1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	MATTER OF STATE OF NEW YORK,
4	Respondent,
5	-against-
6	NO. 102 FLOYD Y.,
7 8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor September 13, 201
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
15	ASSOCIATE GODGE FACE FEINMAN
16	Appearances:
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1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Number 102, the Matter of
2	the State of New York v. Floyd Y.
3	Counsel?
4	MS. KEELING: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I'd
5	like to request two minutes of rebuttal.
6	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may.
7	MS. KEELING: Thank you.
8	Alexandra Keeling, Mental Hygiene Legal Service,
9	for Floyd Y. May it please the court.
10	The psychological portrait presented here by the
11	expert, the state expert, mirrored that in Kenneth T., with
12	the same state expert using the same analytical reasoning
13	and the same language to describe Floyd Y.
14	And the First Department went out of its way,
15	beyond the record, to quote the DSM, but to conflate
16	prongs one and two of the mental abnormality standard with
17	their statement that pedophilia, by definition, involves an
18	element of difficulty of control. But that is not what the
19	DSM says.
20	The the First Department engaged in an
21	armchair psychology to cure what was the
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, the the the
23	decision's not based solely on the diagnosis of pedophilia,
24	correct?

MS. KEELING: The - - - he - - - correct, Your

Honor, in the sense that Floyd Y. was diagnosed also with ASPD as well as substance use disorder. And that is exactly what Justice Conviser gets right here, where he, at A-69 of the appendix in his decision notes that Dr.

Kirshner's testimony what - - - all - - - about on that second prong; about a serious difficulty of control of sexual behavior was rooted solely in the non-paraphilic diagnoses ASPD, and was not linked back to any paraphilic behavior, and that's what this court warns against in - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: But doesn't the - - -

MS. KEELING: -- in Kenneth T.

Appellate Division in its last paragraph or second to last, say, "We do not hold that all offenders who suffer from pedophilia automatically by virtue of the diagnosis alone are subject to mandatory management". And they go on to say, we look at everything; the diagnoses, the history of sexual misconduct, admitted inability to control his pedophilic urges, lack of satisfactory progress in sex offender treatment, so I don't see how you can read that decision to say they relied only on the diagnosis.

MS. KEELING: Well, the - - - the language that pedophilia, by definition, involves a - - - an element of difficulty of control is just wrong; that's not what the DSM says, but however the other evidence that the First

Department, to your question, Your Honor, is not what the record is here. Dr. Kirshner - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: So then you're asking us to substitute our view of what the record says for the Appellate Division.

 $\,$ MS. KEELING: The - - - the question for this court is whether or not the evidence was legally sufficient and - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But assuming it's what they say, you would agree they are right? You're just saying, what they say is wrong?

MS. KEELING: Correct, Your Honor, and here's why it is wrong. Precisely what Justice Conviser notes in his decision is that the State expert relied precisely on the - - what this court has said, a general tendency towards criminality. Those types of behaviors, it's rooted solely in the ASPD. He uses identical language; the internal breaking mechanism, a lack of conscience - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But he didn't have a lack of satisfactory progress in his sex offender treatment program; that's not an accurate statement or - - -

MS. KEELING: That's not an accurate statement,
Your Honor, to the extent that number one, he did complete,
successfully graduates from a sex offender treatment
program while he was in prison, and then his subsequent



1	treatment, he it's not that he is not completed it.
2	He is still in it. And he and Dr. Kirshner's
3	testimony is that there have been gains and setbacks, and
4	so to say that he has failed completely by that alone
5	does not make this case sufficient.
6	JUDGE WILSON: What are the underlying sorts of
7	facts on which an expert could rely to find prong two
8	satisfied?
9	MS. KEELING: Your Honor, and that is something
10	that this court has spoken to both in Kenneth T. and as
11	well as in Dennis K., which reaffirms the holding it in
12	Kenneth T. and Donald D.D
13	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, it it really
14	MS. KEELING: that it's the detailed
15	psychological
16	JUDGE FAHEY: slow down.
17	MS. KEELING: portrait
18	JUDGE FAHEY: Slow excuse me. Slow down.
19	It doesn't really; does it? Because I thought Dennis K.
20	said ASPD plus borderline personality disorder was legally
21	sufficient. And it really distinguished Kenneth T.; don't
22	you don't you think?
23	MS. KEELING: Dennis K., some of the fact
24	patterns distinguish or distinguish, factually

distinguishable. In terms of - - one of the things that

this court says in Kenneth T. are the - - - the types of
evidence that's equivocal, that could be - - - on the one
hand go one way, and on the other hand go another way, and
one of the things that this court points out is crimes that
are situational and opportunistic are not to the converse
of the question about mental abnormality what types of
facts. It - -
JUDGE WILSON: Well, you're answering the obverse
of my question.

MS. KEELING: And to get to that as well, Your
Honor, the types of facts - - - it is linked back to the -

MS. KEELING: And to get to that as well, Your
Honor, the types of facts - - it is linked back to the - to the predicate diagnosis. Crane says that the
serious difficulty of control to the Supreme Court
jurisprudence of the serious difficulty of control must be
viewed in the light of such features as a psychiatric
diagnosis as well as the severity of the mental
abnormality, and everything from the crimes themselves, the
circumstances surrounding the crimes themselves, yes, the
diagnosis itself, and the ones - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Can - - -

MS. KEELING: - - - progress and treatment - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Isn't that exactly what happened

here?

MS. KEELING: No, Your Honor, when you - - -

JUDGE STEIN: What - - - what's missing here?



1	MS. KEELING: Is the linkage back to the
2	paraphilic behavior, to the pedophilia. It's
3	JUDGE FAHEY: All right. Can I
4	MS. KEELING: Dr. Kirshner
5	JUDGE FAHEY: Can I excuse me. Can I stop
6	you there? Kenneth T. is about paraphilia. This case is
7	pedophilia. They aren't the same thing. And your argument
8	presumes that they're the same thing. Isn't there a
9	disconnect there for you?
10	MS. KEELING: Your Honor, that it's
11	it's Dr. Kirshner's testimony, Dr. Kirshner
12	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, no, let's just stay on my
13	question. My my question, respectfully, was
14	paraphilia is not equivalent to pedophilia; do you agree
15	with that statement?
16	MS. KEELING: I agree, Your Honor, of course.
17	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. And Kenneth T. or Kenneth -
18	whatever his initial was was about paraphilia,
19	correct?
20	MS. KEELING: Correct.
21	JUDGE FAHEY: All right.
22	MS. KEELING: Paraphilia NOS.
23	JUDGE FAHEY: Now we're talking about pedophilia,
24	which is a certainly, a a defined
25	manifestations of abhorrent behavior in the DSM. There's

no question about it. This court has not said that paraphilia - - - excuse me, that pedophilia is not one of the things that could be considered for legal sufficiency, and isn't that a distinction that we should be looking at, because I understand your paraphilia argument, but I don't think it applies to pedophilia.

MS. KEELING: I think that gets into the two prongs of mental abnormality, Your Honor.

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.

MS. KEELING: Where the paraphilia, pedophilia - pedophilia meets that first prong, which is the
predicate diagnosis that predisposes one to engage in
behavior that would constitute a sex offense.

JUDGE FAHEY: Oh, we - - -

MS. KEELING: But we're - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: We've got a - - - we've got a man who says - - - who says - - - who - - - who's - - - there's more than one prong here. There's three prongs that

Kirshner was relying on; the ASPD, the pedophilia, and of course, his substance abuse behavior. But also, we've got a man who - - - who clearly says, I think the quote from Dr. Kirshner's testimony was when describing why he acted the way he did impulsively, he said, "I want what I want when I want it." That's, I believe, a direct quote from the doctor's testimony. Isn't that something we can rely

on?

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MS. KEELING: Certainly, one of the - - - the most quality types of evidence is a - - - is an offender's own statements, but that was contextualized as to the behavior in question at that time. And moreover, Dr. Kirshner is rooting this serious difficulty of control, and he isolates it as to the ASPD only and does not connect it back to the pedophilia, the predicate diagnosis.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, I thought there was testimony from him also; that -- that Floyd said that he had been fighting his urges towards his step-daughter for a long time and finally gave in to them. Isn't that some indication of a tie in between the pedophilia and an inability to control his urges?

MS. KEELING: Well, one - - - two things, Your
Honor. I mean, one, in Kenneth T., the respondent, Kenneth
T., himself, made a statement, a one-time statement here.

It's also a one-time statement, but that was as to that
time period in question. It is - - - there's a difference
between the fighting the urge in those moments versus an
ongoing - - and there's nothing to suggest that the - - that his inability to control is ongoing. And I would just
end with it's the difference between the sick and wicked as
the Seventh Circuit characterized it. And here, questions
of serious difficulty of control are difficult logically,

but it's Dr. Kirshner's testimony that mirrors Kenneth T., which this court held was insufficient. Thank you.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counselor.

Counsel, what was the detailed psychological portrait that was relied on just before the - - -

MR. GRIECO: So the detailed psychological portrait, as this court explained in Dennis K., consists of several components. Here, the detailed psychological portrait was made up of the specific and detailed testimony similar to that this court found sufficient in Dennis K. comprising the following pieces. Direct testimony about Floyd Y.'s thinking and direct evidence about how that thinking leads to a specific offense pattern. There was no testimony relied upon by the expert witness in Kenneth T. of that nature.

The logical starting point to assess serious difficulty of control, as Dennis K. made clear, is the individualized characteristics of Floyd Y.'s diagnoses. Floyd Y. suffers from the rare and powerful combination of pedophilia and ASPD. In the authoritative manual in this field, the DSM, recognizes that this specific combination causes a heightened volitional impairment, as both experts testified. And that is a - - - that is strong evidence of a mental abnormality.

JUDGE FAHEY: No, we - - - you know, we're



familiar with that. They referred to it as a toxic mix.

MR. GRIECO: Right.

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JUDGE FAHEY: But there was another element that was added, which was his - - - his participation in programs, his substance abuse problems.

MR. GRIECO: That's right.

JUDGE FAHEY: One of the things that strikes me is it seems that there's a catch-22 problem, where these - - - the people that are involved in these programs are sent into the programs, and they're - - - they have to either admit their past behavior, which can then be used as evidence against them, or they don't admit, and then they're cited for failure to cooperate with the program.

And in this catch-22, that's how we're producing evidence, and it seems like we're producing evidence, programmatic evidence, that doesn't comport with basic due process principles.

MR. GRIECO: The way forward out of that is the road map that this court set in the Michael M. case. The respondent in that case explained that he was able to develop practical tools for avoiding reoffending, and that would be - - - that would be the first and - - - and most important step. And secondly, I would say, it's simply not true that people are trapped. There - - - there have been twenty-one instances in which people who were diagnosed

with pedophilia, have been release - - - people who were diagnosed with pedophilia, and have been released - - - were on SIST, and have now been fully discharged to discharge from all civil management. And - - and in nineteen of those twenty-one cases of people who fully - - been fully discharged from SIST to no civil management - - -

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JUDGE FAHEY: And you understand what I'm saying, though. It's usually the other forms of evidence that we're talking about. This particular form of evidence, the evidence that comes out of the programs, it still doesn't alleviate that problem.

MR. GRIECO: The way forward out of the problem is to at least - - - to at least expect the respondent to have a plan for - - - to avoid reoffending when we're talking about proven offenses.

And here, as - as his own expert described, he has acknowledged being sexually aroused by a - - - by his step-daughter and giving into those urges on, at least, three occasions over the two - - - over a two-year period which - - when she was eight and ten years old. And furthermore, as - as Dr. Kirshner explained to the jury, he told his expert that he was thinking to himself as he was doing it, you know, "what the hell am I doing", were his words to his expert, and he was still unable to restrain

1 himself from offending. That's at page 453. 2 JUDGE STEIN: One of the things that - - - that 3 struck me in this case was that the testimony about his 4 lacking of cognitive skills to be able to manage his 5 pedophilia and also his - - -his lack of a prevention, you 6 know, relapse prevention program, which I think go 7 together. 8 MR. GRIECO: Right. 9 JUDGE STEIN: So is that - - -10 MR. GRIECO: Yeah, it's - - - it's the 11 absence of a relapse prevention program is the single most 12 important fact that comes out of - - - comes out of the 13 treatment process. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: Is that - - - does that say that 15 anywhere in Article 10 you need that? 16 MR. GRIECO: The - - - well, that - - - that's 17 what Dr. Kirshner - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Is that required on - - -19 MR. GRIECO: - - - testified - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: I was asking you, is it required 2.1 under Article 10 to have what you call a relapse program? 2.2 MR. GRIECO: Well, what the statute - - - what 23 the statute requires is serious difficulty controlling 24 one's conduct. And Dr. Kirshner - - -25 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So let's get back to that.

1	Let's get back to what you said before. If if
2	if he didn't have ASPD and it was just the pedophilia,
3	would that have met the standard under Article 10?
4	MR. GRIECO: What
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Could you have shown the second
6	prong of the test?
7	MR. GRIECO: Could could could it be
8	shown, yes.
9	JUDGE RIVERA: Inability to control their
10	how so?
11	MR. GRIECO: Could you would you
12	would show it by putting together the full detailed
13	psychological portrait including the diagnoses, the extent
14	of his success in treatment, and the how that
15	how that leads to a specific pattern of offending. Now,
16	whatever the case would be in a case where it was just
17	pedophilia
18	JUDGE RIVERA: But I'm talking does that
19	boil down to his statements? Pedophilia in his statements
20	that I can't control my urges?
21	MR. GRIECO: It it it's pedophilia.
22	It's whether he is he is meaningfully engaging in
23	treatment and I would I would point out that Floyd Y.
24	made gains in treatment early on and then backslid from
25	that. And it is the backsliding that is cause for concern.

He - - - as recently as 2014, which was his most recent 1 2 interview with his expert, he was continuing to invent 3 implausible explanations for - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So again - - -5 MR. GRIECO: - - - for his proven conduct. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - it's his - - - it - - - what 7 you're saying is that it's the pedophilia. We've gone with 8 the hypothetical, as we're assuming someone doesn't have 9 the ASPD. The pedophilia and the individual's statements. 10 MR. GRIECO: Pedophilia and - - - and the overall assessment of his engagement and conduct and whether the -11 12 - - and the expert's explanation to the jury of how this 13 manifests in a particular pattern of behavior. Let me 14 explain what I mean by - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: But the pattern of behavior, 16 doesn't that rely on the crimes that he has committed, 17 which we've already said in Article 10 makes clear you 18 cannot rely on for this diagnosis? 19 MR. GRIECO: That's not what Kenneth T. said, 20 Your Honor. Kenneth T. said that the - - - the facts of 2.1 someone's sex offenses standing alone will rarely suffice 2.2 to show serious difficulty. Nothing in Kenneth T. 23 suggested that the facts of one's offenses are 24 categorically irrelevant to showing serious difficulty, nor

could - - - nor could that be the case.

2 As the Supreme Court has recognized in the Kansas 3 case v. - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, isn't that what - - - unless 5 you have the profile, all right, unless you have the 6 profile that the court has referred to in the past, if 7 you're looking at crimes that have been committed in that 8 pattern, aren't you just hypothesizing that he will commit 9 the crime again, as opposed to what Article 10 requires? 10 It's you've esta - - - because it's your burden. You've established, you've persuaded the jury that indeed, 11 12 he cannot control these urges. So I'm just trying to 13 figure out how - - - how you - - - perhaps, it's more of 14 what Judge Wilson was asking before, how - - - how you're 15 going to be able to establish - - -16 MR. GRIECO: The - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - other than the pedophilia, 18 the inability to control urges. 19 MR. GRIECO: It is a - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: If ASPD alone would not give you 2.1 that? 22 MR. GRIECO: ASPD alone, this court said in 23 Donald D.D., would not give you that. However, whatever 24 the case may be with someone with ASPD alone, someone who 25 has ASPD and pedophilia, it is the single psycholo - - -

fundamental error that Judge Conviser made.

psychiatric risk factor recognized by the DSM. And here,
Dr. Kirshner
JUDGE RIVERA: So then it boils down to what
Judge Fahey was asking about that that pedophilia is
not paraphilia NOS; there's something different about
pedophilia that the combination allows you to get to this
conclusion and determination under Article 10?
MR. GRIECO: On the facts of this case, and with
respect to the specific combination of pedophilia and ASPD,
yes, it is special, because the the psychiatric
JUDGE RIVERA: And is that because pedophilia is
specifically about sexual urges?
MR. GRIECO: It is because pedophilia
JUDGE RIVERA: Whereas paraphilia NOS is not
necessarily about sexual urges?
MR. GRIECO: Well, all paraphilia is in some way
involve sexual urges.
JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
MR. GRIECO: What it's about is the fact that
pedophilia, the profession has recognized that that
specific kind of paraphilia has a specific interaction with
ASPD. And the
JUDGE RIVERA: Because it's the interest in the
prepubescent children?

MR. GRIECO: I - - - well, the interest in

prepubescent children and acting on that over a period of more than six months, or in Floyd Y.'s case, over a period of two years, that is the definition of pedophilia.

It is - - - it is - - - it is just in the text of the DSM in - - - it lists the risk factors for pedophilia, and there's only one psychiatric comorbidity that it lists as a risk factor for pedophilia, and that is ASPD.

And getting to your question, Judge Rivera, about

JUDGE RIVERA: Does it mean if you establish that, does a jury have to determine that you've met your burden of proof?

MR. GRIECO: No, there's no presumption.

Pedophilia is strong evidence of a mental abnormality, and that - - and the evidence is particularly strong when pedophilia is mixed with ASPD. You - - that's when you go - - you go then to the other factors of the detailed psychological portrait. These are the same factors that the court relied upon in Dennis K. He point - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Is it possible to enunciate a - - - a specific rule, or is this - - - I mean, the more I get into this, the more it feels like you know it when you see it. You know, how much is enough. Is that what we're talking about here, or is - - - or can you articulate what it is that has to be shown and how you show it?



1 MR. GRIECO: What has to be sh - -2 JUDGE STEIN: And you know what has to be shown, 3 but - -4 MR. GRIECO: Right. 5 JUDGE STEIN: -- how do you show it? 6 MR. GRIECO: What - - - what has to be shown is, 7 of course, serious difficulty, and in this case, it means 8 serious difficulty sufficient to justify supervision in the 9 community as opposed to total release from all civil 10 management. And the way that you show it is through - - - you 11 12 - - - you begin - - - as I said at the beginning of the 13 14 in Dennis K., you begin with the individualized 15 characteristics of the respondent's diagnoses, and you 16 17

argument - - - you begin, and this is where the court began then, from there, it is the responsibility of the expert to provide a detailed psychological portrait, which will draw upon multiple factors; it will draw upon his success in treatment, not just his statements, but also his degree of engagement and whether he's developing a relapse prevention plan, and also the particular pattern of offending.

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And here, the particular pattern of offending, which is comparable to the patterns of offending described in Dennis K., particularly the Richard T. T. respondent in Dennis K. He targets people who are vulnerable because



they occupy particular positions of trust in his life, and over the time - - - and over time, he has shifted towards increasingly younger victims, culminating in his multi-year abuse of his prepubescent step-children. He could develop a plan to avoid reoffending, but he hasn't done so. That's the testimony that was provided here that wasn't provided in Dennis K., and that's why this court should - - - wasn't provided in Kenneth T., and that's why this court should affirm.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

Ms. Keeling, how significant is the absence of a relapse prevention program?

MS. KEELING: According to this court's jurisprudence, it's not significant enough to make this case sufficient. And in ter - - - it's a protective factor. Treatment is a protective factor that does speak to someone's ability to control, but the absence of it does not mean that does not exist the concept of someone who's wicked, who chooses to engage in their behavior.

And I take issue with the idea that the DSM says that pedophilia combined with ASPD, the comorbidity speaks to volitional control. It speaks to recidivism. And the difference between a risk of reoffending and the ability to control is also a fine, subtle distinction, but it's what Justice Conviser warns against, again, at A-71 in his



decision about these in - - - these inferential shortcuts. That because someone repeats their crimes it feels like they can't control themselves, but there is a difference between an offender who repeats their crimes by choice - - and here, Dr. Kirshner's testimony it - - he isolates it as to the ASPD only regarding the serious difficulty of control and when these crimes, the pattern of offending, shows that these crimes are situational and opportunistic at which this court in Kenneth T. notes crimes of opportunities do not have that sufficient quality. It's not that quantum - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: But does the substance abuse diagnosis add anything to this mix?

MS. KEELING: The - - - certainly, Your Honor, the substance abuse diagnosis, A, speaks to the first prong, and as well as to serious difficulty of control, but it's not linked back to the paraphilic behavior and pedophilia here - - -

JUDGE STEIN: What do you mean by - - -

MS. KEELING: -- by Dr. - - -

JUDGE STEIN: What do you mean by link, because that seems to be the nub of your argument, you know, when you've been presented with various questions from this bench on what's missing, you know what you need, you keep talking about a link. Give me a specific example of what



1 | that link would look like.

MS. KEELING: Well, I - - - the - - - I think, to conversely - - - to my adversary, Richard T.T. shows the - - - the linkage between his predicate diagnosis and his serious difficulty of control where he admits that his frequent sexual thoughts are driving him nuts. He has - - - he's possessing pornography while combined in sex offender treatment. He is writing obsessively regarding his obsession with underage girls, and everything in a consistent pattern, he's exhibiting this inability to control through these different factors that links back to his - - his disorder that predisposes him his psychological condition. It's for these reasons we ask that the First Department's decision be reversed. Thank you, Your Honors.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. (Court is adjourned)



CERTIFICATION I, Gina Gattone, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of State of New York v. Floyd V., No. 102 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. gin Gattone Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 Date: September 21, 2017

