1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	EXCESS LINE ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK
4	(ELANY),
5	Appellant,
6	-against- No. 98
7	WALDORF & ASSOCIATES,
8	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Street
10	Albany, New York September 7, 2017
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
16	
17	Appearances:
18	DAVID B. HAMM, ESQ. HERZFELD & RUBIN, P.C.
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20	New York, NY 10004
21	MICHAEL D. BROWN, ESQ. OHRENSTEIN & BROWN, LLP
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24	
25	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcriber

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The final matter on this afternoon's calendar is appeal number 98, Excess Line Association of New York v. Waldorf & Associates.

Counsel.

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MR. HAMM: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the court, my name is David Hamm. I'm with Herzfeld & Rubin, and I'm here on behalf of ELANY. I - - - I would start by noting that whatever may be said about Section 2130 and 2118 that is the basis for capacity and standing in this matter, we are in the end an association. And we are seeking, by this suit, to enforce a lawful claim against our member.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, what was the legislative purpose for creating the association?

MR. HAMM: Legislative purpose for creating the association?

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Um-hmm.

MR. HAMM: Was for the benefit of the insureds and the - - - to make sure that Excess Line Insurance would be available to provide insurance where no lawful - - - no admitted insurer could provide that insurance. And to funnel that information in so that it could be considered by the superintendent and also to be a buffer between the nonauthorized insurers, which were not under the supervision or the - - - or the rules or regulations of the

superintendent, and the Insurance Department.

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JUDGE STEIN: It was, essentially, to protect the insureds, right?

MR. HAMM: Correct. However, if Your Honor is referring to the Uhr test or the Sheehy test or the for private cause of action, I was - - I would first of all say that the issue of whether we meet that test, the first part of it, is not - - is dependent on what statute we are looking at. We're not suing under Article 21 as a whole or even under 2130 or 2018 as a whole. We are suing particularly to obtain our stamping fees and to have the opportunity to take a look at the books and records of the Waldorfs. That's under Insurance Law 2118(c)(2) and 2130(f). Those provision are directly for our benefit only.

JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, can - - - can the superintendent use its disciplinary authority to compel the Waldorf to enter into a settlement and make one of the conditions to pay you back the fees? Could the superintendent have done that?

MR. HAMM: Couldn't have done that. It didn't.

There - - - there are three answers, really, to this.

JUDGE FEINMAN: All right. So it didn't do that, but I'm not asking whether they did that in this case.

MR. HAMM: Right.

1 JUDGE FEINMAN: I'm asking you whether they 2 could. 3 MR. HAMM: Well - - -4 JUDGE FEINMAN: And you're seeming to say yes. 5 I don't know. And I will - - - I MR. HAMM: б don't know. I would posit. One answer is they didn't. Second answer is I don't know, and as part of a settlement 8 that's possible. But I don't know, frankly, if the - - -9 if the superintendent has standing to seek recovery of the 10 stamping fees that go to us. 11 JUDGE STEIN: But doesn't their approved plan of 12 operation require you to let DFS know when the stamping 13 fees aren't paid? 14 MR. HAMM: Absolutely. 15 JUDGE STEIN: And what would be the point of that 16 if DFS couldn't do anything about it? 17 MR. HAMM: Disciplinary action. They could 18 certainly bring a disciplinary action against the - - - the 19 brokers, could eliminate their license, could cancel their 20 license for failing to comply - - -JUDGE STEIN: But where does it -21 2.2 MR. HAMM: - - - with the Insurance Law. 23 JUDGE STEIN: If they could do that why couldn't 24 they sue?

MR. HAMM: Could they have? I don't know because

I'm - - - I'm not saying definitely that they can. 2 when it comes to - - - to the question of standing, the 3 question is what is their stake in the outcome. Right. 4 That's - - - that's what the courts have said. What stake 5 does the superintendent have in going out and seeking 6 recovery of our stamping fees? That's our money. 7 not the insurance department's money. It's not the State's 8 money. It's not the - - - any insurer's money. It's not 9 any insurance money. It's our money alone. 10 JUDGE WILSON: So you're saying you have standard 11 because you have injury in fact because there are fees that 12 are due to you that you haven't received? 13 MR. HAMM: That's correct. That's certainly 14 correct. But - - - but beyond that - - - and I'm not - -15 JUDGE WILSON: And you have capacity to sue 16 because you're a general business association and under 17 Section 12 you have capacity. Is that what you're saying? 18 MR. HAMM: I'm sorry? 19 JUDGE WILSON: You have - - -20 MR. HAMM: We certainly - - - yeah. I would - -21 - I was just going to say that at the beginning. 22 JUDGE WILSON: Standing and capacity are 23 different. 24 MR. HAMM: Right.

JUDGE WILSON: I just asked you about standing.

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1 MR. HAMM: Right. 2 JUDGE WILSON: I'm asking you now about capacity. 3 MR. HAMM: Yes. 4 JUDGE WILSON: You claim capacity is under 5 Section 12 of the General Association Law; is that right? 6 MR. HAMM: That is correct. But we also say that 7 we should have a standing - - - we should have capacity under 2130 and 2118 - - -8 9 JUDGE WILSON: Okay. 10 MR. HAMM: - - - of the Insurance Law. 11 JUDGE WILSON: Okay. 12 MR. HAMM: And - - - and in that respect the real 13 issue is, I think, whether the superintendent - - - whether 14 it has standing or not - - -15 JUDGE STEIN: But just before we leave the 16 General Association Law, doesn't there have to be a right 17 of action - - - doesn't a right of action have to exist 18 first in order for there to be a lawful claim under Section 19 12 of that? 20 MR. HAMM: I don't - - - I don't think there has 2.1 to be a - - - I don't think there has to be an independent 2.2 source of - - - of a cause of action. We have under the 23 statute the right to obtain that money. The question, how 24 do we go about it? Well, the General Association Law says

that if have a lawful claim, which is the abil - - - the -

1 - - we have a claim for the money, we should be able to 2 enforce it under the General Association Law. I think - -3 4 JUDGE STEIN: But also under that section, 5 doesn't - - - doesn't the action have to be commenced by an 6 officer - - -7 MR. HAMM: That's it. JUDGE STEIN: - - - of the association? 8 9 MR. HAMM: That's - - - that is correct, Your 10 Honor. And that's true. 11 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. And it wasn't, right? 12 MR. HAMM: Except that we - - - it was not. 13 we - - - there have been cases which have stated that 14 that's a correctable error. We asked the court below for 15 leave to amend, and that's correctable error. That's 16 something that can be - - - that can be done by amendment. 17 And there's a case, Concerned Citizens against State, 140 18 A.D.2d which - - - which says that that's something that we 19 can take care of by amendment. So - - - and if that were 20 the sole cause for dismissal, then we would have - - - we 2.1 would start the action again under 205(a). We wouldn't 22 have a problem with the statute of - - - I think - - - I 23 think if that were the only issue, I think we could correct 24 that.

The legislative purpose is promoted - - - the

second piece of Uhr - - - is promoted by allowing us to sue because the legislature wants ELANY to exist. Obviously, we've been doing a bang-up job. I've - - - that 2013 memo, I haven't seen praise like that for anything coming out of the legislature. And - - - and they want us to be there. We can't exist if we can't get our stamping fees. It's our sole source of money. We don't have - - - if we don't get the stamping fees, we're dead.

And is it consistency with the legislatively scheme? We are not interfering with any way with the Insurance Division. We - - - they go after the taxes. They go after the penalties. They impose discipline. We're not doing anything of the sort. What we are seeking is simply to get our stamping fees and the opportunity to look at the books so we can see how much we're owed. So I - - I think we fit within the Uhr scheme even if we had to rely upon it for capacity and - - - for capacity.

JUDGE STEIN: Do you agree that - - - that your - - that your capacity is advisory to CFS?

MR. HAMM: There are some aspects in which, yeah, we are - - - we do advise the superintendent. To be sure, we give a lot of advice to the superintendent. We - - - I say the superintendent. It's deputy superintendent. We do it - - - we do provide a lot of advice, but - - - and among them is the - - - the advice concerning those excess - - -

excess line carriers which should not - - - which should not be part of the scheme.

JUDGE FAHEY: You know, I don't see this as a question of your right to the stamping fees but more who has the enforcement power to collect the stamping fees, and that seems to be a little bit different question. And the statute seems to reserve all the enforcement power in DFS and the superintendent.

MR. HAMM: Really? 109(d) of the - - - of the Insurance Law provides that they may go after penalties, not - - it doesn't say anything about our fees. It says - - it talks about - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: Can't - - - under 109, you know, bring a lawsuit and then remit the proceeds that they recover directly to your association?

MR. HAMM: Well, take a look at this now. What is the impetus for the superintendent to now seek - - - bringing - - - use the resources of the - - - of the Insurance Division, use their resources in order to go out and bring a lawsuit against the Waldorfs to recover fees which go directly to us?

JUDGE STEIN: Well, they couldn't do that here because they had the settlement but - - - but they may have made that choice.

MR. HAMM: Well, the settlement actually only

stated that they were settling the property taxes and disciplinary action. If you look at the wording, and that's what we look out for this when we try to interpret a document, the only thing that they stated that they were settling was the property taxes and the - - - and the disciplinary action. Nothing at all about the fees, zero.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. HAMM: Thank you, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

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MR. BROWN: May it please the court, Michael Brown for respondents. Before addressing the issue of capacity, I just would like to make an observation and that is ELANY says this is about our stamping fees. They want you to ignore the actual complaint in this case. The actual complaint in this case is - - alleges fraud, alleges antitrust violations, alleges consumer harm. And in fact, the issues that appellant has asked this court to hear are only two, and that is capacity and standing.

But in point of fact, Justice Emerson of the

Supreme Court also dismissed each of these claims for

failure to state a claim. And that is not appealed. The

appellant has raised no issue about that. It's possible

that they could argue, well, you know, we argued standing

and standing for the Donelley Act, the Antitrust Act, but

clearly they concede in their own brief they're not a

competitor of the Waldorfs. There's no standing for that.

Nor is there standing under the Consumer Protection Act.

So in point of fact the - - - the issues that the plaint - - - the appellant has raised here are not really before court which is - - -

JUDGE STEIN: So - - - but let's assume - - - let's assume they are.

MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor.

and - - and none of their members wants to pay the stamping fees and DFS says, ah, we're not going to - - you know, it's not our concern, then - - - then what?

MR. BROWN: They have a remedy. And that's the plan of operation. You go first to the superintendent.

And remember, the - - - the legislature says in creating ELANY - - - and they say that, you know, ELANY is - - - in their statement, in their brief, we have - - - we have these enforcement powers but then they cite the legislative history. The legislative history says ELANY an advisory capacity. But let me answer your question directly. The way it works you follow the plan of operation as you're required to by the legislature. You go to the

superintendent. If the superintendent says, nah, not interested, you have an Article 78 against the superintendent, which they did before - - - which they did before in ELANY against Curiale.

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So they have a remedy. They chose not to follow it, and they chose not to follow it for a very simple reason. What this case is really about is about ELANY's trying to get some jurisdiction to be a co-regulator. That's really what this case is about. And it's interesting, the appellant cites the - - - the Uhr case. And the Uhr case has a very interesting quote in it. And it says basically that, you know, sometimes, you know, in dealing with consistency two statutes are inconsistent. And they work not in harmony but in disharmony. And what you have is two drivers at the wheel, and that's what needs to be avoided here is having two drivers at the wheel.

JUDGE WILSON: Didn't DFS say, essentially they said - - this is alleged to ELANY if you want - - - go ahead and do whatever you want to do?

MR. BROWN: No.

JUDGE WILSON: No?

MR. BROWN: ELANY has an affidavit that he met with three unnamed people at DFS. Don't know who they are.

Don't know if it happened. That's never been - - - been -

1 - - that's never - - - we've never had the capacity to - -2 - to litigate that to examine that. DFS has certainly not 3 put in any papers. DFS could very well have written 4 something and say, you know, you - - - you have the 5 authority. But what would have to happen, Your Honor, 6 under the legislation 2013 says that we're creating ELANY 7 under the supervision of the superintendent. And you're 8 going to operate pursuant to a plan of operation approved 9 by the superintendent. So then he creates his plan of 10 operation, and nowhere in there do they say and by the way, 11 we want the right to sue. 12 JUDGE STEIN: But I - - - in follow up to Judge 13 Wilson's questions, what - - - what if the plan of 14 operation - - - that could be amended, I assume, by - - with DFS' consent. Couldn't DFS approve as part of that 15 16 plan of operation their right to - - - to seek to recover 17 18 MR. BROWN: They would have to amend the plan of 19 operation - - -20 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. Yeah. 21 MR. BROWN: - - - which they haven't done. 22 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. But they could do that? 23 MR. BROWN: Oh, they absolutely could do that. 24 They could go out tomorrow and say to the superintendent we 25 want to plan - - - amend the plan of operation so that we

can sue. And if the superintendent wished to do that then
- - - then that was would be perfectly appropriate. That
would be pursuant to the legislative mandate, but that's
not what we have before us. What we have before us is a
plan of operation which says you report it to the
superintendent. Now - - -

JUDGE WILSON: So let me ask you this. If - - - if ELANY were a voluntary association, would they have capacity to sue?

MR. BROWN: No. Because you have two conflicting statutes. You have 2130 and you have - - - and you have General Association. Let - - - let me answer your question, if I - - - if I may. Because they're not a voluntary - - - they're not a general association.

JUDGE WILSON: But answer my question. My question's if they were, right.

MR. BROWN: If they - - - if they were - - 
JUDGE WILSON: IF there was not - - - what I'm 
- - what I'm asking, really, is is your argument that

because of the existence of the statutory scheme they don't

have - - I mean these are - - - these are businesses,

right? These are insurers who have gotten together. If

they simply had gotten together in a voluntary way and

there was no statute do you concede they would have

capacity to sue via an appropriate officer?

1 MR. BROWN: If - - - if they were a voluntary 2 association, yes, Your Honor. And - - -3 JUDGE WILSON: Okay. And because they are not, 4 they don't? 5 MR. BROWN: That's correct. 6 JUDGE WILSON: Okay. 7 MR. BROWN: And that - - - and also, Your Honor, in Community Board Seven this court addressed the General 8 9 Association Law with regard to artificial entities just 10 like ELANY. And it said and it defined what they were, 11 voluntary associations. This is an involuntary 12 association. It's created by the legislature and its 13 membership is involuntary. 14 JUDGE WILSON: In Community Board Seven there was 15 a sort of lengthy discussion of the legislative history 16 that showed, I think, very clearly that the city considered 17 and deliberately rejected the idea that Community Board 18 Seven would have the ability to subpoena the type of 19 documents they were trying to subpoena in that case, right? MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. 20 21 Is there a parallel legislative JUDGE WILSON: 2.2 history here? 23 MR. BROWN: Well, there is, Your Honor. First, 24 we start with the legislative history saying ELANY is a

voluntary association. And the people - - - the class of

people to be benefitted, especially benefitted, by the creation of ELANY are two, insureds seeking insurance in New York and the State's financial interest, and that's what it states. And very interestingly, as I say, in Community Board Seven, just like in ELANY, that's an advisory association also.

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But here there is much evidence that ELANY - - that there is contrary legislative intention. You have
one, the insurance law has many provisions. There's a
chart at the end of the record, page 368, and it recites
all the sections in the Insurance Law where the court says
- - - where the legislature said and you can go to court
and sue. And it has all the other things that ELANY has
it, but it also says you got the right to use and they
don't do that here. The legislature didn't do that here.
The legislature has created a superintendent to be in
charge of the Insurance Law. And as Uhr says, you don't
want to have two drivers. You don't want to have competing
interests.

A settlement just like this - - - and Your Honor asked a question before. What happens in the real world because the superintendent has those powers is the superintendent goes to a broker and says, look, we want you to make restitution to - - - to somebody. Doesn't say in the statute he can ask for restitution, but he says but if

you don't make restitution, I'll take your license away. Same thing here. The - - - the Department of Financial Services could come to the Waldorfs, to any other broker and say if you're not paying your fees, we're going to bring you up for violating the Insurance Law, and we'll take your license away. So pay your fees. And that's why the plan of operation approved by the superintendent did not give ELANY the independent right because the superintendent wants the right to make those settlements that he believes are in the interest of enforcement of the Insurance Law, not a second body. If you - - - if you had ELANY with that authority, Your Honors, these settlements would never happen because you'd have two coequal regulators and that's not what the legislative plan here is.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. BROWN: Thank you, Your Honors.

(Court is adjourned)

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