1	COURT OF APPEALS	COURT OF APPEALS	
2	STATE OF NEW YORK		
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4	PEOPLE,		
5	Respondent,		
6	-against-	No. 97	
	PETER AUSTIN,	NO. 97	
7	Appellant.		
8			
9		20 Eagle Street	
10		Albany, New York September 7, 2017	
11	Before:		
	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE		
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN		
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA		
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON		
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUI	- FEINMAN	
16	Appearances:		
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	Sara Winkeljohn		
25	Of.	ficial Court Transcriber	

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next matter on the 1 2 calendar is appeal number 87, the People of the State of 3 New York v. Peter Austin. 4 Counsel. 5 MR. ZENO: Good afternoon. My name is Mark Zeno, 6 and I represent appellant, Peter Austin. I'd like to 7 reserve two minutes of rebuttal. 8 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, Mr. Zeno. 9 Thank you. I plan to argue both 10 points today, but I'd like to begin with the confrontation 11 clause point. In People v. John, this - - -12 JUDGE GARCIA: Before you get to - - I'm sorry, 13 counsel. 14 MR. ZENO: Sure. 15 16

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JUDGE GARCIA: Before you get to that, could you talk a little bit about how this argument is preserved?

MR. ZENO: How it's preserved, sure. When it came clear that Criminalist O'Connor was going to be testifying, defense counsel objected to the admission of DNA testimony without calling the appropriate witnesses. And then there followed a colloquy about which witnesses were necessary to be called. Defense counsel cited Melendez, cited Williams v. Illinois, referred to the fact that O'Connor was only the supervisor on two of the tests, two of the three tests, and essentially said that he was

the wrong witness to be calling or an inadequate witness to be calling under the confrontation clause.

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TUDGE WILSON: So, counsel, you're referring to the portions at 936, maybe, through 939 of the record, I think. And let me ask you this, the way this starts out with the court, you know, for the first couple pages, the court is identifying three laboratory reports. These are documents. And at least, you know, one reading of this is that Mr. Sandleitner's objections were to the introduction of the reports. And when he cites Bullcoming and Melendez and so on, those are cases about the admissibility of reports. And then what happens after that is the court ultimately doesn't - - - am I correct that none of these reports were actually admitted into evidence?

MR. ZENO: That's correct.

JUDGE WILSON: And then what happens after that in the trial is that Mr. O'Connor is qualified as an expert without objection from Mr. Sandleitner and then testifies as an expert. And sometimes Mr. Sandleitner makes objections and sometimes those are sustained and sometimes they're overruled. But if there's something that you can point me to in addition or different from what's the pages I just mentioned where there's an objection on confrontation clause grounds to O'Connor's expert testimony, I'd like to see that.

MR. ZENO: Well, you're - - - you're looking at the correct pages, Your Honor, but I - - - I read the - - - I read those objections differently.

JUDGE WILSON: Okay.

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MR. ZENO: I think that when the objection - - - counsel stated he was objecting on Melendez-Diaz grounds, and he said that the prosecutor was attempting to elicit testimony from witnesses who not be call - - - called and was trying to get around that problem by calling a criminalist to testify as a supervisor. And perhaps defense counsel could have been more precise, but when he was objecting to this witness testifying as a supervisor, I mean that was certainly an adequate objection to put the court on notice that he was an inadequate witness, particularly because this case was tried before People v. John was decided where these precise rules were laid out. He was objecting to the - - - to the criminalist testifying as a supervisor. And - -

JUDGE WILSON: For the purpose of admitting the reports or for any purpose at all?

MR. ZENO: Well, the - - - for the purpose of admitting the evidence, whether it came in by virtue of the report or came in by virtue of his live testimony, he was objecting to the admission of the evidence. It's the evidence, whether it came in through a report or whether it

came in through a live witness. He was saying that you needed someone who was qualified to testify, and a supervisor was inadequately qualified.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: I thought the objection related to the calibration of the machine?

MR. ZENO: Well, counsel took a very broad position. Again, this was a pre-John case before this court laid down some very specific rules about which witnesses were required to testify. Counsel was saying you need - - - needed to bring in all the witnesses. the all witnesses rule, which is referred to John and rejected. You needed to bring in all these witnesses. Every stage of the - - - every stage of the testing you needed to have a witness testify. And before this court decided John, it was unclear whether that was necessary or not. But the fact that he asked that they bring in all the witnesses didn't - - - didn't waive an objection to at least bringing in one necessary witness, the one that - - necessary witness who either was the person that called the alleles, as this court talked about in John, or that - - or that performed an independent review of the data.

JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, so looking at the three reports, can it not be said that Mr. O'Connor performed the same review of the raw data that - - - for the buccal swab that he did for the crime scene DNA? And can't we infer

that from the fact that he initialed all of those pages and

MR. ZENO: Well - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - and on those pages he's
listed as the analyst?

MR. ZENO: He did initial all the pages. There was no testimony as to what his initials meant. We do have his testimony about exactly what he performed with regard to the post-arrest swab, and that's at page 1004 and 1005 of the record. And when he is being examined by the prosecutor during direct examination, the prosecutor asks him: "Did you analyze the DNA profile in this particular case?" Answer: "I reviewed the DNA profile in this case." Question: "And when you reviewed it, what did you do with it?" Answer: "I looked at the DNA profile, the string of numbers," which is the DNA profile, "and compared it to the - - to the other two reports." He compared the string of numbers. And that's the box score that the court talked about in - - in John. He compared the numbers that had been prepared by others.

JUDGE GARCIA: And it seems a hard argument to make that you can get around what we say is a confrontation clause violation in John by just not admitting the report and what he seems to do in his testimony, to me, is rely on it and refer to it throughout his testimony. Because it

seems the harm in John wasn't the report. It was the potential for tampering or contamination that might be there if you didn't call someone who was actually involved in a critical stage of the DNA analysis.

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MR. ZENO: Right. And - - - and I think that John anticipated that. John talked about Williams v. Illinois where - - - where exactly that happened. In Williams v. Illinois, they didn't admit the reports as here, and they called a witness who basically testified to conclusions based on those reports. And in Williams v. Illinois, the - - - the dissent specifically pointed out New York Law, People v. Goldstein, and said what you're doing here is unlawful. Courts in states like New York don't allow it. And then when this court decided John, it reaffirmed that rule that it doesn't matter how that data comes in, doesn't matter how those conclusions come in, whether it's through a report or whether it's through a live witness. The - - - it's the evidence that's the It's the potential for tainted evidence, tainted conclusions, in that evidence that's the problem.

JUDGE RIVERA: So, counsel, let's say we agree with you. Do we have to reach the adverse inference issue?

MR. ZENO: Not if you agree on this point.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MR. ZENO: But I see - - - I see my time is

1 running out, but so let me - - - let me turn to that - - -2 JUDGE RIVERA: You will turn to that. 3 MR. ZENO: - - - inference point. In People v. 4 Handy this court ruled that regardless of whether evidence 5 is technically discoverable, if it has been requested by 6 the defense with reasonable diligence, the prosecutor must 7 take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that that evidence will be available to the defense. Here - -8 9 JUDGE FEINMAN: Now even the dissent in applying 10 Handy seems to require that the defense act with some 11 reasonable diligence in - - - in making the demand. What's 12 your basis for saying that the - - - the defense got it - -13 - the majority got it wrong in saying that there was 14 reasonable diligence by the defense? 15 MR. ZENO: Well, they made a - - - the defense 16 made a demand in December of 2010 for all of the evidence, 17 which would have included this bloody receipt. 18 JUDGE FEINMAN: And then how long did it go by -19 20 MR. ZENO: And in - - -21 JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - unresponded to before the 2.2 defense woke up and said that - - -23 MR. ZENO: In June of 2011 - - -24 JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - I need that? 25 MR. ZENO: - - - there was a status conference

1 where the court directed completion of discovery, and when 2 the case moved for trial the following year, sixteen months 3 later, before jury selection started the defense 4 specifically again asked for all the - - - the evidence 5 from which the DNA was derived and the court said to the б prosecutor deal with it. Five days later, it still hadn't 7 been dealt with when - - - when Hurricane Sandy made 8 landfall and the evidence was destroyed. That was still an 9 outstanding request. So in the middle of jury selection, 10 after the - - - the court had directed the prosecutor to 11 turn over the - - -12 JUDGE FAHEY: See, that's why I'm wondering why -13 - - why would Handy apply since the destruction of the 14 evidence wasn't by - - - wasn't lost by an agent of the 15 state - -16 MR. ZENO: Right. 17 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - or destroyed by an agent. 18 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: To follow up on that, what 19 would the adverse inference be that would be drawn? 20 MR. ZENO: Well - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: What's - - - what's the 2.2 adverse inference? 23 MR. ZENO: - - - the adverse inference is that

MR. ZENO: - - - the adverse inference is that

from - - - from the - - - that the jury was permitted to

draw the inference that the evidence would not have been

1 favorable to the prosecution. That - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: That the scientific testing 3 that was performed? 4 MR. ZENO: Well - - - no. That - - - well, 5 ultimately, the scientific testing. If the - - - if this 6 bloody receipt had been contaminated or there was proof of 7 contamination in the way it had been stored, that might 8 have affected the test - - - the ultimate testing. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't that argument that 10 they'd have to be deciding that because the People dragged 11 their feet, the - - - the evidence was adverse to them? 12 And that's - - - that's not what these cases turn on, 13 right? It's the failure to actually turn over the evidence 14 or that it's destroyed and now you can't turn it over. 15 JUDGE FAHEY: Right. 16 MR. ZENO: That's - - -17 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, as to - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: As to opposed to they dragged 19 their feet, maybe that day they would have turned it over 20 but now Sandy hit and it's impossible to access the 21 material, even if it still exists. 2.2 MR. ZENO: Well, that's right. Well, they - - -23 this case is distinguishable from Sandy [sic] because it was not an - - - not an affirmative act of destruction of 24

the evidence. But it was destroyed -

JUDGE FAHEY: I guess the question for us is is 1 2 this an act of God? It seems like we're going to have more 3 hurricanes. This may be more of a question that we may 4 have to deal with more often, all of us. 5 MR. ZENO: Well - - -6 JUDGE FAHEY: So that being the case - - - or is 7 it an act of the State? 8 MR. ZENO: Well, it's - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: Or as a follow up on that, do - -10 - do you get this adverse inference if the People of - - only drag their feet two months? 11 12 MR. ZENO: Well, that's not this case, and 13 dragging - - - that - - - that would be a question for the 14 court. Here we have a period of multiple years where the 15 - - where the People drag their feet. And - - - and 16 getting back to your - - - sort of the original question is 17 we'd be asking for - - - for the jury to be permitted to 18 infer from the fact that they delayed this disclosure for 19 two years or delayed producing the evidence for two years 20 that from that fact the jury would be permitted to infer 21 but not required to infer that the - - - that the evidence 22 wasn't favorable. 23 JUDGE FAHEY: But was this - - -24 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, sir. 25

JUDGE FAHEY: Oh, I'm sorry.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

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MR. WHITE: May it please the court, Matthew
Benjamin White for the District Attorney of Bronx County,
Darcel D. Clark. Your Honors, to take up with the adverse
inference point, defense did not exercise reasonable
diligence in asking for the property.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, let's assume for the moment that - - - that they did. I think probably everyone agrees that it wasn't their fault that the hurricane contaminated where this was stored and that there was nothing improper about where it was stored or how it was stored or anything like that. The issue to me boils down to they did delay for a very extensive period of time, and as a result of which the evidence is no longer there. So somebody has to bear, you know, the - - - the brunt of that, if you will. Either the defendant is harmed by the fact that this happened and allows the jury - - - the inference allows the jury to decide that, yes, it wasn't their fault - - - the hurricane wasn't their fault but had they complied with their obligations, this never would have happened, and, you know, maybe there's a reason they didn't comply with their obligations versus if nothing - - - if there is no permissive inference instruction then - - - you know, then this - - - this unanticipated loss falls on the shoulders of the defense and the - - - and the prosecution is sort of

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        scot-free on having failed to comply with their discovery
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        obligations. That was a little long-winded, but I think
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        you get what I'm saying.
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                  MR. WHITE: Yes, Your Honor. But with respect, I
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        - - - I take issue with the premise that there was an undue
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        delay on the part of the People.
                  JUDGE STEIN: Well, obviously, I think that would
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        have to be - - - that would have to be the premise.
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                  MR. WHITE: And - - - and there's no evidence in
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        the record to support that. Notably - - -
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                  JUDGE STEIN: Well, what if - - - what if there
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        was? What if there was?
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                  MR. WHITE: What if there was?
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                  JUDGE STEIN: Yes. What if there was?
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        so, you know, then you got this balance. So what - - - you
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        know - -
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                  MR. WHITE: Well, again, I take - - -
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                  JUDGE STEIN: - - - why wouldn't - - -
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                  MR. WHITE: I take issue with the premise, but
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        assuming there was then because it was a once-in-a-lifetime
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        meteorological phenomenon, I think in this case that an
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        adverse inference would not be required.
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                  JUDGE STEIN: Well, what if it wasn't a
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        hurricane? What if it was a robbery?
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                  MR. WHITE: If someone broke into - - -
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JUDGE STEIN: A burglary? 1 MR. WHITE: - - - the police warehouse - - -2 3 JUDGE STEIN: Yep. 4 MR. WHITE: - - - and stole the property? 5 JUDGE STEIN: Yep. 6 MR. WHITE: Well, in that case arguably - - -7 JUDGE STEIN: Or what if it was a fire or, you 8 know, any number of things, a flood? 9 MR. WHITE: Well, Your Honor, I mean it - - -10 it's sort of a hypothetical far removed from this 11 situation. I mean we are talking about an act of God. Wе 12 are talking about a once-in-a-lifetime event. 13 JUDGE STEIN: No. I understand that just assume 14 that something happens that is not the People's fault, that 15 the event that results in the loss of the evidence is not 16 the People's fault. I think that's the point. 17 MR. WHITE: Well, if - - -18 JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but had they been timely 19 in their disclosure, the stuff wouldn't have been there. 20 It would have been in the hands of the defense. 21 MR. WHITE: Your Honor, I - - - if we did delay, 2.2 and I - - -23 JUDGE STEIN: I understand. I understand. 24 MR. WHITE: - - - we did not. And if, say, a 25 robber broke into the warehouse and stole the property and

1 if somehow this robber was, you know, some kind of super 2 robber that, you know, the police were somehow negligent or 3 not negligent in - - - in stopping him, arguably, an 4 adverse inference in that unique situation might be 5 warranted. But we need not go that far. This is a case 6 where notably the bill and demand is not in the record. So 7 you - - - Your Honors had actually no idea what property 8 was requested, and I would submit to Your Honors that the 9 property at issue here was not discoverable under CPL 10 Section 240.20. Under that section, the only property that is - - -11 12 JUDGE RIVERA: But - - -13 MR. WHITE: - - - discover - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: But I thought the judge ordered 15 you to turn it over. 16 MR. WHITE: The judge ordered us to comply - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: So I don't know that that's your 18 strongest argument, right? 19 MR. WHITE: Well, Your Honor, the judge ordered 20 us to comply with our discovery obligations. This was not 21 property that was discoverable as of rights. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but he set out what he 23 wanted and that's what the judge ordered, right? 24 MR. WHITE: Well, there are two - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Did he not say I want all the DNA

1 2 MR. WHITE: But if you're not entitled to it, 3 Your Honor, then why would we - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: But if the judge ordered it. 5 MR. WHITE: But if - - - if the judge - - -6 JUDGE RIVERA: Isn't that where we are here? 7 MR. WHITE: The judge did not - - - no judge ever 8 specifically ordered that this property be turned over. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hmm. 10 MR. WHITE: No judge ever ordered that, Your 11 Honor. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: But what did the judge order be 13 turned over then? 14 JUDGE FEINMAN: I'm sorry. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry. What did, in your 16 opinion, the judge order to be turned over? 17 MR. WHITE: The judge ordered us to turn over the 18 - - the discovery that the defense was entitled to. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Never mentioned anything specific 20 about DNA either in response to a request or some statement 21 from the prosecutor related to the DNA evidence? 22 MR. WHITE: Your Honor, the only evidence in the 23 record related to this - - - appears at page A-54. 24 the first day of trial when defense counsel says, Your

Honors, I haven't seen the physical evidence yet, but the

1 prosecutor's been very accommodating. I'm sure we'll make 2 arrangements. Five days later, Sandy strikes. Under those 3 circumstances where defense counsel has waited two years to 4 look at this property - - -5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Was there ever any 6 discussion about making arrangements to have the evidence 7 tested? In fact, defense counsel 8 MR. WHITE: No. 9 specifically stated he did not want to test this evidence. 10 And so - - -11 JUDGE FEINMAN: So your position, bottom line, is 12 that they didn't exercise reasonable diligence? 13 MR. WHITE: Yes, Your Honor. 14 JUDGE FEINMAN: Now I want to go back to the 15 confrontation clause which you haven't addressed and give 16 you a chance to do that - - -17 MR. WHITE: Yes, Your Honor. JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - because I think you would 18 19 agree we don't need to reach the adverse inference issue if 20 this case is resolved on John in favor of the defendant. 21 MR. WHITE: Correct. But the issue is not 2.2 preserved, Your Honor. The objection that defense counsel 23 is pointing out to occurred on the last day of a month-long 24 trial. The last day right before the witness was about to 25 testify, not for the first time, but for the second time,

1 right. So clearly the objection is not timely. And also, 2 I submit to Your Honor that the objection was not made with 3 any kind of precision. You're dealing here with a very 4 complicated area of jurisprudence, three different DNA 5 reports where up to six analysts might be required for each report, so we're talking about eighteen potential 6 7 witnesses. JUDGE GARCIA: But is the objection made before 8 9 the testimony he objects to is given? So what does it 10 matter if it's the last day or the first day? I mean he 11 objects before the testimony is made. 12 MR. WHITE: He - - - no. He - - - well, as I 13 said, the witness testified previously - - -14 JUDGE GARCIA: But to - - -15 MR. WHITE: - - - and he - - -16 JUDGE FEINMAN: The judge could always strike it 17 if it turns out it was wrongly allowed. 18 MR. WHITE: Right. But - - -19 JUDGE GARCIA: And then there - - is there 20 additional testimony after he makes the objection on this 21 issue? 2.2 MR. WHITE: The - - - yes. But the objections 23 are misplaced because the objections are related to the 24 crime scene reports. They're not relate - - - and - - -

and those counsel concedes are not testimonial on appeal,

right. Counsel's issue on appeal is that we should have called the analysts for the DNA buccal swab that was taken from the defendant later. Defense counsel never asked for that witness to be called. Okay. He - - - he said that we had to produce the witnesses who calibrated the machines and - - - and the court said no. The People are not required to produce all witnesses, which is exactly what this court said in John. The People are not required to produce all witnesses related to a DNA report, and so there's no precision in the objection. We had no - - - the court was not alerted to the particular error at issue, and that's why no court has ever ruled on this issue in this Not the trial court, not the First Department, and I submit that Your Honors should not be the first to rule on this issue in this very complicated area of jurisprudence.

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JUDGE FEINMAN: Is there anything in the record that shows Mr. O'Connor performed more analysis of the raw data of the buccal - - - or buccal as you're pronouncing, so I don't know which is correct - - - swab than the analyst in - - in John?

MR. WHITE: Yes, Your Honor. I mean at page A-984 of the record, Mr. O'Connor talks about the standard testing that he does when he writes up a DNA report. And he states that: "After all the testing is done and all of the data is compiled in the case file, in the case folder

everything is put. I reviewed every test that was done, every control that was involved, and all of the data that was finally found, and I made a determination of a DNA profile." So clearly he's taking responsibility for the DNA profile, and the DNA profile at issue in this case was essentially machine generated. If you look at the DNA report that counsel takes issue with on appeal, you can see at - - - and this is at A-1263, the electropherogram essentially sets forth the alleles as they appear on the allele table at A-1260, right. And it's - - - and it's an exact match. And then when you look at the edit table on A-1262, they refer to four samples that were edited in that batch of twenty-five that was tested, but it's not our sample. So this is a situation where the alleles are essentially machine generated.

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JUDGE GARCIA: And isn't that case - - - that was the case in Sean John. I mean that fight's been lost.

MR. WHITE: Your Honor, with due resp - - - I disagree because I believe - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: All of them are generated by a machine, and the point is it's who's doing that.

MR. WHITE: No. No. No. Your Honor, with - - with due respect, the - - - the gun swab in Sean John was edited. It was edited.

JUDGE GARCIA: It was edited for certain peaks

1 and - -2 MR. WHITE: For peaks. I'm - - - I'm just saying 3 to the extent - - - and this is why the preservation issue 4 is so important, Your Honors, because you're - - - there's 5 no guidance for the court. There's no record for the 6 court. 7 JUDGE GARCIA: Peaks and editing that was done in 8 there only served to reinforce the point of the majority in 9 that case, which was there's a potential for things to be 10 manipulated in some way at this stage, and that's why you 11 need the person who actually performed it rather than a 12 machine printout that an expert then can compare to a 13 different machine printout. 14 MR. WHITE: Your Honor, this is a - - - an 15 argument we don't need to have because it's not preserved. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. What should - - - what 17 should counsel have said to preserve this argument? What's 18 missing from - - -19 MR. WHITE: What's missing is he should have said 20 21 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that colloquy?

MR. WHITE:

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MR. WHITE: He should have said, Your Honor, the DNA buccal swab profile is testimonial and we need to hear

Yeah.

I'm sorry to interrupt.

No problem.

1 from the analyst who did the typing. 2 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: If he's said it's a violation of 4 Supreme Court cases on this and cited the cases, would that 5 have been enough? б MR. WHITE: It would not have been enough, Your 7 Honor. Because as I said there are three DNA reports, six 8 analysts per report, eighteen witnesses. We need to know 9 with some specificity who to call because theoretically we 10 could have - - - the objections could have been sustained, 11 his witnesses could have been called, and then he could 12 have turned around and said on appeal - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: Did the judge's decision - - - did 14 the judge's decision perhaps resolve the issue for purposes 15 of this preservation question? 16 MR. WHITE: No, Your Honor, because the judge's 17 ruling was that not all witnesses need to be called. 18 That's a very different proposition that the People don't 19 need to call anyone else. And again, this objection was 20 made on the last day of testimony on a month-long trial 21 where defense counsel had had the reports for over three 2.2 weeks. 23 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 24 MR. WHITE: Thank you, Your Honors.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Zeno.

JUDGE FAHEY: What do you say about the objection being on the last day of testimony?

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MR. ZENO: Well, the objection was before the evidence came in. I - - - I don't know of any rule of evidence that requires you to make an objection at any earlier point. The objection occurred before the criminalist testified about the - - - his conclusions about the DNA. I mean I don't even actually understand it's - -- there are no - - - there's no timing requirement as long as it's before the testimony comes in, and it was before the testimony came in. It was when he learned that this criminalist was going to testify about this evidence and he objected. And I want to get back to preservation, but I -- - I wanted to correct something that respondent said in response to Judge Feinman's question asking about is there any evidence in the record as to what type of supervision or analysis he performed on this report? And counsel cited to page 984 of the appendix and where O'Connor said that he had reviewed every test that was done, every control, all of that information, but he was specifically referring to one of the other reports that we don't object to. If you look at 984, question: "What role did you play in the analysis of this particular piece of evidence under FB0904107?" And that's one of the reports we're not objecting to.

JUDGE GARCIA: And didn't - - - wasn't there also 1 2 a comment on Mr. O'Connor's role that the court made at A-3 1047 saying: "Mr. O'Connor was ill prepared. Apparently, 4 all he did was to review what other people did"? 5 MR. ZENO: Absolutely. I mean - - and he - -6 he testified to that with regard to this report. All he 7 did is review. All he did is create that box score, which 8 under John is inadequate. John made a very precise rule 9 and he doesn't fit within that rule. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: To be clear what - - - what is it 11 you are now raising as your confrontation clause claim? 12 What - - - what is it you're objecting to now? 13 MR. ZENO: That the evidence from the buccal swab 14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 16 MR. ZENO: - - - that my client's DNA matched the 17 DNA from the - - - that was found on the bloody receipt at 18 the Bed and Bath store. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: So it's the testimony comparing? 20 MR. ZENO: It's the testimony comparing - - -21 JUDGE RIVERA: Comparison testimony? 2.2 MR. ZENO: - - - and - - - but it's more than 23 that because it necessity brings in the testimony of the 24 criminalists who did not testify who produced the data that 25 - that O'Connor used to reach that conclusion. He was

1	relying on data of other criminalists who performed the	
2	tests, edited the graphs, came up with the numbers, and he	
3	just took that underlying number, put it in a box score,	
4	and concluded they're the same. So to the extent that he	
5	was allowed to testify that they were the same, we object	
6	to that. And to the extent that he was allowed to	
7	integrate that other testimony that was not admissible tha	
8	did not have a constitutional foundation, we object to that	
9	as well.	
10	JUDGE RIVERA: So not just the defendant's DNA	
11	profile?	
12	MR. ZENO: No. Just the defendant just the	
13	defendant.	
14	JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying the the DNA	
15	from the crime scene also?	
16	MR. ZENO: No. We we do not object to that	
17		
18	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.	
19	MR. ZENO: because under John that is not	
20	testimonial because it was pre-accusatory.	
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, okay.	
22	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.	
23	MR. ZENO: Thank you.	
24	(Court is adjourned)	
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