1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	AMERICAN ECONOMY INSURANCE COMPANY,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 96
	STATE OF NEW YORK,
7	Appellant.
8	
9	20 Eagle Street
10	Albany, New York September 7, 2017
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL G. FEINMAN
15	
16	Appearances:
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1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The first matter on this 2 afternoon's calendar is appeal number 96, American Economy 3 v. The State of New York. 4 Counsel. 5 Thank you. Steven Wu for the State of MR. WU: б New York. I'd like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal. 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, Mr. Wu. 8 MR. WU: One of the unique protections provided 9 by workers' compensation is the long-term financial 10 commitment that it requires insurance carriers to make to 11 injured workers. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, how - - - how do the 13 employers benefit? What - - - what is the savings that 14 they get as a result of the amendment and the closure of 15 the fund? 16 There's an immediate cost savings in the 17 18 19

form of getting rid of what has ballooned to be a 300-million-dollar annual assessment against employers. That's sort of the immediate cost savings at issue here. And there's a longer-term cost savings from what are anticipated to be increased efficiencies from having insurance carriers retain these liabilities rather than transfer them to a third party - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Is - - -

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MR. WU: - - - which is the - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - the first one offset by increased premiums?

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MR. WU: To some extent in the short term it may be offset by increased premiums, but - - - but that gets me to the longer-term benefits of this. And there a couple of benefits here to cost savings. The one is that carriers that retain these liabilities can use their existing apparatus to adjudicate claims, to evaluate them, and basically to administer these workers' compensation claims going forward. Before, there were substantial costs in having a separate party, which is the Fund for Reopened Cases, assume these claims often many years after the date of the injury.

JUDGE STEIN: And in fact, there was a lot of litigation over that whole system, right?

MR. WU: That - - - that's correct, and that's sort of the second big costs savings here is that the very process of transferring claims to the Reopened Cases Fund was a complex and costly one. It was one that involved a great deal of administrative litigation, as well as litigation to the Third Department - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: And - - - and - - -

MR. WU: - - - and even to this court.

JUDGE RIVERA: So I'm - - - this is where I'm unclear. So who was bearing the cost of that? Aren't all

of these costs either through surcharges or a pass through?
Who actually was paying for that?

MR. WU: The immediate assessments were levied against the insurance carriers, but under 151 of the Workers' Compensation Law, they were then allowed - the carriers were allowed to surcharge the employers and therefore collect some, though necessarily not all, of the assessments that had been levied against them.

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so what's the windfall to the carriers - - -

MR. WU: Well - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that was referenced as a basis for the amendment?

MR. WU: There are a couple of answers to that.

And I think the clearest answer comes from the immediate impetus for the closure of this fund, which was the rapid escalation of the costs that were imposed on employers here. What that represented was an increased utilization of the fund by insurance carriers that exceeded the assumptions that had been in place when premiums were first imposed. In other words, carriers had collected premium in the years prior to the closure on the assumption that they would retain a larger amount of liability than they, in fact, retained when the time came to pay those claims.

And - - - and the flip side to that is that

employers were basically required to pay twice. They paid premiums so that the carriers could retain certain liabilities. And then, when several years later the carriers transferred basically triple that amount of liability to the fund, carr- - - employers again had to pay assessments to the fund to manage those liabilities. And that is, in part, the premium windfall that the governor's memorandum was referring to as a basis for saying that the cost of this would be somewhat - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so when you use a windfall, it's almost as if it's unexpected. What - - - what unexpected about that?

MR. WU: What was unexpected was what is always unexpected in these cases, and when there's a change in the way that the workers' comp system operates different from what had historically occurred. And that change here was the dramatic increase in utilization. And just to give you a sense of the numbers, in 2006, the assessments levied against employers was under 100 million dollars, and that had roughly been the figure for several years. Only six years later, by the end of 2012, that figure had ballooned to over 300 million dollars, and as a result of that, the legislature, supported I should say by the insurance industry and by employers, decided to close the fund.

JUDGE WILSON: Can I ask you a question about the

meaning of a statement in the July 2013 DFS decision that reads: "It's not practical or feasible to quantify the effect the fund closure will have, if any, on the experience of policies that are currently in effect. To the extent that such experience is adversely affected by the RFC closure, the adverse experience will be reviewed as part of - - part of future rate filings." What is DFS doing, if anything, with regard to RFS - - - RCF closure related expenses and future rate adjustments?

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MR. WU: Well, I think that is basically a statement that they are going to be seeing what the anticipated effects of this closure are going to be in a broader scale.

JUDGE WILSON: And will adjust premiums upward to compensate the insurers for losses out of the RCF fund, or no?

MR. WU: Yes. There will. There will be premium increases and there have been premium increases to account for that fact that insurers are now required to retain those liabilities and to pay them basically out of their own pocket.

JUDGE WILSON: And does that apply to past liabilities or no?

MR. WU: Well, it does in the - - - in a technical actuarial sense, which is that DFS does not

approve rate increases going back in time. It only increases rates going forward.

JUDGE WILSON: But will the forward rates account for losses that arise from the RCF fund closure prior to 2014?

MR. WU: They - - - they will not, again, as a technical matter. But - - - but this is not unique to premiums for the purposes of the closure of the fund here. I mean premiums never look backward, even if there are unanticipated statutory changes. And the broader context here is that that is routine in the Workers' Compensation Law. There are always going to be changes to the benefits to employees, to the cost on carriers, and to the burdens on employers.

JUDGE RIVERA: So you mean if in the past - - - so you mean if in the past - - - whatever premiums have been set in the past, as it turns out, don't actually cover the expenses, carriers have to pay for that anyway because the premiums were the premiums that were set?

MR. WU: That's correct. And - - - and my point here - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So they may have benefitted in the past.

MR. WU: Well, and that's my point here is that that is part of the expectation of all the participants in

the system that there will be changes, and that premium may or may not account for them. And as you just referenced, sometimes - - -

me. One of the things in the approval memorandum that was sent over with the legislation is - - is the statement that the premiums the insurance carriers charged already covered the liability. Do you concede that that statement in the approval memorandum, I think it was from the governor's office, was in - - was incorrect?

MR. WU: I - - - I do not, and part of the answer

JUDGE FAHEY: No?

MR. WU: And part of the answer is the answer that I gave to Judge Rivera about how the increased usage of the fund actually made past-collected premiums excessive based on the assumption that carriers would retain a larger set of liability.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, are there other

justifications, hypothetical justifications, for the retro
- - for any possible retroactive impact of the law that

we can point to, then, assuming that those premiums were

not charged to cover this liability?

MR. WU: There are other justifications, and they're not hypothetical. They were explicit in the

legislative history. And the two main ones were first, to reduce a burden on employers. And that burden reduction could be achieved most immediately by cutting off the fund to new applications going forward instead of deferring the effect of that disclosure until post-enactment dates of entry.

JUDGE RIVERA: The - - the burden being this 300 million as opposed to 100 million.

MR. WU: That's correct.

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JUDGE RIVERA: Is that what you mean?

MR. WU: That's correct. And the second was another rationale that was supported both by industry and by employers, which is that the fund had outlived its original purpose. You know, when the fund was created in 1933, it was a very - - - it was intended to be a one-time adjustment for a very small number of cases. twenty cases were filed in the first year, growing to only a hundred in 1936. By 2012 and 2013, thousands of claims were being adjudicated at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. And importantly, the types of claims that were being adjudicated were also substantially different. fund was created, as its name suggests, for claims that unexpectedly would reopen. But the history here shows that the types of claims being transferred were increasingly shifting to cases where there were foreseeable ongoing

1 medical costs that technically qualified for transfer to 2 the fund because indemnity payments for lost wages had been 3 settled seven years before. And as a result, the fund was 4 no longer dealing with cases where carriers could not 5 predict the cost going forward that had unexpectedly б reopened. JUDGE FAHEY: Let - - - let me just go a little briefly to the Article 1 Section 16 argument - - - or 8 9 Section 18 argument of the New York State Constitution that 10 you made. Did you raise the issue below? 11 MR. WU: This is the argument about whether the 12 Workers' Compensation - - -13 JUDGE FAHEY: Did the - - -14 MR. WU: - - - Law is affected by - - -15 JUDGE FAHEY: Is included in the New York State 16 Constitution. Yeah. 17 MR. WU: Yeah. That - - - we - - - I don't 18 recall if we made that argument specifically below. We are 19 not principally relying on that argument as a basis for 20 saying that the constitutional arguments here fail. I - -21 - I think, if I could just finish this one thought. 22 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Go ahead. 23 JUDGE FAHEY: Sure. 24 MR. WU: I think the basic arguments on the

constitutional claims are that they're premised on two

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fundamental mistakes. The first is that there is no legitimate justification at all for the closure of the fund. And - - and, you know, what I've been arguing so far is there is a legitimate justification here articulated in the legislatively history.

And the second is a fundamental mischaracterization by the carriers about the nature of their initial liability. I think a core part of their argument is that when they entered into these contracts, the contracts themselves excluded liability for what they're calling claims in reopened cases. But that is flatly incorrect. What the Reopened Cases Fund did was to provide a mechanism for relieving certain liabilities by carriers as they arose in the future from reopened cases. It was not a redefinition on their initial liability. we can tell this, in part, because what the fund - - - what triggered the fund's application was an application by the carrier to, as the statute says, transfer their liability to the fund to handle. Because of that the basic starting premise is that - - - that insurance carriers have this liability and the fund's removal only changed their relief going forward.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. WU: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

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MR. WAXMAN: May it please the court, I'm Seth
Waxman for the respondents. I think maybe I'll start by
addressing the two concluding points that my friend raised,
one of which is that we somehow were wrong in our core
argument that this legislation, this amendment imposes
retroactive liability, has retroactive effect, and
secondly, that our argument is that there's no legitimate
justification to close the fund.

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I'll start with the - - - with the first one first and hope that I get around to the second. The 2013 amendment makes insurers liable for a category of coverage, that is reopened cases described in Section 25(a) of the Workers' Compensation Law, that were not included in the earlier State-approved contracts, and were not covered by premiums that insurers were permitted to change. I don't think there's any dispute about this, but let me just point the court to the places in the record that establishes that. The contr- - - at page 504 of the record, you'll see a sample State-approved contract, and the contract - -

JUDGE STEIN: Counselor, if we - - - if we accept this argument, when could any changes ever be made to allocating who pays what in workers' compensation cases?

MR. WAXMAN: So, Your Honor, there - - - there are two questions - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Retroactive.

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MR. WAXMAN: - - - embedded here. If - - - the first question is is the law retroactive or isn't it? And I understand Your Honor's question to be let's assume that it is.

JUDGE STEIN: Right.

MR. WAXMAN: Under what circumstances can the legislature enact laws that are retroactive? There are many instances in which - - - and the Supreme Court and this court has been clear - - - that retroactive legislation is not, in and of itself, unconstitutional. It may be constitutional if it meets the specified tests that this court and the U.S. Supreme Court has established for scrutiny under the three provisions of the constitution, I'll say the United States Constitution, two of which exist in the New York State Constitution, that speak - - - that are sensitive to retroactive legislation.

So, for example, under the contracts clause, a state may impair the obligations, contractual obligations but only to the extent that the - - - that regulation is quote: "Reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose." And as this court's decision in the Health Industries Association v. Hartnett and Moore v.

Metropolitan Insurance - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Let - - - let me jump in here on

Hartnett because I think it's - - - it goes to the heart of your argument, and one of the things I've struggled with it. It seems that you have a retroactive application of the law that says is going to result in 62 million dollars in unfunded liability, which says to me that you have a contract that says that you are required to cover these particular losses. And I think you would agree with that, that - - -

MR. WAXMAN: No, Judge Fahey. I actually don't agree with it. The - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. Let me finish my thought then.

MR. WAXMAN: Okay.

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JUDGE FAHEY: All right. Because the way I read it, it says if - - - if you've got an unfunded liability in your contract, which I'm looking at page 264 from the sample contract says: "Workers' Compensation Law means," blah, blah, blah, and it seems to specifically lay out your obligation to cover any loss under the Workers' Compensation Law and any amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law. So if there's no liability, you would simply disclaim. If there is liability, then this liability is funded and we're talking about a loss of profit and that's not necessarily the creation of a new liability. Hartnett is a maternity case and that - - -

that I see - - - think is a question of the creation of a new liability. And I think that's why I want you to explain this - - - this conflict for me, if you could.

MR. WAXMAN: Right. So there isn't a conflict because - - and again, at page 264 and it's also at page 504 of the appendix, the contract, the insurance contract, provides - - it limits carrier's liability to, quote: "Benefits required of the employer by the Workers' Compensation Law, including any amendments in effect during the policy period." That is the - - the employer's obligation - - the insurer's obligation is limited to those liabilities, those statutory responsibilities that employers have under the Workers' Compensation Law during the policy period. There's no dispute in this case that these are one-year contracts that have a start date and a termination date.

JUDGE FAHEY: Sure.

MR. WAXMAN: And we're talking about applic- - - - and so it is not true that employ- - - either employers or insurance carriers by contract had any obligation under those contracts.

JUDGE WILSON: These document to which you're referring us are not actually the contracts. Are the contracts in the record anywhere?

MR. WAXMAN: I believe the State approved the

form of the contract - - -

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JUDGE WILSON: Well, the - - -

MR. WAXMAN: - - - and I believe that the - - -

JUDGE WILSON: The disclaimer at the front of these two documents you're pointing to at 503 and 263 of the record say: "This quick reference is not part of the workers' compensation employer's liability policy and does not provide coverage. Refer to the workers' compensation employer's liability policy itself for actual contractual provisions." So it seems to me you're asking us to invalidate state legislation on a constitutional grounds because your contracts have been impaired, and the contracts aren't in the record.

MR. WAXMAN: I believe that one of the affidavits in the case - - - and I could be wrong - - - that included these contracts made a representation that these were the material terms of the contracts signed - - - contracts issued during the prior policy periods. And I don't think there's - - I think there's no disagreement that this is, in fact, what the contracts are. The - - - the point is that under the contracts the insurer undertook - - - the insurer, with the State's approval, bargained for liability - - indemnification liability for those obligations that the Workers' Compensation Law placed on the employer during

the policy period. And during those periods, Section 10 of the Workers' Compensation Law - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Let me just stop you one second.

The contrac- - - forget about the amendments were made.

When this contract was in place, there was coverage, your employers who were - - who you made - - who you contracted with assumed and you assumed that you - - you were able to transfer to the 25(a) account. When you lost the ability to do - - and you did that pursuant to contract, you said, but that isn't included in the contract because the State wasn't a party to the contract. Now it - - and but nonetheless, the liability was - - was calculated in the cost of the contract. That's the way I - - that's the way I understand the facts in this case.

MR. WAXMAN: So the - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead.

MR. WAXMAN: If I may?

JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead.

MR. WAXMAN: The word "transfer" in the statute is part of the 2013 amendment. The statute Section 10 and Section 25(a), at the time that these earlier contracts were enacted, provided in Section 10 that employers were responsible for disability compensation, quote: "Except as otherwise provided in Section 25(a)."

JUDGE STEIN: So - - -

MR. WAXMAN: And Section 25(a) stated that any award in a reopened case shall be against the Reopened Case Fund. And therefore, this - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: Okay. So - - - so what is a reopened case? I mean we've - - - we've heard and - - - and there are affidavits in the record about - - - about the difficulty and the amount of litigation in each and every individual case to determine whether, in fact, that was a - - entitled to transfer to the fund because it's not just a matter of meeting certain time frames. It's there are all sorts of issues that were being litigated about whether they qualified or not.

MR. WAXMAN: With respect, Judge Stein, there were two questions that when a - -

JUDGE STEIN: When a case was - - -

MR. WAXMAN: When a case was - - - when a claim was submitted to the Workers' Compensation Board, the board had to answer two questions as an initial matter. One, is this a claim that is made in a closed case? And, two, if the case was closed, is it more than seven years since the accident and three years since the last claim.

JUDGE STEIN: You would agree that those - - those inquiries are not limited to just what the time
periods are. There were all kinds of issues about what's a
true closure, what's a payment of compensation, you know,

1 and what - - - what qualifies. 2 MR. WAXMAN: I - - - I - - -3 JUDGE STEIN: I sat on the Third Department. 4 know the number of cases that - - - that got up to that 5 court, and that doesn't even consider the ones that ended б with the board. So - - -7 MR. WAXMAN: The salient point for purposes of the constitutional analysis is that under - - - if - - - it 8 9 may or may not have been difficult in individual cases to 10 determine whether something was a reopen - - - a claim in a 11 reopened case under 25(a). But if it did, as this court 12 explained in Mayo - - - De Mayo and as the Third Department 13 has explained in many cases, liability for the indemnity 14 payments passed as a matter of law to the fund. 15 JUDGE STEIN: But the question - - -16 MR. WAXMAN: They were never the responsibility 17 of the employ- - - -18 JUDGE STEIN: I think my point is is that there's 19 no way as a matter of contract to have anticipated exactly 20 what those cases would be. I mean so it's - - - it's 21 almost a term that is so ambiguous that it doesn't mean 2.2 anything. 23 MR. WAXMAN: No. With respect, there - - -24 everybody was clear. There - - - there may have been

factual determinations and factual disputes, but everybody

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1 was clear that as a matter of law, if it was a reopened 2 case, there was no liability. The premiums that the State 3 allowed the insurers to charge didn't cover it. 4 JUDGE FAHEY: When you say everybody was clear, 5 point to us in the contract where - - - where that was made 6 clear explicitly. 7 Yes. Well, the contract says in the MR. WAXMAN: 8 page that you cited that the carrier's liability is limited 9 to the benefits required of the employer by the Workers' 10 Compensation Law in effect during the policy period. And 11 during the policy period, Sections - - -12 JUDGE FAHEY: And so you're saying that exempts 13 this fund then? 14 MR. WAXMAN: Absolute - - -15 JUDGE FAHEY: That's - - -16 JUDGE STEIN: Aren't you saying - - -17 MR. WAXMAN: I think there's no dispute that it 18 exempts this - - -19 JUDGE STEIN: - - - that you could say to an 20 employer we're not playing this claim because we think that 21 it - - - the fund should take it, and the fund says we're 22 not taking it. Then what? 23 MR. WAXMAN: The problem - - - the problem is - -24 25 Then what? JUDGE STEIN:

MR. WAXMAN: - - - we're not arguing that under our contract with the employer the employer has to pay this. The - - - the reason that we've had to reserve 62 million - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: Well, you're saying you don't have to pay it. And I'm - - - I'm asking you what is it that you don't have to pay and - - - and how do you define that?

MR. WAXMAN: Are you talking about after the amendment for - - - after the amendment or before?

JUDGE STEIN: No. No. I'm talking about the - - before the amendment. You're saying that there's a

contractual right there to transfer these funds - - - these
claims, to the funds. And so as a matter of contract

between you and your insured, you are not responsible for
those, but what are they that you're not responsible for?

What if you think you're not responsible, that - - - and
the fund thinks you are?

MR. WAXMAN: Judge Stein, we are responsible under those old contracts for any liability that the employer had during the relevant policy period under the Workers' Compensation Law. Section 10 of the Workers' Compensation Law provided that the employers had liability to make disability payments except as otherwise provided in Section 25(a), which placed, as a matter of law, on the fund the indemnification obligation for reopened cases. If

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JUDGE WILSON: And a different - - - a difficult

- - - a different way to read the "includes any" amendment

language to which you've been pointing us is that there was

a constant recognition by the insurers that the law might

change anytime and they were assuming that risk.

MR. WAXMAN: That - - - that what the State - - - that - - - the insurers were certainly assuming risks that the law might change and their indemnification obligations would change during the policy period. What the State wants to do is read out of the contract the words "in effect during the policy period." The - - - there's no dispute that the premiums that the State allowed us to charge for these periods took no account and could take no account either of indemnification responsibilities that would be covered by the fund under 25F, or the assessments that we paid on an annual basis in order to pay those. If I may just spend one - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Can I ask is there any cost that you bore that didn't get passed onto the employer pre-this amendment?

MR. WAXMAN: You mean for - - - in the assessments?

JUDGE RIVERA: Related to reopened cases?

MR. WAXMAN: In the assessments?

1 JUDGE RIVERA: To anything. 2 MR. WAXMAN: So - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: Any attempt for a case to be 4 reopened and to be transferred shifted to the fund. 5 MR. WAXMAN: So any case - - - so any costs, 6 administrative costs, that were involved in adjudicating a 7 factual dispute, for example that Judge Stein raised, were 8 the responsibility of the insurers and they were included 9 in the calcu- - - - the lost cost calculations that the New 10 York CIRB made and the State approved in setting premium 11 Indemnification for reopened - - - claims under rates. 12 reopened cases was not included and there was no 13 compensation because, although as my friend points out the 14 statute in 25(a)(3) says that, you know, there will be an 15 annual assessment made to carriers for any shortfalls in 16 the - - - in the fund for cases pending, it's - - - it also 17 says that the insurers shall assess to the employers the 18 amount of that fund. So we were a passthrough. Now if I 19 just - - -20 JUDGE FAHEY: Judge - - - Judge, could I just ask 21

JUDGE FAHEY: Judge - - - Judge, could I just ask - - - I know his time is almost up, but can I ask about the taking clause argument?

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes.

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JUDGE FAHEY: Would that be all right? Just because we haven't gotten to that at all. I figured you

might want to get to that. So just to clarify for me, I believe this court has decided that an economic regulation that merely imposes an obligation to pay money cannot be considered a taking. That not be - - - that's St. James.

We not - - - that may not be exactly in compliance with Supreme Court jurisprudence, but it seems as if the Supreme Court has left the question open in Eastern Enterprises. I thought it was a plurality decision in Eastern Enterprises, and frankly, I'm not sure how it affects our jurisprudence right now. It may someday, but at this point it doesn't.

Do you agree with that?

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MR. WAXMAN: So our - - - I can't - - - if I - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Do you agree with the principle that our jurisprudence, that New York's jurisprudence, says that an economic regulation, such as a tax that merely imposes an obligation to pay money cannot be considered a -

MR. WAXMAN: I agree with that as a matter not only of New York Constitutional Law but Federal Constitutional Law. What is at issue here is not just the obligation to pay money but the diminution in value of existing contractual obligations that - - - by virtue of a legislative alteration of the term of a preexisting contract.

JUDGE FAHEY: See, in some ways, I see it the same way you do in terms of the - - - I don't see this case so much as an impairment of contract but rather an argument about the diminution and the value of the contract. MR. WAXMAN: So the - - - it's an impairment of contract. I mean the - - - the Supreme Court - - -JUDGE FAHEY: Well, that's the question, isn't it Isn't the question really whether or not if we're not changing a clause or adding a clause or modifying a clause in the actual contract but we're - - - we're saying that the contract may not worth as much. Just like if we 12 raised taxes on your property, your property may not be 13 worth as much or we change the zoning on it or any other of 14 a number of arguments. That's a diminution of value as opposed to an impairment of a contract.

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MR. WAXMAN: Well, in this case, it's both because an impairment of a contract is, you know, in the retroactive sense of the word, anything that creates a new contractual obligation with respect to a contract that's -

> JUDGE FAHEY: Sure.

MR. WAXMAN: - - - already in place, as was in Hartnett. On the issue - - - just on the - - - the one factual issue that my friend mentioned that this law was justified because, I don't know, after the 2007 closing of the special disability fund, you know, the - - - the insurers are making unanticipated use of this and sending off to this fund, or we're sending off to this fund, claims that otherwise would have been covered by that other fund. That it's important to focus on what is in the record in this case. The record in this case at page 259 and 260 demonstrates that between 2007 and 2013, the number of claims that insurers actually transferred to the fund decreased. It did not increase.

There was an increase in the value of those claims and the amount that the fund had to pay out to those claims. But at page 260, the New York CIRB shows that that was because of a - - a vastly increasing rise in the rate of healthcare costs to the amount of five percent per year. Now, my - - the - - - my friend says, well, you know, over that period assessments increased by twenty-six - - it's by 300 million dollars. And that doesn't - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: It went from - - - I thought the number was 100-and-something to 310-.

MR. WAXMAN: Whatever it was, if - - - if you look, they're getting these figures from their declaration of Mr. Papa, the only declaration they filed in the district court. And those figures in his declaration refute this argument. What they show is that the actual costs to the fund over this period increased seven percent

1 a year, and we know that five percent of that was due to the rising costs in healthcare. While the fund increased 2 3 assessments by - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: But does any of that - - -5 MR. WAXMAN: - - - twenty-six percent a year. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: Does any of that matter if it was 7 always a passthrough to employers? You said before it was 8 a passthrough and it will continue to be one based on your 9 argument that the DFS is going to raise the premiums to 10 reflect going forward. So isn't the battle royal here only 11 about this - - - this small number that are the past that 12 are not going to get covered because the premiums - - -13 MR. WAXMAN: This is - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - have already been paid out? 15 The - - - the battle here - - - what MR. WAXMAN: 16 you're calling a small number is what the New York CIRB 17 estimated to be between 1.1 and 1.6 billion dollars in 18 unfunded mandates. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: But your client's share is much smaller, no? 20 21 MR. WAXMAN: Our client's share, because our 2.2 client's share of the business is much smaller, is 62 23 million dollars. 24 JUDGE FEINMAN: How did you calculate that 25 number?

We - - - we calculated it by the New MR. WAXMAN: York CIRB used a methodology that complies with New York State Law that requires employers to raise their loss contingencies to cover their - - - to - - - to raise their reserves to the amount covered. And it's done in accordance with the standards required under, I believe, Section 103 of the relevant New York State statute. Nobody disputes that those numbers are right. In fact, the New York CIRB and the Department of Financial Services have approved them, so there's no question that our unfunded mandate amounts to 62 million dollars, and we have reserve 12 for that. 13 JUDGE FEINMAN: So assuming the accuracy of that 14 number, then how does that relate to the premiums or loss

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reserves that you have? How - - - how does that - -

MR. WAXMAN: So it doesn't relate to the premiums because as a matter of New York Law, and everybody agrees with this, the premiums that we're allowed to charge apply only to claims that may arise in the policy year in which the premium is assessed. So we cannot go back and, believe me, the Department of Financial Services wouldn't allow this, would not allow us to basically say, well, we're going to have this unfunded liability, we'll make it up on the front end with premium payments. That is - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, isn't that - - - isn't that

the nature of insurance? I mean in some years, you - - - you made probably, you know, a big profit on it and then in other years not so much. So - - -

MR. WAXMAN: The question is what our contractual liability or, for purposes of the takings clause or the due process clause, our reasonable expectation was at the sign. We contracted with the State's - - I think at the State's direction, but certainly with the State's approval - - - for a limitation on our liability, which is we are liable only for benefits that the employer has to pay during the policy period, not for any benefits that may have thereafter increased.

JUDGE STEIN: But would you agree that - - that, you know, your adversary said a special fund was set
up for a very limited number of - - of claims, and over
the years, you've managed to expand what the initial intent
was to begin with. So - - - so I - - how does that give
you a right - - -

MR. WAXMAN: Judge Stein, I agree that in 1933 the number of cases that were these stale claims - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, let me just give you one example. Okay. So when there were a few cases that came down in - - in 2003, 2007, Jones and - - and Matter of Bates, that - - that redefined, you know, when authorization for symptomatic medical treatment was or was

not compensation for purposes of determining whether this was a reopen case. And it seems to me that - - - that there was a practice that was engaged in by the insurance companies thereafter which was, you know, to - - - to have these indemnity-only agreements to sort of bypass that and - - - and let the cases continue to flow. So I guess part of what I - - - what I'm seeing is, is that that the insurer's found ways to either increase or at least maintain the flow of cases that was not intended. And so just because you found a way to do that, how does that give you the right to have that expectation that it will continue?

MR. WAXMAN: The quest- - - the relevant question, particularly under the heightened scrutiny that's appropriate that is applied for a contracts clause violation, is what the legislature's intent was, what its purpose was at the time. There is no - - - it - - - even the State, which is raising this argument in this court for the first time, you know, supported by the statistics and the Papa declaration that I've - - - that I've explained says, oh, there was this practice that resulted in these vast increases in claims. Number one, the State isn't even saying this occurred. The State says in its brief that this may have occurred. The - - - what we know for a fact and - - - that I - - - is that it did not occur and that in

1 any event, it is certainly not the legislative purpose. 2 The legislative purpose was as stated in the government's 3 - - governor's approval memorandum that the purpose of this 4 legislation was preventing a windfall for carriers who 5 don't need it because the premiums they've charged already 6 7 JUDGE STEIN: And - - -8 MR. WAXMAN: - - - cover this liability. 9 JUDGE STEIN: And save the New York businesses 10 hundreds of millions of dollars in assessments, right? 11 Wasn't that also one of the - - - one of the purposes? 12 MR. WAXMAN: The - - - well, no. What it says is 13 it will save the employers hundreds of millions of dollars 14 of assessments, which everybody agrees with. The reason 15 that the insurance industry supported this law 16 prospectively was that it was going to be vastly cheaper to 17 simply have insurers adjudicate these claims rather than go 18 through this long dispute about whose legal responsibility 19 JUDGE FAHEY: I know we're - - - I know we're 20 21 getting kind of long here but you - - -22 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Last question. 23 JUDGE FAHEY: Thank you, Judge. You had made 24 reference to this standard being heightened here in the

taking clause arguments. And my understanding is unless

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you've established a vested property right, for instance, here the way I understand your argument you'd have to say you had a vested property right in the law remaining the same, that there could be no alteration in the law or the legislative policy. Otherwise, my understanding is you got a rational basis test that has to be met, and it's obviously a much lower standard. You're arguing that there's some heightened standard. In the absence of that vested property right and a particular law, which I've never seen, I don't see how you get there.

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MR. WAXMAN: So, Judge Fahey, what I was referring to is the test under the contracts clause which the Supreme Court - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. Not the takings clause.

MR. WAXMAN: - - explained in Gray (ph.) and Connolly is intermediate level - -

JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so let me stop you, so I'm clear. It's not in the takings clause. It's in the contracts clause you're talking about?

MR. WAXMAN: Yes. I - - - the takings clause is not rational basis either. Rational basis is the due process test for prospective application. This court has said in the - - - in Chu v. The Alliance of Insurers that for retroactive retrospective application, the due process test is a multifactor - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: I'm not - - - I'm not sure once again if Chu applies. That - - - that's the trust fund case, I believe. And - - - okay. All right.

MR. WAXMAN: And - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. Waxman.

MR. WAXMAN: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

MR. WU: Thank you. I - - - I'd like to make just three, hopefully brief, points. The first is that Mr. Waxman argued that the effect of this statute is retroactive because it makes insurance carriers responsible for a new set of claims. But the critical point here is that on the date that this statute was enacted, and really, the nine-month period afterwards, there were no identifiable set of claims that were precluded. statute applies only to future applications. What this means is that if an insurer had a concrete reopened case for which it could apply for a transfer, it was able to do so for the nine-month period after the statute's enactment. And the only consequence of this statute was to prevent the transfer of cases that arise from reopened claims that would themselves reopen in the future. I mean that is the very definition of a prospective legislation.

The second argument that Mr. Waxman made was to say that the underlying liability here for reopened cases

was not part of the original contract because the contract basically incorporated the fund's continued existence going forward. And there a couple of problems with this argument. One is one that Judge Stein pointed to which is if it is true that the contracts themselves exclude liability, then it's a little unclear why the carriers care whether the fund remains in existence. They could just tell the employees or the employers we're not going to cover that as a contractual matter, and if the fund also won't cover it, you know, sort of that's your problem. Go back to the - - - go back to the legislature.

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But - - - but the other point I want to make here is that this is a really sweeping argument to say that the contract freezes in place the law at the time that the contract was entered into because the Workers' Compensation Law is enormously complex. It includes, for instance, you know, substantial both benefits and burdens on a wide class of the participants. And the argument that the contract prevents the legislature from changing those benefits going forward would basically preclude them from making substantial and important reforms. And one example is one that is raised by one of the amici to this case, which is the legislature's decision in 2006 to give 9/11 workers additional time to file workers' compensation claims. That reform was applied to injuries - - - by definition injuries

and policy years prior to that statute's enactment. sort of costs on the carriers were not part of their initial premium, and yet, there has not be any challenge, nor do I think it would be successful to say the legislature was forbidden from enacting that change. So - - - so do we have to - - - we JUDGE RIVERA: don't have to decide the retroactivity if we determine that the constitutional - - - these other constitutional claims are without merit, correct?

MR. WU: That's correct. I mean even if the statute had some retrospective - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: If we disagreed with you on this matter.

MR. WU: That - - - that's correct. There's no particularly high bar to sustaining retroactive legislation. And the very last point I'd like to make is this. I mean much of what the carriers have been arguing here is about the perceived practical burden of now having to retain these claims. Now this argument about burden was not actually presented to the legislature at any time. Instead, the legislature had the unanimous support of the insurance industry and the employers here.

But more to the point, to the extent that there is an ongoing burden that he legislature did not adequately consider, the proper forum for that complaint is the

legislature itself. And this is not just an empty slogan to leave these questions to the legislature. The workers' compensation system is so complex that any change in one particular area has unforeseen consequence elsewhere. As Mr. Waxman referenced, part of the reason the fund became a problem after 2007 was that the legislature had closed a separate fund called the Special Disability Fund in 2007 that then led to the tripling of obligations at - - - JUDGE RIVERA: But the reality is that moving

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JUDGE RIVERA: But the reality is that moving forward, this is all going to pass through to the employers.

MR. WU: The - - if this fund - -

JUDGE RIVERA: And it doesn't necessarily reduce the number of claims, right?

MR. WU: Well, this will reduce the number of claims because it will cut off applications.

JUDGE RIVERA: Because you're not going to get new ones, but in terms of the ones that may be out there, they were either going to be reopened cases or they weren't.

MR. WU: That's correct. And - - - and the other important balancing act that the legislature did here was that it did not disturb claims that had already been transferred to the fund. The legislature could have decided, I suppose, to say that if a claim had previously

been transferred they were going to close the fund entirely
and send it all back to the original carriers. They didn't
make that judgment.

JUDGE FAHEY: Maybe I misunderstood but it - - you're not saying it would pass through to the employers.

It's going to pass through to the carriers on the reopened

MR. WU: That - - - that's right. I guess I'd make this distinction.

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.

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cases.

MR. WU: Which is for claims that the fund continues - - - $\!\!\!\!$

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, no. But if you change the prem- - - isn't his whole argument that it shows that the premiums never covered this because the premiums moving forward are going to cover this?

MR. WU: That's right. If I'm - - - if I'm understanding the question correctly, it is true that to some extent the costs of these reopened claims going forward is going to fall back on the employers because of the increase in premium that DFS has approved. The legislature reasonably believed that the premiums would be lower than the cost of the assessments, in part because of the cost savings we referred to before, including no longer having to rely on this complex administrative process.

1 But - - - but I think the fact that the fund 2 remains in operation for previously transferred cases, it 3 self-represents a form of balancing that the legislature 4 engaged in. They understood that at the time the Workers' 5 Compensation Board had agreed to transfer certain cases to б the fund, there might have been a legitimate expectation 7 for carriers that they would not see those liabilities 8 again. But it was - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 10 - - reasonable to have a different 11 judgment for future applications. 12 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. 13 MR. WU: Thank you. 14 (Court is adjourned) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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