the issues of foundation and methodology. In other words, Frye - - - I don't know if you'd say Frye versus Parker, but do you agree with me that those are two completely separate inquiries?

MR. PHILLIPS: Your - - Your Honor, the case law generally says that they are separate inquiry, and I can certainly cite to you New York cases that say very directly that a Frye inquiry goes to methodology and that the conclusion of the expert is really a matter Constitutionally protected and subject to cross-examination and jury determination, because we understand that experts disagree.

JUDGE STEIN: So what - - - so what happened here? There was a - - - there was a summary judgment motion based on Parker, which was denied, right, and then there was the Frye motion. Did - - -

was the foundational question revisited on the Frye motion?

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MR. PHILLIPS: Well, Your Honor, one of the ways in which we felt that the trial court - - - that the IAS court sort of went off the rails is that he revisited an issue that had not only been resolved at the trial level, but was also resolved at the Appellate Division level. I don't - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: I thought the - - - I
thought the defendants went out of their way to say
this is not a Frye issue when they were bringing
their summary judgment motion; said we're not
addressing that, we're addressing simply the - - -

MR. PHILLIPS: Well, Your Honor, saying it and it being true are two different things. Because if you look at the IAS record from the first round of appeals, there are two things that are clear. The first is that the trial court wisely - - - and I think this was a good proceeding - - - on the defendant's request, deferred the summary judgment motion until after the 3101 disclosure. And when they made the motion, it may not have been as artfully made as all of that, but you will find that there was a specific attack or challenge - - - and if you look at the first round of - - - of appeal and -

- - and motion practice, Parker figured in that. The Parker issue was raised, it was addressed, and it was rejected, and correctly so.

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JUDGE FAHEY: You know what I'm wondering, though, is I - - I don't say this casually, but in this circumstance, what difference does it make? In Parker, general causation, I think, was conceded, specific causation wasn't; that's the way I read that. In this case, general causation would be that - - would - - would be that gasoline vapors can cause the damages claimed here, general causation, and that there's proof for that and that it's generally accepted in the scientific community. And general acceptance in the scientific community would be the same as general causation.

So then the next step is reached no matter what is, even if you haven't shown that, we'll give you the benefit of the doubt on that, we still got to go to the next level, assuming that it's generally accepted - - - which I don't know if we can do that here - - we got to go to the level of specific causation. And so the question becomes, at what threshold levels does - - - do gasoline vapors cause the damages alleged and has that been shown by anybody.

1 MR. PHILLIPS: Your - - -2 JUDGE FAHEY: So what I'm saying to you is, 3 does it matter if it's Frye or if it's Parker here in 4 this circumstance, and don't we still end up with the 5 question of specific causation no matter what? MR. PHILLIPS: Your Honor has asked several 6 7 questions and - - -JUDGE FAHEY: I understand. I understand, 8 9 and they're not simple questions. 10 MR. PHILLIPS: And - - - but - - - but I -11 - - I welcome the opportunity to address them and it 12 may take me a minute or two to do so. 13 JUDGE FAHEY: That's up to Judge Pigott, 14 not to me. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Sally forth. 16 MR. PHILLIPS: Let me do my best. Your - -17 - Your Honor, let me start by saying that in order for us to prevail ultimately, of course we have to 18 establish exposure at a level sufficient to cause 19 20 this injury, and we have to do a bunch of other 21 specific causation things; all of which we've done, I 22 would suggest. And we're appealing here the 23 exclusion of experts in a setting, Your Honor, where

other experts were permitted to testify on specific

causation. So to put the - - - you know, we - - - we

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need to have the whole picture here.

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I - - - I would - - - and I want to state this carefully; I would agree with Your Honor that all of those things need to be addressed. Whether they're before you on this appeal or not is a different question. What's before you on this appeal, I would suggest, is the exposure question, strictly speaking, although I expect to address the caus - - - the specific and general causation question as well, or at least I hope to if time - time permits. But the Appellate Division decision departed from the IAS decision because it acknowledged that general causation had been addressed. It's not a very lengthy or illuminating decision, but they - - - they do - - - they - - they do depart and they depart quite directly from the IAS decision which challenges causation.

With respect to the exposure piece of this, let me say this to Your Honor; the methodology of symptom - - because it's not just odor threshold, it's symptom threshold, and Dr. Frazier is - - is extraordinarily qualified to address that.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, let's look back. Did she do anything other than in figuring out that it's 1,000 ppms - - or even one-third less than that, I

remember she said that in her affidavit. Did she do 1 2 anything other than look at what the symptoms, the 3 reactions were? Did she base it on anything other than that, whether - - - not just related to Mrs. 4 5 Reeps but anyone else - - - is it only based on what people said were their symptoms? 6 7 MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah. Well, first of - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: Inhaling the vapors. 9 MR. PHILLIPS: First of all, let's not 10 forget that there's the engineer - - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I - - - that's what 12 I'm asking you. 13 MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah. JUDGE RIVERA: What else did she do? I 14 15 understand you have your engineer, I want to hear about that, but what else did she base this on? 16 17 MR. PHILLIPS: Well, what she's base - - what she's based it upon is - - - is a very elaborate 18 19 of work in the AICGH and elsewhere about what 20 occupational medicine does. We have data. The data 21 in this record is both specific to this case, but then a general scientific record. 22 23 And, Judge Rivera, let me sort of try to 2.4 adumbrate that quickly. First of all, you have the

testimony of not only Mrs. Reeps but others that they

1 experienced these symptoms in this car. Secondly, you have evidence from the BMW recall records that 2 3 others driving cars with the same defects experienced 4 these defects. So a jury or a fact finder or an 5 expert has an ample basis for concluding that the 6 exposures are not just Mrs. Reeps' pregnancy - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I understand that. 8 But then - - - but then they put forward their 9 expert's testimony that the - - - those symptoms that 10 are experienced, right, the nausea, the headaches - -11 12 MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - might be experienced at a much lower threshold, a nontoxic level. 14 15 MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: And so the question is, how 17 does your expert get to the point that says, I come 18 to the conclusion that they experienced it at this 19 toxic level? 20 MR. PHILLIPS: Because, Your Honor, the 21 AICGH in 2004 conducted an elaborate study about 22 symptom thresholds, and symptom thresholds are data 23 derived from the study - - - from many studies and much scientific work, and the fact that their 2.4

experts, whose qualifications are what they are, say

it, doesn't make it so. Dr. Frazier, who is an occupational medicine specialist and the only occupational medicine specialist in this case, informs this court in - - in the record that this is a generally accepted method in occupational medicine, and that we have - - we, meaning the scientific world and the government regulatory agencies, have information about when the average person or most persons or people in general - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: And does the science say you can rely on that alone or is that in addition to data about the actual exposure?

MR. PHILLIPS: The answer to that is that that is coupled with data about actual exposure. The AICGH (sic) does not simply collect complaints about gasoline. They have numbers and they give - - in fact, someone from this court asked us to send that document along, and I would commend it to your attention.

JUDGE FAHEY: I - - - I read it. I read it. And one of the things that strikes me is the title of it is "Confirmed Animal Carcinogen with Unknown Relevance to Humans". It does say, as your expert did and I think you're correct about that, that 1,000 ppms show - - - show a mild toxic effect

1 in humans. It doesn't make the leap that you're asking it to make - - - let me just finish - - - but 2 3 it does say that there's a mild toxic effect. Then it talks about threshold levels and long-term effect, 4 5 about 300 parts per million. MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah. 6 7 JUDGE FAHEY: So its - - - its relevance to 8 humans isn't established, I don't think, the way your 9 expert argued it is, but I think it's a point in her 10 favor, I guess. 11 MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah. Judge Fahey, let me respond to you by saying - - -12 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: Be - - - before you do that, 14 I'm going to have to intrude on your time for a 15 little bit so that we can hear from your opponents. 16 But you still - - -17 MR. PHILLIPS: May I just answer his question while - - -18 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: Certainly. 20 MR. PHILLIPS: - - - it's fresh in our 21 mind? This needn't be established off that document, 22 because what - - - you know, an expert doesn't have 23 to rely on one document for each point. 2.4 JUDGE FAHEY: I don't want to take up your

time because this is a complicated issue, but the

1 problem was, I found that to be the strongest 2 document in your favor. That's why I bring it up. 3 MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah, the point that I'm - -- that I wish to make, if I might, is that that 4 5 document is then coupled with a score of documents 6 that show that at 100 parts per million, there's 7 damage to a brain; that adults suffer brain damage at 8 50 parts per million of benzene. And so what I would 9 urge Your Honor to do is to take that document and 10 then read it, as you must, in conjunction with the 11 other documents that document the level of birth defects - - - look at California's documents and so 12 13 on - - - and I will get up again to - - - to address 14 that if I may. But I think that it's critical, and I 15 would urge Your Honor to take a look at this document 16 in conjunction with the others because it's there. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Thank you, Mr. Phillips. 18 Mr. Semprevivo - - - am I pronouncing your 19 name correctly? 20 MR. SEMPREVIVO: [Sem-pre-vee'-voh], Your 21 Honor, correct. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: Welcome. 23 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Thank you. And - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: You're conceding about three 25 of your minutes to your compadres.

1 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Yes. Yes. Yes, Your 2 Good afternoon. As indicated, my name is 3 Phil Semprevivo. I'm here on behalf of the 4 defendants-respondents BMW. And I simply - - - I 5 want - - - I want to begin with what I - - - I 6 believe the Appellate Division highlighted, as well as Judge York below, that the - - - the - - - almost 7 8 the elephant in the room is there has been no 9 scientific study linking a causal relationship 10 between gasoline and developmental defects. 11 JUDGE STEIN: Are you saying that you have 12 to administer gasoline vapors to pregnant women and 13 see what the result is? 14 MR. SEMPREVIVO: No, Your Honor. We're not 15 saying that you have to go through that. 16 JUDGE STEIN: So what are you saying - - -17 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Okay. 18 JUDGE STEIN: What - - - what are you 19 saying? I mean, what - - - and what are your experts 20 actually saying? I mean, it seems to me that it's -21 - - at its basest level, that's what they're saying. 22 Oh, there's no - - - you know, there's no - - there's no controlled studies of this and how it 23 2.4 affects - - - how else would - - - how would you do

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that?

1 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Okay. I - - - I think I 2 would - - - I'm sorry to interrupt. 3 JUDGE STEIN: Go ahead. MR. SEMPREVIVO: But I think I would answer 4 5 that best is listen, gasoline is a very common substance. It's been around for quite a while. 6 7 have federal and state regulatory agencies that are 8 out there examining it for everything, and there has 9 never been any causal finding, let alone an 10 association, with any sort of developmental defects. 11 And I'm not saying you have to go out and test, but 12 you would expect that through all the testing over 13 all the decades, that you would have something - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, they said that about 15 cigarettes, too, and that took several decades, too. 16 I don't - - - I don't know that that might be your 17 strongest point there. MR. SEMPREVIVO: Well, I think - - -18 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Well - - - well, we've never 20 said you absolutely must have these epidemiological 21 studies, correct? You - - - you - - -22 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Well - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: It's not that a case falls 2.4 or rises based solely on those studies.

MR. SEMPREVIVO: But those are the studies

that will link to causal - - -1 2 JUDGE RIVERA: I understand. 3 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Yeah. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so their expert did 5 this weight of the evidence. MR. SEMPREVIVO: Okay. 6 7 JUDGE RIVERA: And the question is, in 8 part, whether or not that's an appropriate scientific 9 methodology. 10 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Well - - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: I don't think even your 12 experts deny that that's an appropriate scientific 13 methodology that could be followed. 14 MR. SEMPREVIVO: It - - - it's not, Your 15 Honor, and what we have there is everything that the 16 - - - the plaintiffs base it on is stud - - - and 17 they're not even studies - - - a case report 18 regarding toluene, which is a component of gasoline -19 2.0 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 21 MR. SEMPREVIVO: - - - which is one 22 percent, approximately, of gasoline. So even if we were to look at the article Your Honor raised before 23 2.4 - - - which I would note, if you look at the 25 footnotes and you trace the footnotes back - - -

1	JUDGE RIVERA: But why doesn't that
2	MR. SEMPREVIVO: those studies go
3	back a hundred years and
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Why doesn't that just end up
5	being the battle of the experts? She's their
6	experts are using certain scientific methodological
7	studies and they come to particular conclusions that
8	your experts say you can't come to those conclusions,
9	these studies don't support those conclusions, and so
10	forth. But isn't the question whether or not they're
11	following appropriate scientific reviews and so forth
12	and using studies that have been peer-reviewed and
13	then it's a battle of the experts at at the
14	trial
15	MR. SEMPREVIVO: Well, I
16	JUDGE RIVERA: whether or not the
17	jury's persuaded by one or the other?
18	MR. SEMPREVIVO: I think you could almost
19	say that about anything if you were to take that
20	idea. But
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, no. You said you
22	can't you can't rely on junk science. Are you
23	arguing that that their experts are relying on
24	junk science?

MR. SEMPREVIVO: I think what their experts

are relying upon - - - they've taken methodologies

that arguably those type of methodologies might work,

but they have taken leaps with those methodologies

and have not gone through them appropriately. For -

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JUDGE FAHEY: Well, what they're relying on, though, is - - is as the Judge has said, they're relying on animal studies, occupational studies, because that's really the only place, like Judge Stein was saying - - -

MR. SEMPREVIVO: Right.

you're going to get this kind of information is people work in the environment. And then so - - - and then of course fetal glue sniffing studies that have shown the effect of damages to fetuses who have been exposed to toluene in that setting. So - - - so it seems to me that what - - what they're relying on - - I guess the question is is Frye requires a scientific consensus to be generally accepted in the scientific community to be admissible. Let's assume the plaintiffs didn't make that scientific consensus. That's a - - that's I think a difficult standard here. But what if it was Daubert and what if we were applying Daubert? If we were applying Daubert - -

in other words, not scientific consensus but 1 2 scientifically credible - - - what do you say then? 3 MR. SEMPREVIVO: I - - - I still say that 4 there is - - - there is nothing that has come forward 5 that is scientifically credible here because even if 6 we were to take the component of - - -7 JUDGE FAHEY: So you're saying that studies 8 of mammals wouldn't be sufficient, you'd have to have 9 a study linking it up, specific causation between 10 humans and the inhalation of gasoline vapors? 11 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Well, we have - - - we 12 have studies of mammals here that don't support their 13 theory. The only ones out there, the mice - - - the 14 closest you come is if you soak - - - soak mice or 15 rats in - - - you know, in these chemicals or 16 gasoline over extended period of time, which we don't 17 have here. You might have - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: But - - -19 MR. SEMPREVIVO: - - - a sudden abortion-20 type scenario or the toluene - - - yes, Judge? 21 JUDGE RIVERA: But is the question really 22 consensus or whether or not they're using appropriate 23 science? They may come to a different conclusion 2.4 than your experts.

MR. SEMPREVIVO:

But - - -

1 JUDGE RIVERA: I understand your point about that. 2 3 MR. SEMPREVIVO: But they're not using the 4 appropriate - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Well, what is - - - that's 5 6 what I'm asking you. 7 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Okay. JUDGE RIVERA: What is - - - what is 8 9 inappropriate about the way they have approached this 10 question of the cause of this child's defects? 11 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Okay. Well, they've - - they've looked at the situation. There's no studies 12 13 at all that support their theory, we know that. Then what they - - -14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Studies that you can't do. 16 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Okay. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: So let's move on. 18 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Whether they could or - -- okay, there's - - - there's nothing out there that 19 2.0 they can rely upon, so what they've done is taken 21 let's look at the constituents. Now, Parker which 22 said you can't look at that and - - - and, you know, 23 the 150 constituents here. They have one study of gasoline that talks about nausea or headaches. Those 2.4 25 aren't developmental defects. Then you have the

1 component toluene, which you have the - - - the 2 abusers at 4,000 ppm to 12,000 ppm. Now, in 3 gasoline, at one percent, you're talking about ten -4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, let - - - let me - - can I ask you about that a little bit because that -6 7 - - that seemed to me to be relatively significant 8 because I think in one of your experts, Dr. Shalli 9 (ph.), if I'm pronouncing it right - - -10 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Yeah. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - said "in order for the 12 plaintiff mother to receive a dose of a constituent 13 compound such as toluene comparable to the dose found 14 to produce any injury in animal study subjects, she 15 would have had to inhale gasoline in concentrations well in excess of the human lethal limit." So that 16 17 argument to me seems to be that concede everything -18 19 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Right. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - concede that you have 21 an expert, that your expert says X, we're telling you 22 that even with that, there is no - - - there is no 23 causal relationship here.

MR. SEMPREVIVO: Absolutely. And in that

situation, you would also only have - - - if - - - if

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1 you exceeded, you know, those limits and you're in 2 that situation, the best you have is a case report, 3 not even a study, of people that had deaths of the 4 fetuses, not developmental defects. So there's - - -5 there's no comparison, no association, no studies, 6 nothing backing up linking it all together. 7 JUDGE STEIN: Doesn't that go to the 8 weight, not the methodology? I mean - - - and in 9 terms of the components, didn't plaintiff's experts 10 talk about the combination of the components of the 11 gasoline and how they would exacerbate effects and -- - and so on and so forth? Didn't they do more than 12 13 what was done in - - - in Parker? 14 MR. SEMPREVIVO: There's - - - there is 15 nothing supporting the - - - the fact that if you 16 combine all of this, it exacerbates, but still, 17 they'd have to put some sort of analysis there and 18 again you have one percent, you know, of - - - of the 19 substance. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: I thought they relied on 21 actual studies related to mixtures? 22 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Not of - - - not of this 23 gas - - -2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: The mixtures of these toxic

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components - - -

1	MR. SEMPREVIVO: But not in
2	JUDGE RIVERA: would themselves be,
3	at a minimum, as toxic if not more so. I thought
4	they they relied on those studies.
5	MR. SEMPREVIVO: But there's no study
6	linking the the components of, you know, 150 or
7	so con constituents of gasoline to get there.
8	JUDGE RIVERA: I understand, but the
9	general proposition of the mixtures, why can't they
10	rely on that? Why isn't that a way
11	MR. SEMPREVIVO: That
12	JUDGE RIVERA: to rely on science
13	that's appropriate in this case?
14	MR. SEMPREVIVO: That's never been an
15	accepted scientific principle, Your Honor. I mean -
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17	JUDGE RIVERA: You have to rely on the
18	actual studies of the actual components of the
19	mixture you're talking about?
20	MR. SEMPREVIVO: Exact exactly.
21	JUDGE STEIN: But, I mean, it seems to me
22	that what you're arguing is the not what they
23	did to to study this, not the methods that they
24	use, but the conclusions that they reached from these
25	methods. And I and I can't and I'm

1 having trouble understanding why that is part of the 2 Frye analysis, and why that is not something that 3 should be decided by a jury. MR. SEMPREVIVO: Well, I think - - - well, 4 5 there's two - - - there's two things here that are 6 going on. They've taken the leap with those methods, 7 okay, similar to where you have a situation where 8 they have - - -9 JUDGE STEIN: Well, that's what your 10 experts are saying, yes. 11 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Yeah, but - - - but I'm 12 also saying that, Your Honor, here today, is you have 13 a situation where they have - - - they've come out 14 and said, well, toluene, it causes bad things and we 15 have a study about that. Well, since toluene's in 16 gasoline, we're going to take the leap and say 17 gasoline causes these bad things. So that - - -18 JUDGE STEIN: But isn't it that leap, that 19 conclusion that - - -20 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Well, since there's no 21 found - - -22 JUDGE STEIN: - - - that you - - - that 23 you're questioning? 2.4 MR. SEMPREVIVO: I'm - - - I'm questioning 25 - - here actually both. I'm questioning the way

1 that they perform their methodologies as well as the 2 leap that they took with their conclusions on those 3 methodologies. So you have somewhat of a foundation 4 and a - - - and - - - and a Parker - - - yeah, Parker 5 scenario as well as a Frye scenario where - - -6 JUDGE STEIN: I guess that gets me back to I thought - - - I thought foundation in Parker were 7 8 decided already in the summary judgment motion. Why 9 - - - why are we - - -10 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Oh, and - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: - - - even looking at that 12 again? 13 MR. SEMPREVIVO: - - - and that's - - -14 actually, Your Honor, when you brought that up I want 15 - - - I had in my notes to go right back to that. 16 our motion for summary judgment that was brought a 17 year or so before this motion, that - - - you know, with the guidance of the court, we brought it at the 18 time; in fact, during oral argument or actually 19 20 before the Judge said we're going to deal with Frye 21 issues later. So we dealt with - - - in our motion it was 22 23 - - - the car at that time had been lost, and we - -2.4 - they - - - it'd been disposed of and we had a

spoliation aspect of our motion for summary judgment.

But the key was that there had been this recall, and the recall itself doesn't - - - does not get you a basis to go forward with the case. There was no - -- not sufficient circumstantial evidence to move forward and summary judgment is warranted. We did not - - - we did not attack Dr. - - - Dr. Kramer, Dr. Frazier in our motion whatsoever. Now, I believe my CO - - -JUDGE STEIN: But you could - - - you could

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JUDGE STEIN: But you could - - - you could have.

MR. SEMPREVIVO: Well, that - - - no, that

JUDGE STEIN: You had the expert disclosure at that time.

MR. SEMPREVIVO: We had the expert disclosure at about that same time, but the - - - it was understood - - - and in fact, Judge York, in his decision, he makes it very clear - - - and I believe it was the second decision, he may have said it in both - - - that this is an evidentiary issue that I'm dealing with separate from the summary judgment. So we followed the guidelines as laid out by the judge and the judge even reiterated that in his decision, so the - - - we did not address their experts in that because we had a clear, specific issue on the car,

1 the mechanical aspects of the car, and that's - - -2 and that was the issue of our summary judgment 3 motion. 4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, I - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: Can we talk about the 1,000 ppm and - - - and the - - - based on the reactions 6 7 and whether or not that's an appropriate scientific 8 way to come to that conclusion that it was toxic 9 exposure? 10 MR. SEMPREVIVO: A couple things on it. 11 One, the - - - that article of the 1,000 ppms that 12 doesn't deal with development defects, by the way. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 14 MR. SEMPREVIVO: It deals with, you know, 15 eye irritation, throat, headaches, nausea; those are 16 symptoms very clear, especially when you're dealing 17 with - - - with a - - - with a pregnant woman in this 18 situation, that there's so many factors in life. You 19 can't work in reverse here on a different - - - you 20 know, again, you're assuming you're at a differential 21 diagnosis on a specific causation, which we say you 22 never get to, but - - -23 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Going back to the 2.4 experts, I was just curious, you challenged Dr.

Frazier and Dr. Kramer. What about the other experts

1 who now presumably, if this case goes to trial, will 2 be able to testify? 3 MR. SEMPREVIVO: The other experts on the issue of general causation relied wholly upon Frazier 4 5 - - - Dr. Frazier and Dr. Kramer. They brought in more information regarding specific causation, and 6 7 the judge looked at it that we knocked out the general and we - - - we would have to attack at trial 8 9 if there's a subsequent motion - - - which we had 10 conversations in chambers and then filed, it was 11 actually put on hold regarding the - - - the issues 12 of the other experts. That's not before Your Honor 13 at the moment, though. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I - - - I understand 14 15 I was just curious about - - - I - - - I'm 16 trying to figure out why, if they relied, as they 17 apparently did, on Kramer and Frazier, why didn't you also attack them? 18 19 MR. SEMPREVIVO: Well, we - - - we make it 20 very clear in our papers that they are - - - they're 21 relying on them and they have nothing to go on as 22 long - - - you know, when Dr. Kramer and Dr. Frazier 23 are - - -2.4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Okay.

MR. SEMPREVIVO: - - - knocked out on - - -

1	on the challenge.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: If you win this, you're
3	- you're done?
4	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: You're done.
5	MR. SEMPREVIVO: Yes.
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.
7	MR. SEMPREVIVO: Ultimately it's not
8	it's an evidentiary, but the ultimate effect is
9	yes.
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. Thank you thank
11	you, sir.
12	MR. SEMPREVIVO: Thank you, Your Honor.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: Ms. McHugh?
14	MS. MCHUGH: I have nothing to add unless
15	you have questions for me, Your Honors.
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: Mr. Brill?
17	MR. BRILL: Same here, Judge.
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: You must have been
19	brilliant.
20	MR. SEMPREVIVO: I hope so.
21	MR. PHILLIPS: May I have, Judge, three
22	minutes?
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: You have your rebuttal, sir.
24	You want their minutes too?
25	MR. PHILLIPS: A couple of things. First

of all, my specific causation experts do - - - do not rely exclusively, nor do their - - - are their opinions founded upon Drs. Kramer and Frazier.

They're independent. They say so. They say that they concur, and that's a different matter, but they're free. And of course when we go back, however this comes, they have to make a summary judgment motion and the legislature has recently enacted a statute that sort of opens - - -

2.4

JUDGE PIGOTT: In regards to 3101.

MR. PHILLIPS: --- a number of --- of doors on 3101.

But I'd like to return, Judge Fahey, with,
I hope, an additional answer to the question that you
initially - - - you propounded to me. If you look at
page 1546 and all of - - - of the record and then
thereafter - - - and that's Dr. Frazier's affidavit,
and I think Mr. Semprevivo in effect concedes,
because he said several times to you well, they do
have a toluene case, a tol - - - they do have toluene
things. Well, toluene is a significant proportion of
what this exposure is. It's sort of like saying, as
we said in our brief, gin and tonic in an alco - - in an alcohol impairment case, you know, the fact
that there's tonic in there too is besides the point.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's why I asked that question before, though, about they - - - they said even conceding that.

MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah, and I wanted to get to that. I've known Dr. Shalli for a long time and I have a low opinion of him, but if you read our brief, I think you'll perhaps - - - I'm - - - I'm sure you have read our brief, forgive me, but the fact that Dr. Shalli says something is, at best, a subject to be addressed at a hearing, because he's, frankly, kind of - - well, less credible than he might be.

JUDGE PIGOTT: That's a point - - - I

didn't mean to interrupt you, but that's a point I

think you made that you didn't have a hearing on

Frye. These - - - these two were just knocked out on

papers, right?

MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, and - - - and that raises - - - that raises an interesting point. As a plaintiff's lawyer, I'm loath to tell you that you should issue an opinion saying there should always be Frye hearings in everything, because that would impose a burden on the courts in all sorts of things. But where you have a record such as this, and we asked for the Frye hearing and ask for it repeatedly

2.4

1 JUDGE RIVERA: But didn't you initially say 2 this can be decided without a Frye hearing, and there 3 should not be a Frye hearing? MR. PHILLIPS: No, I said half of that, not 4 5 the other half. What we said - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Which half did you say? 6 7 The half that we said - - -MR. PHILLIPS: 8 JUDGE RIVERA: If I may inquire. 9 MR. PHILLIPS: You - - - you sure may. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you. 11 MR. PHILLIPS: Judge Rivera, what we said, 12 and I'll repeat it to you, is that we can win this 13 appeal and can win this motion without need for your 14 ordering another hearing because of some of the 15 points that Your Honors have made. Judge Stein has 16 pointed out repeatedly, if this is about methodology, 17 you can figure that out without need for a hearing. 18 But where you have experts of the quality of Drs. 19 Kramer and Frazier, and where Dr. Frazier, who after 20 all, you'll - - - you'd be hard put to find an expert 21 more qualified to talk about symptom thresholds and 22 their relevance to reproductive - - - adverse 23 reproductive outcomes, and that will take me back in 2.4 a bit to the toluene and benzene points.

But where you have that, I think that it

strikes me as very bad policy for the IAS judge to have said, I've got enough, I don't need to address this. And again - - -

JUDGE STEIN: When - - - when did you make your repeated requests for the hearing? At what stage?

MR. PHILLIPS: It - - - Your Honor, it was made in the second round of argument. Justice York - - - who is a wonderful judge, whose passing I mourn personally, I - - - I suppose we all do - - - there was an oral argument and it was never transcribed, but at that oral argument - - - and I respectfully disagree with my colleague. The point was made, if you have any questions bring Dr. Frazier in, bring Dr. Shalli in. Boy, would I like to cross-examine him.

In our motion for re-argument, which was granted - - and again, this had a funny history.

We argued this and then waited for more than a year because the motion was held in abeyance pending the Appellate Division review of - - of the initial motion. Then it came back and we just waited and waited and then there was a decision, so the decision was stale, if I can put it that way. It came long, long after this thing had been briefed and - - and

1 argued. 2 But in the re-argument papers, and you'll 3 see this in the record, we - - - we urged the court to have a hearing, and the court declined. The 4 5 Appellate Division found that - - - that he had granted re-argument so it's certainly preserved and 6 7 there's no question that we had asked for that. Now 8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: What - - - what did - - -10 can you talk about Edwin Zucker (ph.), the engineer? 11 MR. PHILLIPS: Sure. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: He's the engineer, correct? 13 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes. JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, and he - - - he 14 15 addressed the symptom threshold, correct? 16 relying on merely the actual symptoms that anyone had 17 experienced. 18 MR. PHILLIPS: Well, what - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: Right? The - - - the 20 toxicity threshold, excuse me, not the symptom 21 threshold. 22 MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah, what - - - what - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: He came to a different 2.4 conclusion.

MR. PHILLIPS:

Than Leeds and not - - -

1 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 2 MR. PHILLIPS: He - - - he corroborated - -3 - there was an issue, Your Honor, about whether or not the levels of exposure within that vehicle could 4 5 have reached 1,000 ppm. Leeds said no way no how, and Zucker disagreed with him and presented the 6 7 formulaic basis for saying that indeed, the exposures would - - - would have been at that level or - - - or 8 9 - - - or higher. Engineers are not by their nature 10 qualified to talk about medical causation, so he 11 didn't do that. I don't want to give you a false 12 impression on - - - on - - - on that. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: He was just talking about what would have been in the car cabin, correct? 14 15 MR. PHILLIPS: Correct. What - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: The exposure level in the 17 car cabin? 18 MR. PHILLIPS: He was independently confirming what Dr. - - - Dr. Frazier and Engineer 19 2.0 Zucker got to the same place using separate 21 methodologies. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: I have to ask you to sum up, 23 sir, because your time has expired. 2.4 MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah, the - - - the point

that I would like to sum up, Your - - - Your Honor

and to - - - well, to all of you, of course, but to

Judge Fahey particularly, is that if you look at page

27 of our brief and then look at the authorities, you

- - - you will see that - - - and also at Dr.

Frazier's affidavit, you will see a - - - a well
reasoned and careful analysis of why levels of ten

parts per million of benzene cause genotoxic injury,

and why genotoxic injuries are associated with - -
with adverse - - - with birth defects.

And what I would lastly do is - - - is

point you all respectfully to some case law, because
if you look at the Zito case and the Marsh case in

the Appellate Divisions First and Second Department,
and above all the Milward case which is a - - - a

very well-crafted decision by the Chief Judge of the

First Circuit talking in Daubert but making the

point, you will see that in putting together a

causation case, it's not a matter of a reductionistic

atomistic thing. You look at - - at all of those

cases and - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Could I - - - counsel, could I just interrupt slightly? You - - - you mentioned Marsh. Is that Marsh v. Smyth in the First Department? Judge Saxe's concurring opinion?

MR. PHILLIPS: Yes.

2.4

1 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Yeah, I'm very familiar with it. And didn't Judge Saxe say that if 2 3 there - - - you have to have at least some study that 4 would support the position that the opponent of this 5 theory is - - -6 MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah. 7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - is proffering, 8 right? And - - - and don't we go back to what 9 counsel said for BMW, where is that study? Where is 10 that one study? 11 MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah, Your Honor, there are 12 actually not one but scores of studies that Drs. 13 Kramer and Frazier spell out at great length about 14 the capacity at eighty-eight parts per million of 15 toluene to create spontaneous abortion, and then 16 explaining that an abortion - - - a spon - - - a 17 miscarriage is a bigger injury than a birth defect, and this is well established, so that there's a body 18 19 -- - there's a body of learning and this is a jury 20 question. It is one that really needs to be 21 presented to a jury, or at a minimum, for a hearing. 22 Your Honors, thank you so much for your indulgence. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: Thank you, Mr. Phillips. 2.4 Thank you all.

(Court is adjourned)

CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Sean R. v. BMW of North America, LLC, No. 3 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the

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