1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	AL RUSHAID,
5	Appellant,
6	-against-
7	No. 180 PICTET & CIE,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	October 19, 2016
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
17	Appearances:
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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Next on the calendar is appeal number 180, Al Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie. MR. NAFTALIS: May it please the court. Gary Naftalis for the appellants. May I reserve four minutes for rebuttal? CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir. MR. NAFTALIS: Leave - - - we saw it, and

leave to appeal - - - leave to appeal was granted by this court asking to review how, in our view, the First Department of the Appellate Division failed to apply this court's bright line standard found by a unanimous court only a few years ago in the Licci case for determining personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1), and also that the Appellate Division failed to address core allegations in evidence showing that - - showing in our allegations.

Because after all, we're here on a complaint were all the allegations are assumed to be true, and all inferences are to be drawn in our benefit. And indeed, that how our allegations show that Pictet repeatedly used its New York correspondent banking relationship to - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is that the operative standard that it has to be repeated use and that's it?

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MR. NAFTALIS: I would say so, Your Honor, because if you recall the history of Licci, the Second Circuit had the Licci case, it was removed from the state court to the Southern District, and up on the Second Circuit, and there was some confusion as to what was required beyond mere maintenance of a correspondent banking relationship.

What, in addition to mere maintenance of a correspondent banking relationship, would suffice to hold that a foreign bank transacted business, and would be subjected jurisdiction under 302(a)(1).

JUDGE STEIN: Well - - - and we examined - - - and we examined that in Licci based on - - - based on the activities of the bank there, which seem to me are very different from the activities of the bank here.

In Licci, the bank had its own interest and - - and was - - was actively using its account to - - to do something that was illegal, to even do what it did, which was to send money to terrorists, and so it had the direct relation. It seems that there are a lot of distinctive features between Licci and this. And the question is, is how far - - how far does Licci take us, not whether - - because to me, I think it's pretty clear that this is not Licci.

1 MR. NAFTALIS: I - - - I would respectfully 2 agree that this is not Licci because I would 3 respectfully submit this is a much easier case for jurisdiction than Licci. 4 5 In Licci, the certified question was, does a foreign bank's maintenance of a correspondent bank account 6 7 at a financial institution in New York, and use of that account to effect dozens of wire transfers on behalf of a 8 9 foreign client, and I emphasize on behalf of a foreign 10 client, constitute a transaction of business in New York. 11 This court answered that question by saying, complainants alleging a foreign bank's repeated use of a 12 13 correspondent account in New York on behalf of a client, in effect, a course of dealing shows percible - - -14 15 parsifal - - - if I can get some water. 16 JUDGE PIGOTT: Close enough. 17 JUDGE FAHEY: Purposeful. 18 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Purpose. MR. NAFTALIS: I'm a better lawyer than I 19 2.0 am a grammarian, I hope. 21 Time will tell. JUDGE RIVERA: 22 MR. NAFTALIS: I hope so. 23 Shows purposeful availment of New York's 2.4 dependable and transparent banking system.

The allegation in Licci, which is really kind of

1 important, is that the allegation -- you look at the Licci 2 complaint, is says in paragraphs 51 and 53, which are 3 quoted in the record of our case at pages 278 and 279, Judge Stein, that there that at all times, LCB, Lebanese 4 5 Bank, at all times, all transaction carried out in all the Hezbollah accounts were carried out by Hezbollah at the 6 7 direction of Hezbollah. And between 2004 and July 2006, Hezbollah made and received dozens of wire transfers via 8 9 defendant's AmEx bank. 10 So this at direction standard, which is contrary 11 to Licci which was set up by the First Department, is 12 completely contrary - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So as I'm 14 understanding what your argument is about purposeful 15 availment is that there's a money laundering scheme, 16 right - - -17 MR. NAFTALIS: Yes. JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that facilitates that 18 19 breach of the fiduciary duty. Stealing from their 2.0 employers, they're using the vendors to get these 21 kickbacks, right, am I following you? And they are -22 23 MR. NAFTALIS: Not only following me;

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, we'll see. And - - -

you're doing better.

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1 and - - - and then you have the money laundering scheme. And Pictet & Cie and Chambaz are the money 2 3 launderers. So now the whole case is whether or not the use 4 5 of Citibank in New York City is purposeful availment by 6 them in that money laundering scheme. 7 Tell me how they did that. Because that's what 8 - - - that's the test, the purposeful availment. 9 you're calling this course of dealing as the way you get 10 to purposeful availment. 11 MR. NAFTALIS: But here, you have - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 13 MR. NAFTALIS: - - - without any discovery in this case - - -14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 16 MR. NAFTALIS: - - - we've been able to 17 discover fifteen bribes that were paid into the correspondent bank accounts, and were then 18 19 transferred at Pictet's direction, because only 2.0 Pictet can direct the payment out of the 21 correspondent banking account, not - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, this is what I wanted 23 to ask you. So as I understand it, the complaint 2.4 alleges that the money that goes to Citibank, the

correspondent account in New York, is credited to

1	TSJ. It's then divided up amongst these three
2	employees later on, and their accounts are credited.
3	What does that mean, "credited"?
4	MR. NAFTALIS: What what it means is
5	is this. As the allegations of the complaint
6	say
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
8	MR. NAFTALIS: Pictet was a central
9	player in the money laundering.
LO	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
L1	MR. NAFTALIS: Pictet, this fellow Chambaz,
L2	who was the per he knew he knew the three
L3	corrupt employees for thirty years, was friends with
L4	them.
L5	JUDGE RIVERA: With them, um-hum.
L6	MR. NAFTALIS: He knew where they worked.
L7	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
L8	MR. NAFTALIS: He knew about their
L9	fiduciary duties to Al Rushaid, he knew that they did
20	they were not permitted to take monies from
21	vendors of Al Rushaid.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. No, no, no. But this
23	is this is a exercise of as I understood
24	your allegation, by the bank of their authority. And
25	I just want to know what that means to credit the

1 account. Does that mean the correspondent account -2 - - let's just use easy numbers. A vendor puts in 3 100 dollars' worth of kickbacks, that correspondent account informs Pictet, Pictet credits TSJ 100. 4 5 Right. That's what I understand the allegations are. Does that mean that the Citibank account 6 7 now is at zero and the Pictet account is at 100, or 8 does it mean something else? What does that mean to 9 credit - - -10 MR. NAFTALIS: I think it - - - once Pictet 11 authorizes the transfer out of the correspondent 12 banking account, it's no longer there - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 14 MR. NAFTALIS: - - - it's now in Pictet's 15 account. 16 Initially, in the phony corporation that a 17 Chambaz setup for them, which was this TSJ Engineering, which was a fake - - -18 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 20 MR. NAFTALIS: - - - which was used as a 21 conduit, and then first there, in that phony company 22 that was set up by Pictet for the corrupt employees 23 in the British Virgin Islands, and then transferred 2.4 from there to individual Swiss bank accounts that

Pictet had setup for the individuals in Switzerland.

And what Pictet has alleged to have done

here at the complaint stage here, is obviously be a

central player in the scheme. And why, in response

to Judge Stein's comment, I took a different view

6 you the difference between this and Licci.

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In Licci, what was the real harm? The real harm didn't occur in the United States. The real harm occurred in Israel. Because what happened in Licci, the allegation was that the alleged terrorist organization, Hezbollah, was killing innocent Israeli civilians, i.e. the plaintiffs or relatives of the plaintiffs who were killed or injured. But they were all killed or injured in Israel by the Hezbollah terrorists.

than Judge Stein's initial question was, let me tell

JUDGE STEIN: So was it your argument - - - is it your argument that here, it's Pictet - - - because Pictet knew about this - - - this bribery scheme, and enabled it, so to speak, that that's what gets it passed just being a passive transfer?

Because we said that merely having a correspondent bank account isn't enough. And as you describe it, whenever there is a correspondent bank account, the foreign bank has to be the one to direct money from that account to somewhere else. So in that view, then Three Amigos would be meaningless

because anytime there was a correspondent bank

account, there would be - - - there would be direct

action directed by the foreign bank, and in your

view, it would be long-arm jurisdiction, right,

purposeful availment.

MR. NAFTALIS: Well, I think that - - -

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MR. NAFTALIS: Well, I think that - - - most respectfully, I think you may be reading Licci a little too narrowly. Because - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, I'm trying to figure out where the line is.

MR. NAFTALIS: Well, the line is this. The line is this. What Licci was talking about, or this court - - - your court was talking about in Licci was, does - - - when is something purposeful as opposed to a mistake. In other words, if something happens once, and that's language in Licci, that they talked about not being a mistake. If something happens once, it could happen by accident; it could happen by - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, isn't that - - - isn't it a little different? Isn't it to show purposefulness, you have to look at them on a continuum. So - - - and that means - - - so on one hand you've got Licci, and on the other hand you've got Amigo Foods. One transaction doesn't show a

purposeful pattern of behavior. Licci was dozens, right? So in Licci, there was purposeful behavior, and that shows that this seems to fall somewhere between - - on that continuum between the two of them.

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MR. NAFTALIS: Well, if you look at - -
JUDGE FAHEY: In other words, it's not,

three transactions gets you in, no, that - - - that

gets you jurisdiction; it's not the way it works. We

have to look at the whole thing as a continuum, and

to see - - and to see if there was enough there in

the record. Here, we have fifteen transactions that

we have to determine whether or not that would

constitute purposeful behavior.

MR. NAFTALIS: Here, you have - - but what I - - - what I was trying to - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead.

MR. NAFTALIS: Answer - - - both in answer to your question and getting back to something Judge Stein said to me, fifteen transactions involving four million dollars' worth of bribes, why I say this is an easier case than Licci, and why it easily fits within it, here, as I was saying, the primary wrongdoing in Licci occurred in Israel because the killing of the people. The financial - - - the

financial assistance to it - - -

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JUDGE FAHEY: I know we got there, yeah.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - was secondary. Here, what was the principle violation? The principle violation was a breach of fiduciary duty by the three corrupt employees to our clients. And where did that happen initially? The payment of the bribes occurred in New York. It occurred at the correspondent bank. At that point in time, the breach of fiduciary duty was proven, and Pictet and it's - - - Pictet was central to that.

JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't that going to the second prong of the statute, the articulable nexus, and not this first prong, which is what we're still talking about?

MR. NAFTALIS: I think that the first prong is a much lower hurdle. The first prong - - - and that's what Licci was saying. We - - - in order - - - if somebody, and indeed, if you look at the Second Circuit follow-up opinion to Licci by Judge Sack, at some point, if you do enough, you're subject to the jurisdiction. And certainly, we would suggest that we plainly have a better situation than Licci on the first prong.

Secondly, on the second prong, which I think is

1 really easy in this case, because - - - and the second 2 prong acts as a bit of a shield, because if there's no 3 connection, no relationship, no articulable nexus, as 4 Licci says, between the transactions and the tort, or in 5 the violation, then some - - - you wouldn't have long-arm 6 jurisdiction. Here, you have it, because the bribes 7 themselves are the wrong. Here, it's an easy case, on the 8 second leg, Judge Rivera. 9 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, I'm sorry, chief, 10 may I ask one question? 11 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes. 12 JUDGE GARCIA: Mr. Naftalis, so if you 13 split it that way, one and two, doing business in New 14 York and in the nexus, right - - -15 MR. NAFTALIS: Yeah. 16 JUDGE GARCIA: So you have a bank, Zurich 17 Bank, they have a correspondent account at Citibank 18 and they do 10,000 transactions through that account 19 a day. Are they doing business in New York and 20 meeting the first prong? 21 MR. NAFTALIS: I think they are meeting the 22 If there was no connection whatsoever first prong. 23 2.4 JUDGE GARCIA: Understood. But just on the

1 MR. NAFTALIS: - - - they wouldn't be 2 meeting the second prong. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: Right. So just on the first prong, you're not looking at fifteen transactions 4 5 related to this specific - - - to the nexus question; 6 you're looking at how much business are they doing in 7 New York through their correspondent account? MR. NAFTALIS: I think what we - - - what 8 9 we have in terms of our record and our evidence here 10 is we have fifteen corrupt transactions. Fifteen 11 corrupt transactions - - -12 JUDGE GARCIA: Right. 13 MR. NAFTALIS: - - - which we think is of 14 the same family as dozens of corrupt transactions in 15 Licci. 16 JUDGE GARCIA: So I guess my question is, 17 do you need them to be corrupt transactions to meet the first prong, or if you do enough transactions in 18 19 your correspondent account in the Citibank in New 2.0 York, are you doing business such as to get by the 21 first prong of the jurisdiction? 22 MR. NAFTALIS: I think they don't have to 23 be corrupt transactions to get by the first prong of 2.4 Licci. I believe - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: And then the second is nexus

between X number of those transactions and the 1 2 alleged wrong in your complaint. 3 MR. NAFTALIS: Yes, Judge Garcia, I would 4 agree with that. 5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 6 MR. NAFTALIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Ms. O'Connor. 8 MS. O'CONNOR: Good afternoon, and may it 9 please the court. Maeve O'Connor, for the defendants 10 and appellees in this case. 11 Before I jump into Licci, which I've been calling [Lee'-chee] this entire time - - -12 13 JUDGE GARCIA: So have I. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: Me too, so it's okay. 15 MS. O'CONNOR: Okay. I was good. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: Keep calling it Licci. 17 JUDGE GARCIA: I think Mr. Naftalis is 18 wrong. 19 MS. O'CONNOR: I feel better. 2.0 So before I jump into that, I do want to say 21 that the picture that Mr. Naftalis has painted of this 22 elaborate money laundering scheme masterminded By Pictet, 23 this case has traveled a very long way through the 2.4 successive rounds of briefing, and the lawyer's

argumentation, the rhetoric from the complaint and from

the documents attached to the complaint, and this was a 1 2 motion to dismiss that was initially decided by New York 3 Supreme based on a complaint that says one thing about 4 correspondent bank accounts. It doesn't say they were the 5 center of a huge scheme. What it says is that the - - the corrupt employees caused, you know, the vendors to pay 6 7 money, and instructed them to pay it through these 8 correspondent bank accounts. That's the allegation in the 9 complaint on the correspondent bank accounts. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: You know, I think we're 11 familiar with the complaint - - -MS. O'CONNOR: Okay. 12 13 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - so let's now get to 14 purposeful availment. So can you clarify for me what 15 does it mean to have credited the account in 16 Switzerland? MS. O'CONNOR: Well, I mean, again, there 17 18 is nothing in the complaint on this. Right. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: I understand that, but I'm 2.0 asking what does that mean. 21 MS. O'CONNOR: Right. Well, as a technical 22 matter, I'm not - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 2.4 MS. O'CONNOR: - - - frankly entirely sure

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
2	MS. O'CONNOR: how the crediting
3	works. My understanding is the wire the money
4	gets wired into an account that's held in the names
5	of these individuals in Switzerland.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Pictet would approve this
7	transfer, this wiring, or this crediting?
8	MS. O'CONNOR: I didn't hear the question.
9	JUDGE RIVERA: Is that correct; Pictet must
10	approve it?
11	MS. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, I'm sorry to say
12	that I don't know the answer to that question. I
13	don't and again, there is no proof on that; we
14	heard assertions on it. So
15	JUDGE RIVERA: There's a motion to dismiss;
16	we are assuming the factual allegations
17	MS. O'CONNOR: There's no factual
18	allegation of this, Your Honor, at all.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: There's no factual
20	they say you credited it.
21	MS. O'CONNOR: They don't allege that
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Are you saying that's not a
23	factual allegation?
24	MS. O'CONNOR: There's no there is no
25	factual allegation, I believe, Your Honor, that

Pictet affirmatively took an action to cause the money to be wired into Geneva.

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JUDGE RIVERA: I believe they say it's credited, that you credited it.

MS. O'CONNOR: Okay. Well, I don't want to - - - I don't have that allegation specifically in front of me; I can look for it.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

JUDGE GARCIA: Going back to the complaint, doesn't, you know, paragraph 38 lay out this conspiracy theory among the employees of the bank and the corrupted employees? And it seems to me what the allegation is accepting them as true for jurisdictional purposes is the corrupt employees got together with Pictet, and I have to admit, I was calling it [Pic-tet], but Pictet bankers came up with this way to get money to the Virgin Islands, and part of that was setting up this company in the BVI.

But the allegations are that the insiders in the bank were part of that. So it isn't Amigos, certainly, where it was, the bank sends it to the corresponding account in York when it could have sent it to Maine.

And isn't it more like Licci, where the allegations in the complaint, and I've read that

complaint, where Hezbollah was allegedly directing the money into the New York correspondent account. The allegation, and I think it was Judge Stein who was getting at this earlier, that to me seemed to make the nexus was that the Lebanese Bank itself was part of the scheme to fund Hezbollah, and that using the accounts in New York which Hezbollah was directing the money to, furthered that scheme.

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And isn't that analogous to this, where the allegations, at least, or the bank was involved, for whatever commercial purposes it might have had, in helping these employees hide the money, those employees like Hezbollah used the correspondent account?

MS. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, I don't believe it's particularly analogous at all. I think that Licci is a different case. And I think they make some kind of extraordinary arguments, actually, trying to get jurisdiction here, to the effect that - - that repeated use is the standard, as opposed to purposeful availment.

JUDGE GARCIA: But let's look at nexus through the crime, which seems to me the Appellate Division is saying it was the corrupt employees, let's call them, who directed the money to go through the correspondent bank, which seems to be making an

analogy to Amigo.

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But what's different to me about that, is, one, Licci wasn't the bank itself saying there is no allegation that I can find in that case that the bank itself was directing the funds through its New York correspondent accounts. In fact, the only thing in the record I can find is that Hezbollah was allegedly directing the money into the New York correspondent bank.

So I have a problem with what the Appellate Division was saying was the distinction here; that the direction came from the corrupt employees rather than the bank; that doesn't make sense to me, especially in light of those two cases.

MS. O'CONNOR: Well, I'd be happy to address that, Your Honor. I think that the language of the decision by this court certainly seems to suggest something other. The allegation is that - - - that the clients requested that money be funded, but not that the clients requested that money be funded through New York.

And what this court stated is, while it may be that LCB could have routed the transactions on behalf of Shaheed elsewhere, the fact that LCB used a New York account dozens of times indicates desirability and a lack of coincidence.

And this is very significant. I think the court was focused on an active choice by that bank to actively wire the funds to New York, to reach out to New York, to choose New York as opposed to Miami or someplace else.

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JUDGE GARCIA: But how do you square that with the language in Licci from all the documentation below, and I think even in the circuit decision referring the question to us that it's Hezbollah who directs the money to go through the New York corresponding bank?

MS. O'CONNOR: Well, I don't - - - I don't know how to exactly square those, but it's the - - - it's the opinion of this court that's the law, and so I'm just reading this Code, and that's what we were - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: I don't think we ever - - - MS. O'CONNOR: - - - based on.

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - actually say the bank directed it. We say something about the bank's motives for using the New York correspondent account, it may be cheaper, but I think that you could also read Licci to say, the use by the bank of the corresponding accounts in New York really went to that the bank was part of the crime as alleged.

So the bank is using its accounts in New York to
further the improper purpose, and that's the use of the
bank of the New York accounts. Not that LCB, I think it

is, is saying, use our New York corresponding accounts.

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MS. O'CONNOR: Well, that's not the way I read the case, Your Honor, but - - and I also think that Licci key was further different in that the act of the wire was - - was the wrong. So the - - - the - - the bank is alleged to have shared a goal, and this court said that the wrongdoing occurred when the funds were wired. In this case, this is a case against a bank, the alleged wrongdoing occurred five months before anything was wired - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But it's a - - -

MS. O'CONNOR: - - - in Geneva.

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - conspiracy allegation, right, at least in part as two count - - - charges. So one is a conspiracy that the bank was part of aiding and abetting or conspiring, I guess are the two counts, to breach fiduciary duty by these employees. So if that's an ongoing crime, and part of that conspiracy is to launder the money into the British Virgin Islands, how is this not under our nexus analysis of Licci part of that?

MS. O'CONNOR: I actually think that issue

1 is a huge problem for the plaintiffs, and here is 2 why. The whole thing is an aiding and abetting 3 claim. Right. So they're trying - - -4 JUDGE GARCIA: There's also a conspiracy 5 claim, isn't there? MS. O'CONNOR: Well, there is a - - -6 7 there's also a conspiracy claim, but the - - - the -- - the claim is that they aided and abetted the 8 9 breach of duty, and that the bribes are an essential part of that payment. 10 But this is essentially an attempt to hold the 11 12 bank liable, or subject to jurisdiction based on the 13 conduct of others, because they're saying these other 14 people caused these funds to be wired - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, no. 16 JUDGE GARCIA: They're saying the conduct 17 of others is a conduct of your bank employees. 18 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Right. 20 JUDGE GARCIA: It's the bank being part of 21 this, the bank has the corresponding accounts, the 22 bank, and these are the allegations, set up the 23 British Virgin Islands company, and then the bank is 2.4 part of this, and the corresponding accounts are

being used. I think those are the allegations.

1 MS. O'CONNOR: Well - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: But their claim, as I said before, is that you are the money launderers, and you facilitated this breach of the fiduciary duty for the clients, these employees, and that you are completely active. That this is not a passive role; you're not sitting at the bank and money comes in and out of your accounts and you are unaware of it.

They alleged particular factual assertions about what Pictet & Cie did, as well as Chambaz, and the -- whatever it was, the eight board members, however many it was, and I - - - I - - - I'm just finding it very difficult to understand your argument when there are assertions on a motion to dismiss, just on the face of the complaint, is that that is the active role, and that that role only makes sense with respect to the correspondent bank if indeed you are approving the use of that bank.

Money goes in, you credit it somewhere else.

And if that's part of the money laundering scheme, and that's essential to the role that you played vis-a-vis the claims that they assert, the aiding and abetting and the conspiracy. That sounds to me like purposeful availment.

I'm not understanding your argument.

MS. O'CONNOR: Okay. Well - - - well,

that's not good news for me, so I'll make one more attempt - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: You have time.

MS. O'CONNOR: - - - and then I'll move on to another argument. But I guess our - - - our view is that it's not - - - it's not - - - it's very different from Licci, and different from other purposeful availment cases. Because in Licci, the bank was actively wiring money out through New York, choosing New York, and wiring it in that direction.

In this case, the bank is - - - funds are coming in, the actual allegations against the bank pertained to a meeting in Geneva five months earlier.

JUDGE GARCIA: But then if your view of
Licci is correct and we accept it, why don't they get
jurisdictional discovery to see if there is any
correspondence or communications indicating that what
they allege are the insiders at your bank, your
client's bank, are involved in directing the money
through New York, since they set up the Virgin
Islands shell company?

I think there are two reasons why they don't get jurisdictional discovery. The first is that Mr. Naftalis said to Justice Scarpulla, we don't need additional discovery.

1 JUDGE GARCIA: No. What he said was, I 2 don't need it; it's my fall back. 3 MS. O'CONNOR: Well, I think I was there, 4 and I heard it the same way Justice Scarpulla did, 5 and I thought to myself, okay, we're not going to 6 have that argument. And I don't think you can say 7 that to a court and then turn around and say, I'm 8 going to appeal your ruling because I was entitled to 9 something I said I did - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, it was in the motion, 11 it's an alternative argument - - -12 MS. O'CONNOR: Yeah. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - it may very well be 14 you don't want to undermine what you think is the 15 strongest argument on that oral argument, but it's in 16 your papers. 17 MS. O'CONNOR: Yeah. So - - - but 18 secondarily, I think the other reason is because 19 there's no need for it. Judicial efficiency would 2.0 not - - - does not make sense to the parties to 21 engage in a whole lot of jurisdictional discovery - -22 23 JUDGE GARCIA: But you are saying - - -2.4 MS. O'CONNOR: - - - when this case is 25

subject to dismissal.

1 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - it's their missing 2 piece that you've - - -I'm sorry. 3 MS. O'CONNOR: 4 JUDGE GARCIA: You're saying it's their 5 missing piece that they don't have the bank in any way affirmatively directing this money through New 6 7 York or taking an active role in the choice of the 8 correspondent account. And why wouldn't they be 9 entitled to do a limited amount of discovery to see 10 if you actually did that? 11 MS. O'CONNOR: Because the case is subject to dismissal as a matter of law under this court's 12 13 decision in Mashreqbank. And under the United States Supreme Court decision in Sinochem in 2007, you can 14 15 address forum non conveniens prior to addressing personal jurisdiction. 16 17 Forum non conveniens is a ministerial decision that a court can make and should make in a 18 case where otherwise the interest of judicial economy 19 2.0 would be disserved by undertaking expensive 21 jurisdictional discovery for no reason. 22 JUDGE STEIN: Well, you're not suggesting 23 that we should make that determination, right? 2.4 MS. O'CONNOR: Well, I believe this court

absolutely can make this determination for - -

JUDGE STEIN: Isn't that -- isn't that a highly factual discretionary balancing of a whole lot of things?

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MS. O'CONNOR: Well, this court could not make it as an act of discretion; I would agree with that. As an act of discretion, the lower court would need to address the first, and this court would review it for abuse of discretion. But this case, I believe - - -

JUDGE STEIN: We have nothing to review for abuse of discretion because no determination was made.

MS. O'CONNOR: That's correct. Because this is one of the unusual cases where the decision can be made as a matter of law. This case, if you march through the - - - the sort of key paragraph of this court's decision in Mashreqbank, which identifies that case as an unusual - - - as an unusual case in which forum non conveniens could be decided as a matter of law, the court said, "Apart from the use of New York banks to facilitate dollars transactions," a fact which we've said is of minor importance here, "we see nothing in this case to justify resort to a New York forum, no party is a New York resident," it's also the case here, "no relevant

conduct apart from the execution of funds transfers occurred here."

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That's also true, because as I've said, the claims against the Pictet will turn on conversations in Geneva; they won't turn on the fund transfers.

"No party has identified any important New York witnesses or New York documents." And the keyword there is important because the standard does not - - as articulated by this court, no party can, by scratching their head, identify any conceivable New York witness.

Even in Mashreqbank, there was alleged to have been transfers through a New York account, and in fact, there was allege to have been a fraudulent transfer from one New York bank to another. They would have been some New York witnesses, but there were not important witnesses in the case.

There is no property related to this dispute that's located in New York.

The question of related litigation, the plaintiffs have tried to sort of bootstrap their way up here by filing some other cases in New York.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, I know you want us to take a different action, but I want to stick to what's before us right here about whether

this is under Licci or not.

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MS. O'CONNOR: Okay.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And, you know, I - - - I think that part of my concern about the Appellate Division's decision is they never once used the term "repeated". And that was something that we mentioned in Licci.

Repeated banking activity shows New York transactions are, in fact, purposeful. And the Appellate Division never even use the word "repeated", although there are twelve, fifteen transactions here. So what does that tell us?

MS. O'CONNOR: Well, I think the word

"repeated", the way I interpret it, and I'm obviously

speaking to the authority on the meaning of the case,

but the way I interpret it is that it was used in

that case sort of as a proxy for purposeful

availment. And combined with other factors, such as

the - - - the - - - the sense that comes through from

the decision of an active choice to use New York.

In this case, there is deposits made through that account at the direction of third parties that are received by the bank, and I think the court felt it might be appropriate that that was not indicia of purposeful availment by Pictet, but

1 rather was something more passive. 2 And I'm not aware to be clear of any case 3 in which this court has found personal jurisdiction 4 based on the sending of deposits only through a New 5 York correspondent bank account. I think that would 6 be - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: But - - -8 MS. O'CONNOR: - - - I'm not aware of any 9 case like that. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: But again, it's wiring these bribes - - - the alleged bribes and kickbacks, they 11 are all factual allegations, right, to - - - to 12 13 Citibank, the correspondent account, which is then credited elsewhere. And as he points out, you got to 14 15 prove that. So again, I just - - - I'm trying very hard 16 17 to appreciate your argument, but I'm really not fully understanding. 18 19 MS. O'CONNOR: Okay. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: It's very hard to appreciate 21 what I think is the essence of your argument, which 22 is, vendors just put money in that account, and they

MS. O'CONNOR: Well, I guess I would say

ended up in Geneva, and we don't know how that

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happened.

this, Your Honor. I think that this argument that -1 2 - - that just receiving funds through a correspondent 3 bank account is very much akin to mere maintenance of 4 the bank account. Because merely - - - a bank that 5 merely maintains a bank account, if it's the case that they need to take action to cause those funds to 6 7 be wired, they're doing that all the time, but that's 8 not enough. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: But if it's used for the 10 purpose of this laundering enterprise, it's not 11 merely, we deposit it there, and somehow we decide 12 it'll end up in Geneva at some point or another. But 13 it's part of, again, it's their allegations - - -14 MS. O'CONNOR: Right, right, right. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - I appreciate that. 16 But it's part of this enterprise. 17 MS. O'CONNOR: Right, but I - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Doesn't that make that 19 different from just, you know, somebody is putting 2.0 deposits in my account? 21 MS. O'CONNOR: I don't think it does because again, I think their claims against Pictet 22 23 are about a meeting in Geneva five months earlier. 2.4 That's what those claims against Pictet are about.

Did Pierre-Alain Chambaz know or did he not know?

1	JUDGE RIVERA: But again, the allegations
2	are that this these are deposits, and it's a
3	kickback scheme that's over years.
4	Are you taking the position that this is all
5	like one day later?
6	MS. O'CONNOR: One day
7	JUDGE RIVERA: The fifteen transactions are
8	all one day later
9	MS. O'CONNOR: One day later
10	JUDGE RIVERA: after the meeting or -
11	
12	MS. O'CONNOR: I'm sorry, but I'm not
13	understanding.
14	JUDGE RIVERA: As I understood the
15	complaint was that this is over years.
16	MS. O'CONNOR: Well, I'm not taking the
17	position that
18	JUDGE RIVERA: Certainly it sounds like a
19	course of dealing over years.
20	MS. O'CONNOR: Well, I think our point
21	would be that the case against Pictet, this is a
22	foreign entity, the claims against it are going to
23	rise or fall not based on whether funds were
24	transferred through a correspondent bank account.

It's incidental. They're going to rise or

fall based on testimony by people who, by the way, can't be compelled into New York. These - - - these corrupt employees can't be compelled into New York by anyone present here.

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So it's going to rise or fall based on testimony by them and by Pierre-Alain Chambaz about what was discussed and was there a conspiracy, and was there - - - that's what it rises or falls on.

This, the transfers, you know, they say they're bribes, we say they're not bribes. I don't actually think they have properly alleged much of this stuff that is now spread all of their briefs.

But in any event, this is - - - this is not the core of their complaint by any stretch; I don't think there is a real substantial nexus to what needs to be proved by burdening completely foreign parties to speak in there not-native tongue about claims that - - - that, you know, pertain to something that took place in Geneva.

There is a perfectly adequate form available in Switzerland, and I don't - - - I don't think that there's any - - - any point in burdening the parties further with judicial discovery.

I see I'm out of time. Thank you very much.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Ms.

O'Connor.

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Mr. Naftalis.

JUDGE STEIN: Can I ask you a question about the discovery? You made a request for discovery, but in - - in response to the motion to dismiss, were there any affidavits or anything of a factual nature submitted to the court to asserting or providing a basis to say that there may be, you know, facts that would be revealed, and how, to assist you in establishing jurisdiction? I mean, isn't that what you have to do?

MR. NAFTALIS: We - - - in connection with the - - - in connection with the motion, we filed - - - in addition to the documents, we filed, in there in the record beginning at 209, a series of exhibits to an affidavit of mine, which I think they are Exhibits C through I, and they are at the record beginning at page 209, which are the instructions to the bribe payers to pay to the correspondent banks.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay. But that's your evidence of this. But did you ever say that we think that there may be other forms of - - - that's the evidence you do have.

Did you ever say, this is what we think we might be able to get, that's, you know, where the

1 case law clearly says it has to be more than 2 speculation and all that. Did you provide anything 3 to the court to support your argument that 4 jurisdictional discovery would be necessary and 5 appropriate here? MR. NAFTALIS: Yes. Well, we didn't put it 6 7 - - - we didn't put it in an affidavit, we did put it in our briefs, the kinds of questions - - - some of 8 9 the - - -10 JUDGE STEIN: Well, I'm talking about at 11 the trial level. 12 MR. NAFTALIS: No. 13 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. MR. NAFTALIS: I think we did that in 14 15 Supreme - - - in Supreme Court, not here. 16 check that to be sure, because I don't want to 17 misrepresent. But obviously, the discovery - - - and just 18 19 so it's clear, I wanted to clarify one thing on the 2.0 discovery while I'm answer your question. We - - -21 the notion that we gave up our rights to get 22 jurisdictional discovery, I mean, that's just not 23 correct. 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you see any limit to

this? Your rule is that if you have an account in

New York, you're subject to New York jurisdiction. 1 2 MR. NAFTALIS: No, that's not our rule. 3 Look, the rule is the rule that your court, that this court laid down in Licci. And what the court - - -4 5 and I want to get back to Judge Stein, so that I - -6 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. Forget it. 8 MR. NAFTALIS: No, no, I don't want to 9 forget it; I want to answer both questions. 10 The - - - no, what was happening was 11 particularly in some Southern District of New York cases, 12 the courts were all over the place trying to figure out if 13 just simply having a correspondent banking account isn't 14 enough, what more do you need. And they posed the 15 certified question to this court under the facts of Licci, 16 which we would respectfully suggest are not dissimilar to 17 ours in any way in terms of the core route. 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: So you think that's the 19 rule. You - - - if you fall within, what I keep calling Licci, then you're - - -2.0 21 MR. NAFTALIS: I'll call it Licci, it's 22 okay. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - then you're fine; if 2.4 not, you're not.

MR. NAFTALIS: I think that rule, because

if - - - when - - - when this court was dealing with 1 2 it, they were trying to set up some kind of bright 3 line test. 4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 5 MR. NAFTALIS: We don't want - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: And my understanding - - -6 7 MR. NAFTALIS: We don't want to take jurisdiction when it's like - - - in Amigo Foods, it 8 9 was a onetime unintentional thing which didn't even 10 happen. And if it's once or twice, and the court 11 even knew this - - - this court even in Licci said 12 that, you know, if it's once or twice by mistake, 13 that's not what we're looking for. 14 JUDGE PIGOTT: My understand - - -15 MR. NAFTALIS: We're looking for something 16 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. 18 MR. NAFTALIS: - - - and we think repeated 19 conduct indicates - - - I'm sorry, repeated use is -2.0 - - is a nice bright line test. 21 And I think that's where the Appellate 22 Division went wrong. They didn't even cite the 23 standard. What they did was - - - was almost like a 2.4 reargument of Licci because they were the same. 25 - - - you know, they were trying to - - - they

1 weren't accepting the allegations as true; they were 2 trying to carve out some passive exception, which of 3 course is inconsistent with the actual facts of Licci. 4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's why I ask you 6 the question. A passive exception doesn't sound like 7 a difficult thing to me. If - - - pick any bank you want in the world, if - - - if there's a 8 9 correspondent with a New York bank that they don't know a thing about, that's passive, we get 10 11 jurisdiction. We get - - - all of those cases come 12 to New York. 13 MR. NAFTALIS: No. I don't - - - no, I think if all - - - if - - -14 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: You just said they were 16 making a passive exception, I thought that - - -17 MR. NAFTALIS: No, if in fact - - - if in 18 fact, I'm the foreign bank and I have a correspondent 19 bank in New York, and I don't do anything, period, 20 there is no jurisdiction there. The long arm - - -21 you're not transacting business. 22 If you engage in repeated transactions 23 there - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: The bank. 25 MR. NAFTALIS: If - - - yes.

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: Not employees, not 2 depositors, the bank does. 3 MR. NAFTALIS: Yes, and - - - but the 4 depositor - - - the bank, Judge Pigott, acts on 5 behalf of its depositors. That's - - - that's why I 6 think there was some mythology in the Appellate Division's - - - a bank doesn't act for itself; it 7 8 acts on behalf of its depositors, its customers. 9 That's what they were doing in Licci. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I think if the bank knows that they've got a terrorist, and they're 11 12 trying to assist the terrorist in getting money, and 13 they use a bank in New York, there may be something to be said about that. 14 15 MR. NAFTALIS: I agree. And just - - -16 JUDGE PIGOTT: If, on the other hand, they 17 say to Citibank, you know, we'd like to set up a 18 banking thing with you because we've got people that 19 travel back and forth between us and them, and the 2.0 people that are using it are doing whatever - - -

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Because otherwise, you're saying, you know, you're saying just having the correspondent bank makes you - - -

whenever they're doing, maybe the bank - - - maybe

you don't have jurisdiction over the bank.

1 MR. NAFTALIS: Yeah, but - - - but just as 2 - - - indeed, even in the latest Licci, or the Licci 3 --- the follow-up Licci opinion after ---JUDGE PIGOTT: Licci II. 4 5 MR. NAFTALIS: - - - this court certified 6 to the Second Circuit and Judge Sack wrote, I mean, 7 the New York courts have - - - if an interest in not 8 having the banks being used for either terrorism, 9 money laundering, which is what we have here, or the 10 like. 11 I think it seems to me what you - - - if - - -12 if those are your allegations, and they are here, and they 13 14 15 heck of a lot more. 16 17

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are allegations supported by evidence, which I - - - even without any discovery we have these fifteen bribes. And obviously, if we got discovery, we might discover a whole And what I said, just so it's clear, at page 271 of the record before Judge Kapnick, who - - - - Justice

Kapnick, when she first heard the argument before she got elevated, it's our - - - after arguing why we had jurisdiction, "It's our view that we don't need additional discovery. I think we have enough here. We just add that as a fallback argument. And I think we have plenty here to show that the jurisdiction - - - "

So we weren't withdrawing it; we were saying we

1 had - - - we think we have enough here without 2 jurisdictional discovery. But if this court felt that we 3 didn't, we certainly have made a sufficient start by - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Can we decide the forum non 4 5 conveniens as a matter of law? 6 MR. NAFTALIS: I'm sorry. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: Can we decide the forum non conveniens as a matter of law? 8 9 MR. NAFTALIS: Oh, I wouldn't think so in 10 this case for two reasons. Number one, Mashregbank 11 was, as this court said, a rare case, a rare case. 12 There was one - - - one unimportant 13 transaction in New York. And indeed, in Mashregbank, 14 as you would recall, the original plaintiff - - -15 this was - - - the original plaintiff said it ought 16 to be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. 17 This was a third party claim by the defendant. 18

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And in addition, in Mashreqbank, there had been two levels of discretion exercised before it got up to this court. Supreme Court that there had made a ruling, which said that - - - said that forum non conveniens applied, the First Department reversed that ruling, and then this court reversed the First Department. So there had been review there.

And in addition, just for a minute or two, since

my - - - my - - - my friend here argued, this is hardly a case. There is so little showing here. I mean, I think it should be remitted as - - if they want - - - if they want to continue to press this issue, it should be remitted so there is an exercise of discretion to be reviewed.

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But this is unlike any forum non conveniens motion I ever heard; there was no affidavit from them with a list of third-party witnesses who would be available in Switzerland.

JUDGE RIVERA: But if - - - but if the allegations are true, exactly as you state them - - - MR. NAFTALIS: Yes.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - And all you've got is this account in New York and nothing else, why isn't that an appropriate basis to rule as a matter of law in the forum non conveniens?

MR. NAFTALIS: Well, for a number of reasons. One, that's not all we have. There is an affidavit in the record that we submitted to Judge Scarpulla, I think I can get you the record cite, where we had pointed out other witnesses, for example - - and connections to New York, for example the individual plaintiff, Rasheed Al Rushaid, maintains an office in New York.

1 Secondly, two of the critical witnesses 2 that we have, Dr. Ibler and Ms. Medler, who at that 3 time ran an investigation firm called Stratex Capital, their principal place of business is in New 4 5 York, they're the ones who discovered the fraud. 6 They are critical - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: Those are your experts. 8 MR. NAFTALIS: They're not experts; they're 9 fact witnesses. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, I see. 11 MR. NAFTALIS: They discovered the fraud. 12 No, they weren't - - - they're not hired experts. 13 Indeed, although this is not in the record, Dr. Ibler is now the CFO of ARPIC, and he maintains office in 14 15 New York. 16

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In addition, there are the witnesses and documents from Citibank and the other financial institutions which are in the evidence we submitted; HSBC, Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank, all of whom were involved in the transactions here.

Thirdly, in the United - - - in the United

States, there's a lot of United States connection. First

of all, all the bribes from all the bribe payers that we

have discovered so far were paid in New York. And the

principle bribe payer is a United States company called

NOV, which is located in Texas, who would be susceptible to discovery here, and would not be susceptible to discovery in Switzerland.

In addition, there are a number of pending actions in the - - - in the commercial division against four or five of the bribe payers. So you have the issue of coordination, which is - - - is a factor, and fine - - and as I said, they have made no showing there are any nonparty witnesses in Switzerland, obviously that's where they come from, that's where I assume they'd like to be.

And in addition, there is also a disproport - - a disconnect between the kind of discovery in process
you get in Switzerland. There is no real discovery there,
there are no depositions; you would never be able to get
the testimony of - - - here, you could get testimony
obviously of people in New York, but also like the thirdparty bribe payers who could get a commission before a
state Supreme Court judge, to take a deposition and the
like.

JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you, counsel.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ NAFTALIS: Thank you very much for hearing me.

(Court is adjourned)

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1	CERTIFICATION
2	
3	I, Meir Sabbah, certify that the foregoing
4	transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of
5	Al Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie, No. 180 was prepared
6	using the required transcription equipment and is a
7	true and accurate record of the proceedings.
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