COURT OF APPEALS 1 2 STATE OF NEW YORK 3 -----4 PEOPLE, 5 Appellant-Respondent, 6 -against-No. 169 7 MATTHEW A. DAVIS, 8 Respondent-Appellant. 9 -------10 Appellate Division, Fourth Department The Hon. Samuel L. Green Courtroom 11 50 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14604 October 14, 2016 12 13 Before: CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE 14 ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA 15 ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN 16 ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA 17 Appearances: LAURA T. BITTNER, ADA 18 NIAGARA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 19 Attorneys for Appellant-Respondent 175 Hawley Street 20 Lockport, NY 14094 21 PATRICIA M. MCGRATH, ESQ. Attorney for Respondent-Appellant 22 37 East Avenue P.O. Box 293 23 Lockport, NY 14094 24 Karen Schiffmiller 25 Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next matter on
2	the calendar is appeal number 169, the People of the
3	State of New York v. Matthew A. Davis.
4	MS. BITTNER: Good morning.
5	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good morning,
6	counsel.
7	MS. BITTNER: May it please the court, my
8	name is Laura Bittner, and I'm here representing the
9	Niagara County District Attorney's Office. I don't
10	wish to reserve any time for rebuttal.
11	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.
12	MS. BITTNER: There was two points in our
13	brief to this court, and the first being that the
14	People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
15	assault that occurred on the victim in this case at
16	the hands of the defendant was a sufficiently direct
17	cause of the defendant or, I'm sorry of
18	the victim's death in this case.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: But didn't your expert
20	witness though from the M.E.'s office say "but for"?
21	MS. BITTNER: They did. That
22	JUDGE RIVERA: So how does that satisfy
23	reasonable doubt?
24	MS. BITTNER: The only time that that "but
25	for" was used was during that testimony of the

medical examiner. I'd point out to the court that the judge charged the jury properly. Obviously, the jury is presumed to have followed those judge's instructions. And what that "but for" causation was, was simply a starting point. It's the first step in the analysis.

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7 So, yes, "but for" the defendant entering 8 the victim's apartment that day, beating him up, he 9 wouldn't have died. We're at step one. And then the 10 medical examiner went on after that point to explain, okay, let's take this a step further. Why was this a 11 12 sufficiently direct cause? Because we had an obese 13 victim, who - - - given the information we know now 14 about obesity and the health problems that it can 15 cause, and the same way we consider, you know, an 16 elderly person might have health problems in that - -17 - in some of the other cases this court has examined, 18 has the potential to have heart disease, to have 19 heart problems.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, does the court have to take into account the knowledge or experience of the defendant? I mean, some people might know that obesity causes heart failure or heart disease. But what about a young person who isn't thinking about things like that? I don't know how

old the defendant is here, but what about someone who 1 2 may not have that kind of life experience? 3 MS. BITTNER: I think considered - - -4 considering the prevalence of that information, that 5 we have in the media now, the articles that are 6 written about it, things we see in the news about 7 just simply eating healthier, that - - - that 8 obesity, you can call it, can cause heart disease and 9 all these problems in that. I think that it is 10 within the average person's knowledge at this point 11 in the same - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: To - - - to understand if I 13 punch you in the jaw, you might have a heart attack, 14 because you're very, very overweight? 15 MS. BITTNER: Given this - - - when you 16 have a victim like this in front of you, yes. And 17 given the - - - the beating that occurred here too. 18 We're not just talking about one punch that broke his 19 jaw. We're not talk - - - we're talking about a 20 prolonged - - - blunt-force injuries that occurred 21 over and over again. And part of - - - I think what 22 the Fourth Department didn't address - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: And did the M.E. suggest 24 that that was the cause? 25 MS. BITTNER: What they suggested was that

1 2 JUDGE RIVERA: That prolonged struggle that 3 you seem to be talking about? MS. BITTNER: The longer the struggle, the 4 5 more brutal it was, the more strain you're putting on 6 a person's heart. And when you have someone whose 7 heart is already somewhat damaged, you're looking at 8 increasing their - - - their blood pressure, you're 9 increasing their - - - their heart rate, and so the 10 longer it goes on, the more brutal it is, I think 11 that increases the risk, and that's what we have 12 here. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: Do you have to be obese or 14 just very heavy? MS. BITTNER: I think - - - I guess 15 16 visually what, you know, this - - - this defendant 17 was looking at in front of him, whether he's making a 18 distinction between very heavy or whether he's, you 19 know, officially obese on your - - - your BMI, I - -20 - I think visually - - -21 JUDGE FAHEY: Well - - - well, there are -22 - - there are some - - -MS. BITTNER: - - - he could see this was 23 24 an overweight person. 25 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - some cases from the

1	Court of Appeals that on on the issue of heart
2	attack involving elderly victims. I think Anthony M.
3	is one and the People v. Cable and also People v.
4	Ingram. And and those cases, if if
5	you're familiar with them, do – – – do you want to
6	address those? Because they they seem to argue
7	that they don't argue obesity, but you have to
8	be aware of the condition of the person, I guess, in
9	the analysis. That would be the fairest way to put
10	it.
11	MS. BITTNER: And in that same way, you're
12	looking at someone who, you know, you might not
13	exactly know that they're eighty-six years old, but
14	you know that they are elderly. And the same way you
15	might know not know whether or not their exact
16	weight makes them officially obese, but you can look
17	at someone and see that they're overweight.
18	And in those cases, you know, we have even
19	a further attenuated someone that died ten days
20	later in Anthony or someone that died fifty-five
21	hours later. This was almost immediate. When you
22	look at the the evidence by the crime scene
23	experts and by the blood splatter experts, once Mr.
24	Bradberry went down, he never got back up again.
25	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah.

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, is there any significance we should attach to the fact that the 2 3 M.E. classified this death as undetermined? 4 MS. BITTNER: I think that that actually 5 perfectly so - - - showcases what the jury was supposed to do here. The - - - in the - - - I 6 7 believe it was in the redirect, the M.E. explained that they went with "undetermined", because it's not 8 9 simply a homicide. It's not simply someone walking 10 up, shooting someone in the heart, they're dead, 11 that's easier to determine. Nor is it, completely natural causes either. 12 13 So you have to look at all of the - - - the chain of causes that went into effect here to 14 15 determine the cause of death, and I think the M.E. 16 almost sa - - - said that's what the jury is here to 17 decide, is to look at, okay, we have this beating. We have this strain that causes on a heart. We have 18 19 a person who, we're looking at as obese or overweight 20 in front of us. And that's what ultimate - - -21 ultimately causes the death. 22 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Would you care to 23 address the admissibility of the video surveillance 24 tape? 25 MS. BITTNER: I believe those objections

1 went more so to the weight that was given of the 2 tape. As far as - - - there was extensive, I 3 believe, in Mr. Brandt's brief, as well as the 4 testimony at the court, as far as, you know, some of 5 the jumps in that that occur in the video. Something 6 for the jury to take into account as far as weighing 7 it's - - - as far as its weight, but not as its 8 ultimate admissibility. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Is your position that they 10 preserved this question about the - - - the 11 foundational question about admissibility, the 12 question is all about the weight? 13 MS. BITTNER: Yes. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 15 MS. BITTNER: Any further questions? 16 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 17 MS. BITTNER: Okay, thank you. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Ms. McGrath? 18 19 MS. MCGRATH: Good morning, Your Honors. 20 My name is Patricia McGrath. I'm here on behalf of 21 Matthew Davis, and I would like to begin by - - - by discussing the - - - the issue of the - - - of the -22 23 - - of the heart attack. Heart rate's a little 24 interesting concept for me at the moment, but I will 25 soldier on here.

1	The the the medical examiner,
2	which, of course, is is somebody who didn't
3	actually perform the autopsy but did have did
4	have an opportunity to review the the findings,
5	uses a "but for" test. And the
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, they I know they
7	said that, but but he's six-one, 270, right?
8	There's a bunch of them who are going to be playing
9	football on Sunday, right? And when they talked
10	about obesity, and when I first looked at this, I
11	thought, you know, we're looking at some lumbering
12	person who can barely get out of bed in the morning,
13	and, you know, sits in a chair all day, and that
14	wasn't necessarily the case here.
15	And isn't she right? The CJI was was
16	followed to a T. And and they said it's not
17	the "but for" test, it's a direct cause, and that's
18	what the jury was given and don't we don't we
19	have to presume that they followed that instruction
20	and came to the conclusion they did?
21	MS. MCGRATH: Well, I I think that as
22	the as the Appellate Division stated, the
23	the judge made the made the correct gave
24	the correct jury instructions, however, the
25	combination of of her her testimony and

1	the fact that the the heart attack for someone
2	who is forty-one years old, unlike the the
3	victims in in Anthony M. and and the
4	-
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: But the standard was right,
6	is is my point. In other words, if we're
7	looking at the question of law as to whether or not
8	the jury was given the appropriate standard by which
9	to to make a determination on the facts, they
10	got the right standard, and they reached a conclusion
11	that it was a murder; it was a homicide. So how
12	- how do we how do we interfere with that?
13	MS. MCGRATH: Be because as as
14	the the cases the line of cases that talk
15	about the the necessity for felony murder, that
16	there be a sufficiently direct connection between the
17	the incident and and the death. And, you
18	know, we have we have a a discussion by
19	the by the M.E. on the on the witness
20	stand with with regard to time of death,
21	although we don't know the time of death.
22	JUDGE GARCIA: But counsel, it's a giv
23	- to Judge Pigott's point in a different way a little
24	bit maybe, isn't with this instruction,
25	wouldn't we have to say there is no version of the
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M.E.'s testimony and the rest of it that would 1 2 support this verdict? I mean, that would really be 3 the standard, right? We would have to say there is 4 no rational way this jury could have applied the 5 correct instructions and come up with a guilty verdict? 6 7 MS. MCGRATH: Un - - - under - - - under legal sufficiency? 8 9 JUDGE GARCIA: Right. MS. MCGRATH: Yes, yes. 10 11 JUDGE FAHEY: You know, I - - - I - - -12 it's kind of an interesting question, be - - -13 because of - - - of how we look at causality. So are 14 we talking about that this - - - that the only way 15 that this - - - this victim would have passed away 16 would have been because of robbery, or are we talking 17 about that it was a significant contributing factor 18 in causing it? And which is it for your argument? 19 The reason I ask that is because Anthony M. 20 and some of those cases talk about it being a link in 21 the chain and - - - and the language is used that the 22 actual contributing factor forged a link at - - - in 23 the chain at the cause of events, which is kind of 24 normal, proximate cause. And - - - but if we 25 accepted your argument, I think we'd be saying that

1 there has to be, "but for" this happening, he 2 wouldn't have had a heart attack. It wouldn't have -3 - - it wouldn't happen. It's got to be the sole 4 contributing factor almost. 5 Do you see the distinction I'm making here between a number of factors that could be significant 6 7 that - - - to cause it or the sole factor that could 8 cause it? And - - - and that's the problem I'm 9 having with your argument, that - - - that - - - that 10 you're - - - you're arguing that almost would have to 11 be the sole factor that caused it. 12 MS. MCGRATH: Oh. Our - - - our argument, 13 Your Honor, is that, while it does not have to be the 14 sole contributing factor, that it has to be, you 15 know, more significant than wha - - - than what was -16 - - was - - - was testified to - - -17 JUDGE FAHEY: So let's assume that's true, We'll - - - we'll take that in - - - so then 18 then. 19 how is not appear a jury question, in weighing the 20 different factors? Because obviously there's more 21 than one factor. Obviously, weight was a factor in 22 causing it. Stress. You know, that happens over 23 time. It's not just at this - - - this particular moment. There are a number of factors, but this is a 24 25 - - was this a significant contributing factor?

1	How how do we distinguish those here as a
2	matter of law?
3	MS. MCGRATH: I I think that because
4	we have testimony by the medical examiner that it
5	- the report itself as I think, perhaps it was Judge
6	Rivera had had indicated that the report
7	itself shows undetermined maybe I
8	apologize, it might have been you, Judge. But the -
9	the cause of the death was was a question
10	for that the I'm not, I apologize
11	the manner of death is
12	JUDGE FAHEY: So what you're really saying
13	is, we should look at the the testimony then of
14	the the medical examiner in making our
15	determination. And so you're saying that's what
16	insufficient.
17	MS. MCGRATH: With with respect to
18	the the the felony murder. Then
19	then, of course, we have the the issue as well
20	with respect to the the videotape
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, before you get there,
22	I want to just go
23	MS. MCGRATH: Sure.
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: go back on his death
25	again. Your argument seems to end up being because

1	the the medical examiner's report, because the
2	you know, says what it says, you can move to
3	dismiss this right at right at the grand jury,
4	then, because it says it says cardiac event.
5	QED, I win. It's not homicide. Unless the C.M.E.,
6	or the medical examiner, says it's a homicide, the DA
7	has no right to charge to charge somebody with
8	murder.
9	MS. MCGRATH: No, I'm not saying that, Your
10	Honor.
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay, so that means that
12	because the sit the medical examiner said it
13	was a heart attack, does not necessarily mean it
14	would not be a homicide. The jury was given the
15	instructions that it has to be a direct cause or
16	whatever. They made a factual determination based
17	upon that standard using that medical examiner
18	report. What's the flaw?
19	MS. MCGRATH: Your Honor, as I said, I
20	think that the the flaw is that there has to be
21	some sufficiently direct as to to to use
22	the language of the cases, sufficiently direct
23	connection between the the action and between
24	the even though, it's not a "but for" test, it
25	still has to have some some significance.

1	JUDGE STEIN: Well, what makes this in
2	- insufficiently direct as a matter of law? What
3	- what is it that that's missing as a matter of
4	law that says that a jury could not take this
5	expert's testimony and find defendant guilty?
6	MS. MCGRATH: I honestly can't say that it
7	it would be as a matter of law, so that it
8	really goes to the the decision that of
9	the Appellate Division and its its analysis
10	which they have, of course, the the ability to
11	do, and and they they agreed with
12	with our argument that it was insufficiently direct,
13	and consequently it wasn't reasonably foreseeable
14	_
15	JUDGE RIVERA: But the but the
16	MS. MCGRATH: you know, we
17	JUDGE RIVERA: The People the People
18	are also arguing that in addition to the M.E.'s
19	testimony, and you're correct it's not the M.E. who
20	did this particular autopsy, but the M.E.'s testimony
21	and what we can get from it, that there's other
22	evidence anyway, so that the blood splatter and the
23	fact that it's a struggle to draw on. Let's assume
24	that one one would be persuaded by your
25	argument about the M.E.'s testimony. Why doesn't the

1 rest of the evidence, though, get you past the 2 hurdle? Because you focused only on the M.E.'s, but 3 I'm saying the People have argued, but there's other 4 evidence. 5 MS. MCGRATH: Yes, there - - - the - - the ev - - - the - - - the blood - - - blood splatter 6 7 evidence shows that there was a struggle, but we also 8 know from the - - - from the - - - the autopsy report 9 that there - - - there were no serious injuries. 10 There, you know, there was - - - there was some 11 contusions, there - - - there was, you know, a 12 fractured jaw - - -13 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Does there have to be 14 injury? What if - - - what if instead of just having 15 a fist-fight with the defendant, the victim came to 16 the door or the defendant barged in and had a gun and 17 then the victim immediately has a heart attack and 18 dies? Would you say there's no direct connection 19 between what the defendant did, barging in with a 20 gun, and the heart attack? 21 MS. MCGRATH: Well, I - - - I think that 22 goes to the question of foreseeability, Your Honor, 23 because, you know, I think it's a lot more 24 foreseeable that somebody would react in such a way 25 with a - - - if a gun is being pointed at them, then

1	if they're getting, you know
2	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So it has to be a
3	weapon?
4	MS. MCGRATH: No, I'm not saying it doesn't
5	have to be a weapon, but but but I
6	I think your your hypothetical, you know, has a
7	is a fact pattern that I think would
8	would more more reasonably support the
9	foreseeability.
10	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Ms. McGrath, would
11	like to move to the admissibility of video
12	surveillance?
13	MS. MCGRATH: Yes, as as we indicated
14	in our our briefs, I think that first
15	off, I think that the matter was preserved, because
16	there was there was an immediate motion upon
17	the testimony of the expert that this really did not
18	was not a fair and accurate representation of
19	what took place on the evening in question. That
20	- that that motion, in and of itself, as well
21	as the renewal of it at the time of the trial order,
22	I think sufficiently preserves the the matter
23	for our consideration today.
24	I I think that although you know
25	there are certainly a number of arguments proffered

1	by the appellant's brief with respect to how you
2	authenticate a video that, you know, the one that
3	they didn't get to is the one that that we
4	- we believe the most troubling, which is that it's
5	not a fair and accurate representation.
6	Consequently, you know, that comes out, then it's a
7	little bit like a house of cards with respect to the
8	underlying (indiscernable).
9	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
10	MS. MCGRATH: Thank you.
11	(Court is adjourned)
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2	CERTIFICATION
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