1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	TARA N.P.,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- No. 8
7	WESTERN SUFFOLK BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SEVICES,
8	Respondent.
9	20 F 1 . G
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	January 10, 2017
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE  ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
16	Appearances:
17	MARY ELLEN O'BRIEN, ESQ.
18	MIROTZNIK & ASSOCIATES, LLC Attorneys for Appellant
19	2115 Hempstead Turnpike East Meadow, NY 11554
20	CHRISTOPHER ALLAN JEFFREYS, ESQ.
21	SUFFOLK COUNTY ATTORNEY Attorneys for Respondent
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25	Meir Sabbah Official Court Transcriber

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good afternoon, 1 2 everyone. Appeal number 8 on today's calendar, Tara 3 N.P. v. Western Suffolk Board of Cooperative Educational Services. 4 5 MS. O'BRIEN: May it please the court. am Mary Ellen O'Brien. With me is Michael C. Levine, 6 7 of Meyerson & Levine, we are attorneys for the 8 appellant. 9 This appeal raises two issues. 10 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, do you care 11 to reserve any rebuttal time? 12 MS. O'BRIEN: Oh, yes - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Excuse me. 14 MS. O'BRIEN: - - - I'm sorry. Three 15 minutes for rebuttal. Thank you. 16 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Three? 17 MS. O'BRIEN: Three, please. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may. 18 19 MS. O'BRIEN: This appeal raises two 2.0 issues. Whether or not the County made a prima facie 21 showing that it cannot be held liable as a landlord, 22 and whether or not the County made a prima facie 23 showing that it's entitled to a - - a governmental 2.4 immunity.

As to the landlord issue, the specific act, so

1	to speak, that giving rise to this, is the failure
2	of the duty as a landlord, the common law duty as a
3	landlord to provide the very basic of rudimentary safety
4	or security procedures, once a recidivist had been
5	referred, assigned, or acquiesced in being present at the
6	site.
7	This is the issue that we had argued below.
8	There is no question that the County was in any
9	landlord/tenant relationship with the NACEC facility,
10	which they knew was an educational facility. There's no
11	question that they had an internal policy that you're
12	never to send someone who is a convicted
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Does the tenant have the
14	final say on whether or not to accept the recommended
15	employee?
16	MS. O'BRIEN: Well, NACEC accepted it
17	accepted the had the had the ability to
18	accept or reject someone.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Could they have hired
20	someone not referred to them; could that have chosen
21	someone else?
22	MS. O'BRIEN: I'm not following.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Can you
24	MS. O'BRIEN: If NACEC could hire someone -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. Was there arrangement that you could only hire someone that was referred to you, even if you could turn down one of those referrals?

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MS. O'BRIEN: There are no facts in the record which indicate that. The - - - the lease provides that NACEC was - - - was responsible for the in - - interior of the building, under its lease terms. It agreed separately, under a separate agreement, to services agreement, to become a work site or to allow the premises to be used as a work site for the government's work employment program.

There is no indication that that was an exclusive arrangement, but there was never - - - there's no facts either that they - - - there was ever anyone else placed. And there was clearly an agreement also between the County and NACEC that NACEC's lease was in - - - in exchange for the services it was offering to young people to get GEDs, and also there was a separate tenant who housed a school.

JUDGE STEIN: But don't we have to look at what were the acts that - - - that caused this injury, and decide whether they arose out of that proprietary function as a landlord, versus whether they arose out of the governmental function of the

1 County in administering this SWEP program? 2 Isn't that what we - - - what we have to 3 look at first and foremost? 4 MS. O'BRIEN: That is to the - - - in - -5 in the way this - - - the precedents have involved 6 with this continuum of responsibility when you're 7 acting in a dual capacity, both as a landlord. But 8 I'm - - - the reality of this is that as a landlord, 9 they - - - as a landlord, you still have an ongoing 10 and exclusive duty, a common law duty to provide a -11 - - a safe premises for foreseeable harm. There's no 12 quest - - -13 JUDGE STEIN: Right. But the question is, 14 is whether the State has - - - has immunity from that 15 liability, because, again, if - - - if the act - - -16 if the injury arose out of not their landlord "role", 17 but their governmental "role", then - - - then we 18 have a different analysis. Isn't that - - - isn't 19 that correct? MS. O'BRIEN: That's true. 20 21 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. 22 MS. O'BRIEN: Under the ca - - - that in 23 the referral, where you isolate the event to the 2.4 referral, saying - - -25 JUDGE STEIN: Okay.

MS. O'BRIEN: - - - the referral is all I 1 2 am responsible for as - - - as a county. You do have 3 a tenant duty. But I don't think that - - -4 JUDGE STEIN: No, no, I don't think we have 5 to say that the referral is all that I'm responsible for, I think we have to look at the nature of what 6 7 happened here. MS. O'BRIEN: So I don't think the referral 8 9 10 JUDGE STEIN: In other words, let me - - -11 let me stop you for a second. 12 MS. O'BRIEN: Okay. 13 JUDGE STEIN: We could, and - - - and I - -14 - you know, I think one way to look at this is, was 15 the County hiring a maintenance worker because they, 16 you know, this was a position that they needed to - -17 - to fill in to - - - to maintain their maintenance 18 responsibilities. Or was this person sent there 19 because the County was involved in this SWEP program, 2.0 and this was one of their placements, so they gave 21 this guy this job. 22 So to me, that - - - you know, that's how I 23 view it. Why - - - why isn't that the right way to 2.4 view it?

MS. O'BRIEN: Well, I think the - - - the -

1	it isn't the right way to view it because I thin
2	the common law duty is coexistent with the duty of a
3	government and a landlord. You still have a duty as
4	a as a as a landlord to provide for
5	foreseeable harm. Once the County and I think
6	it arises I think the negligent act is the
7	failure to warn NACEC, or to tell NACEC, in any way,
8	that this was a person who might pose foreseeable
9	harm.
10	JUDGE STEIN: How is this different

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MS. O'BRIEN: They robbed it from the ability to protect itself, or from any other way to provide any means to protect the children on the site.

JUDGE GARCIA: But isn't that more of a claim by NACEC against the government then, instead of a claim by the plaintiff directly against the government?

MS. O'BRIEN: I think it goes to comparative fault to contribute - - - I mean, both, I think have to have liability here. There's no question - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But not - - - not on a contributory basis, because you can have a claim against a third party when the claim by the plaintiff

against that third party may be barred, like workers' comp. Right. So wouldn't this more, given the nature of the failure here, which as I understand it is, we're going to send you a worker under this program, don't worry, we won't send you a felon, the school then relies on that to say, you know, we may not do a check, we're not going to do our own vetting, you've promised, and they send a Level 3 sex offender over, wouldn't that go to, that's why I'm liable to this plaintiff in a claim, though being barred, because there's no special duty by the plaintiff directly against the County?

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MS. O'BRIEN: I don't think that it does, in the sense that, since the County withheld very vial information which was - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well - - -

MS. O'BRIEN: --- to allow the ---

JUDGE FAHEY: - - - that doesn't get you around the special duty problem that Judge Garcia just raised.

Analytically, it seems like a three-step process once they act as a governmental proprietary. Secondly, if it's governmental, is there a special duty. And then if there is a special day, does the government immunity defense apply.

1	Now, I grant you, I think the government
2	immunity defense, if you got to it, may be a question
3	of fact, on the last prong on that letter, but I'm
4	adding a hard time to see how how you establish
5	a special duty here. You want to touch that? Your
6	case
7	MS. O'BRIEN: Yeah, I I would like to
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9	JUDGE FAHEY: your brief does that.
10	MS. O'BRIEN: I would like to
11	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, you should talk about
12	that a little, because
13	MS. O'BRIEN: Yeah. I would like to touch
14	the special duty problem.
15	JUDGE FAHEY: It seems to be the nub of it.
16	MS. O'BRIEN: Yeah. I
17	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah.
18	MS. O'BRIEN: I believe I believe
19	under the scenario of the facts in this case, and
20	relying heavily on the Haddock v. City of New York
21	case, and
22	JUDGE FAHEY: I'm familiar with the case,
23	and Haddock, interestingly enough, it was a referral
24	of there was a rape of a nine-year-old girl,
25	and it was a park employee, similar kind of scenario

1 2 MS. O'BRIEN: Right. 3 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - a sex offender 4 referred. Except there, I think Judge Kaye's opinion 5 said that - - - that this referral was a governmental function. 6 MS. O'BRIEN: No, she - - - she said - - -7 8 JUDGE FAHEY: No, her language, quite 9 specifically said it's governmental function of - - -10 but that the government immunity offense - - -11 defense applied, and there was never any analysis in 12 the case of - - - of the special duty problem. And 13 so our cases have evolved, our jurisprudence has 14 evolved, since then, you know, Valdez and McLean. 15 But there it says, "Plaintiff's injury 16 allegedly resulted from govern - - - "a governmental 17 decision to retain its employee, not any proprietary 18 function in managing a park." It's in Haddock at 483, 484. 19 20 And I think I recognize there is a - - -21 there's a problem here in our jurisprudence, because, 22 you know, the facts are so similar here, they applied 23 the government immunity defense, but I still see the

special duty problem.

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MS. O'BRIEN: With regard to the special

duty, the only two prongs, I think the key thing here is by eliciting NACEC to be a work site.

JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.

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MS. O'BRIEN: It was a very special obligation that was assumed. According to the factual record, which was that you were not going to send someone who was a recidivist sexual offender.

And I think that the - - - there was clearly knowledge that that person would cause harm.

And the two last prongs, which are the direct contact and justifiable reliance, which according to the jurisprudence of this court have - - - have relied heavily on the direct contact between the person who was harmed and the reliance of the person who is harmed.

But in a case like this where you have a - - - a school where she is - - - she is the locus parentis.

We've got disabled adults, we've got children, this - - - the promises and the justifiable reliance directly to the Rosemarie Dearing of NACEC between the County, I think can be imputed, where for the benefit of the children and the people at this, basically raises a question of fact in my mind, under Florence v. Goldberg and Haddock, because you have a duty here that was assumed.

And this is clearly a ministerial act, because for eight months, while the County tracked the hours that

he - - - that Mr. Smith worked, and while the County knew he had work restrictions, which meant he was a sexual offender, they may not have known he - - - he was a sexual offender twice of minors, but they certainly knew he was a sexual offender of minors, and they had him there, and nobody ever questioned that assignment.

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They had an internal policy that said, you're not to assign someone to that - - - to that school, or any educational facility - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, I - - - I get what you're saying about tracking the hours of - - - of Mr. Smith. But referring him to the program, you think that was a ministerial function, as opposed to no discretion on the government's part?

MS. O'BRIEN: Well, the - - - the facts and patter - - - the fact pattern, as developed in the record, was that Elizabeth Trusas says to the counselor who just matched him up with the ZIP Code, and referred him there because he didn't have a car and he could walk.

The other thing that she said was, well, you know, he was going to be working outside. She knew he had a work restriction, so there - - - there really was no reason judgment, which is the whole purpose of the - - - the special duty, the - - - the ability to allow county

1 workers to be free to - - - to - - -2 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: We don't know whether 3 there were other employers who were similarly 4 situated, or perspective employers that Mr. Smith 5 could have walked to work, right, we don't know that. MS. O'BRIEN: We do not know that. 6 7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Yeah. MS. O'BRIEN: We do not. There's no facts 8 9 in the record - - -10 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So - - -MS. O'BRIEN: - - - then that would make -11 12 - - mean that you would have to have a question of 13 fact to establish a special duty, if that were the 14 case. 15 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. MS. O'BRIEN: Thank you very much. 16 17 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel. 18 MR. JEFFREYS: May it please the court. 19 name is Christopher Jeffreys, assistant county 2.0 attorney with the County of Suffolk, for the 21 respondents in this case. 22 I believe the questions on the direct 23 examination point out the problem. And this court's 2.4 Applewhite decision, I think, solves the first major

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hurdle.

In Applewhite, which is the guiding principle that we're using, it's your most recent decision on the issue of governmental propriety versus governmental function, the test is not whether the same thing is done by a private enterprise, but rather whether the governmental entity is exercising its powers and duties of government conferred by law for the general wellbeing of its citizens.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but this is a troubling case to me for a number of reasons, but the cost - - - let's say we agree with you and the Appellate Division, and then you have a case where the County specifically represented they wouldn't send a felon, let alone a sex offender to this institution, arguably relied on by the institution, and then you say, but, you know, we have this immunity here.

So the message that could be taken from that is, you could enter any agreement you want with the placement of these workers, and say, you know, don't worry, we're not going to send you a - - - we would never send you a sex offender, then you - - - like, sorry, you should never have relied on that, probably because, you know, the Court of Appeals is never going to hold us liable.

That troubles me. And - - - and this is

somewhat different than a case where this was part of the 1 2 program, you had your own internal policies, you send 3 someone. I think that's the case with the park that Judge 4 Fahey was referring to. This is different. 5 MR. JEFFREYS: If I could - - -6 JUDGE GARCIA: I mean, how do you 7 counteract - - -8 MR. JEFFREYS: - - - if I could help you a 9 little bit with that 10 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - that message? 11 MR. JEFFREYS: In this particular case, we 12 have three contracts that are in the record that form 13 the entire agreement between the County and NACEC. 14 There is the lease, there is the service agreement, 15 and there is the memo of understanding. 16 And in those three documents that sets 17 forth all of the rights and liabilities of the 18 parties. There are merger agreements in it, there's 19 a no oral modification clause agreement, and if there 2.0 were to be no referral of criminals, it could've been 21 stated in the contracts; it's not. The contracts are 22 absolutely silent about who - - -23 JUDGE GARCIA: But what is it stated in? MR. JEFFREYS: - - - it should be referred. 2.4

JUDGE GARCIA: What is that stated in; that

representation is made where?

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MR. JEFFREYS: The serve - - - the lease agreement says that the lessee will equip, operate, and a training facility for citizens of Suffolk County who are unemployed, who are under employable, or economically disadvantaged.

JUDGE GARCIA: Right.

MR. JEFFREYS: That's what the lease says.

There's nothing about the qualifications of the people; they just have to be unemployed or unemployable.

The services agreement says, "The contractor, at no cost to the County, shall develop a program to train and educate persons needing and deserving to become employed, will upgrade in skills for employment."

There is, again, nothing in there that puts any limitation of any kind on the individuals who get referred.

The third written document, which modifies the service agreement, because it could only be modified by a writing, is the memorandum of understanding. And in the memorandum of understanding, "The parties hereto desire to make available for eligible Suffolk County residents, and employment and training program, that includes work experience under the Work Investment Act, WIA, or SWEP."

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So what's the genesis 2 of the agreement not to refer the - - -3 MR. JEFFREYS: The genesis of agreement 4 comes from the request from NACEC. NACEC requested, 5 through the state system, because we have to 6 understand, the computer system that operates all of 7 these systems are run by the State of New York. When it was run by the County of Suffolk, and all of the 8 9 individual counties, there were sixty-two different 10 computer systems running the WEP programs under 11 366(C). 12 The State brought it in - - - within its 13 own management, and they made certain determinations of what individual counselors could see. And the 14 15 determination was that they could not see the negative input that NACEC had a position that they 16 17 didn't want criminals. That that was the thing that was blocked from our counselor. That is a NACEC - -18 19 2.0 JUDGE RIVERA: So what are you saying, that 21 - - - that's in the computer program? 22 MR. JEFFREYS: Yes. It's actually in the 23 record also. 2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: There was not a negotiation

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about that?

1 MR. JEFFREYS: No. No. Now, would we, if 2 we had seen that, sent somebody who is a criminal to 3 No. We're partners with NACEC, we would do NACEC? 4 what may NACEC would had - - - would have asked. But 5 it's NACEC's policy, not the County's policy. The 6 County's policy is to get everyone who is in the SWEP 7 program employed, employable, or trained. 8 JUDGE FAHEY: So your - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: So you - - -JUDGE FAHEY: - - - your - - -10 11 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - never confirmed to 12 them that - - - that what you're saying is in a - - -13 in the computer program their policy is something 14 that you were in accord with? 15 MR. JEFFREYS: I - - - I - - - you - - -16 you trailed off at the end. I'm sorry. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry. So the - - there was never communicate - - - you're saying, 18 19 there was never any communication that you were 2.0 acquiescing to this policy? 21 MR. JEFFREYS: Our person says, we told 22 NACEC that there was - - - this person was a 23 criminal. Ms. Dearing, who is the executive 2.4 director, says, I don't remember that. But he - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: I think the judge's question

is, did you - - - Judge Rivera's is, did you ever communicate - - - did the County ever communicate to the school, let's call them, that they would not send them a felon?

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MR. JEFFREYS: No. There's nothing in the record to indicate that. There is - - - there are different individuals who testified, that said, if they had known, they would not have sent this person to NACEC, but they didn't know. The counselors didn't know.

And ultimately, NACEC had the responsibility. This is NACEC's limitation, not the County's limitation.

So when we look at Haddock v. the City of New York, that is a very similar scenario, but to NACEC. In Haddock v. the City of New York, the claim was negligent retention of an employee. The City of New York had chosen to hire, in that case it was a rep person, it was a former prisoner who is in a SWEP-type program, and the City kept that person as an employee.

Now, the City has certain guidelines for criminals in their own program, and they had to do certain things according to their own guidelines, and the City didn't do it. And Judge Kaye, in her decision, criticized the City for not doing that. But the issue in that case

1 came down to the fact, as the justices has said, that this 2 was not a proprietary act - - -3 JUDGE GARCIA: I'm sorry. I'm having some trouble find - - -4 5 MR. JEFFREYS: - - - this was a 6 governmental act. 7 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - following the 8 sequence. So it is the school's requirement that you 9 don't send felons. 10 MR. JEFFREYS: Yes. Well, criminals. They 11 said no - - - nobody with a criminal background. 12 JUDGE GARCIA: And that's only theirs, not 13 yours. 14 MR. JEFFREYS: Correct. 15 JUDGE GARCIA: But somehow, that gets 16 communicated to you, right, because Exhibit L has, as 17 an enrollment requirement, "Do not refer applicants with criminal record." 18 19 MR. JEFFREYS: Correct. There is a 2.0 printout that comes from the State of New York that 21 our counselors don't get to see. Our counselors 22 don't see that, it's on the state welfare to workfare 23 program, it is blocked from the counselors, such as 2.4 Elizabeth Trusas, who actually sent NAC - - - to - -

- sent Mr. Smith to NACEC.

1 JUDGE GARCIA: So she wouldn't have seen 2 this Exhibit L. MR. JEFFREYS: No, she did not. And that 3 becomes what the issue was. When - - -4 5 JUDGE RIVERA: But I'm a little confused. 6 When you say it's a state printout, it's a state 7 printout of a state form? 8 MR. JEFFREYS: It's a state printout of a 9 state website. The state website is called the WTC 10 website - - - WTW website, excuse me, that is 11 exclusively a WTW state-backed website for all 62 12 counties. 13 The State does all of the input of all of the SWEP representatives. The County's websites, 14 15 where we used to do it, is no longer in existence. 16 The State has foreclosed us to do that separately. 17 We must use the State's website now. The State's 18 website happens to be significantly different from the County's website. We felt that counselors should 19 2.0 know this information. The State decided, no, 21 counselors do not need to know this information. 22 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: During - - - during -23 - - any time before this incident happened, counsel, 2.4 did the County know - - - did Ms. - - - counselors

like Ms. Trusas know that NACEC - - - or NACEC had

asked not to have criminals sent to them?

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MR. JEFFREYS: In --- in this record, there's no proof that that exists.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I - - -

MR. JEFFREYS: That - - - that she knew that there was nobody. She searched for individuals, and the notes concerning Mr. Smith's placement shows how hard she searched for him in order to find a place that would take a criminal.

When she saw NACEC's particular opening, which was for a maintenance ground assistant for landscaping, painting, and cleaning duties, and then she called NACEC, and there was a conversation that it was supposed to be an exterior job not involving students, so we have no reason why - - - no reason to know why Larry Smith, who was under the control of NACEC at the time, was actually in the GED classroom at all, considering that was not the scope of what the referral was that we were given.

So we don't know what NACEC did. If the plaintiff had a claim against NACEC, by all means, that claim could be proffered. But as this court is aware, I made the clerk aware, I made aware in a footnote, the case against NACEC has been dismissed.

JUDGE GARCIA: Judge - - - Chief Judge, may

1 I just - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - ask one question? 4 So under this - - - the County program, your 5 person making this decision, she knows this is - - - the 6 criminal history of this person. 7 MR. JEFFREYS: Yes, she does. 8 JUDGE GARCIA: She doesn't know, because 9 it's in the State system, but shielded from her, that 10 they have a requirement that says no criminals. 11 MR. JEFFREYS: Correct. She does not know NACEC's limitations on it. 12 13 JUDGE GARCIA: And then your person, let's 14 call them, makes a decision, given the job 15 description here, to send this - - - place this 16 person in this facility. 17 MR. JEFFREYS: Well, it was a call - - - it always ends up with a call to the potential SWEP - -18 19 - I don't want to say employer, because there's not 20 an employment relationship there, but the SWEP 21 trainer, and it went to Elizabeth (sic) Dearing, I 22 believe her name was, and she was the executive 23 director of the NACEC. 2.4 JUDGE GARCIA: I understand.

MR. JEFFREYS: And then ultimately, NACEC

agreed to take Mr. Smith, not for a job, it's not like we referred him and he got a job, he went for an interview, and then after the interview, NACEC made their independent decision to hire Mr. Smith into the program. The County had nothing to do with that.

Our end of the program was to get him an

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Our end of the program was to get him an interview, ultimately, he got a placement, and we had to keep records for timekeeping in order to meet the statutory requirements.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. Jeffreys.

MR. JEFFREYS: Thank you, Your Honors.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Ms. O'Brien.

MS. O'BRIEN: I think I really have to correct the record here.

First of all, the testimony is not so black and white as to what Elizabeth Trusas new or did not no. It was testimony from a Michael Denningan, who was the person who input, there was - - - this is true, they were changing over the system around the time that she made the referral, but there was testimony from Michael Denningan, who was then the head of Department of Labor overseeing these counselors who placed the work employment people out in the - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: He worked for the

1 County, not for the state; is that where you're 2 saying? 3 MS. O'BRIEN: He worked for the Department 4 of Labor in the County. 5 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Okay. 6 MS. O'BRIEN: And he input the - - - and he 7 - - - he said that he input, I believe, it was in 8 July, before the placement was done in August, and 9 that all Elizabeth Trusas had to do was to hit the -10 - - the spot, and the second page, which was the 11 offering page, evidencing the restriction, and it was 12 our understanding from Elizabeth Trusas' testimony 13 that that obligation was extracted, and it was a 14 promise that she got from the County when she went 15 into the agreement to - - - to allow the premises to 16 be used as a worksite. 17 JUDGE GARCIA: So it was an oral - - - I'm 18 sorry. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: No, no - - -2.0 JUDGE GARCIA: It - - -21 JUDGE RIVERA: That - - - that was the 22 question here. Go ahead. 23 JUDGE GARCIA: So the oral promise - - -2.4 MS. O'BRIEN: Yes. I - - - I think it was 25 an oral promise, but it then appears - - - it then

1 appears in her offering sheet, which describes that 2 this promise was made, and it is - - - it's been 3 memorialized in the - - - the offering sheet. 4 JUDGE GARCIA: And where is that offering 5 sheet in the record, do you know? MS. O'BRIEN: It is - - - if I could find 6 7 it. 8 JUDGE GARCIA: Perhaps your co-counsel can. 9 MS. O'BRIEN: It is on - - - you can see it 10 in one of them. In several places - - - okay. It's 11 706 in volume 2. 12 JUDGE GARCIA: Great. Thank you. 13 MS. O'BRIEN: But I've got "Do not refer an 14 applicant with a criminal record." That was the - -15 - that's in the offering sheet. That is right there 16 in 706. 17 JUDGE GARCIA: And clearly, the County had that sheet? 18 19 MS. O'BRIEN: According to, I think it was 20 --- there is --- there is a County --- a woman 21 by the name of Bailey is her last name, and another 22 young gentleman, kind of a hard name to say, both of 23 whom were deposed, and both of whose testimony appear 2.4 on the record, all testified - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Were County employees?

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                    MS. O'BRIEN: County employees. All
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          counselors, like Mrs. Trusas.
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                    JUDGE RIVERA: Could I - - - I'm sorry.
          Could you just clarify, what is an offering sheet?
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                    MS. O'BRIEN: The offering sheet,
 6
          apparently, was the second page that you - - - when
 7
          the counselors had it on this computer system, they
 8
          had the first page which listed work restrictions,
 9
          which told the counselor that the party they were
10
          interviewing was a - - - a person with a - - -
                    JUDGE RIVERA: All right. Let's try it a
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12
          different way. So you developed the offering sheet,
13
          correct?
14
                    MS. O'BRIEN: No, the County did.
15
                    JUDGE RIVERA: The County develops this
16
          offering sheet - - -
17
                    MS. O'BRIEN: Yes, coun - - -
                    JUDGE RIVERA: - - - and fills in - - -
18
19
                    MS. O'BRIEN: - - - and - - -
2.0
                    JUDGE RIVERA: - - - all these parameters -
21
22
                    MS. O'BRIEN: Based on - - -
23
                    JUDGE RIVERA: - - - they fill this in
2.4
          themselves.
```

MS. O'BRIEN: Correct. Correct.

This was

1 2 JUDGE RIVERA: And then they upload it into 3 the computer. 4 MS. O'BRIEN: Right. They - - - they're 5 the ones who put this information into the system 6 based on their conversation with Rosemarie Dearing, 7 and this is why I think there's a question of fact 8 here as to - - - to - - -9 JUDGE FAHEY: The prob - - - the problem 10 is, is that just let's take a - - excuse me, Judge. 11 I just want to go through this for a second. 12 MS. O'BRIEN: Okay. 13 JUDGE FAHEY: Recognizing here - - - to 14 create a special duty here, you're going under the 15 voluntary assumption of a duty, right, that's your 16 theory. And we all recognize it's a four-part test, 17 and you've got to meet all four parts. 18 MS. O'BRIEN: Right. 19 JUDGE FAHEY: And going through them, 20 there's assumption, knowledge, direct contact, and 21 justifiable reliance. Where's the direct contact? MS. O'BRIEN: Well, there's no direct 22 23 contact with Tara, but there is direct contact with

Rosemarie Dearing, who was the one who - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Doesn't - - - let me just

2.4

```
finish. Doesn't there have to be direct contact
 1
 2
          between the County's agents and the plaintiffs, in
 3
          order to create that special duty?
                    MS. O'BRIEN: But that - - - there have
 4
 5
          been minor exceptions in a very narrow realm, and
          that is the Florence v. Goldberg - - - there was no
 6
 7
          direct contact - - -
 8
                    JUDGE FAHEY: It's the Second Department
 9
          case, is you're talking about, is that the - - -
10
                    MS. O'BRIEN: The Florence v. Goldberg case
11
          is - - -
                    JUDGE FAHEY: I don't - - - I don't
12
13
          remember. I'll look at it again, though.
14
                    MS. O'BRIEN: I think maybe you - - -
15
                    JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, I know what you're
16
          talking about. Yeah.
17
                    MS. O'BRIEN: Yeah. It - - - I mean - - -
                    JUDGE FAHEY: There seems to be - - - let
18
19
          me just finish the point, and I recognize your time
20
          is up, but maybe the Chief Judge will allow you to
21
          respond.
                    That seems to be the weakest link in - - - of
22
23
          the four prongs for you.
2.4
                    MS. O'BRIEN: Well, I think the - - - when
25
          you're dealing with somebody who is disabled, I don't
```

1 think - - - I think you've got to look at the reality 2 - - - this is a person - - -3 JUDGE FAHEY: Listen, I've looked at the 4 reality of this case, these cases are very hard, 5 because they involve a limitation of a duty, usually, 6 where something really bad has happened. Something 7 that - - - that any normal person wouldn't reflect 8 on. So it's - - - I - - - we recognize that, I 9 think, honestly. 10 It's more a question of trying to apply 11 some awful facts, almost always in these kind of 12 cases, to a rather rigorous rule. So that's why I 13 ask it that way. 14 MS. O'BRIEN: Well, I agree. 15 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah. MS. O'BRIEN: There's no direct contact to 16 17 Tara, but I think you have to consider direct contact 18 to the NACEC. 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Ms. 20 O'Brien. 21 JUDGE FAHEY: To NACEC. Okay. All right. 22 (Court is adjourned) 23 2.4

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2.4

## CERTIFICATION

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I, Meir Sabbah, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Tara N.P. v. Western Suffolk Board of Cooperative Educational Sevices, No. 8 was prepared using the

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