1 COURT OF APPEALS 2 STATE OF NEW YORK 3 \_\_\_\_\_ PEOPLE, 4 Respondent, 5 -against-No. 166 6 PHILLIP COUSER, 167 7 Appellant. 8 9 Appellate Division, Fourth Department The Hon. Samuel L. Green Courtroom 10 50 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14604 11 October 14, 2016 Before: 12 CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE 13 ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA 14 ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN 15 ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA 16 17 Appearances: JAMES A. HOBBS, ESQ. 18 MONROE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 19 Attorney for Appellant 10 N. Fitzhugh Street 20 Rochester, NY 14614 21 KELLY CHRISTINE WOLFORD, ADA MONROE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorney for Respondent 22 Ebenezer Watts Building 23 Suite 832 Rochester, NY 14614 24 Sara Winkeljohn 25 Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So the first appeals on our
2	calendar this morning are numbers 166 and 167 in the matter
3	of the People of the State of New York v. Phillip Couser.
4	Counsel.
5	MR. HOBBS: Good morning, Your Honors; may it
б	please the court, I'm James Hobbs on behalf of the
7	appellant, Phillip Couser. I would like to reserve four
8	minutes for rebuttal.
9	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir.
10	MR. HOBBS: There are there are two appeals
11	in this case and they present two different sets of issues.
12	So I want to try to address both of them. I plan to spend
13	a few minutes on the sentences for the trial convictions
14	and then I do want to address the problems with Mr.
15	Couser's Alford plea address entered after the trial was
16	over.
17	With respect to the first issue, the evidence
18	showed that Mr. Couser attempted to rob a group of people
19	who were walking together and that he initiated this group
20	robbery only through group-directed acts. He turned
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: Is this is this a law
22	question? The the judge, it seemed to me, went
23	through in pretty good detail why he was giving consecutive
24	and concurrents. And is is your argument that even
25	though he was doing that that he was legally incorrect in

1	doing so?
2	MR. HOBBS: Correct. There there is
3	as a matter of law, there wasn't evidence to to
4	separate and impose consecutive sentences under Penal Law
5	70.25(2). Penal Law 70.25(2)
6	JUDGE GARCIA: But counsel. I'm sorry to
7	interrupt to you, but it seems to me if you have Ramirez
8	from this court that says you can have consecutive
9	sentences for robbing, essentially, a Brink's truck, right.
10	And one is robbery of a guard, robbery of the gun. A
11	second count that was run consecutively is robbery of
12	another guard, robbery of a gun. Why isn't that analogous
13	to this case?
14	MR. HOBBS: It's not analogous because those two
15	guards involved very separate uses of force. Essentially,
16	in Ramirez the defendant pointed the gun at the two guards.
17	One guard immediately was subdued. He he, I believe,
18	got to the ground and gave up his gun. The other guard
19	engaged in a firefight. The other guard stepped away or
20	tried to walk away, shot back, and there was guns
21	there were bullets fired back and forth. That's a much
22	-
23	JUDGE GARCIA: But why doesn't that go to Judge

Pigott's about isn't this really a question of fact then? MR. HOBBS: I don't think so. The - - - the fact

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is there were - - - I mean with respect to the Appellate -- - the attempted robberies, there was no dispute at the Appellate Division - - - or at least the Appellate Division held that these acts were indistinguishable, that he pointed the gun at a group of people and he issued commands to that group of people and that there was no individualized display of firearm.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So if he - - - if he had requested or demanded that each person get to the ground, you would say that that would clear the consecutive - - -

MR. HOBBS: Potentially. If he had turned to one person and said you get on the ground and then walked up to another person and said you get on the ground and so forth, then you would have distinguishing actions. You'd have, basically, a crime that's walking along a path and then branches where it addresses one person and then addresses another person and then addresses another person.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But what if the person in the back of the group didn't hear him initially, that he was speaking to the group?

21MR. HOBBS: You know, I mean, that's a - - -22JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And just followed what

everybody else did?

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24 MR. HOBBS: I'm not sure - - - the - - - what we 25 need to first set is what - - -

1	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: That's your separate act?
2	MR. HOBBS: the number of actions that Mr.
3	Couser took, not necessarily the behavior of the victims.
4	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Of if somebody hesitated?
5	MR. HOBBS: If someone if that then
6	prompted an additional act directed particularly at that
7	victim
8	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So they all had to
9	MR. HOBBS: then we'd have a different
10	case.
11	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: You know, because they all
12	got to the ground at the same time you're saying it's the
13	same act?
14	MR. HOBBS: In response to I'm saying
15	because he he issued one set of commands on this
16	record. We don't have any evidence that there were
17	separate commands. If it took one person longer to get
18	down on the ground but he didn't take any additional act, I
19	think we're on the same.
20	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, does your argument
21	not ignore the fact that the aggravating element of the
22	robbery is the display of the weapon to the victim and that
23	thus there are separate victims there? Isn't that
24	minimizing those separate acts and sort of according a
25	group discount for the group?

1	MR. HOBBS: I'd say I'd say two things.
2	First, I don't I don't think I'm ignoring the fact
3	that it's a display of a firearm that that aggravates
4	this crime. In fact, that's one of the actions that's
5	indistinguishable
6	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: As to each individual
7	victim who has to perceive the display of the weapon
8	MR. HOBBS: Correct.
9	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: and the fear, the
10	elevated fear that that causes.
11	MR. HOBBS: Sure. There are because Penal
12	Law 70.25(2) turns on the number of actions that the
13	defendant takes, there are going to be a lot of cases where
14	you have multiple victims but only one sentence. There are
15	there's a case out of the Appellate Division cited in
16	my briefs where a defendant drives his car into a police
17	car that contains two officers. It's one action, it's two
18	separate assaults, two victims. Sentences had to be
19	concurrent because the defendant only took one set of
20	actions against them. You could say that discounts the
21	- the injury suffered, the fear suffered by the officer,
22	but that that's not the way the legislature asks us
23	to look at these cases. The legislature directs our
24	attention to the number of actions that the defendant took
25	and whether or not those actions can be divided up.
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1 There's nothing on this record that allows us to divide up 2 the way he pointed the gun. The testimony was he pointed 3 it at the group, not that he pointed it one person, then he 4 pointed it another and - - - and so forth. 5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Then move us to the 6 McKnight analysis. MR. HOBBS: The McKnight analysis, I believe 7 8 McKnight is the case in which the - - - the defendant shot 9 multiple - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Splayed his gun. MR. HOBBS: - - - multiple gunshots, right? 11 12 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Um-hum. 13 MR. HOBBS: So that's - - - this is the way - - -14 you have different outcomes with different sets of multiple 15 If the defendant takes one action against a group victims. 16 of victims, you're going to have concurrent sentences 17 required. But if the defendant shoots multiple bullets, whether or not he intended to - - - intent isn't at issue. 18 19 That's - - - that's clear from McKnight and other cases. 20 The issue is the number of actions they've taken. And so 21 if he shoots the gun multiple times and that results in 22 multiple victims, then you can have consecutive sentence 23 because the defendant took multiple actions. It's - - -24 that's the way the legislature asks us to - - -25 JUDGE GARCIA: You have convictions here for

1	attempted robbery, which the Appellate Division then ran
2	concurrently.
3	MR. HOBBS: Correct.
4	JUDGE GARCIA: And attempt and a robbery.
5	MR. HOBBS: Um-hum.
6	JUDGE GARCIA: Doesn't that suggest that they're
7	separate acts? Doesn't there necessarily have to be
8	something else to have a completed robbery?
9	MR. HOBBS: There did have to be a taking. But
10	that additional act is not sufficient under the under
11	Penal Law 70.25(2).
12	JUDGE GARCIA: And what's the case law support
13	for that?
14	MR. HOBBS: The case support, there are multiple
15	cases in which you have an additional act of taking in
16	which the sentences have to be concurrent. Laureano is a
17	case out of the Court of Appeals in which the defendant
18	committed a manslaughter, killed a victim, and the
19	that act constituted the use of force necessary to complete
20	the or to to start the robbery. But then the
21	defendant also took the victim's property, so that was
22	- that's
23	JUDGE GARCIA: That's the same victim, right?
24	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: A single victim.
25	MR. HOBBS: in addition it is the

1 same victim. You've got in Battles - - - or no, not 2 Battles, I'm sorry, Ramirez. The other element of - - -3 the other aspect of that case, there was an aspect in which 4 there were two guards, but there was also the robbery of a 5 guard and the robbery of the truck. Those are takings from two different victims. 6 7 JUDGE GARCIA: But that, as I understand it, was 8 it was a taking from one victim but they had said - - -9 they had found that that was also a taking from the company 10 that the victim was driving for, right? 11 MR. HOBBS: Well, - - -12 JUDGE GARCIA: The other victim was the owner of 13 the truck - - -14 MR. HOBBS: True, but there was an additional act 15 against another. There was the taking of the gun from the 16 guard was the robbery of the guard. The take - - - the 17 robbery from the - - - the company, the separate victim, 18 yes, it wasn't a person there in the - - - in the literal 19 human sense but it was a corporate person there and it did 20 involve a separate act of taking money from the truck. 21 JUDGE GARCIA: But again, it's a - - - it's a 22 victim issue almost to me, that one. Because the - - -23 you're saying the victim is the owner of the funds in the 24 truck but the act is exactly the same. The act of robbing 25 those guards is the same act as robbing the company because

1	the company technically isn't there as a victim. They own
2	the funds. It would, you know, if somebody has my wallet
3	and gets robbed and they take my wallet and I'm a victim.
4	It almost seems analogous to that to me.
5	MR. HOBBS: I mean, I don't see that. It is a
6	separate act of taking from the property from the
7	truck. That wasn't the guard's property. That wasn't what
8	was stolen. That wasn't what completed the robbery against
9	the guard.
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: I don't I don't mean to take
11	you off your case but you wanted to argue the Alford part
12	of it.
13	MR. HOBBS: I do. And thank you very much. I
14	was about to try to turn to that, and I appreciate it.
15	Okay. With respect to the the Alford plea, after the
16	trial was over, Mr. Couser entered an Alford plea to the
17	charge of attempted intentional felony murder. He always
18	denied that he committed this crime. That was the
19	basically the whole reason he went to the first trial and
20	was prepared to go to the second trial to contest this
21	again. The only reason the record shows for him entering
22	this plea is to avoid the risk of another consecutive
23	sentence.
24	JUDGE GARCIA: But isn't it your this is an
25	ineffective assistance claim, right?

1	MR. HOBBS: I want to focus, actually, on point
2	three. I mean the the sentencing point that I makes
3	in points two and point three runs together runs
4	through both points.
5	JUDGE GARCIA: But the Alford plea is an
6	ineffective assistance claim?
7	MR. HOBBS: The Alford plea on the record is
8	- is deficient on its own whether or not you find
9	ineffective whether or not you fault counsel or not.
10	JUDGE FAHEY: So so how will we do that?
11	If if it's not ineffective assistance, you're saying
12	you could still vacate and go back to a trial on the
13	attempted murder charge. How would you do that? Give me
14	the logic of that.
15	MR. HOBBS: Sure. An Alford plea requires the
16	court to ensure two things, that the defendant is making a
17	voluntary and rational decision, a choice among his
18	his potential options at that point, and that there's
19	strong evidence of of guilt.
20	JUDGE STEIN: And what's missing here?
21	MR. HOBBS: The volun the idea that this
22	was a rational there's record support for this being
23	a rational decision.
24	JUDGE STEIN: Well, there was a pretty extensive
25	colloquy, right?

1	MR. HOBBS: Not by the defendant.
2	JUDGE STEIN: Well,
3	MR. HOBBS: The the colloquy was conducted
4	entirely with counsel. There was almost nothing said by
5	the defendant on the
б	JUDGE STEIN: Yeah. But haven't we held
7	repeatedly that as long as the that counsel can make
8	the statements but but the defendant has to be asked
9	do you understand this, is this what you want to do. And
10	didn't that take place here?
11	MR. HOBBS: That didn't take place. There was no
12	questions to to confirm that he was making a
13	that he understood the proceedings, no questions to confirm
14	that he wasn't under the influence of any drugs or alcohol,
15	hadn't been made any threats or promises. There were no
16	questions to confirm that he understood the trial rights he
17	was waiving. None of that happened. But then, also, we
18	have on the record a, at best, oversimplification of what
19	the risks of a consecutive sentence are at trial. I think
20	it's flat wrong, but at best, it's a it's an
21	oversimplification. There was nothing to confirm that he
22	understood the consequences that might occur at trial and
23	the fact that he might have an argument for current
24	sentence sentencing.
25	JUDGE STEIN: Well, there there certainly

1	was a full discussion of of what the proof was
2	against him and and the likelihood of his being
3	convicted on a retrial and all that.
4	MR. HOBBS: Right.
5	JUDGE STEIN: Doesn't that factor into it?
6	MR. HOBBS: I'm that is I suppose
7	that's that's a helpful fact that
8	JUDGE FAHEY: I guess what I the problem
9	I'm having is is how to distinguish between the
10	ineffective assistance claim all right, I get that.
11	They gave he gave him the wrong information. That's
12	your argument. The problem there is that you've got the
13	trial judge and the Fourth Department. Even if we
14	overturned them, is it ineffective assistance if the Fourth
15	Department agreed with his underlying analysis and logic?
16	So then you get to the Alford claim. And in the Alford
17	claim, if it's not ineffective assistance in how he gave
18	his plea, then I'm having a hard time as seeing it now as
19	KVI, knowing and voluntary and intelligent.
20	MR. HOBBS: The it was the court's
21	obligation to ask whether he understood the risks that he
22	would
23	JUDGE FAHEY: So it's not ineffective assistance
24	of counsel, it's the entire proceeding, including the
25	court?

1	MR. HOBBS: That's correct.
2	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. That's your argument.
3	MR. HOBBS: That's correct.
4	JUDGE FAHEY: I see.
5	MR. HOBBS: Just I see my time is up, but
6	just one case in which is similar to this is People v.
7	Hill, it's a 2011 decision from this this court.
8	JUDGE FAHEY: Right. But that's the only
9	that's the only one that seemed to be going that way in
10	terms of the analysis. It seemed like all the other
11	Appellate Division authority well, I should say all
12	the other Appellate Division authority kind of favored you.
13	Hill seemed to be going the other way, the Second
14	Department case.
15	MR. HOBBS: No. The the Court of Appeals
16	decision in Hill, though
17	JUDGE FAHEY: I see.
18	MR. HOBBS: was one where the defendant as
19	not asked whether he was making a he understood that
20	he was making a choice to avoid a harsher consequence
21	JUDGE FAHEY: Sure.
22	MR. HOBBS: after trial.
23	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
24	MR. HOBBS: Thank you.
25	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

MS. WOLFORD: Good morning; may it please the court, Kelly Wolford on behalf of the People. First, I'll address the consecutive sentence issue because I do think that it directly impacts the Alford plea situation. And Your Honor, I do agree that the argument made by the defendant here is, in fact, giving a group discount for the robbery or attempted robbery of five - - -

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8 JUDGE FAHEY: But that really wasn't your 9 argument, was it? I'm having a - - - I'm having a little 10 difficult time and maybe you can clarify it for me. But it 11 seems that - - - that you're arguing that there's a - - -12 there's a different analysis between the first degree and 13 second-degree murder. And - - - and that in your brief you 14 argue that first-degree murder is - - - we should be 15 looking at the mens rea which is different than I read 16 Laureano for consecutive sentences and the test there. But 17 with second-degree murder we should be looking at the actus 18 reus, at the act itself. Is - - - is that your argument? 19 Or are you - - - or are you saying something else? 20 MS. WOLFORD: With respect to the Alford plea and 21 whether or not the sentence for attempted murder first 22 would have run consecutive, there's - - - it's actually a 23 two-part argument. One would be that there are two 24 separate actus reus with respect to intentional felony 25 murder, which does not exist in felony murder under murder

two where the felony supplants the intent or the - - - the mens rea element where you can't have felony murder under murder two without the underlying robbery. When you have murder one, however, you have the felony of, in this case, robbery but then you have a completely separate act of intentional or here, attempted intentional, murder.

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7 So you have to have the intent to commit the 8 robbery or attempted robbery and then you have to have the 9 separate act of actually intending to commit the murder. 10 So we have two different actus reus where if you go back to murder second, where there's no intentional murder element 11 12 to that crime and you have no mens rea for - - - for the 13 murder, it's supplanted by the underlying felony. We have 14 a separate situation. So there's only one actus reus in 15 murder second where there's two in intentional felony 16 murder. Then – –

JUDGE FAHEY: I've - - - I have never seen that argued anywhere. This is something - - -

MS. WOLFORD: That's why we're here I think. JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. It's creative. I got to give you credit there, anyway. I got to give you credit. But - - -

MS. WOLFORD: If I'm nothing else, Judge, I can
be creative.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, you got to give somebody

credit for that.

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2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Ms. Wolford, going back - - - I 3 know you want to talk about the beginning of this thing. 4 When you look at what happened, in your view, could the 5 judge have made these all concurrent? 6 MS. WOLFORD: He could have. 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: So this is all discretionary? 8 MS. WOLFORD: Absolutely. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: And - - - and we've got to decide 10 why a judge would say even though you got these people on 11 the ground and you're doing what you're doing and you only 12 took the purse and - - - and the gunshot grazed one person, 13 he can parse these out and add up to forty-eight years as 14 opposed to what would be a much smaller, I forget what it 15 - - if they're all concurrent, what it would be, about 16 fifteen? 17 MS. WOLFORD: He could have done twenty - - - if 18 he got the maximum sentence on the one completed robbery, 19 he could have done twenty-five. He was given eighteen on 20 that and then the judge then took the rest of the time and 21 kind of parsed out, per victim, a different sentence. That 22 was - - - each one of those sentences was less than the 23 maximum that was available for each of the charges. 24 JUDGE PIGOTT: It just seemed strange to me that, 25 you know, if you - - - we have - - - we have our predicates

1 and our persistence and all of those make sense. But here we're saying because of what you did in the park, I'm 2 3 deciding that you're going to do forty-eight years for 4 stealing a purse and nick - - - and I don't want to say 5 nicking somebody with a gun, I mean it was not a nice thing 6 to do. But it just seemed like a broad discretion on the 7 part of the judge. And you were saying that yeah, they can 8 do that - - -9 MS. WOLFORD: Absolutely. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - or they can make it 11 concurrent. 12 MS. WOLFORD: Well, and I think, ultimately, the 13 first issue we have to get by is whether or not legally he 14 was authorized to impose consecutive time. And in this 15 particular case, he was legally authorized to impose 16 consecutive time. And if we go back and we take a look at 17 the record and we see what happened in the park that night, 18 to say that there is only one - - - in essence, what 19 defendant is arguing is there's only one robbery. There 20 just happened to be five people there. 21 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, no. Not really. I mean what 22 he's arguing is - - - is that you could have charged him 23 with another kind of attempted murder. But the way you 24 charged attempted murder here - - - the way you charged him 25 here, you know, you could have charged felony murder in a

1 different way or you could have charged him with 2 intentional murder and not felony murder. And if you had 3 charged him with intentional murder and not felony murder, then there would be no question of the stacking here. 4 Ιt 5 would be a straightforward. 6 MS. WOLFORD: Okay. 7 JUDGE FAHEY: But that's not the way you charged 8 him. It because you charged the felony murder that we're 9 in the situation that we have to look at the underlying 10 felony and see if that, in and of itself, can be 11 distinguished. 12 MS. WOLFORD: Right. 13 JUDGE FAHEY: That's why we're in this situation. 14 MS. WOLFORD: Okay. So two separate issues, I 15 think, Your Honor. The one with respect to whether or not 16 the five counts of one completed robbery and four attempts 17 can be run consecutively to each other and then the 18 separate issue of whether or not that intentional attempted 19 felony murder can run - - -20 JUDGE FAHEY: That's correct. 21 MS. WOLFORD: - - - consecutive to any of those. 22 Now just briefly, I'll come back to your question, Judge 23 Pigott - - - but just briefly on the - - - the intentional 24 - - - attempted intentional felony murder. Okay. That - -25 - that charge was the one that they hung on and is,

1 ultimately, the Alford plea is over. At the point in time 2 when he makes a decision to plead to that charge, we are at 3 the point in time where we have to retry that case. 4 And I do understand that during the first trial 5 we did not specify the underlying robbery or attempted 6 robbery that was the predicate for the - - - the robbery. 7 However, we're facing a second trial now. And at this 8 point in time, we can fix that. We can specify that it was 9 Mark Lewis who was the attempted robbery victim and that he 10 was the one that was shot. And then we would avoid the 11 problem that he's arguing now without a doubt. We wouldn't 12 even have to get into whether or not everything was 13 consecutive because the shooting of Mark Lewis and the 14 robbery of him would clearly be consecutive to the theft of 15 the purse. 16 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah. But - - - but we're talking 17 about felony murder here. So - - - so I don't - - -18 MS. WOLFORD: Well, it's intentional felony 19 murder. 20 JUDGE FAHEY: Right. 21 MS. WOLFORD: And he was convicted of attempted 22 robbery of Mark Lewis. Okay? 23 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 24 MS. WOLFORD: So if Mark Lewis is the person 25 who's shot and Mark Lewis is the - - - also the victim of

the attempted robbery and that is clarified to the jury on retrial, that can run consecutively to the time that he was given for the completed robbery of Julie Belknap. That is clear. And we can do that on the second trial, and we don't - - - we're not bound by what happened during the first trial. So actually, the - - - the attorney was a hundred percent correct in giving the advice that he could get consecutive time if he went to trial, which then takes away the ineffective assistance claim. So the Alford plea, besides the fact that we're all here today still arguing about this years later, clearly, the attorney was correct 12 in giving him the advice he could face consecutive time. 13 And then the decision was rational to take the plea to the minimum on that charge and then run it concurrent with the time that he was already sentenced to.

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16 Now going back to the robbery and the attempted 17 robberies, we have five people who are laying on the 18 ground. Every single one of them testified that the 19 defendant waved his gun at all of them. Now as I hear 20 defendant's argument, if he stopped at you and then you and 21 then you and then you and then you then we have five. 22 Those would be five robberies. Those would be consecutive 23 time because they're distinct acts. I pointed at you, and 24 I stopped. I pointed at you and I stopped. But here, we 25 have one robbery because he does this instead of saying man

1 in the tie, on the ground; woman with the earrings, on the 2 ground. This is - - - this is what he's saying separates 3 this case from Ramirez, the fact that it was a continuous 4 pointing of the gun. Every single one of those people said 5 the gun was pointed at us as a group, it wasn't pointed at 6 individ - - - one individual. Julie Belknap says it was 7 pointed right in her face. Clearly, it's pointed at Mark 8 Lewis, who is shot in the head. Every single one of them 9 who came in and testified said it was pointed at the group. 10 That he was waving it around. That doesn't make it one 11 robbery. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So counsel, it wouldn't 12 13 matter how many people? What if - - - what if there had 14 been ten people and then each of those were run 15 consecutively? We have - - - here, you know, that - - -16 that would net this guy maybe fifty years or more in jail 17 just for robbery when, you know, nobody died here. I agree 18 with Judge Pigott. 19 MS. WOLFORD: Right. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: This was a horrible incident 20 21 but nobody died. 22 MS. WOLFORD: Well, and you know, Your Honor, 23 with all due respect, the - - - the law in this is really 24 kind of messy. And part of it is because it does come down 25 to some very, very specific factual determinations in each

1 trial. 2 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, doesn't it ultimately come 3 down to the second prong of the Laureano test which is the 4 separate and distinct prong? This ultimately comes down to 5 that, right? 6 MS. WOLFORD: Whether they're separate and 7 distinct acts - - -JUDGE FAHEY: Right. 8 9 MS. WOLFORD: - - - between them? Yes. 10 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah. 11 MS. WOLFORD: And here we have - - -12 JUDGE FAHEY: But the problem I had was that 13 that's not really the way I thought - - - saw you - - - saw 14 you arguing it. I thought you were arguing it on - - - on 15 the old mens rea first-degree murder versus second, and you 16 really weren't arguing it that way. 17 MS. WOLFORD: I think that argument was an 18 attempt to distinguish it from the cases on the second-19 degree murder cases. And like I said there's two arguments 20 with respect to that. 21 JUDGE FAHEY: And that's where all the Appellate 22 Division authority is so that's why you were doing that? 23 MS. WOLFORD: Right. 24 JUDGE FAHEY: I see. 25 MS. WOLFORD: And then if we go back to the

1 concurr - - - the robbery, quite frankly, I think the Appellate Division got it wrong in running the - - - the 2 3 one completed robbery cons - - - consecutively to the two -4 - - the four attempts and then running all of those 5 concurrently. Because I think that the record - - - there 6 was record support for the judge's decision to run those 7 terms consecutively given the facts as he found them - - -8 or as the jury found them at this trial. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: How long did this whole thing take 10 11 MS. WOLFORD: It - - -12 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - from the time that he 13 accosted these five kids and - - - I don't know if I should 14 call them the kids, but - - -15 MS. WOLFORD: It took - - - it took a very short 16 period of time. All of them say they don't know exactly, 17 how long but all of them will say it's very quickly. 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: Does that bother you at all - - -19 MS. WOLFORD: It was very quick. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - that because - - - the judge 21 says that because you did this with this one, I'm giving -22 - - I'm giving you fifteen plus five and on this one, I'm 23 giving you ten plus five, and all this adds up to forty-24 eight years in jail. 25 MS. WOLFORD: Right. Well, what we don't want to

discount - - -

2	JUDGE PIGOTT: Doesn't that bother you at all?
3	MS. WOLFORD: Your Honor, is the fact that
4	in this case that would be whether or not he abused his
5	discretion in his sentencing. And fact that would be
6	a factual issue not the underlying legal issue which, quite
7	frankly, is very important to the State. Not because of
8	the facts of this case but because it really does affect
9	consecutive sentencing law across the state whether or not,
10	under circumstances like this, it is separate acts.
11	Because there can be much more significant things that
12	happen to people under these circumstances.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: Like what?
14	MS. WOLFORD: What if what if the person at
15	the end of the line had a heart attack because she was so
16	scared?
17	JUDGE PIGOTT: We'll talk about that later.
18	MS. WOLFORD: I have no idea why that but
19	there's many, many, many circumstances that can
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: But you can charge that. Just
21	picking up what Judge Fahey is saying you decide how you
22	want to charge these things.
23	MS. WOLFORD: Right.
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: And that and those things
25	occur. But it just seems to me that and I don't mean

1 to - - - to take this lightly but I mean, you're putting 2 somebody away from fifty years because of - - - nobody 3 knows, I mean a five or ten minute thing where nobody - - · 4 nobody died. 5 MS. WOLFORD: Right. 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: And in fact the gentleman that was 7 shot, I mean, it was a grazing - - -8 MS. WOLFORD: It was a graze wound. Well, - - -9 JUDGE PIGOTT: That doesn't - - - doesn't that 10 trouble you? 11 MS. WOLFORD: It doesn't trouble me, Judge, 12 because basically what could happen here is ultimately that 13 is the sentencing - - - sentencing court's discretion. And 14 here, he could have received the minimum on each one of 15 those charges and there's no mandatory consecutive. It's 16 discretionary consecutive. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Minimum - - -JUDGE STEIN: So what if there were a hundred 18 19 people? What if he walked into - - -20 MS. WOLFORD: Well - - -21 JUDGE STEIN: - - - the mall or the - - - or the 22 train station or the grocery station and waved it around 23 and said okay, everybody down? Okay. 24 MS. WOLFORD: Well, and I was thinking of that, 25 Your Honor, because I was thinking of the circumstance,

1 where we see it in the movies or if somebody walks into a 2 There's a whole lot - - - all these people are here. bank. But I want to rob you. I want to rob this teller. 3 4 Everybody else is closed. And I walk into the back and I 5 say everybody on the ground but then I go right to you and 6 I stay with you and you're the only focus of my attention. 7 When I've got your money, I leave. Completely separate 8 from what happened here where during this whole event he's 9 saying on the ground, I'm going to kill every one of you. 10 He shoots - - - he steals your purse and he shoots you in 11 the head and he's waving the gun around at everybody who is 12 very close to each other. If those people had been behind 13 in the park watching, there wouldn't be a robbery. 14 JUDGE GARCIA: So what if, while he's at the 15 teller window, he says and all you behind me give me your 16 wallets while I'm doing this? 17 MS. WOLFORD: Then he has separate robberies. 18 JUDGE FAHEY: Your reading of the statute, 19 though, just to go back to the fundamental question which 20 is a question of - - - of what's just, is - - - is a life 21 sentence, right? Isn't that your reading of the statute 22 that - - - that we're at because it's intentional murder, 23 because it's felony murder it's a one, it's murder one, so 24 we're talking to life, right? 25 MS. WOLFORD: Correct.

1 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. So we're back to Judge 2 Pigott's question, which seems to be the heart of the 3 question, it is the Court of Appeals, so is that just? 4 MS. WOLFORD: Well, with respect to the felony 5 murder conviction, it's a - - - it's a mandatory life 6 sentence. He got the minimum for his record on that - - -7 on that term. 8 JUDGE FAHEY: So would that explain the reasoning 9 behind going for that as opposed to murder two and it would 10 have got capped at twenty-five? 11 MS. WOLFORD: As a prosecutor? 12 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 13 MS. WOLFORD: There's many reasons why you would 14 do that, and it would depend on the circumstances of each 15 It wouldn't necessarily be to get life on the end, case. 16 although that is obviously a factor if you feel someone 17 deserves that. But in the same - - - in the same vein, we 18 have an individual who every single person testified that 19 he brandished the weapon, they heard him cock the weapon, 20 he - - - that it seems from the record that Mr. Lewis was 21 slow to get down, and as he's getting down he gets shot in 22 the back of the head. He's lucky he flinched and it's a 23 graze wound because he's clearly shot in the back of the 24 head. And then depending on which - - - there's a little 25 bit of a conflict in the testimony whether the purse was

1	taken before or after. But quick frankly, after that he
2	takes off. So I think what ends up happening oh, I -
3	I'm sorry.
4	JUDGE FAHEY: You see what I mean, though, by
5	_
6	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Ms. Wolford, do you want to
7	move to to the Alford plea?
8	MS. WOLFORD: I do want to move to the Alford
9	plea just quickly. I think we've addressed some of it with
10	respect to I don't believe that counsel was ineffective or
11	counsel gave wrong advice that undermined the voluntariness
12	of the plea. I think the record was very clear it was a
13	knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. And that,
14	although it's an Alford plea which I know is not
15	necessarily beloved by the court, the court here did the
16	right thing in how it went through the entire factual
17	colloquy and the entire legal colloquy. And ultimately,
18	the record's very clear that he understood there was a
19	great possibility of him being convicted of intentional
20	felony murder after trial based on the original trial
21	results.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Was it what did he ask the
23	defendant? What did the judge ask during that colloquy of
24	the defendant? Because he says that's on this part
25	of his argument regarding the Alford plea

1 MS. WOLFORD: Well, - - -JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that's where he says the 2 3 judge - - - the colloquy is defective. MS. WOLFORD: Well, and I think that's actually 4 5 not what he wrote in his brief. He com - - - there's a 6 completely separate argument in the brief that has nothing 7 to do with that. But I think that what does happen - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: I think he did say that the 9 colloquy was not good enough. 10 MS. WOLFORD: He's - - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: And I think he did say it's 12 involuntary - - -13 MS. WOLFORD: He's saying - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - because you don't have 15 anything in this record to show that this defendant 16 understood the consequences of the plea. 17 MS. WOLFORD: Which - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: But anyway, you tell me why - - -19 why the record is - - - is good enough. 20 MS. WOLFORD: The record clearly goes through - -21 - I mean we're talking about whether or not he has already 22 - - - whether or not they understood that he could get 23 consecutive time. That's been the continuous theme. It is 24 written and the court goes over that and it goes over that 25 with counsel. Defendant is present with counsel. There is

1 clearly discussion back and forth. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: But does the record show he 3 understood otherwise all - - - all the other rights that he 4 was forfeiting as a result? He was waiving as a result? 5 MS. WOLFORD: Yes. It does sufficiently - - - it 6 does sufficiently - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: Where - - - where did the judge 8 ask of that? Or where is it in the record that you see it? 9 MS. WOLFORD: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I need - -10 - I'm going to need to look at the record because that was 11 not actually argued at - - - at no point in time did he argue that there was a Boykin's right violation. There was 12 13 no argument - - - the argument was completely focused on whether or not the - - -14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying it's not preserved? 16 MS. WOLFORD: It's - - - it's definitely not 17 preserved and it - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: This argument is not preserved. 19 MS. WOLFORD: - - - was completely not argued 20 until this morning. So I apologize. I don't have that - -21 22 JUDGE RIVERA: No. That's okay. 23 MS. WOLFORD: - - - fresh in my head. But he did 24 go through the part that was argued which was the 25 understanding of the defendant as to the strength of the

1 People's case and his likelihood of conviction after trial 2 and the defendant making a voluntary decision even though 3 the defendant had maintained his innocence with respect to 4 the intentional element of the attempted murder that he - -5 - that was covered during the Alford colloguy. And as we 6 argued in our answer to point three, Alford, by its nature, 7 the defendant's not admitting his guilt to all of the 8 elements of the crime. So the fact that he negates an 9 element there, that's expected in an Alford plea. But he 10 then says I understand that I would probably lose in that 11 argument and I'm willing to take the consequences anyway 12 given the beneficial plea bargain. 13 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Ms. Wolford. 14 Thank you. MS. WOLFORD: 15 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Hobbs. 16 JUDGE PIGOTT: Mr. Hobbs, isn't that true, and 17 from your own experience, sometimes you just don't want your client to say a whole lot when - - - when they plea? 18 19 MR. HOBBS: You may not want them to say a whole 20 lot but that doesn't mean that that's the right way for it 21 That may mean you have an involuntary plea. to be done. Ι 22 mean -23 JUDGE PIGOTT: But that doesn't rise to the level 24 of mode of proceedings error or anything, does it? 25 MR. HOBBS: Well, it - - - it is an error that

this - - - this court can reach as a matter of law. I
don't think it's ever been characterized as a mode of
proceedings error but in cases like Lopez and Mox and so
forth, if there's a defect in the proceedings, if there's a
defect that shows that the plea was not potentially fully
understood - - -

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, then how do we know that? MR. HOBBS: - - - then I think it'd raise - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Wouldn't - - - wouldn't a 440 suit the defendant better in a situation like this to explain why in his view his lawyer was somehow ineffective?

MR. HOBBS: No. And this - - - this record, the - - - the explanation of the sentencing risks if he went back to trial were stated on the record and it was erroneous or, at best, oversimplified. And there was just not a single question asked to clarify that with the defendant. There was not a single question asked if he even understood the advice of counsel that he received, much less whether or not it was actually - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, we don't know that. That's my point. In other words, is he going to say that or is his lawyer going to back him up or is he going to - - - we discussed all of this and I made it very clear to him I don't want to hear a peep out of you because I'm going to handle this with the judge and Alford's a complicated thing

1 and so we're going to run through it and do you have any 2 questions. And then at the end, you know, he didn't seem 3 to be particularly upset with his guilty plea. 4 MR. HOBBS: It's the court's obligation to ask 5 these questions. That - - - I mean the same thing could be 6 said of a case like Mox where the - - - the counselor, the 7 defendant - - - defense counsel answered the questions 8 about the defense that was being waived and said yeah, 9 we're going to waive that defense. That's fine. This 10 court held that that's not enough. You need to ask the 11 defendant if they know that they're waiving their defense. 12 Similarly, the same thing's for here. He needed to ask Mr. 13 Couser whether or not he understood what the sentencing 14 risks were if he went from - - - and he was making a 15 rational decision to avoid those sentencing risks. I mean 16 there's just no - - - I mean the attorney gets up there and 17 says it but we have no idea whether Mr. Couser understood 18 it. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Is that - - - that's the only part 20 that's defective? She is correct then that that's the only 21 argument you're basing this on about - - -22 MR. HOBBS: Yes. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - the plea, this part of the -24 - your argument - - -25 MR. HOBBS: I believe that that - -

1	JUDGE RIVERA: The plea about the plea
2	being involuntary?
3	MR. HOBBS: That is a fundamental defect in this
4	plea but the the plea on its on its whole is
5	deficient, and I made that argument both in my in my
6	opening brief and then more fully in the reply brief. I
7	cite Boykin.
8	JUDGE FAHEY: I think the question is, though, is
9	I think this is an important question because it's
10	either a pure legal question or or it can be enhanced
11	by the record. And because your argument is the record's
12	inadequate as to the plea, that would favor a 440. But if
13	if it's a pure legal question on the questions that
14	were asked and there has to be some deficiency in what the
15	defendant was asked to respond to by the court,
16	particularly, or or offered proof that was it failed
17	to be offered by counsel. One of those two things had to
18	happen. Is that is that correct?
19	MR. HOBBS: That's correct.
20	JUDGE FAHEY: Is that what you're arguing?
21	MR. HOBBS: It does have to be
22	JUDGE FAHEY: So it's a pure legal question? You
23	weren't arguing there's some there's some place that
24	we can point to in the record? You're just saying there's
25	a deficiency in the record that shows that that the

1 legal question wasn't addressed. 2 MR. HOBBS: Right. The deficiency is at least as 3 clear as it was in Serrano, a 1965 case, where this court 4 held an Alford plea was inadequate and - - - and Hill where 5 this court held the same thing. It's also at least as 6 deficient as Lopez and Mox. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: Could you respond to her 8 hypothetical about the bank? 9 MR. HOBBS: The bank. The bank involved a 10 robbery of - - - of the teller with a bunch of people 11 standing in the background. JUDGE RIVERA: Correct. Walk in, show the gun, 12 13 shoot the gun, whatever - - -14 MR. HOBBS: I'm not sure what the - - - the crime 15 against the people in the - - - in the background are. 16 There - - - there is no attempted robbery being charged 17 there. It - - - there wasn't - - - there wasn't any 18 attempt to rob those people. So I - - - you know, is it 19 menacing? I'm not sure what the crime would be there but 20 you'd have to look at what the elements of that crime would 21 be and then look at those. 22 I - - - I do want to respond to the - - - the 23 idea that, you know, if he had paused at each person and 24 made a separate threat to each of them. Potentially, that 25 could distinguish the crimes but this is where the law gets

1 fuzzy. How - - - how far into it can we get before we 2 start distinguishing separate acts? And I - - - I admit 3 that that is a difficult question under this law but it is 4 the question that's put to us. You know, and when it's 5 enough is a question for a different case. This case is -6 7 JUDGE GARCIA: Isn't the question, though, really 8 for the trial judge who heard all the testimony about the 9 acts and listens every day to this and - - - and 10 understands the situation from sitting through the trial. And again, going back to, I think Judge Pigott's point, 11 12 isn't this a question of fact more than law? 13 MR. HOBBS: I don't - - - I don't think this case 14 presents a question of fact because there was no such 15 distinguishing evidence. And when you look at what - - -16 JUDGE GARCIA: You're saying it's fuzzy, and I 17 think fuzzy to me means you really have to parse, I think 18 as you're saying, the facts of the case and did the person 19 pause, did they move on. If I'm a trial judge sitting 20 through the testimony of however many victims you had here, 21 I certainly would think I have a better basis for doing 22 that an appeals court looking back as a matter of law. 23 MR. HOBBS: What I was suggesting is that it 24 could be fuzzy if there was evidence of - - - of pauses and 25 evidence of separate threats to carry out the robberies.

1 Here there was no such evidence. The reason the sentencing 2 court gave for distinguishing these sentences and imposing 3 different sentences was not about separate acts that Mr. 4 Couser took. They were about how acts impacted into the 5 victims. In fact, one person had property taken, 6 accounting for one. The fact that Mr. Lewis got shot after 7 the robbery was complete, which was clearly held to be not 8 part of this robbery, that's supported by this court's 9 decision in Rodriguez, that was his justification for - -10 for heightening that sentence. The explanation for a ten-11 year sentence on one of the attempted robberies and fiveyear sentence on the attempted robberies, I don't - - - I 12 13 don't understand and there doesn't seem to be a good 14 explanation about that. 15 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. 16 MR. HOBBS: None of it was separate acts. 17 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. Hobbs. (Court is adjourned) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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2	CERTIFICATION
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4	I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing
5	transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People
6	v. Phillip Couser, No. 166, 167 was prepared using the
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10	and muleson
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20 21	Date: October 26, 2016
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