1 COURT OF APPEALS 2 STATE OF NEW YORK 3 _____ PEOPLE, 4 Respondent, 5 -against-NO. 80 б DAVID LOFTON, 7 Appellant. 8 _____ 9 20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 10 May 21, 2017 Before: 11 CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA 12 ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN 13 ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA 14 ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON 15 Appearances: 16 BRIAN SHIFFRIN, ESO. 17 EASTON THOMPSON KASPEREK SHIFFRIN LLP Attorney for Appellant 18 16 West Main Street Suite 243 Rochester, NY 14614 19 20 SCOTT M. MYLES, ADA MONROE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 21 Attorney for Respondent Suite 832 Ebenezer Watts Building 22 Rochester, NY 14614 23 24 Meir Sabbah 25 Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on this 2 afternoon's calendar is appeal number 80, the People of the 3 State of New York v. David Lofton. MR. SHIFFRIN: Brian Shiffrin on behalf of David 4 5 Lofton. б May I request to reserve two minutes for 7 rebuttal, please? 8 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may. 9 Thank you. Before addressing the MR. SHIFFRIN: 10 youthful offender point, I'd like to first urge that it was 11 Constitutional error for the District Attorney to be twice 12 permitted to argue in summation that the prosecution's case 13 was undisputed, unchallenged, and uncontested. 14 This was a case in which Mr. Lofton exercised his 15 right to remain silent and attacked the prosecution's case 16 through cross examination - - -17 JUDGE STEIN: If it's error, is it subject to 18 harmless error analysis? 19 MR. SHIFFRIN: Yeah, it's subject to - - to 20 Constitutional harmless error because - - - because the 21 nature of the error is - - - is that it went to the right 2.2 of the defendant to remain silent and - - - and the burden 23 of proof. Under the Constitutional harmless error test of 24 25 harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the - - - test, there

is a reasonable possibility here that the offensive comments, especially because they were given - - - the judicial sanction made an impact. This is a case where contrary - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, didn't the judge also instruct the jury that the burden never shifts?

MR. SHIFFRIN: He instructed the burden never shifts, but his - - - his - - - the judge's instruction after the - - - denying the second objection actually worsened the situation. Because the judge said that, and it's set forth in both - - - in both our briefs and the record, is, the ruling is based upon the opportunity given to challenge - - - the defendant's attorney to challenge the evidence. Suggesting that the defendant didn't - - did not, in fact, challenge the evidence.

Instead, in this case, in detail, in summation, the defense counsel pointed out all the problems with the evidence, which resulted in acquittal of two of the four counts. This was a case in which the jury did not accept the complainant's testimony, and we know that because if they accepted her testimony, there would have been a conviction of all four counts.

JUDGE STEIN: Could it have been fair comment on the evidence where - - - where the defendant was making an - - - proffering a - - - a view of the case that no

1 evidence was presented to support? 2 MR. SHIFFRIN: Respectfully, no, Your Honor. 3 There was a statement on page A 291, appendix 291 saying 4 that there was a criminal trespass here, and that's not 5 challenged for - - - that's not challenged. They then б immediately - - -7 JUDGE STEIN: No, no, but he was arguing that it 8 was - - - there was a previous relationship, it was 9 consensual, and - - - and - - - and so on and so forth, and 10 so could that not have been a fair response to - - - to 11 that theory? 12 MR. SHIFFRIN: To that - - - it's actually - - -13 the - - - that actually highlighted the problem, because 14 the two counts in which there were acquittal, okay, where 15 the counts where the physical evidence didn't back up the 16 complainant's allegations. The counts in which there were 17 conviction were the counts in which the argument based, 18 again, in summation on the lack of evidence, based on her 19 appearance, based on the failure to do anything in 20 disarray, was that this was consensual - - - consensual 21 behavior, and therefore it was a criminal trespass, but not 2.2 - - - not a sexual count, and therefore not a burglary. 23 That - - - that argument that it was consen - - -24 that it was consensual was effectively negated by the 25 court's instruction that he had an opportunity to challenge in cross examination, and it didn't do so. So it's our position that the court's instruction actually worsened the harm of that - - - of that argument - - - of that argument. Not made once, but made - - - first of all, the DA made it three times. The first time, objection sustained, repeated two more times, and then after the second time the objection overruled, the District Attorney again said, undisputed.

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So the message here was undisputed, unchallenged, and uncontroverted. And that is an improper argument, and we believe, in a case where the jury had problems with the complainant's testimony, we don't believe it was harmless.

Moving back to point one, this is a case, it was a fifteen year old convicted of enumerated sex offense. This case - - - court in Middlebrooks made it clear, that in such cases, two - - - two determinations are required. One, it has to be an on the record determination as to whether the statutory factors for the exceptions to allow the youthful offender eligibility were met, and if - - - if so, a second determination as to whether or not the defendant should be adjudicated a youthful offender.

In this case, when the defense counsel made the request for adjudication of Y.O. as - - - as recommended by the PSI report, the court's only response is that it's certainly outside the realm of this court's consideration

1	following trial. That cannot meet the Middlebrooks			
2	requirement			
3	JUDGE FAHEY: It was in a context, though, that			
4	was a little bit broader than that. Weren't the court's			
5	remarks in a larger context, Mr. Shiffrin?			
6	MR. SHIFFRIN: The court had just explained the			
7	source again, I believe it's page 295 of the			
8	JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead.			
9	MR. SHIFFRIN: on the record.			
10	JUDGE FAHEY: I'm listening.			
11	MR. SHIFFRIN: The court had just explained why			
12	he was the court was imposing consecutive maximum			
13	sentences. However, you cannot tell from that statement by			
14	the court that that is not under consideration whether or			
15	not there was a refusal to consider a Y.O., whether or not			
16	there was the determination of Mr. Lofton was			
17	eligible for Y.O. treatment, or whether or not he			
18	there was a determination was eligible, but not giving Y.O.			
19	JUDGE RIVERA: What what should he have			
20	done? What should the judge have done, gone through every			
21	single factor?			
22	MR. SHIFFRIN: No. They			
23	JUDGE RIVERA: What is it that you're saying is			
24	the rule?			
25	MR. SHIFFRIN: The rule has to be that the record			

1 has to be sufficient to tell what was decided and why, 2 which doesn't require enumeration of all the factors. I 3 find you're not eligible because the statutory factors were not met would be - - - it would be sufficient. 4 5 JUDGE WILSON: Well, determination might mean б result or it might mean explanation. And how do we know 7 which it is here? 8 MR. SHIFFRIN: And the - - - indeed, that's the 9 problem. 10 JUDGE WILSON: We know the result, right? 11 I should point out, this was a MR. SHIFFRIN: 12 pre-Middlebrooks, pre-Rudolph case, which perhaps explains 13 why the judge didn't do what Middlebrooks says. Three 14 times, this court in Middlebrooks said, you need an 15 on-the-record statement as to whether or not the 16 statutory-fact exceptions were met. That wasn't done here. 17 JUDGE FAHEY: So you know that usually the Court 18 of Appeals is very reluctant to require a litany by trial 19 judges. It - - - it seems though that that's what you're 20 asking for, some particular catechism that he has to 21 resign. 2.2 MR. SHIFFRIN: I want to be clear that - - - that 23 if I have given that impression, that's not what I'm 24 urging. I'm not arguing there has to be a detailed 25 analysis of each - - - of each factor, but there has to be

enough. There has to be enough to tell, first of all, in a 1 2 case where the section - - - where a person is convicted -3 4 JUDGE STEIN: Is it - - - would it be enough to 5 just say, I have considered the factors under the statute, б and I've determined that defendant is not eligible - - -7 MR. SHIFFRIN: Absolutely. 8 JUDGE STEIN: - - - for Y.O.? 9 MR. SHIFFRIN: Because then - - - then, when I 10 say "we", both the attorneys at the trial level court and 11 the - - - then the courts - - - appellate courts making 12 review to determine whether an abuse of discretion can know 13 what was decided and why. And that - - - that, I believe -14 15 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: But is there any - - -17 MR. SHIFFRIN: - - - is all that's required. 18 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, did you - - -19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: - - - really any view of 20 this record that - - - that suggests that the judge didn't 21 consider the absence of mitigating circumstances - - -22 MR. SHIFFRIN: His - - - his language saying - -23 24 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: - - - as described in his -25 - - his characterization of the case, and what he thought

1	1 of these acts?			
2	2 MR. SHIFFRIN: Respectfully, the judge's words			
3	3 that's beyond the court's consideration suggests that he			
4 didn't consider it. The literal meaning of the judge				
5	5 words			
б	JUDGE WILSON: And what he said what he			
7	said right what he said right before that were, "The			
8	trial evidence completely controverts the statements made			
9	by the defendant and the probation department.			
10	"The defendant continues to deny any involvement			
11	whatsoever regarding sexual contact with the victim, again,			
12	totally inconsistent and contrary of what the jury			
13	ultimately determined.			
14 "There was overwhelming evidence that the				
15	15 defendant has to the sexual acts that were performed on t			
16	victim.			
17	"Defendant engaged in what I deemed to be some of			
18	the most vicious and blatant criminal behavior by an			
19	individual who was only sixteen years of age at the present			
20	time.			
21	"The trial evidence brought home to the court the			
22	very violent and vicious nature of the conduct of the			
23	defendant.			
24	"And the probation report concluded that the			
25 defendant posed a threat to society."				

Those were the things he said right before 1 2 saying, and youthful offender status is out of the 3 question. 4 MR. SHIFFRIN: Okay. And just so it's clear, 5 everything that you just said was said with respect to why б the judge was imposing the sentencing that he imposed. The 7 court then said, and additionally, then it goes to - - -8 there's a request for a PSI for - - - for youthful offender 9 adjudication. If the judge said, and for the reason I just 10 stated, I determine he's not eligible, done. 11 JUDGE WILSON: So those reasons are sufficient if 12 he had tied it to the youthful offender status. 13 MR. SHIFFRIN: Yeah. And it wasn't tied to the 14 issue of - - - of Y.O.; it was tied to the - - - the 15 imposition of the particular sentence. 16 JUDGE GARCIA: So counsel, this is a case before 17 Middlebrooks, where we hadn't said yet - - - I think it's 18 four years before Middlebrooks, we hadn't said yet, you 19 need to do this, with reference to these factors I would 20 find they don't apply. 21 And following up on what Judge Wilson said, it 2.2 seems this record is more robust as to why they don't 23 apply. So we would be sending a case back at this point to 24 give the opportunity for the judge based on, essentially, 25 those same findings to put in the record. And I don't find

1	those two factors apply. One of which is roll in the			
2	offense, which clearly doesn't apply here.			
3	So it's only mitigating. He went through that			
4	litany four years before Middlebrooks, and now we're going			
5	to send it back so he can say, and because of those same			
б	reasons, I don't think he's a youthful offender.			
7	MR. SHIFFRIN: Again, not criticizing the judge			
8	for not anticipating Middlebrooks. In Middlebrooks, this			
9	court rejected the contention that the burden is on the			
10	defendant to show the exceptions were met, but rather said			
11	in every case in every case it's required. It wasn't			
12	done here. This is a case on direct appeal.			
13	JUDGE GARCIA: But if they're the same factors he			
14	just went through and didn't say those are the reasons why			
15	under the mitigating prong he doesn't qualify			
16	MR. SHIFFRIN: I I I agree			
17	JUDGE GARCIA: but says he doesn't qualify			
18	as a youthful offender, I I don't know what we would			
19	be sending it back for.			
20	MR. SHIFFRIN: We're sending it back to ensure			
21	that that there is not a new exception to			
22	Middlebrooks which should not go going to only affect			
23	Mr. Lofton, the many other defendants, which is, well, if			
24	we know he's not going to get it, it doesn't matter.			
25	That Middlebrooks is an easy thing to do.			

1	The requirement is very simple. It takes less than a			
2	minute to do; it wasn't done here.			
3	JUDGE GARCIA: But as I remember Middlebrooks, no			
4	one mentioned youthful offender, and there was no			
5	discussion of it.			
6	MR. SHIFFRIN: But the holding is not really, you			
7	can't discuss it. It has to it says three separate			
8	times, it must be on a on-the-record determination of			
9	the statutory factors. Not done here.			
10	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, this this was also			
11	before Rudolph too, wasn't it?			
12	MR. SHIFFRIN: That's correct, Your Honor.			
13	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. Shiffrin.			
14	Counsel.			
15	MR. MYLES: Good afternoon, Your Honors. Scott			
16	Myles on behalf of the People.			
17	Very brief really touching on appellant's			
18	arguments in regards to the People's summation. You cannot			
19	look at the People's summation in a vacuum; you have to			
20	also look at the defendant's summation, which happened			
21	immediately before the People's closing arguments in which			
22	the defense counsel himself reiterates several times that			
23	they were not challenging certain of the allegations. He			
24	used the word, you'll find that the the certain			
25	allegations unchallenged.			

So the fact that the People, in their summation, 1 2 then went ahead and agreed with the defense that there were 3 no challenges to certain of the allegations, there's no 4 error there. There was - - - if there was any kind of 5 error, it was ameliorated by the judge's instructions to б the jury that the burden never shifts from the People to 7 the defendant. 8 In addition, if there was any error, it would 9 have been harmless given the overwhelming nature of the 10 evidence in this case. 11 Moving on to the youthful offender issue. Ι 12 would like to note in regards to what Judge Garcia was just 13 saying. There has never been any argument, at any point, 14 in - - - in this case at the lower Appellate Division or before this court that, in fact, this defendant is eligible 15 16 for youthful offender. There is no - - - there is no -17 JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but didn't Middlebrooks 18 say that the court had to make that determination on the 19 Isn't that what Middlebrooks stands for? record? 20 MR. MYLES: It does, Your Honor. And - - -21 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. So what - - - so what - -

23 MR. MYLES: I think that's what we're - - -24 exactly what we're here for. We're here to - - - to 25 determine once and for all - - - once and for all what is

what is - - - so what does that mean?

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1 meant by that word, determination; what constitutes a 2 determination on the record. 3 JUDGE STEIN: Right. Is it enough to just say, 4 I'm - - I'm sentencing you to X, which happens to be the 5 maximum sentence allowable because of all of these factors. б Is that enough to - - - to - - - to indicate that the - - -7 the court considered Y.O. status and rejected it? 8 MR. MYLES: I - - - I think that just a simple 9 statement of what the sentence is after Middlebrooks would not be enough. I think there has to be some indication on 10 11 the record that the judge is considering those factors in 12 relation to the youthful offender stature. 13 JUDGE STEIN: And - - - and where does that exist in this discussion? 14 15 MR. MYLES: When the judge states in a single 16 unbroken - - - I believe it's one or two paragraphs, where 17 the judge goes through not mitigating factors that he found 18 in this case, but in fact aggravating factors. He uses the phrase "vicious conduct". 19 20 JUDGE STEIN: But how - - - how do we know from 21 that that he didn't think that the defendant was legally 22 eligible; how do we know? 23 MR. MYLES: I think, given the fact that he goes 24 through all of the factors that weighed on his decision, 25 and then immediately after that says, based on all that

1 proof that came in at trial, youthful offender - - - he 2 doesn't use the phrase youthful offender, but he's clearly 3 referencing youthful offender, that is beyond this court's 4 - - - that is something that the court is not going to 5 consider for you. 6 JUDGE STEIN: Well, it says beyond - - - yeah. 7 That - - - that's the problem that I'm having, is that 8 there are several ways that that can be interpreted, and is 9 - - if it's not a clear statement, is that enough. 10 MR. MYLES: Again, as the People put in their 11 papers, in this case, it is enough, because it's clear that 12 the court made a determination. It determined that this 13 defendant was not going to be receiving youthful offender 14 treatment. And immediately before making that 15 determination, it went through all of the reasons, all of 16 the factors in - - -17 JUDGE STEIN: Well, but then - - - then what is -18 - - I don't - - - I'm sorry, I have to go back. Then what 19 does Middlebrooks mean? If - - - if - - - if it's enough 20 that the court doesn't give Y.O. treatment to satisfy 21 Middlebrooks, what did Middlebrooks add to the - - - to the 22 discussion? I - - - I thought that's what Middlebrooks was 23 correcting. It was saying that isn't enough. 24 I think that's exactly what we're doing here, 25 Your Honor. Either myself and the Fourth Department or the

appellant is not understanding what Middlebrooks said. So the appellant is urging this court to adopt a rule that the court, the sentencing court, does not merely need to make a determination, but it needs to state the reasons for its determination.

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JUDGE STEIN: I think that's a separate issue. I - - - I'm not even getting to that issue. I - - - I'm just trying to determine whether the court said enough to tell us that it made a determination, as opposed to made some assumptions and just went on to sentence without Y.O.

MR. MYLES: Well, again, I think that's getting us, again, to the argument of a litany that is required a specific set of words that the sentencing court needs to say and were to make it clear whether or not a determination is being made.

And again, that gets us back to what is meant by the word "determination". Is a simple yes or no in the context of whether youthful offender is going to be granted, is that a determination.

JUDGE WILSON: So - - - so put aside, for a moment, the - - - the things that I read that the judge said during the colloquy, and pretend he hadn't said them, but all that he said were the words - - these words, which he actually did say, "The request that defendant be adjudicated a youthful offender is certainly outside the

1	1 realm of this court's consideration following trial."	
2	2 If he said just that, does that satisfy	
3	3 Middlebrooks or no?	
4	MR. MYLES: I would say that it does, because	
5	again, that is a determination. That is saying, I have	
б	considered youthful offender in the context of this	
7	defendant, and I am not granting it. And again,	
8 Middlebrooks went through the pol		
9	JUDGE FAHEY: The problem the problem you	
10	have is is that Middlebrooks was dealing with a	
11	situation where you've got an eligible someone who is	
12	12 not an eligible youth because you're convicted of an arr	
13	felony or a designated sex offense.	
14	So that's what this kid falls this	
15	defendant falls in this category. Let me just finish the	
16	thought. So then so then the question is, the court	
17	needs to make a determination. First, is this person an	
18	eligible youth. Then secondly, do the mitigating factors	
19	under, what is it, 720.10[3] apply.	
20	That would be the normal process. You should	
21	have a two-step process. Is he eligible, do they yes	
22	or no, no, and if and if or if yes, then do	
23	these mitigating factors apply to this person, will we	
24	grant him Y.O. status. That clearly wasn't done here.	
25	But this is pre-Rudolph, pre-Middlebrooks. So is	

1 the language sufficient, I guess, is the question, and 2 where is there two separate determinations in there that 3 you can point to in the record? 4 MR. MYLES: I - - - I can't point to any two 5 separate discrete points in the record because, again, it б is essentially one unbroken thought process - - -7 JUDGE FAHEY: Right. 8 MR. MYLES: - - - by the judge. 9 JUDGE FAHEY: Right. 10 MR. MYLES: I would just note that Middlebrooks 11 and Rudolph also dealt with a situation where the 12 sentencing court was silent as to youthful offender. That 13 is not what happened here. 14 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 15 MR. MYLES: In Middlebrooks, this court 16 determined that, as a policy consideration for why it was 17 deciding Middlebrooks the way it did, that the youthful 18 offender adjudication is so important to certain 19 defendants, that there needs to be some indication - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, it was also based on the 21 statutory language, right? 22 MR. MYLES: Correct. Yes. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. So it's not just policy 24 there. 25 MR. MYLES: No, no. But the pol - - - there was

policy discussion.

2 JUDGE RIVERA: Let's say we disagree with what 3 you argue is the clarity of the words of the judge. So if it's uncertain or ambiguous, doesn't that then, under 4 5 Middlebrook, said under the statute, require that it go б back for resentencing to get that clarity? 7 MR. MYLES: I don't believe it would, Your Honor, 8 because the wording of the statute, in my view, says that a 9 defendant is not eligible unless the judge determines, 10 based on one of those two factors, that he is, in fact, 11 eligible. That clearly did not happen here. 12 So the judge's determination that he was not 13 granting the defendant youthful offender after stating all 14 of the aggravating factors that he found after hearing the 15 proof at trial, it's the People's position that that 16 satisfies the requirements of Middlebrooks. 17 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 18 Counsel. 19 MR. SHIFFRIN: First - - -Mr. Shiffrin, can - - can you 20 JUDGE FAHEY: 21 jump to that point that counsel just made at the end, where 2.2 basically you could tell by reading what the judge said 23 that he felt that this defendant was eligible, and the only 24 question is whether or not he was going to grant it. 25 That's the way I understand that argument.

1 MR. SHIFFRIN: This is a case in which no one, 2 neither attorney nor the judge even mentioned there was a 3 conviction for an enumerated sex offense. It's not in the 4 PSI report. It's - - - it's speculation that this judge 5 even was considering the fact that it might not even - - б JUDGE FAHEY: Are you familiar with Stitt, the 7 Fourth Department - - -8 MR. SHIFFRIN: Yes. 9 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - case? 10 MR. SHIFFRIN: Stitt - - - Stitt is different in 11 a few respects. 12 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 13 MR. SHIFFRIN: Because in Stitt, the Fourth 14 Department went through the basis - - - went through his 15 ruling as to why it wasn't granting Y.O., it considered the 16 factors, and therefore, necessarily had got past 17 eligibility. Because you can't go through the factors for 18 weighing without having determined - - -19 JUDGE FAHEY: Right. Right. 20 MR. SHIFFRIN: - - - he's eligible. 21 JUDGE FAHEY: I got it. 22 MR. SHIFFRIN: In this case, there wasn't - - -23 this is, to me, I - - - actually, I cite Stitt, because I 24 think Stitt shows there always - - - there was not a lot 25 required to get to the Middlebrooks test, and that wasn't

done here.

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There was simply impossible to read this record and know for sure that the judge even considered the possibility of Y.O., considered the issue of eligibility for - - - under the enumerated sex offense exceptions, or determined Y.O. With - - - again, with respect to the summation

issue, counsel just argued that this was a proper response to the summation because the argument was the - - - the trial prosecutor argued that it was not challenged with respect to certain allegations. Respectfully, that was not the argument made below. The District Attorney repeatedly said unchallenged, undisputed, uncontroverted, with respect to all the allegations.

Only thing that the defense attorney said was unchallenged was that criminal trespass and that there had been an act of anal sex, but the argument was, that was consensual.

And therefore, to use that as a basis for saying invite - - invited comment is simply improper. Thank you, Your Honors. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

(Court is adjourned)

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1	CERTIFICATION			
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3	I, Meir Sabb	oah, certify that the foregoing		
4	transcript of proceedi	transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People		
5	v. David Lofton, No. 8	v. David Lofton, No. 80 was prepared using the required		
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