1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 14 MICHAEL PENA,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	January 12, 2017
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
16	Appearances:
17	EPHRAIM SAVITT, ESQ.
18	THE LAW OFFICES OF EPHRAIM SAVITT ESQ. Attorneys for Appellant
19	260 Madison Avenue Suite 2200
20	New York, NY 10016
21	JOSHUA L. HABER, ADA THE NEW YORK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
22	Attorneys for Respondent One Hogan Place
23	New York, NY 10013
24	
25	Meir Sabbah Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on
2	this afternoon's calendar is appeal number 14, the
3	People of the State of New York v. Michael Pena.
4	Counsel.
5	MR. SAVITT: Good afternoon, Your Honors.
6	My name is Ephraim Savitt; I represent the Appellant
7	Michael Pena.
8	Had my client murdered three people and
9	been sentenced to the sentence that he got, seventy-
10	five years to life, I'm sure I wouldn't be standing
11	before this august court
12	JUDGE GARCIA: What
13	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And Mr. Savitt, may I
14	interrupt you for one second?
15	MR. SAVITT: Please.
16	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Would you care to
17	reserve rebuttal time
18	MR. SAVITT: Oh, I'm so sorry
19	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: before we get
20	into the argument?
21	MR. SAVITT: yes, yes. If I may have
22	three minutes of rebuttal time.
23	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, you may, of
24	course.
25	MR. SAVITT: Thank you.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, could you address the preservation argument?

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MR. SAVITT: Yes, Your Honor. First and foremost, under Criminal Procedure Law 470.05, which is actually a - - a very liberal standard for preservation, there isn't - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But counsel, if they were as liberal as you say it was, then there would never be - - - that would swallow the whole preservation rule.

MR. SAVITT: Well, Your Honor dur - -
JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: We would have to hear
every case that came here, whether the issue were
preserved or not.

MR. SAVITT: Well, the - - - the unconstitutionality of the sentence only arose after the sentence was pronounced. But even after the sentence was pronounced, and when the People were arguing for a maximum sentence of seventy-five years to life, I argued, because I was also his trial counsel, that my client, and this is on page 12 of the proceeding, as part of my appendix, he deserves to be punished, but not punished as if he had committed multiple murders in a heinous way; he did not.

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JUDGE STEIN: Well, you - - - you agree
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        that he - - - he committed multiple crimes.
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                  MR. SAVITT: He certain - - - yes, I - - -
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        of course, I agree.
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                  JUDGE STEIN: And you don't dispute that
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        consecutive sentences are appropriate.
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                  MR. SAVITT: Your Honor, I - - - I actually
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        do dispute that consecutive sentences, in this case,
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        are - - - are appropriate. I - - -
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                  JUDGE STEIN: Well, you're - - -
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                  MR. SAVITT: - - - I'm not saying - - -
                  JUDGE STEIN: You're talking about in terms
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        of the length. I - - - I mean as just as a matter of
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        - - - of - - -
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                  MR. SAVITT: Statutory - - -
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                  JUDGE STEIN: - - - statutory - - -
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                  MR. SAVITT: - - - interpretation. Yes, of
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        course. The statute is - - - it does not forbid
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        consecutive sentencing.
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                  JUDGE STEIN: If that - - - that's legal in
21
        this case, that's my question - - -
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                  MR. SAVITT: Under this - - -
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                  JUDGE STEIN: - - - legal to impose
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        consecutive sentences.
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MR. SAVITT: Under - - - under the statute,

2 JUDGE STEIN: And - - - and - - - and do 3 you dispute that twenty-five years to life for one of 4 these crimes is - - - is a reasonable and - - - and 5 not excessive sentence? 6 MR. SAVITT: Well, Your Honor, given the 7 fact that my client was sentenced to three times that 8 amount, as a minimum - - -9 JUDGE STEIN: Well, I'm not talking about 10 that. I'm talk - - - I'm asking about one. One 11 sentence, twenty-five to life - - -12 MR. SAVITT: Your Honor - - -13 JUDGE STEIN: - - - with this - - - for 14 this type of - - -15 MR. SAVITT: Our pos - - - our position is 16 that because he was a police officer, and under the 17 circumstances of the case, punishing him to a minimum 18 - - - on the minimum side to a sentence that - - -19 that is twice as long as the average rape sentence in 2.0 - - - in New York State and across - - -21 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Your position, 22 counsel, at - - - both at sentencing was ten years to 23 life would have been more like it. Right. That's -2.4 25

MR. SAVITT: Well, that's what I argued

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of course it is.

1 before - - -2 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Right. 3 MR. SAVITT: - - - the sentencing judge. And - - - and yes, it would've been more like it. 4 5 But I understand that - - -JUDGE RIVERA: What did the prosecutor ask 6 7 for? 8 MR. SAVITT: Seventy-five to life. Maximum 9 punishment. 10 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Twenty - - - yeah, 11 twenty-five on each count. 12 MR. SAVITT: Twenty-five on each count. So 13 that for each touching, there's another dead body, 14 basically. 15 Essentially, equating what, concededly, are 16 terrible crimes, but when there was a single victim 17 who was not, thankfully, killed during the course of these crimes, or even beaten, and was able to return 18 19 to her job within two weeks, I believe it was, after 2.0 this - - - this incident, and didn't even require 21 inpatient hospitalization, for each - - -22 JUDGE STEIN: Well, the trial judge seemed 23 to put a fair amount of - - - of weight on the fact that he was a police officer, and that he did use his 2.4

police weapon to coerce the victim into performing

1 these pretty horrific acts. 2 MR. SAVITT: Well, that's - - - that's 3 quite clear. And that's why he sentenced him - - -4 my client to seventy-five years to life. I'm arguing 5 that under the Eighth Amendment, and Article 1 6 Section 5 of our Constitution - - -7 JUDGE FAHEY: But the - - - the problem is 8 - - - is - - - it seems the key to - - - the heart of 9 this case is whether or not the issue was preserved, 10 before we even address the Eighth Amendment issues -11 MR. SAVITT: Well, it's - - -12 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - in and of themselves. 13 Let me finish. 14 15 MR. SAVITT: Oh, I'm so sorry. 16 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so as I understood 17 the objection you gave in trial court, and you can 18 correct me, because you know it better than me. You 19 said it was a draconian sentence, and then you made 2.0 the comparison. 21 But you never use the word 22 unconstitutional, you never challenged it under the 23 Eighth Amendment, those issues were never 2.4 specifically put before the court, because if they

had been, then it would have required the court to do

1	a particular analysis like the Supreme Court's
2	analysis, as it set out and looked the factors in
3	Ewing v. California. And that's and then we
4	would have had a record in front of us to look at
5	those issues, but that didn't take place here. So
6	that's, I think, why we're focusing on the
7	preservation issue.
8	MR. SAVITT: Well, Your Honor, as a
9	practical matter, even though the People asked for
10	seventy-five to life, and even though this is a
11	terrible case, concededly
12	JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.
13	MR. SAVITT: I I was actually
14	floored when consecutive sentences were
15	JUDGE FAHEY: That's understandable. But -
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17	MR. SAVITT: were were
18	JUDGE FAHEY: how about
19	MR. SAVITT: supposed.
20	JUDGE STEIN: is there been is
21	there been a post-trial motion, 440.20, I think is
22	the section, is has that motion taken place,
23	was the sentence challenged that way?
24	MR. SAVITT: No, it wasn't, but certainly
25	there was at least enough of a protest to the

1 to the - - - to the position of the People that there 2 should be maximum punishment in order to preserve it. 3 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: There were a lot - - -4 yeah, there was a lot of verbiage, counsel, as - - -5 as you pointed out, but the only word that you used was draconian. You didn't say it was cruel and 6 7 unusual, you didn't say Eighth Amendment, as - - -8 MR. SAVITT: I did not - - - it does not 9 say - - -10 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - Judge Fahey 11 mentioned. 12 MR. SAVITT: - - - concededly, I did not. 13 But, you know, apart from the procedural statutory 14 grounds that I argued, and maybe it's - - - I'm 15 arguing on a slippery slope, this is, in fact, a 16 Constitutional challenge to the sentence that was 17 ultimately imposed. And under the case law of - - - of this 18 19 court, such a Constitutional challenge does not have 2.0 to be raised in the first place before the trial 21 court. 22 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And what case are you 23 relying on for that? 2.4 MR. SAVITT: People v. Morse, this court, 25 in 1984, held that a - - - an attack against the

power of the court to sentence, as it did, may be raised for the first time on appeal.

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, you - - - you're talking about the power of the court, that's not the Constitutional issue that you're raising now.

MR. SAVITT: Well, Your Honor, the power of the court to sentence as it did, is - - - is the Constitutional issue.

JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, I think you're misunderstand what the power of the court is there.

If I'm right about that case, I thought that was - - - it was a jurisdictional issue. It's different than - - than the - - - the Constitutional issue that you are seeking to raise.

MR. SAVITT: But - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: You know, the thing about this case is, is that - - - two things that strike me. Of course it's an awful case, we all recognize that, but the other thing is, is that it - - - the legal issue, in and of itself, on the nature of the sentencing, if it - - - if it does, it's a serious issue, it's not a frivolous issue, I don't think that, and you can't say that about everything we see.

But it's very difficult for me to get around the preservation issue, and that's why we keep

going back to it, I think.

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MR. SAVITT: If I may, I keep going back to the language at 470.05. It doesn't have to be expressed, doesn't have to be implied, and it - - - it certainly was enough of an argument to the judge that - - that a triple punishment would - - - would be unfair and - -

JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but if you had raised the Eighth Amendment argument, and some of the - - - and you've presented us with all kinds of statistics, and comparisons, and analysis, I think, isn't the point of raising the argument in - - - in a way that would be recognized as - - - as what it is, so that the trial court could have entertained these kinds of - - - of - - - of this evidence, and these statistics, and the arguments about proportionality, and all of that, so that we would have a record to review.

MR. SAVITT: Well - - -

 $\label{eq:JUDGE STEIN: I mean, can we --- can we} $$ do that now?$

MR. SAVITT: Well, Your Honor, in retrospect, obviously, it would have been better if I came in with all these statistics and mentioned Eighth Amendment, Article 1, Section 5, but as a

1 practical matter, when - - - when a lawyer stands 2 with his client before the court, the lawyer does not 3 expect the judge to impose a - - a sentence that is 4 six times as long as the average sentence for rape in 5 - - - in the - - - in the United States. I - - - I understood that the judge was 6 7 going to impose a - - a tough sentence. The moment 8 he said twenty-five years, I figured twenty-five 9 years, okay, that's a murder sentence. Twenty-five, 10 concurrence it, you know, another pair of twenty-11 fives, concurrent to another pair of twenty-fives, is 12 a consecutive part of it that I, respectfully, argue 13 is unconstitutional under both, the U.S., as well as the New York State Constitutions. 14 15 And that does go to the power of the court. 16 How could a court have the power to impose an 17 unconstitutional sentence? 18 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. 19 Savitt. 2.0 MR. SAVITT: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel. 22 MR. HABER: May it please the court. 23 Joshua Haber for the People. 24 Defendant's claim is jurisdictionally

barred because it is unpreserved. Of course, now,

defendant is claiming that his cumulative sentence is cruel and unusual under the State and Federal

Constitution. As evidenced by Your Honors' questions, defendant never argued that his sentence was cruel and unusual before the sentencing court.

Defendant never argued that his sentence was unconstitutional. Defendant never attempted to invoke the bill of rights with the Federal

Constitution, or the same rights that are in our State Constitution.

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JUDGE STEIN: Why doesn't the exception to the preservation rule for illegal or invalid sentences apply here?

MR. HABER: Because this court made clear, actually, in People v. Ingram, which is controlling; that in order for a defendant to preserve a claim that his or her sentence is cruel and unusual, that defendant is required to preserve it in the court below.

And of course, for the past thirty years, that has been the controlling law in this State. The Appellate Division, in all four departments, has repeatedly relied on that law, and with good reason, to find that other claims of cruel and unusual punishment raised for the first time on appeal are

unpreserved.

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And ultimately, contrary to the defense argument here, all of the cases in which this court has found narrow windows through which preservation might be skirted, none of those apply here.

For example, in People v. Fuller, which defendant attempts to rely on, the judge, there, delegated the sentencing power of the court to the Department of Probation.

In other words, the question there was whether the entity, in that - - - in that case, the Department of Probation, had the power in the first instance to sentence according to legislative prerogative.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, we've recognized the differences between that case and Ingram, didn't we, in Ingram.

MR. HABER: Exactly, Your Honor. In Ingram itself, when the court announced that cruel and unusual punishment claims have to be preserved, there was a cf. cite at the end of that sentence to Fuller and to Morse, on which my adversary now relies.

Obviously, that cf. cite meant that in this court's sound judgment, whatever rule of preservation might have applied in those cases that went to the

1 question of whether the legislature in the first 2 sentence, had it empowered a judge to impose a 3 certain sentence, simply doesn't apply in the context of cruel and unusual punishment claims. 4 5 And the reason for that is also just more 6 fundamental. The legislature is in charge of 7 empowering the judges in our state and the courts to 8 impose sentences. 9 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, if we agree 10 with you, is the defendant without a remedy at all? 11 MR. HABER: Yes, Your Honor. The defendant is here without a remedy. But of course - - -12 13 JUDGE RIVERA: Doesn't he have an ineffective assistance of counsel claim? 14 15 MR. HABER: No, I don't think so, Your 16 Honor, for the simple reason that on the merits of 17 this case - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: On a 440, no? 19 MR. HABER: No, Your Honor. 2.0 JUDGE RIVERA: Is counsel saying, I had no 21 clue, I'd didn't think about it, I didn't know what 22 was going on. 23 MR. HABER: No, Your Honor. Because if you 2.4 read the trial transcript, and with due respect to my

adversary, he represented the defendant here with

1 incredible competence and vigor below. And he did so 2 as well at sentencing. 3 And his surprise in the length of the 4 sentence doesn't make him ineffective, because quite 5 frankly, the sentence in this case, even regarded on 6 the merits, is entirely Constitutional. 7 JUDGE STEIN: But that is a question that 8 the defendant could raise by a 440 motion. You're -

- - you're saying that - - -

MR. HABER: Oh, I'm sorry.

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JUDGE STEIN: - - - merit, but - - -

MR. HABER: Certainly, certainly, I - - - I don't think it's a meritorious argument; it's certainly an argument that the defendant could raise. Of course, the defendant could also attempt to bring a habeas corpus petitions in federal court, if he so chose, and then the federal courts would determine under Federal Constitutional precepts the Constitutionality of this sentence.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Getting back to Judge
Abdus-Salaam's question regarding remedy, are there
any executive remedies that can be sought?

MR. HABER: Of course, Your Honor. the defendant could always get clemency by the Governor. Admittedly, clemency happens on rare occasions, but

1 as we've recently seen, defendants with 2 extraordinarily long sentences, at times, based on 3 their particular behavior in prison, circumstances 4 change. And governors have that power to grant 5 clemency to defendants. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: Given - - - given the crime 7 here, it's pretty unlikely, don't you think? 8 MR. HABER: I would concede that. Yes, 9 Your Honor. However, in other crimes that involve 10 heinous acts of murder, and even terrorism, governors 11 have granted clemency in the past. 12 So just because a crime is particularly 13 heinous and troubling, doesn't necessarily mean that 14 the remedy of clemency is not available to defendant. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Did the People request 16 consecutive - - -17 MR. HABER: Yes, Your Honor. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - sentencing? 19 MR. HABER: Yes, Your Honor. The sentence 2.0 here, imposed by the court, was the sentence that was 21 recommended by the People here. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: So there was no surprise to 23 counsel. 2.4 MR. HABER: Correct, Your Honor. Correct,

Your Honor. In fact, as counsel just said, he

expected that the People would be recommending a sentence of seventy-five years to life. So in other words, going into the sentencing hearing, the defense had before it an expectation that there would be an argument here that a maximum sentence was permissible. And therefore, in that moment, it certainly was, you know - - could have been possible for the defense to raise a cruel and unusual punishment claim under either Constitution.

And just to get quickly to the merits, the merits of this case, albeit we concede this is a very long sentence, but to put defendant's cruel and unusual punishment claim in context, as far as the People know, based on our research, there's not been a single prison sentence in the history of this State that has ever been declared cruel and unusual.

In the history of the United States of America, there has only been one prison sentence for an adult defendant that was declared cruel and unusual, and that was in the case of Solem v. Helm, in 1983, where a low-level, nonviolent recidivist was sentenced to a life mandatory sentence without the possibility of parole for bouncing a one hundred-dollar check.

Here, of course, defendant's conduct is far

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different. He was an off-duty police officer who committed multiple heinous, violent acts of sexual assault. And I won't even get into the details of it; they are in the record for Your Honors to look at.

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But to say the least, the content of the defendant's conduct here was a far cry from bouncing a hundred-dollar check, which was the case in Solem.

And the defense can't point to another case throughout the country where a serious, violent felon who committed multiple crimes, whether over the course of the same criminal transaction, or on separate days, received what essentially amounts to a life sentence, and where that sentence was regarded as cruel and unusual.

As the Supreme Court and this court have observed, applying the cruel and unusual punishment clause to sentences of - - - to prison sentences really can only come up in the exceedingly rare case.

And given the facts of this case, given the egregiousness of the defendant's sentence, given the severity of the Penal Law provision under which defendant was convicted here, and the reasons for the Penal Law provision, for predatory sexual assault, this is obviously not the exceedingly rare case.

1 And in any event, as I started my argument, 2 defendant's arguments to the contrary are simply 3 unpreserved for this court's review under well-4 settled precedent. 5 And unless Your Honors have any questions, we'll rest on our brief. 6 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. 8 Hebert. 9 MR. HABER: Thank you. 10 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Savitt. 11 MR. SAVITT: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 First of all, of course I appreciate my 13 colleague's endorsement of my skills. I almost feel 14 that it's a - - - that - - - that I'm willing to 15 agree with Your Honor that perhaps I was not entirely 16 competent by not actually saying the words Eighth 17 Amendment, but I did say, and perhaps to my credit, 18 perhaps to my shame, that he shouldn't be punished as 19 if he committed a triple murder. 2.0 And it's true that I wasn't surprised, 21 certainly at the time of the sentencing, that the 22 People would ask for a maximum punishment, but I must 23 tell you, I was shocked that the maximum punishment

was actually imposed by the judge.

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The fact of the matter is, Your Honor, that

if we're going to start looking at - - - at various cases, such as People v. Ingram, I mean, People v. Ingram was a relatively short opinion, back in 1986, and at that time, I - - I understand that there was an issue raised by the appellant about Eighth Amendment, but the fact of the matter is that the case was really about a felony murder statute, and whether or not there was any preservation to a challenge to the felony murder statute, when the appellant in that case had been charged and convicted for invading a home, and somebody gets a heart attack inside the home, the question was whether or not, you know, he preserved any challenge to the felony murder statute, or that whether counsel asked for some sort of a - - -

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, I agree with you. I thought Ingram was a very short opinion, so I got the records in Ingram to find out what was really going on, because I thought maybe counsel might have raised an Eighth Amendment challenge, but he didn't, because both sides, both the People and the defendant agreed with the - - asked the court to impose the minimum sentence.

MR. SAVITT: I - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And he did not raise a

in the minimum, in the case of Ingram, who is, you know, like your client, someone who had never committed a crime before, and had just tried to commit a burglary, and as a result of that, the person he committed the burglary against had a heart attack and died. Those are the facts of Ingram.

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MR. SAVITT: I understand that.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Right. And so that's the felony murder that you're talking about - - -

MR. SAVITT: That - - - that's correct.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And both the - - - the defendant and the People thought that the minimum sentence was appropriate in that case, and the court imposed the minimum sentence, but the defendant then later thought, well, you know what, that's too much. That sentence is excessive, and it's cruel and unusual, but he never raised that to the - - - to the sentencing court.

MR. SAVITT: I understand. But to your point, People v. Ingram involved a case where felony murder, in fact, was - - - was the law that fit the crime. A person doesn't have to intend, as Your Honors know, to - - - to murder anybody, or kill anybody in the course of a burglary, but if somebody dies as a result of that, it's felony murder.

1 Here, it's a little - - - it's different. 2 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Are there any 3 circumstances, counsel, where the gun point rape of an adult woman causing a life sentence would be 4 5 unconstitutional? 6 MR. SAVITT: Yes, Your Honor. I believe 7 this is the case, and - - - and - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: I'm sorry. I meant 9 to say Constitutional. Excuse me. 10 MR. SAVITT: It was Constitutional. 11 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Um-hum. 12 MR. SAVITT: We would have to look at - - -13 at various factors that, frankly, just - - - Judge Carruthers did not. And we'd have to look - - - we'd 14 15 have to look at the defendant, whether or not he has 16 any - - - any prior criminal history, whether or not 17 this was, in fact, abhorrent to the rest of his life. 18 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Had the reason Judge 19 Carruthers didn't look at those factors is because 2.0 you didn't bring them to his attention; isn't that 21 true, counsel? 22 MR. SAVITT: No, I did, Your Honor. 23 argued that my client is a first time offender, it's 2.4 a - - - it's a single episode, is a single victim.

It's a terrible crime, but don't punish him as if he

1 killed three people. And that - - - that's where the 2 Eighth Amendment and Article - - - Article 1 Section 3 5 come into play. 4 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, you see, that requires 5 an analysis of the harshness of the crime, the 6 harshness of sentence and the seriousness of the 7 crime, and then you have to compare crimes within jurisdictions, and then similar sentences for similar 8 9 crimes within jurisdictions. 10 Usually, that's the standard that Eighth 11 Amendment cases are argued with under the Supreme 12 Court standard. 13 MR. SAVITT: Yes, Your Honor. JUDGE FAHEY: And that's where our lack of 14 15 record becomes a problem. But anyway, I do understand your argument, but it's - - - it's 16 17 difficult, I think, to make it on this record. 18 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 19 MR. SAVITT: Thank you very much, Your 2.0 Honor. 21 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome. 22 (Court is adjourned) 23

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CERTIFICATION I, Meir Sabbah, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Michael Pena, No. 14 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 January 19, 2017 Date: 2.4