| 1 | COURT OF APPEALS |
|----|---|
| 2 | GENER OF NEW YORK |
| 3 | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| 4 | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, |
| 5 | Respondent, |
| 6 | -against- |
| 7 | NO. 25 NICHOLAS BROOKS, |
| 8 | Appellant. |
| 9 | |
| 10 | 20 Eagle Street Albany, New York |
| 11 | February 7, 2018 Before: |
| 12 | CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE |
| 13 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN |
| 14 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA |
| 15 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN |
| 16 | |
| 17 | Appearances: |
| 18 | SUSAN C. WOLFE, ESQ. BLANK ROME LLP |
| 19 | Attorney for Appellant |
| | The Chrysler Building 405 Lexington Avenue |
| 20 | New York, NY 10174 |
| 21 | DAVID M. COHN, ADA NEW YORK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE |
| 22 | Attorney for Respondent One Hogan Place |
| 23 | New York, NY 10013 |
| 24 | |
| 25 | Sharona Shapiro Official Court Transcribe: |



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Number 25 on the calendar, 1 2 the People of the State of New York v. Nicholas Brooks. 3 MS. WOLFE: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May it 4 please the court. I am Susan Wolfe. Jeffrey Hoffman and I 5 represent Nicholas Brooks. 6 The trial court in this case - - -7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, may I interrupt a 8 Do you care to reserve any rebuttal time? 9 MS. WOLFE: Yeah, thank you. Two minutes 10 rebuttal. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes. 11 12 MS. WOLFE: Thank you. 13 The trial court in this case - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, what - - - what's the 15 challenge to the Frye that's preserved for our 16 consideration? 17 MS. WOLFE: The challenge to the Frye is that 18 there was a Frye. There were motions, extensively 19 litigated motions, explaining why there should be no Frye 20 hearing, including the fact that the issues were not novel. 21 And then once the Frye hearing was granted, the court - - -2.2 the judge let it go on for hundreds of pages. 23 counsel objected at the very beginning, when the first 24 witness, Dr. Catanese, was called, that the questioning of 25

him about every aspect of the People's case and the autopsy

was beyond the scope of - - - of - - - of the - - - what 1 2 Frye is supposed to determine. 3 JUDGE STEIN: And if you're right, if that was all error, why isn't it harmless error? 4 5 MS. WOLFE: It's not harmless error for this 6 It was a full dress rehearsal of the defense case. reason. 7 This was the defense witness, the defense expert. And the 8 judge - -9 JUDGE STEIN: Do you think there's a reasonable 10 probability that - - - or a possibility - - - probability 11 that it would have come out any differently if that hadn't 12 happened? 13 MS. WOLFE: Yes. It is - - - as with some 14 errors, it's an unmeasurable harm. But if you look at what 15 happened - - - take, for example, what if a judge had ruled 16 that the defense could only call a witness if the People 17 got to interview that witness first. 18 JUDGE GARCIA: But are you saying the harm, then, that we analyze, in the harmless error, is the fact that 19 20 they had this free discovery, or are you tying it to a 21 ruling that was made at the Frye stage? 22 MS. WOLFE: I'm tying it - - - I'm tying it to 23 the granting of the Frye and then the conduct of the Frye. 24 JUDGE GARCIA: If you go to Judge Stein's 25 question of what is the harm we're going to analyze in the

harmless-error analysis - - -

MS. WOLFE: Right.

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - if we get there, what would the harm be? Would it be free discovery for hundreds of pages, and something specific in that examination that was used, or would it be one of the judge's Frye rulings?

MS. WOLFE: Well, the - - - the Frye rulings are a separate thing because they flowed from the Frye hearing. So let me just try to answer both your questions. It was an invasion of the defense camp, and what was gained by the prosecution by that was the ability, at trial, an enor - - excuse me, an enormous trial advantage. And - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But let's say - - - let's say this went without a Frye hearing - - - and I'm curious the answer here - - - and the witness starts to testify, and the People are objecting. What does the judge do at that point? There's no foundation for this. There's no basis for this. What does the judge - - - there's a jury sitting here. What is the process at that point?

MS. WOLFE: The judge has the parties up at the bench, hears what they have to say, and determines either that it's not admissible or that it goes to weight and not admissibility.

JUDGE GARCIA: And why shouldn't the judge be able to have the discretion to do that before the jury is



in the box?

2.1

2.2

MS. WOLFE: The answer is - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Based on what the filings have been, and if there's a reasonable basis for objecting to certain things, why couldn't you do that before you get to the middle of trial?

MS. WOLFE: Because that would mean that in every case you would have a Frye hearing at which - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: You wouldn't have a Frye hearing in every case. What you'd have is you'd have a motion in limine to restrict the kind of evidence that would go in. And the court would make a determination as to whether or not this witness had a foundation for the questions that were going to be proffered, which it seems to me may have been the - - if there's an error here, the error is - - is that, that it wasn't done in that procedure, which it would be a foundational procedure, not a Frye procedure. And there seems to be some confusion about the - - - the nomenclature that should be applied here. And that seems to be, arguably, applied incorrectly.

So if that was the case, though, I guess the question we have to ask, and Judge Garcia was getting at it, what difference would it make because, if we called it foundation and the court went forward and got a responding affidavit and then he took some testimony to try and see if



| 1 | there was a proper foundation, wouldn't that be the same |
|----|---|
| 2 | thing as the Frye what was called a Frye hearing, |
| 3 | maybe incorrectly? |
| 4 | MS. WOLFE: Not in this case. |
| 5 | JUDGE FAHEY: Why not? |
| 6 | MS. WOLFE: Because the Frye hearing went far |
| 7 | beyond |
| 8 | JUDGE FAHEY: When you're saying the |
| 9 | MS. WOLFE: some aspect |
| 10 | JUDGE FAHEY: Slow down. |
| 11 | MS. WOLFE: Go ahead. |
| 12 | JUDGE FAHEY: So you're saying the length of the |
| 13 | hearing and the amount of discovery that was given would - |
| 14 | would be much more than you would normally get in a |
| 15 | motion in limine. |
| 16 | MS. WOLFE: Far more. |
| 17 | JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. |
| 18 | MS. WOLFE: And it it encompassed all |
| 19 | aspects of credibility. The Frye hearing was |
| 20 | consumed more pages than the trial testimony and the cross |
| 21 | and it gave them a trial advantage |
| 22 | JUDGE STEIN: Was there any cross based on |
| 23 | inconsistent statements, for example, between what was said |
| 24 | in in the Frye hearing and what was testified |
| 25 | to in the Frye hearing and what was testified to at trial? |

MS. WOLFE: Yes, there were. I believe it 1 2 happened a number of times, and there were questions that 3 weren't asked because the - - - the prosecutor was able to 4 determine that the answer would not be favorable to them at 5 trial. This was discovery. This was discovery that the 6 People wouldn't be entitled to by statute, and by receiving 7 it, they gained a huge trial advantage which deprived Mr. Brooks - - -8 9 JUDGE FEINMAN: So - - -10 MS. WOLFE: - - - of a fair trial. 11 JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - let's assume all of that's 12 What - - - what I am struggling with is why the 13 error, assuming it was error, is not harmless, and why

isn't the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt here that, you know, would allow us to affirm?

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

24

25

MS. WOLFE: Sure. And I'm - - - I - - - I can give you a chronology and a list of why the - - - and - - and I just want to add that we're talking about a six - - a - - - a right to present a defense, a Constitutional error. So the standard would be - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: But that wasn't necessarily how it was preserved, was it?

MS. WOLFE: It was preserved as objecting to the discovery and the advantage. In the pre-trial motions, it was.



JUDGE FEINMAN: The point is nobody said to Judge 1 2 Wittner, wait a minute; you're - - - you're impinging on 3 the - - - the Constitutional right to present a defense. 4 MS. WOLFE: Not with respect to - - -5 JUDGE FEINMAN: It's interesting - - -6 MS. WOLFE: - - - this issue. 7 JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - but I don't think that was 8 ever articulated at that level. So - - - so I want an 9 answer to my question - - -10 MS. WOLFE: Okay. 11 JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - which is why isn't any 12 error harmless? 13 MS. WOLFE: It - - - because if you look at the 14 evidence in this case, you have two experts. The People's 15 expert is certain of the conclusion that she presents. 16 defense expert testifies that there's a very important

MS. WOLFE: It - - - because if you look at the evidence in this case, you have two experts. The People's expert is certain of the conclusion that she presents. The defense expert testifies that there's a very important factor, which is the lack of fluid in the - - - in the sphenoid sinus, which weighs against a finding of forcible drowning. He also testifies that there was an absence of certain marks on the deceased's neck, which would be there, he would expect to be there if this were a strangulation, and forcing her and strangling her under water, and as a result that she drowned. He testified that there is no way to - - and I believe Dr. Sampson also testified that there is no way to tell how long those bruises had been

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

there over - - - you know, over a twenty-four hour period,
they could have occurred, and there's no way to tell.

JUDGE FEINMAN: It's not clear, though, when you
say he testified and she testified, you're talking about at
the trial now, right?

MS. WOLFE: Yes.

JUDGE FEINMAN: All right. So all of this is in front of the jury.

MS. WOLFE: Yes.

JUDGE FEINMAN: Go on.

MS. WOLFE: And I'm - - - I'm addressing Your
Honor's question of - - - of why there isn't overwhelming
evidence. There was a paramedic and a police officer, who
discovered the deceased, who testified that they did not
see injuries. There were - - - there was testimony about
injuries from the CPR that occurred.

She was - - - and most importantly, there was the testimony about how the deceased was acting spacey in sort of a drunken - - - and I don't mean alcohol because alcohol wasn't the issue - - - in a drunken manner, and she had said that she had taken a sleeping pill. And the jury really focused on this. And her DA was on - - - and her DNA was on the controls of the - - - of the bathtub, the faucets of the bath - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: And I think his was - - -



1 MS. WOLFE: - - - bathtub. 2 JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - someplace also in - - - in 3 the shower, wasn't it? 4 MS. WOLFE: Yeah, I mean, there was a - - - there 5 was a shower body, apparently, and his was on one of the handles of that. 6 7 JUDGE FEINMAN: Um-hum. Okay. 8 MS. WOLFE: But the water was coming out of the 9 faucet, the handles of which her DNA was found. This is -10 - - is not overwhelming evidence such - - - such that, had 11 the People not had such an advantage, there would still be 12 a conviction. And I - - - you know, I should - - - I 13 should move to the - - - the precluded evidence because 14 that is as or more important. And that was - - - excuse me 15 - - - the - - - the preclusion of the defense expert's 16 testimony that he would expect to see, ninety percent of 17 the time, a damage to a certain part of the neck if there 18 had been strangulation. 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: What was the basis for that 20 opinion he was offering? 2.1 MS. WOLFE: Excuse me. The basis for that was 2.2 his experience. He was an ME, a medical examiner, for 23 thirty years. He had - - -24 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: How many drowning cases did 25 Dr. Wetli have?

| 1 | MS. WOLFE: He he worked on hundreds of |
|-----|---|
| 2 | drowning cases. And based on that experience and it |
| 3 | |
| 4 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Drowning in which the |
| 5 | manner of death was homicide? |
| 6 | JUDGE FAHEY: I thought the record said one. |
| 7 | MS. WOLFE: There was a forcible drowning, yes, |
| 8 | one forcible drowning, one more than the People's expert, |
| 9 | and hundreds of drowning cases. And |
| LO | JUDGE GARCIA: But wasn't he actually allowed to |
| 11 | testify at trial that if the victim had been forcibly |
| L2 | drowned he would have expected to find this this sinus |
| L3 | filled with water? Isn't that essentially the testimony |
| L4 | that you're arguing should have come in? |
| L5 | MS. WOLFE: That you know, that's sort of |
| L6 | pretty wishy-washy thing to say. I mean, we, as |
| L7 | professionals, clients, patients, they want percentages. |
| L 8 | They want their their professional |
| L9 | JUDGE STEIN: What's the foundation for that |
| 20 | percentage? If he had if he had investigated one |
| 21 | forcible drowning, how could he where does ninety |
| 22 | percent come from? Isn't isn't that partly what the |
| 23 | hearing was about? |
| 24 | MS. WOLFE: It comes again, it comes from |
| 25 | the sum total of his experience. He's worked he has |

| | worked and supervised other medical examiners in both New |
|----|---|
| 2 | York |
| 3 | JUDGE FEINMAN: So let me ask |
| 4 | MS. WOLFE: and Florida. |
| 5 | JUDGE FEINMAN: So let me ask you this. If I |
| 6 | have a malpractice case, a legal malpractice case, and it |
| 7 | an appellate malpractice case I'm not suggesting |
| 8 | anything but can I just say, well, you know, ninety |
| 9 | percent of the cases a criminal defendant loses on appeal |
| 10 | Can I throw that out without any sort of actual study of |
| 11 | success rates? |
| 12 | MS. WOLFE: Experience would inform that kind or |
| 13 | of estimation, of that kind of percentage. And it's |
| 14 | probably close to right, although I think it's |
| 15 | JUDGE FEINMAN: I don't know. |
| 16 | MS. WOLFE: more. |
| 17 | JUDGE FEINMAN: I haven't thought about it, but |
| 18 | |
| 19 | MS. WOLFE: But experience an expert is |
| 20 | allowed to give that kind of of evaluation. People |
| 21 | jurors want it. They want to know more than: well, |
| 22 | what does "expect" mean. |
| 23 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: It has to be tethered to |
| 24 | something, doesn't it? |
| 25 | MS. WOLFE: And again, it's tethered to his |

experience over the course of thirty years of what he's seen. And that - - - you know, and there is cross-examination. And that's what - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Is your point that - - yes, is your point that whether or not the jury should take that into account, and it weighs for something - - -

MS. WOLFE: Right.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - is what they can explore on cross, but they can't keep you from asking him about it and him opining on it; is that your point?

MS. WOLFE: It weighs for something. It comes from an eminently credible source. And the - - - and the People are free to use cross-examination to show what - - - what underlies that estimation. And a jury can weigh, well, you know, he's a really smart guy, but he really didn't have much of a basis to say it, and it was wrong and it was error for the judge to preclude it.

And then the other important area that was entirely precluded, which is was defense counsel's ability to cross-examine, question the defense expert and cross-examine the People's experts about the drug testing that was done. Imagine a situation where defense counsel is precluded from questioning the operator of a Breathalyzer about whether it was calibrated. Nope, just sorry. The People's witness has testified, there's a reason to



| 1 | question it |
|----|--|
| 2 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So does it matter that he's |
| 3 | |
| 4 | MS. WOLFE: you may at cross-examination. |
| 5 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: not a toxicologist? |
| 6 | MS. WOLFE: What? |
| 7 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Does it matter |
| 8 | MS. WOLFE: Excuse me? |
| 9 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Does it matter that he's |
| 10 | not a toxicologist? |
| 11 | MS. WOLFE: It doesn't because, first of all, and |
| 12 | I this isn't a new argument; it's in the in the |
| 13 | appendix. It's but not in the briefs. He was |
| 14 | if you look at his CV, he was accredited by the American |
| 15 | Board of Toxicologists. So his experience included working |
| 16 | with toxicologists and supervising them over the course of |
| 17 | his thirty years' experience. |
| 18 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: A medical examiner would |
| 19 | have a supervisory control over the toxicologist in the |
| 20 | lab, no? |
| 21 | MS. WOLFE: Yes. |
| 22 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yeah. |
| 23 | MS. WOLFE: And he would be discussing cases with |
| 24 | them on an ongoing basis, so he he was qualified to |

give that testimony. And I know that the Appellate - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Aren't we basically being - - - aren't you asking us to - - - to say that the trial judge abused his discretion in - - - in determining that this area would be speculative? Isn't that essentially what you're asking us to do?

2.1

2.2

MS. WOLFE: I'm - - - yes, but - - - but abuse of discretion as a matter of law. There was no basis in law for - - - for the trial judge to make the rulings that she did. Defense counsel was precluded from asking any questions at all about the drug testing. And the drug - - and the - - - and the issue of drugs in the deceased's system was extremely important here.

JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, wait a minute. Wasn't Dr.

Wetli allowed to testify regarding the possible sedative

effects of the victim's pills and - - and, you know,

basically got the whole synergy thing in front of the jury?

MS. WOLFE: Yes, and I should clarify. I'm talking about - - I'm talking about something a little bit differently - - - different, which is to be able to rebut the People's position that none of these drugs would have caused sedation and would have caused her to be, you know, in a position where she might slip under the water. And the toxicologist testified that, you know, she seemed perfectly fine to me, even though a video showed her walking into a wall.

So in order to rebut that, one, you have Wetli's 1 2 testimony that the synergy between these drugs could have 3 had the result that he described. And two, if the People 4 are right, then there must be another drug out there 5 because there must be - - - what's the explanation for her 6 behavior? 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 8 MS. WOLFE: Thank you. 9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel? 10 Counsel, why the Frye hearing? MR. COHN: Good afternoon, Chief Judge DiFiore. 11 12 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good afternoon. 13 MR. COHN: May it please the court. So Your 14 Honor, what - - - what the trial judge did here was 15 perfectly consistent with what the law allows judges to do 16 in any number of cases, and whether you want to call it a 17 Frye hearing, or as Judge Fahey suggested, perhaps a 18 hearing on a motion in limine, this was an - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, it was a Frye hearing. 20 MR. COHN: Right. 21 JUDGE RIVERA: So what's the basis for it? 2.2 MR. COHN: Well, Your - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: Because your - - - your expert 24 sees the - - - the medical report and a medical opinion and 25 their expert has a different one? I thought that's what we

3 MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, the trial judge has 4 the - - - the right, actually the responsibility to make 5 threshold rulings. First, the trial judge has the - - -6 the responsibility to make sure that scientific evidence 7 opinion testimony, which is being put before the jury - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: But this is my point. Isn't the 9 only reason that becomes in contention because the People's 10 position is that their expert disagrees with your expert? MR. COHN: No, Your - - -11 12 JUDGE RIVERA: That can't possibly be the basis 13 for a Frye hearing? 14 MR. COHN: No, Your Honor. Just because somebody 15 is a former medical examiner or - - or is a doctor who's 16 qualified, in some sense, in medicine, doesn't mean that 17 that doctor can get up and say anything in the world they 18 want that has some relationship to the medical field. 19 There has to be a scientific basis for what the doctor is 20 going to say in court. And here we have a situation - - -2.1 JUDGE STEIN: But it can sometimes be based on 22 experience. 23 MR. COHN: Yes, Your Honor. And in fact this 24 court recognized that in - - -25 JUDGE STEIN: So why - - - why wasn't that the

put to the jury to decide which expert they're going to

1

2

believe.

case here?

2.2

MR. COHN: Well, here the only things that the doctor was precluded from testifying about were - - - were opinions that were not based either on science or on his experience. And - - - and that was why it was a very limited preclusion, as was pointed out in some of the - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: Why isn't it enough to say, you know, after thirty-something years, in ninety percent of the cases I would expect to see that? You know, after all, you know, as experienced as an appellate lawyer on behalf of the People, you could probably predict that you would have a certain percentage of success.

MR. COHN: And I could say that, Your Honor, because I've argued a hundred appeals, or you might be able to say that because you sat on hundreds of cases, thousands of cases, perhaps. Here the doctor wanted to say ninety percent of the time we see damage to the - - - the posterior central neck structures, and he couldn't even remember a case where - - where he had a strangulation where - - where that occurred. So this is not somebody who is saying, yes, I - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: But what if - - - what if - - - would it make a difference if this was a foundation issue as opposed to a Frye issue? Wouldn't it really - - - it wouldn't really affect the outcome for you, one way or the



other, would it? We'd really be getting into the - - - whether or not the court abuses discretion in the way it conducted the hearing and the amount of testimony it took.

MR. COHN: Right. Well, Your Honor, I would submit that if the issue - - - if the problem with what happened is that the court should have called it a hearing on a motion in limine instead of a Frye hearing, then that would be harmless error.

JUDGE FAHEY: All right.

MIDGE FEINMAN: Okay. But so let's say, you know, it should have been called - - - you know, whether you want to call it a hearing pursuant to Cornell or, you know, any of these other civil cases, it doesn't really matter so much, in my mind, what you call it. How do you get to ask some of these questions that were asked, for three days and five hundred pages, and haven't we then turned this hearing into a deposition of an expert, which may be allowed in New Jersey in civil cases, but we don't allow that in New York?

MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, actually, to put things in context, Dr. Wetli was only on the stand for parts of two days during the hearing. It was not - - - the hearing spanned five days; it was not five full days. Dr. Wetli was on the stand for parts of two days. The first two days of the hearing, the defense didn't even bring Dr.



Wetli in. They tried to bring in the other expert, Dr. Catanese. And the only purpose of his testimony was to say, well, Dr. Wetli's analysis was fine, and you don't even have to call him at the hearing. They were trying to avoid even having Wetli appear at the hearing. Wetli was on the stand for two days in testimony that took up about 300 pages.

an excessive amount of testimony for, say, a suppression hearing, any number of pre-trial proceedings, a Frye hearing in a complicated case. This is a Frye hearing in a homicide case with a - - with a trial transcript that was thousands of pages. There were very serious issues - - concerns raised to the court about whether the medical testimony being proffered had any basis in science and had any relationship to this case at all or whether it was just something that was being offered as a way to try to create some reasonable doubt in a case where there was absolutely overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay. Talking about overwhelming evidence and other evidence, we - - - we've not - - - just to distract you before your - - -

MR. COHN: Yeah.

JUDGE STEIN: - - - time runs out, on one other issue, which - - - which is of concern to me, and that is



the evidence of the threat. So didn't the People argue at trial that it was admissible as an admission to a party opponent, or as part of the background hearsay exception, and if that's the case, wasn't it admitted as - - - for - - for the truth?

MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, Judge Wittner made clear at the close of the evidence that all of the victim's out-of-court statements were admitted only because she made those statements and not for their truth. So - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But never - - - but she - - - she did make specific - - - give specific instructions to specific testimony but not to the threat, did she?

MR. COHN: I don't recall offhand if there was a specific comment made after the admission of the threat. I do know that, at the close of the evidence, that Judge Wittner made clear that all of the victim's out-of-court statements - - - and the way we know about that threat is because the victim made an out-of-court statement to two of her friends about the threat; in the excitement of the moment, or of the short aftermath when she had been threatened, she called two of her friends, frantic about what had happened. The - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, weren't there - - - am I correct, is the number nine witnesses testified on hearsay statements that the defendant made?



| 1 | MR. COHN: There that the victim made, |
|------------|---|
| 2 | you're talking about? |
| 3 | JUDGE FAHEY: Yes. |
| 4 | MR. COHN: Well, first |
| 5 | JUDGE FAHEY: I'm sorry. |
| 6 | MR. COHN: First, Your Honor, as the Appellate |
| 7 | Division held, this was not or as, as Judge Wittner |
| 8 | instructed the jury, this was not hearsay because it was |
| 9 | not put in for its truth. It was only put in, as Judge |
| 10 | Wittner instructed |
| 11 | JUDGE FAHEY: Well, every single witness that I |
| 12 | read here said that he was a messy unemployed stoner. |
| 13 | MR. COHN: And in fact |
| 14 | JUDGE FAHEY: All nine of them, I think, |
| 15 | testified that way. |
| 16 | MR. COHN: And in fact, Your Honor, the defendant |
| 17 | admitted that he that he loved to smoke marijuana, |
| 18 | and |
| 19 | JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. |
| 20 | MR. COHN: and he admitted that in letters |
| 21 | he wrote to the the victim. And |
| 22 | JUDGE FAHEY: I thought, though, it was it |
| 23 | was being offered for defendant's unacceptable drug use and |
| 24 | the breakdown of the relationship. That's why |
| 25 25 | MR. COHN: Right. |

| 1 | JUDGE FAHEY: I thought it was being |
|----|--|
| 2 | offered. |
| 3 | MR. COHN: The rea it was offered to show |
| 4 | the victim's state of mind and to show what brought her to |
| 5 | the point where she finally |
| 6 | JUDGE FAHEY: Let me ask you this, though. |
| 7 | MR. COHN: broke up with him. |
| 8 | JUDGE FAHEY: Nine witnesses? |
| 9 | JUDGE RIVERA: But why are we even |
| 10 | JUDGE FAHEY: Excuse me. |
| 11 | JUDGE RIVERA: getting there? |
| 12 | JUDGE FAHEY: Excuse me. Nine witnesses? |
| 13 | Doesn't it seem like an excessive number? I mean, two or |
| 14 | three and then you give a limited instruction to the jury, |
| 15 | but I've never seen nine witnesses on the same point |
| 16 | MR. COHN: Well |
| 17 | JUDGE FAHEY: offering hearsay statements. |
| 18 | MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, first, again, our |
| 19 | contention is this was not hearsay because the |
| 20 | because of the instructions given to the jury. It was for |
| 21 | state of mind; it was not for the truth. |
| 22 | And and Your Honor, this was an exercise of |
| 23 | discretion by the trial judge who has control of the trial |
| 24 | to decide, in her discretion, what evidence was probative |
| 25 | and what evidence would be overly prejudicial. Here we |

1 have a situation where the defense theme was that these -2 - the victim and the defendant were in a committed 3 relationship and they just had some minor spats. What - -4 - what the prosecutor was trying to show was that that was 5 not the case here. Although the victim expressed her love 6 for the defendant various times, she also had grave doubts 7 about the relationship and the - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but that's very different 9 from that statement of: I'm going to kill you. Right? 10 mean, sort of a tumultuous relationship is one thing, where 11 there's not some other evidence of violence or 12 aggressiveness. But once you have that statement, isn't -13 14 MR. COHN: Right. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - isn't that the one that, as 16

Judge Stein says, troubles her. Isn't that the one that's extremely problematic here? And that is for its truth.

MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, it actually was not admitted for its truth; like all of the victim's out-ofcourt statements, it was admitted to show her state of And it was actually particularly important - - -

> JUDGE RIVERA: That she was afraid of him?

JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - and I keep saying that.

Her state of mind about what? That - - -

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

JUDGE FEINMAN: That she was afraid?



| 1 | MR. COHN: Exactly. Exactly. And this was one |
|----|---|
| 2 | of the reasons why it took her so long to finally |
| 3 | JUDGE STEIN: But that's not what that's |
| 4 | not what you argued to the jury, for one thing. |
| 5 | MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, the the |
| 6 | summation |
| 7 | JUDGE STEIN: You said it was an admission. |
| 8 | MR. COHN: Your Honor, the summation did argue |
| 9 | the state-of-mind theory to the jury. |
| 10 | JUDGE STEIN: On the threat? |
| 11 | MR. COHN: On I don't |
| 12 | JUDGE STEIN: I know it was argued on the other |
| 13 | on the other evidence, but not on the threat. |
| 14 | MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, it was part of the |
| 15 | background. It was it was part of it was part |
| 16 | of the background of the entire dynamic of the situation. |
| 17 | JUDGE STEIN: And is part of the background |
| 18 | exception in this context to the hearsay |
| 19 | MR. COHN: We're |
| 20 | JUDGE STEIN: rule? |
| 21 | MR. COHN: Your Honor, we're not arguing this - |
| 22 | - we're arguing that is not presented in this case. |
| 23 | Now, there have been other cases, in fact, in in |
| 24 | People now, this is not a hearsay case, but say in |



People v. Dorm, for instance, this court has recognized

that the background of a relationship between intimate partners is extremely relevant and probative in a domestic violence prosecution, and it's - - - it's part of the background that - - - that shows motive and intent. This court has recognized that in previous cases.

2.1

2.2

JUDGE FEINMAN: So that brings us to a different issue, which is, okay, maybe you could do that, but is that an exception to the hearsay rule, or do you still have to get it in in some other admissible form?

MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, if I may answer that in two parts, I'd appreciate the opportunity. First, once again, under the judge's instructions in this case, it was not hearsay, because all of the victim's out-of-court statements were admitted just for the fact that she said them, not for their truth.

Now, in the situation where maybe there is a hearsay issue, there have been cases, perhaps Bierenbaum, in the First Department, where the First Department has said there could be a situation where reliable hearsay could be admitted under the catch-all hearsay exception in a situation like this.

JUDGE STEIN: Did the Appellate Division refer to that case here?

MR. COHN: The Appellate Division did cite Bierenbaum.



1 JUDGE STEIN: Is that the only case - - -2 reported case in which that was - - - that rule was 3 applied? 4 MR. COHN: I - - - I don't believe so. I believe 5 there are other cases, but I don't - - -6 JUDGE WILSON: And the Third and Fourth 7 Department reject Bierenbaum, right? 8 MR. COHN: I believe that's correct. I believe 9 that's correct. But I - - - I don't think Bierenbaum is 10 that controversial a case because it's talking - - - it's 11 not saying there's a catch-all hearsay - - - there's always 12 a hearsay exception for threats. What it's saying is that 13 if you have a situation where there's reliable probative 14 hearsay and the judge goes through the balancing analysis 15 and says, in this particular case, under these particular 16 facts, the probative value and the reliability of this 17 evidence outweighs the potential for prejudice. Then the 18 judge exercises his or her discretion and lets the evidence 19 in. 20 JUDGE FEINMAN: Where did - - -2.1 JUDGE STEIN: Did the judge go through that 22 balancing - - -23 JUDGE FEINMAN: Yeah, where did the judge do 24 that?

JUDGE STEIN:

- - - with the eleven witnesses and

the threat?

2.1

MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, in the context of this heavily-litigated case where - - - where the defense was actually trying to raise misleading impressions about the evidence, not just the evidence of the relationship but the medical evidence as well, it was trying to inject the - - - the notion before the jury that the victim was taking Ativan, which there was no evidence of, was - - - was seeing psychiatrists. There was a - - - a lot going on in this case where the defense was trying to push the boundaries of - - - of probative evidence and admissible relevant evidence, both in terms of the facts of the case and in terms of the expert testimony.

JUDGE WILSON: It sounds like a fight fire with hearsay exception.

MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, again, it was not hearsay, and - - - and even if it - - - $\!\!\!$

JUDGE RIVERA: Let's say we disagree with you and this evidence should not have gone in, what's left to persuade us that there's overwhelming evidence of guilt?

MR. COHN: All right. Well, Your Honor, first, the circumstances under which the victim was discovered. She was wearing a turtleneck sweater. She was - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But was that the turtleneck she wore when she came? They didn't bring any bags, right?



This is the clothes she walked into the hotel with? 1 2 MR. COHN: I believe so, Your Honor. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you. 4 MR. COHN: Yes. She was wearing a turtleneck 5 sweater, she was wearing a Rolex watch, and she was wearing 6 underwear. And - - - and she was fully clothed in the 7 There was evidence that she hated baths. In fact, bath. 8 there was evidence that it - - - she was annoyed by the 9 fact that the defendant would take baths in her apartment. 10 The notion that she would walk in, voluntarily, to a bath, 11 fully clothed, and accidentally drown was, in fact, as the 12 defense expert witness, as Dr. Wetli said, bizarre. 13 understood that - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. But where do you get the -15 16 MR. COHN: - - - that was bizarre. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: Where do you get the evidence that 18 he's the murderer? There - - - there's only one person 19 20 with the opportunity to commit the murder, aside from the -21 - - the hotel staff member who delivered the ice, which 22 nobody thinks is a suspect. The surveillance videos show 23 that the defendant, after going to get something to eat at 24 the restaurant - - - and by the way, this was after they 25 had an argument which was overheard by a hotel staff, which might have been when the strangulation occurred. But after that point, he goes out to eat.

2.1

2.2

He comes back at 1:48 in the morning. At 2:11 in the morning, the - - - the hotel receives the first report of a water leak. At 2:19, the defendant is then downstairs at the front desk where he meets David Raleigh, the - - - the bystander who he goes out and has drinks with in an attempt to create an alibi.

So there's this eight-minute gap between when the water leak is first reported and when the defendant is then seen at the front desk and leaves the apartment. There's no other plausible conclusion than the fact that he was in the apartment when the bathtub was run. The - - - the timing just doesn't work any other way, for the bathtub to run, to overflow, and then for a leak to go down all the way to a lower floor and - - and be reported.

JUDGE GARCIA: Well, from the time of check-in until the time they discover the body, what's the period?

MR. COHN: They check in a little after midnight, and the body is discovered at 2:51 a.m.

JUDGE WILSON: And counsel, the bathtub is actually physically in the room. It's not separated from the bed or anything else in the room by a wall; is that right?

MR. COHN: I don't - - -



JUDGE WILSON: There's a picture in the record.

MR. COHN: Yeah, I'm - - - I'm not sure, Your

Honor. It's - - - it's a hotel room. I think it's just in

the bathroom. This is a hotel room in the bathroom.

2.1

2.2

And also - - - so that the time line is 12:43

a.m., they're in the room. The hotel employee, Ms.

Stephens, overhears this loud argument after which she hears nothing. 12:46 a.m., so three minutes later, the busboy comes to the hotel room to deliver the ice that the defendant had ordered when they checked in. He only sees the defendant. He doesn't hear or see anybody else at that point. So - - - and that's why there's a strong inference that at 12:43 a.m., that's when the victim was actually strangled, knocked unconscious but not killed.

12:48 a.m., the defendant goes downstairs and inquires about can I get food. 12:53 a.m., he orders two meals, has them delivered to the restaurant, but he shows up at the restaurant alone and barely eats his food and - - and looks, according to the hotel employees, distraught.

1:48 a.m., he goes back to the room. 2:11 a.m., there's a complaint from the fourth floor about the water leak. 2:30 - - sorry, 2:19, the defendant leaves the - - the hotel. 2:36, there's a second water leak complaint. 2:51, the hotel employees trace the leak to the defendant and the victim's room and they find the body.



There's nobody else who goes in and out of the room. There's only one person. Assuming that a crime was committed, there's only one person who had committed this crime. And - - - and that's why the defense expert goes out of his way to try to raise some insinuation, no matter how much of a stretch it is, that this could have been an accidental death and that somehow she decided, even though she hates baths, to go into the bathtub fully clothed, wearing a turtleneck sweater and a Rolex watch, and then accidentally drowns because of a combination of drugs that she had been taking for years with no adverse effects.

2.1

2.2

And this also goes back to - - - to the judge's rulings about whether there could be cross-examination on other possible drugs. The defendant doesn't actually have any theory that there is another drug out there that could have caused this. The defense just wants to raise speculative assertions that, oh, maybe it was this drug, maybe it was that drug.

This - - - this court has held that a defendant is not allowed to put on speculative third-party culpability evidence. This is the same kind of thing. The trial judge has the discretion to say, look, under the circumstances, this is too speculative. This is - - - this is just like any other evidentiary determination. If the judge determines that under the - - - under the

circumstances, balancing the probative value against the 1 2 prejudicial effect and - - - and the general considerations 3 in governing a trial, that there's a limit to how far you can go. And - - -4 5 Thank you, Mr. Cohn. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: 6 MR. COHN: Thank you. 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Ms. Wolfe? 8 MS. WOLFE: Thank you, Your Honors. 9 number of ways in which I could respond to each of the 10 aspects of the People's case, and the defense lawyer did 11 that in his summation. But a very important point I want 12 to make sure to make is that the evidence from - - - it was 13 eleven, not nine - - - the evidence from these character 14 witnesses - - -15 JUDGE STEIN: By the way, did you object to the 16 fact that there were eleven witnesses? 17 MS. WOLFE: There was an - - - there was a motion 18 in limine about this, so the - - - the - - -19 JUDGE STEIN: About the number of witnesses? MS. WOLFE: Not the number. 20 2.1 JUDGE STEIN: Did - - - when the - - - when the 22 judge started to give a curative instruction did you say, 23 judge, this is enough, or the curative instruction isn't 24 sufficient, or anything like that? I didn't see anything

of that nature in the record.

| 1 | MS. WOLFE: I thought there was a lot of |
|----|---|
| 2 | discussion about, you know, how this this kind of |
| 3 | evidence shouldn't shouldn't be admitted. But she - |
| 4 | |
| 5 | JUDGE STEIN: Well, at all. |
| 6 | MS. WOLFE: At all, right. |
| 7 | JUDGE STEIN: The nature of the objection was |
| 8 | none of this should come in, not that not that you - |
| 9 | you can't have this |
| 10 | MS. WOLFE: The no |
| 11 | JUDGE STEIN: much or |
| 12 | MS. WOLFE: I can't |
| 13 | JUDGE STEIN: so that it's cumulative or |
| 14 | anything. |
| 15 | MS. WOLFE: Right. I can't |
| 16 | JUDGE STEIN: Okay. |
| 17 | MS. WOLFE: My recollection of what's in the |
| 18 | record on that isn't sufficient for me to be able to answer |
| 19 | it but |
| 20 | JUDGE STEIN: Sorry I interrupted you. |
| 21 | MS. WOLFE: this evidence was offered for |
| 22 | the truth. In his opening statement, the prosecutor said |
| 23 | Nicholas Brooks has a history of patronizing prostitutes. |
| 24 | In his closing, the prosecutor said: this is an unlikely |

couple; she was accomplished; he didn't have a job; he had

| 1 | no ambition; he sat around smoking. And it went even |
|----|--|
| 2 | farther than that. It was presented for the truth. And |
| 3 | not not only was it the testimony of the of |
| 4 | these friends, but the People called on the on the |
| 5 | issue of whether Mr. Brooks had used prostitutes. The |
| 6 | People called a computer expert to show that he had |
| 7 | accessed a adult web site. They also offered texts between |
| 8 | Mr. Brooks and his roommate, nothing to do with the |
| 9 | deceased, about buying marijuana. |
| 10 | JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, let's say all of that's |
| 11 | out you heard the People's very quick summary of the |
| 12 | evidence that, nevertheless, would have shown, |
| 13 | overwhelmingly, that the defendant is guilty. What's |
| 14 | MS. WOLFE: There was |
| 15 | JUDGE RIVERA: your response to that? |
| 16 | MS. WOLFE: There was no camera and no one in |
| 17 | that room. For things like |
| 18 | JUDGE RIVERA: But no one went in the room other |
| 19 | than the three people. |
| 20 | MS. WOLFE: This isn't an ID this isn't |
| 21 | - this isn't a question of maybe someone else did it. This |
| 22 | is accidental the question of whether it was an |
| 23 | accidental death. So for instance, the |
| 24 | JUDGE RIVERA: That's the defendant's theory, |



yeah.

| 1 | MS. WOLFE: the People say that it's crazy |
|----|---|
| 2 | that she would get into a bathtub fully closed |
| 3 | clothed. Well, that is all part of of trying to |
| 4 | determine whether the drug testing in this case was |
| 5 | sufficient because she's clearly shown on the video as |
| 6 | someone who's spacey and and walking into a wall. |
| 7 | She has |
| 8 | JUDGE RIVERA: So the theory is that she turned |
| 9 | on the tub |
| 10 | MS. WOLFE: The theory is |
| 11 | JUDGE RIVERA: because she's spaced out on |
| 12 | the drugs? |
| 13 | MS. WOLFE: she turned on the tub, she got |
| 14 | she let the tub fill up. It started to overflow, but |
| 15 | you couldn't see. |
| 16 | JUDGE RIVERA: She was not too spacey to know to |
| 17 | turn on the tub and have the water run, but she was |
| 18 | MS. WOLFE: Correct. |
| 19 | JUDGE RIVERA: too spacey to stay away from |
| 20 | falling in? |
| 21 | MS. WOLFE: I'm sorry, Your Honor? |
| 22 | JUDGE RIVERA: Right? Isn't that the theory? |
| 23 | She's not spaced out enough that she knows how to turn on a |
| 24 | faucet, knows how to turn on this tub, prepare the tub, but |
| 25 | she's too spaced out to avoid drowning in the tub? |

| 1 | MS. WOLFE: She because once she gets into |
|----|---|
| 2 | the tub |
| 3 | JUDGE RIVERA: But she's spaced out enough to do |
| 4 | something that everyone who knows her says this woman would |
| 5 | never do. |
| 6 | MS. WOLFE: That's exactly when you do things |
| 7 | people say you wouldn't do, when you're not in your |
| 8 | in your in the state of mind where, you know, you |
| 9 | remember that you don't like certain things. |
| 10 | JUDGE RIVERA: Well enough to turn on the tub. |
| 11 | MS. WOLFE: Yes, well enough to turn it on, of |
| 12 | course. |
| 13 | JUDGE WILSON: And so when, on the time line, did |
| 14 | she die? |
| 15 | MS. WOLFE: She died I don't think |
| 16 | it's not on the time line because we don't know. |
| 17 | JUDGE WILSON: Where would where would you |
| 18 | place it? |
| 19 | MS. WOLFE: I would place it there's a |
| 20 | period of time between the time he he goes to have |
| 21 | something to eat and when they find her, because there was |
| 22 | testimony that you couldn't you know, there was a |
| 23 | - a bath curtain, you couldn't see into the bathtub, and |
| 24 | also that the water hadn't overflowed enough to have come |
| 25 | out into the living area. So because, I mean I mean, |

| 1 | of course the government the People are going to |
|----|--|
| 2 | argue it went this way, which is a series of inferences. |
| 3 | And the defense have a different series of inferences base |
| 4 | in and a strong part of that, and an important part |
| 5 | of that were the was the influence of drugs. And he |
| 6 | was precluded from being able to develop that. |
| 7 | JUDGE FEINMAN: But was there any evidence in |
| 8 | either Wetli or Sampson's testimony that would have allowe |
| 9 | an inference that she slipped and it was, you know, based |
| 10 | on the bruising or anything of that nature? |
| 11 | MS. WOLFE: It's I think I recalled |
| 12 | recall some testimony from Wetli about the bruises and tha |
| 13 | they could correspond to someone slipping. |
| 14 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. |
| 15 | MS. WOLFE: Thank you. |
| 16 | (Court is adjourned) |
| 17 | |
| 18 | |
| 19 | |
| 20 | |
| 21 | |
| 22 | |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |



CERTIFICATION I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the court of Appeals of the People of the State of New York v. Nicholas Brooks, No. 25, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Shanna Shaphe Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 February 12, 2018 Date:

