1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	TOTAL OF DELAMADE
4	TOWN OF DELAWARE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- NO. 83
7	IAN LEIFER,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York October 16, 2019
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
15	
16	Appearances:
17	RUSSELL A. SCHINDLER, ESQ. RUSSELL A. SCHNDLER, ATTORNEY AT LAW
18	Attorney for Appellant 245 Wall Street Kingston, NY 12401
19	
20	KENNETH C. KLEIN, ESQ. THE LAW OFFICE OF KENNETH C. KLEIN
21	Attorney for Respondent 4880 State Route 52
22	Jeffersonville, NY 12748
23	
24	Penina Wolicki Official Court Transcriber
25	



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on this
2	afternoon's calendar is appeal number 83, Town of Delaware
3	v. Leifer.
4	(Pause)
5	MR. SCHINDLER: Good afternoon.
6	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good afternoon, Counsel.
7	Do you care to reserve some rebuttal time, sir?
8	MR. SCHINDLER: If it's acceptable to the court,
9	I'll reserve two minutes, please.
10	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Of course.
11	MR. SCHINDLER: Thank you.
12	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome.
13	MR. SCHINDLER: I believe that the statute or
14	zoning ordinance that we've challenged herein it its
15	biggest deficit or under the constitution, is that
16	it's not narrowly tailored to address the significant
17	governmental interest identified by the Town of Delaware,
18	which was to prevent excessive noise, and specifically
19	amplified music, from dusk to dawn.
20	JUDGE STEIN: Where where do you get that
21	that is the limit of what the Town intended to do here? I
22	I don't see that. I
23	MR. SCHINDLER: That brings me back
24	JUDGE STEIN: what the Town says is, is
25	that it is trying to protect and preserve the character of

2	excessive noise or amplified music
3	MR. SCHINDLER: It
4	JUDGE STEIN: or anything like that. Where
5	is that coming from?
6	MR. SCHINDLER: First of all as as the
7	court may be aware, we were deprived of the opportunity to
8	depose the Town Supervisor and the Code Enforcement
9	Officer, because I had consented to Mr. Klein's request for
10	an adjournment of the deposition.
11	JUDGE STEIN: Well, let's let's just talk
12	about what what the statute
13	MR. SCHINDLER: So so I'm limited to
14	JUDGE STEIN: says.
15	MR. SCHINDLER: his paperwork. I didn't
16	get to ask those questions.
17	His Mr. Klein's own paperwork if I
18	recall properly, page 82 of the record
19	JUDGE STEIN: Okay, but but Counselor, the
20	record is what it is before us. We're limited to that, for
21	how however that
22	MR. SCHINDLER: So so page
23	JUDGE STEIN: complete it is.
24	MR. SCHINDLER: 82 of the record is Mr.
25	Klein's own affidavit, when he moved for summary judgment.
	T C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C

this rural district. They don't say that it is limited to

1	And he, as the Town Attorney, identifies the purpose of
2	this statute as preventing amplified music from dusk to
3	dawn.
4	JUDGE STEIN: That he limits it to that.
5	MR. SCHINDLER: It's in his
6	JUDGE STEIN: That you're telling okay,
7	well, I'll go back and I'll look at that.
8	MR. SCHINDLER: I'm pretty sure it's his
9	paragraph 16 of his aff
10	JUDGE STEIN: Okay.
11	MR. SCHINDLER: affidavit.
12	JUDGE STEIN: What about the other well, w
13	can I can we can read that, but
14	MR. SCHINDLER: So assuming that's the
15	JUDGE STEIN: so so you're say
16	you're assuming that that's all that the Town intended to
17	
18	MR. SCHINDLER: I'm limited to that
19	JUDGE STEIN: accomplish.
20	MR. SCHINDLER: by his own filing of the
21	motion for summary judgment prior to my having my
22	discovery.
23	JUDGE STEIN: Okay.
24	MR. SCHINDLER: So so that's what limited
25	the record. And that's why it is what it is in the record

1	JUDGE WILSON: Let me ask you a question about
2	the Town zoning code, and I'll I'll ask Mr. Klein as
3	well. But the way I read it, on Mr. Leifer's property,
4	he's allowed to run a campground, that's a permitted use -
5	a special use. It's got a little asterisk, so he has
6	to have at least four acres to be able to do that. And
7	he's got forty, something like that.
8	MR. SCHINDLER: Sixty-eight.
9	JUDGE WILSON: So that he could invite people to
10	camp. They could set up tents. And there's not a limit I
11	saw in the Town code as to the number. Is that right so
12	far?
13	MR. SCHINDLER: That's my understanding.
14	JUDGE WILSON: Okay.
15	MR. SCHINDLER: So and while they're there,
16	though, they're not allowed to sing or play
17	JUDGE FAHEY: So so could he
18	MR. SCHINDLER: any
19	JUDGE FAHEY: so let me ask this. Could he
20	set up a an amusement park on the land?
21	MR. SCHINDLER: Could he?
22	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, could he? Could he set up ar
23	amusement park?
24	MR. SCHINDLER: Well
25	JUDGE FAHEY. Could be put up rides?

1	MR. SCHINDLER: It's not prohibited by
2	JUDGE FAHEY: How
3	MR. SCHINDLER: this particular challenged
4	ordinance.
5	JUDGE FAHEY: I see. How about building a hockey
6	rink? You could build could you build a recreational
7	facility on there?
8	MR. SCHINDLER: It's not prohibited by this
9	particular section of the zoning
10	JUDGE FAHEY: I thought there were specific
11	I thought it was I thought it was a specific use that
12	was allowed?
13	MR. SCHINDLER: Is it? I I don't recall
14	all the
15	JUDGE FAHEY: I'm counting on you to answer that
16	question.
17	MR. SCHINDLER: allowed uses.
18	JUDGE FAHEY: Slow down. I'm counting on you to
19	answer that question.
20	MR. SCHINDLER: Yes.
21	JUDGE FAHEY: Is it an allowable use in an RU
22	district?
23	MR. SCHINDLER: I would have to search the
24	JUDGE FAHEY: I see.
25	MR. SCHINDLER: statute. I don't know that



1	offhand.
2	JUDGE WILSON: You can find it on page 142 of th
3	record.
4	JUDGE FAHEY: Right. And it is in there, I
5	believe.
6	MR. SCHINDLER: It is in the statute is in
7	the record, yes.
8	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah. Yes.
9	MR. SCHINDLER: So I and I imagine that if
10	a hockey rink was allowed to have been erected in this
11	_
12	JUDGE FAHEY: My point is my point is
13	my question is: is is you have two parts of
14	your argument. One that it's vague the statute; and
15	one part that it's overbroad. So the question is, can a
16	distinction be drawn between theatrical/entertainment and
17	these other activities that are specifically allowed, whic
18	seem to involve a large number of people and a public use
19	of the land.
20	Okay, it's all right. If you're if you're
21	not comfortable answering it, don't worry about.
22	MR. SCHINDLER: No. I'm just not sure I
23	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah.
24	MR. SCHINDLER: understand the question -
25	_



1	JUDGE FAREY: That's all right.
2	MR. SCHINDLER: as it relates to our issue
3	here.
4	But to the extent that gatherings are allowed for
5	other purposes, no music would be allowed to have been
6	played you couldn't sing the National Anthem at a
7	hockey event
8	JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.
9	MR. SCHINDLER: under this that woul
10	it would convert your hockey rink into a theater,
11	because you're playing music
12	JUDGE FAHEY: Since we're on the sports metaphor
13	my my my question to you was a softball. I
14	wanted you to tell me, yes, Judge, yes, those things would
15	be allowed, but those other things wouldn't.
16	MR. SCHINDLER: Okay.
17	JUDGE FAHEY: That's why I went that way.
18	MR. SCHINDLER: Well, yes.
19	JUDGE FAHEY: All right.
20	MR. SCHINDLER: I do agree
21	JUDGE FAHEY: There you go, all right.
22	MR. SCHINDLER: I certainly agree.
23	In fact, what I what I think of
24	JUDGE STEIN: But they require a special use
25	permit, however



1	JUDGE FAHEY: The judge is right. They would.
2	MR. SCHINDLER: Okay. Well, what about
3	what about a political rally?
4	JUDGE STEIN: Did the petitioner here apply for
5	special use permit for this event?
6	MR. SCHINDLER: No, I believe he had originally
7	applied for a variance as opposed to a special use permit.
8	And I did not represent him in the course of that
9	proceeding. I came in after this proceeding had already
10	commenced to get the injunction that the Town got.
11	JUDGE STEIN: Am I am I incorrect in
12	understanding that under this framework here, that unless a
13	use is specifically permitted, it is it is
14	prohibited?
15	MR. SCHINDLER: Yes, that's
16	JUDGE STEIN: In in a particular district.
17	Okay.
18	MR. SCHINDLER: that is the
19	JUDGE STEIN: Um-hum.
20	MR. SCHINDLER: way the zoning statute is -
21	is created.
22	JUDGE STEIN: Um-hum.
23	MR. SCHINDLER: So what I what I submit is
24	that, for instance, the same gathering of people could have
25	involved a political rally and could have generated as much

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noise, you know, using amplified speaking, but you know,
1
2
        that would have been a permitted use, but the minute that
 3
        group of people decided, perhaps, to sing a song, or the
 4
        National Anthem, that then became a misdemeanor under the
 5
        statute.
 6
                  JUDGE STEIN: I - - - I - - as I understood it,
 7
        the - - - the theater restriction, which is what they're
 8
        basing this on, includes the word "facility", right?
 9
                  MR. SCHINDLER: Yes.
10
                  JUDGE STEIN: And then defines what a facility
        is, right?
11
12
                  MR. SCHINDLER: Well - - -
13
                  JUDGE STEIN: So - - -
14
                  MR. SCHINDLER: - - - it doesn't actually define
15
        facility. And that was one of the questions we had, I
16
        think, in our - - -
17
                  JUDGE STEIN: Okay, you - - -
18
                  MR. SCHINDLER: - - - case - - -
19
                  JUDGE STEIN: - - - you're right. But the - - -
20
        but facility is - - - has a meaning of - - - an ordinary
21
        meaning, right?
22
                  MR. SCHINDLER: Yes.
23
                  JUDGE STEIN: Okay.
24
                  MR. SCHINDLER: So that's why I argued that it
25
        violated the - - - the vagueness - - - that it was void for
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1	vagueness, because who would ever think that just having
2	music or a gathering in an open field is a facility of some
3	kind.
4	JUDGE STEIN: But this didn't that's not
5	what this was? This this had stages and it had
6	bathrooms and it had food, other things that arguably would
7	be considered a facility.
8	MR. SCHINDLER: And
9	JUDGE STEIN: Right.
10	MR. SCHINDLER: but of a temporary nature,
11	perhaps, yes. But it he wasn't constructing a
12	theater in the usual sense like what we
13	JUDGE RIVERA: They were putting up tents. Were
14	there not tents being put up?
15	MR. SCHINDLER: There were tents. They thought -
16	
17	JUDGE RIVERA: They were putting up a stage,
18	right?
19	MR. SCHINDLER: There may have been a temporary
20	stage put up. I believe
21	JUDGE RIVERA: There were things that were built
22	to make possible the event as he envisioned it, correct?
23	MR. SCHINDLER: Yes. I agree with that.
24	But I my belief is that the zoning law
25	would apply, for instance, if he had decided to build an

amphitheater - - -1 2 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 3 MR. SCHINDLER: - - - or a drive-in movie 4 That's the type of outdoor facility for the theater. 5 presentation - - -6 JUDGE WILSON: Well, but why is that - - - why is 7 that fundamentally different from putting up a temporary 8 stage for the period of time you need it and putting up 9 speakers and amplifiers? Why - - - why isn't that the 10 same? MR. SCHINDLER: The difference is whether a 11 12 person would normally believe that their behavior was 13 prohibited by the law. That's the vagueness statute. And 14 a zoning statute would seem to be a regulation of the uses 15 of the property and the buildings - - - the types of 16 buildings that can be employed, as opposed to a simple 17 gathering of people at which there's ex - - - free 18 expression, and the primary purpose of being at - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: So where - - - where did - - -20 where did the Woodstock event fall, under your definition? 21 MR. SCHINDLER: Well, that's a - - - first of 22 all, that's a mass gathering, which is not applicable here, 23 because it's - - - this was under 5,000 people, so it

But that's a sim - - - it's a similar - - -



didn't trigger the mass gathering statute.

24

2 MR. SCHINDLER: - - - kind of event. It's a temp 3 --- it was a temporary, three-day event that people came 4 to experience, you know, music, to be together and exchange 5 ideas, and - - - and the experience of - - - of the music 6 itself. So it's similar in that regard, because it's a 7 8 temporary kind of arrangement. He's not building something 9 that would continue on beyond the three-day event. 10 not something like an out - - - drive-in movie theater, 11 that would be used regularly, outdoors, to show films. 12 It was just a gathering. You know, we've had 13 conversations with the Supreme Court and so on about the 14 idea that this is also a religious gathering, and the - - -15 part of our objection here is that the injunction did not 16 say, thou shalt not have a theater. It says you cannot 17 have this event - - - the entire event. 18 So the - - - the part of it that was - - -19 JUDGE FEINMAN: So - - -20 MR. SCHINDLER: - - - a Sabbath observance - - -21 JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - I want to talk to you about 2.2 that injunction. Let - - - let's say we don't agree with 23 your arguments about vagueness and whether it's narrowly 24 tailored and all of that - - - and overbroad. What's wrong 25 with the specific language of this injunction that requires

JUDGE RIVERA: Under your description - - -

1	it to be altered or remitted to the Supreme Court to
2	narrow?
3	MR. SCHINDLER: The the injunction if
4	the court upholds the injunction itself, should just say
5	that Mr. Leifer is enjoined from engaging in music, films,
6	plays, or dramatic performances, because that's what the
7	ordinance prohibits. The ordinance does
8	JUDGE FEINMAN: So your problem is the language
9	that says "any other event of the same kind, nature, or
10	description on the premises"?
11	MR. SCHINDLER: That yes. That part of it
12	I object to. And I object to it applying beyond the
13	playing of music.
14	JUDGE FEINMAN: All right, so
15	JUDGE WILSON: So for example, to overnight
16	camping, which is in the injunction.
17	JUDGE FEINMAN: do we have to send it back.
18	MR. SCHINDLER: It should it should not
19	prohibit the overnight camping, because that's not part of
20	what the definition of theater is. It should not apply
21	_
22	JUDGE FEINMAN: Do we have to send it back for
23	that, or do we have jurisdiction to to tailor that
24	language?

MR. SCHINDLER: I believe the court can modify

1	the order that that's the subject of this appeal is
2	the the injunction itself.
3	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.
4	MR. SCHINDLER: Thank you.
5	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?
6	MR. KLEIN: Good afternoon.
7	JUDGE WILSON: Could we start with the
8	injunction?
9	MR. KLEIN: Sure.
10	JUDGE WILSON: The scope of it?
11	MR. KLEIN: Well, the the scope the
12	scope of it is
13	JUDGE WILSON: Doesn't it seem a little hard to
14	know what's prohibited, and doesn't it seem to prohibit
15	some things that shouldn't be prohibited?
16	MR. KLEIN: I Your Honor, respectfully, no.
17	And the reason is, it's the appellant who designed his
18	project, his his his program. He developed
19	what he wanted to do on the land use. We're bound, in that
20	regard, to what he was doing.
21	JUDGE WILSON: Why should the injunction
22	MR. KLEIN: All we've and and
23	JUDGE WILSON: why should the
24	MR. KLEIN: just
25	JUDGE WILSON: injunction prohibit him from



overnight camping?

MR. KLEIN: It doesn't prohibit him from overnight camping, it prohibits from having that type of an event. Everything is completely intertwined: the music, the camping. The - - - it - - - the camping issue by itself, he can't do the overnight camping without going to the planning board and getting a special use permit, which he didn't obtain. It would have to be designated as a campground. That's under the zoning law in the - - - in that RU district. So in that sense, if he had done it without going to the planning board - - - which is what he did, he - - - it would still be appropriate to prohibit it, because he didn't have the requisite permit.

JUDGE GARCIA: I want to ask a follow-up on that.

It seems - - - and correct me - - - that the Town is relying on the theater use, right? Because this a theater use, it's not a permitted use, it's not a special use for this rural district.

Assume the theater use did not apply here, that it didn't meet those terms, would there be other restrictions that would prevent this festival from going forward?

MR. KLEIN: Yes, because the zoning law - - - the - - - the analysis started with we look at the zoning law.

He's making this use out of his property.



1 JUDGE GARCIA: Right. 2 MR. KLEIN: So we look at the zoning law. 3 it fit within the zoning law? So I analyzed first the RU 4 district. I can't find anything in there that - - - that 5 corresponds to the use he's making. 6 JUDGE GARCIA: Right. 7 MR. KLEIN: Then I look at the overall zoning 8 law.

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law. And I find there are in two other zoning districts, this use of theater. And it's not what you would contemplate to be theater in its traditional - - - it's not the building down the street. It - - - it's a much broader definition of what constitutes a theater. And what he was doing, fit, out of everything that's defined in the zoning ordinances - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Let's assume it did not - - - let's assume it did not fit within theater.

MR. KLEIN: We would be here any - - we would - - we would have done - - taken the exact same action.

JUDGE GARCIA: Why? Based on what?

MR. KLEIN: Because there is nothing in the zoning law that permits him to do what he was doing.

JUDGE GARCIA: So a music festival, let's call it, right, that - - - with these types of attributes, that doesn't fit within any use or - - - permitted use or special use within his district?



MR. KLEIN: Not the way he had - - - not the way he had presented it. No, sir.

JUDGE GARCIA: So whether or not it fits within the theater use, it would still be prohibited, in your view?

MR. KLEIN: Correct.

JUDGE GARCIA: So why do we need to talk about the theater use?

MR. KLEIN: Just because it - - - to identify
that this is the only potential use that it would be
allowed in - - - the Town, number one. Number two, that
use is not available in that zoning district. And I think
also when you look at the - - - at the constitutional
argument, it also shows that there are alternative means
available for the type of activities that he's complaining
are re - - being - - - the First Amendment argument,
those - - - those First Amendment impingements, so to
speak, we're not impinging it, because the zoning law makes
other avenues available to that particular use.

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - so there are other places where he could hold this event, exactly as he envisions it?

MR. KLEIN: I - - - I can't say that, Your Honor, because you have to look at the size and scope of - - - of - - - of what he was doing. This thing was morphing, year after year after year, growing exponentially. It - - - it



got up to 400, 500 - - - I think the last version of it may have been 700 people on sixty-five acres, in the middle of the woods, with no - - - with no permanent facilities no - - - no parking facilities, no - - - no sanitary facilities, other than what little things are brought in. No review, no approval - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Did you limit your objection to music or amplified music being  $-\ -\ -$ 

MR. KLEIN: No, Your Honor - - Your Honor. In fact I - - I think - - - and that's, I think, a misnomer too, that - - - that's been perpetuated throughout this record, at least on the appellant's point of view.

If you look very early on in the record, the first thing that happened was the Town made an application for a preliminary injunction. That application for a preliminary injunction was resolved by stipulation between the parties. And if you look at - - in the record, I believe it's page 97, in there you will - - where that stipulation can be found - - in there you will see that the Town addressed and made sure that it addressed not just simply noise. We were concerned about sanitary situations, parking. We want - - this is about health, safety, and welfare.

It's not just about the impact on the community from noise or whatever - - - traffic. Hundreds of people



1	were being brought into this facility, so to speak, that
2	wasn't really developed properly. Certainly there weren't
3	adequate sanitary
4	JUDGE STEIN: What if this
5	MR. KLEIN: facilities provided for.
6	JUDGE STEIN: was a family wedding of 1,00
7	people, and they needed a place to stay and they needed to
8	be fed and so on and so forth? Would that be prohibited?
9	MR. KLEIN: In 1,000 people, in this
10	context in this context? I think that it would be
11	very difficult to to practically make that happen.
12	It it's theoretically, I suppose, it wouldn't
13	be prohibited, because if you could do that in your
14	backyard, but what it wouldn't involve typically, a
15	family wedding it wouldn't go on for three days, and
16	the music wouldn't wouldn't commence at sunset and
17	run all the way through to through to dawn.
18	JUDGE FEINMAN: I don't know. I some cultures,
19	the wedding goes on for seven days.
20	MR. KLEIN: Well, perhaps so, Your Honor, but -
21	_
22	JUDGE FEINMAN: So
23	MR. KLEIN: that's that would be
24	atypical for the experience of the Town of Delaware; I can
25	tell you that

1	JUDGE RIVERA: So Counsel, am I understanding
2	your correctly that the alternatives that are available
3	cannot provide for this event as he envisions it?
4	MR. KLEIN: I I can't say that, Your Honor,
5	because I'd have to examine there in the two
6	other districts in one of the districts, it's
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, you argued to the Appellate
8	Division that there were alternatives, so what I'm
9	asking
10	MR. KLEIN: Well, and the Appellate Division
11	_
12	JUDGE RIVERA: I'm asking
13	MR. KLEIN: agreed that
14	JUDGE RIVERA: as he envisions it, where
15	are these alternatives?
16	MR. KLEIN: The alternative would be to find a
17	piece of property
18	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.
19	MR. KLEIN: in one of the zoning districts
20	and and if it's a and in the zoning district
21	where it's a special use, bring a plan to the planning
22	board and obtain a special use permit and site plan
23	approval, allowing that to be done, where you would have to
24	show parking; you'd have to show what your sanitary
25	situation is; you would have a site plan that would show

1	exactly where the					
2	JUDGE RIVERA: And what district now exists where					
3	he could go and seek out such property?					
4	MR. KLEIN: I'm sorry, ma'am?					
5	JUDGE RIVERA: What district would he do that in?					
6	MR. KLEIN: I					
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Because you're saying he can't do					
8	it in the rural district.					
9	MR. KLEIN: No, you could do it I believe					
10	it's the CAL-R-1 and the CAL-B-1 District, and that's all -					
11	that's all identified on the record.					
12	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but you don't know if there					
13	is such a property available?					
14	MR. KLEIN: I can't say that. No, Your Honor.					
15	JUDGE RIVERA: And I already know that there's					
16	case law about the market doesn't necessarily have to					
17	facilitate it. I understand that argument.					
18	JUDGE WILSON: But for the theater requirement in					
19	the code, could he have this event, you know, let's say,					
20	absent the stage, absent the music, on his own property, if					
21	he'd gotten a special use permit?					
22	MR. KLEIN: With with the camping and					
23	everything else on					
24	JUDGE WILSON: With the camping, yeah. With the					
25	camping. With some kind of sanitary facilities that the -					

- - that the Town said are adequate or necessary to grant 1 2 the permit. But if he's not having amplified music? 3 MR. KLEIN: I believe theor - - - theoretically, 4 I believe he could, if - - - if he applied for a special 5 use permit - - -6 JUDGE WILSON: On his own - - -7 MR. KLEIN: - - - as a campgrounds. 8 JUDGE WILSON: - - - on his own property? 9 MR. KLEIN: On his own pro - - - sure. 10 JUDGE STEIN: Could he have had amplified music at some - - - for - - - at some intervals of time? 11 12 MR. KLEIN: Potentially, sure. 13 JUDGE STEIN: Um-hum. 14 MR. KLEIN: Because that - - - that might well be 15 something that could be an accessory activity associated 16 with a properly permitted campground. But what would have 17 happened in that instance is there would have been planning 18 board review, and they would have taken into account, as 19 they usually do, what's the impact of this. 20 And I would be very surprised if this planning 21 board in the town I represent or any other planning board 22 would allow that extent of overnight music to - - - to - -

reasonably require in order to have his event versus what

- to continue on. That's what - - - they would strike a

balance. What the - - - what the applicant would

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you - - - how you would mitigate the impact of some of that 1 2 on the community and the surrounding area. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: So it could have the parts of this event that are sort of the - - - what he calls the 4 5 religious practices; is that correct? 6 MR. KLEIN: Yeah, I don't think there's anything 7 in - - - in - - - in the zoning code that - - - that - - -8 the - - - the zoning law is content-neutral. There's 9 nothing in - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so the - - -MR. KLEIN: - - - there that - - -11 12 JUDGE RIVERA: So the point about the number of 13 people, the sanitation, all of that, doesn't matter, if 14 it's just that they're going to exercise - - -15 MR. KLEIN: Well, it - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - religious practices? 17 MR. KLEIN: - - - I have to give you the - - -18 the lawyer's answer, Your Honor. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 20 MR. KLEIN: It depends. It - - - you have to 21 flesh out those facts a little more. If you're having it 22 with the camping associated with it, and it's - - - and 23 it's going on for days on end, then it - - - you have to 24 look, again, at the zoning law and see how does this fit



into the zoning law. You - - - the - - - the

1	appellant makes great moment of trying to equate
2	JUDGE FEINMAN: So let me
3	MR. KLEIN: this act
4	JUDGE FEINMAN: so let me ask you this
5	_
6	MR. SCHINDLER: I'm sorry.
7	JUDGE FEINMAN: in the context of this
8	case, all right? He decides to build a sukkah
9	MR. KLEIN: Um-hum.
10	JUDGE FEINMAN: all right, a temporary
11	structure on that property and invite all these people to
12	to come dine in the sukkah, fulfilling the commandment
13	Now what?
14	MR. KLEIN: Well, Your Honor, I mean, I get it
15	but
16	JUDGE FEINMAN: Can they ta camp out
17	overnight in tents? No music, they're just going to
18	you know
19	MR. KLEIN: It'd be an awful big sukkah to get
20	700 people into it. They'd probably need
21	JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, they go in at times, in
22	intervals. I'm not talking about 700 people. I think he,
23	himself, restricted it to to 400.
24	MR. KLEIN: Even 400. I you know, I mean,
25	you'd be talking about building a structure that needed a

building permit. And again, I'd - - - I'd have to analyze that in the context of the zoning law and see how that fit, because you're - - - you're - - - if you're - - - it's much more expansive than what you would traditionally expect to see in a sukkah.

It goes back to that same dichotomy that we - - - that we've got here. What, I can't whistle in my backyard?

I can't sing a song? I - - - I can't watch a - - - I can't watch a movie on my television? Of course the zoning law doesn't prohibit people in the RU district from doing that.

And it's not a reasonable interpretation to argue it that it does.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?

MR. SCHINDLER: I'm glad - - - I'm glad it was brought up about the wedding, because I've always analogized this to having some sort of backyard party or wedding or even - - - you know, I - - - in my brief I mentioned, for instance, that - - - what if he invited the town over for a 4th of July celebration, and they decided to sing or play music? How - - - there's no - - - the - - - the statute really doesn't limit as to like the number of people or the length of time.

There's the - - - or it doesn't allow for the



playing of music at a gathering for a shorter period of 1 2 time than a longer period of time. 3 JUDGE STEIN: Well, isn't it sort of self-4 limiting? Because if you have to provide structures and 5 you have to fo - - - provide sanitary facilities and you 6 have to provide food vendors or - - - you know, or - - -7 you know, all these other things, isn't that what defines it? 8 9 Because if you invite some people over for the 10 4th of July, that presumes they're going to stay for several hours or whatever, not for three days. 11 12 MR. SCHINDLER: Okay. 13 JUDGE STEIN: And they're not going to be eating 14 and - - - you know - - - and all that stuff. 15 MR. SCHINDLER: But - - - but it - - - but that's 16 not the objection that the law applies to. The law applies 17 - - - this particular statute or ordinance - - - to the 18 playing of music. And it doesn't distinguish between 19 amplified or not amplified - - -20 JUDGE STEIN: I don't see where that is in the 21 law, the - - - the playing of music. 22 MR. SCHINDLER: The - - -23 JUDGE STEIN: - - - I - - -24 MR. SCHINDLER: - - - the definition of "theater" 25 is a building or room or outdoor facility for the playing"

1	or "for" I'm sorry "for the presentation
2	of films, plays, dramatic performances, or music." It
3	doesn't have any relevance to the amount of sound, you
4	know, how loud it is, or how soft the sound is, whether
5	it's indoors or outdoors, whether it's daytime or nighttime
6	
7	JUDGE STEIN: But it does say that nothing shall
8	prohibit the uses allowed under the household
9	MR. SCHINDLER: In inside.
10	JUDGE STEIN: right?
11	MR. SCHINDLER: The statute or or the
12	definition is that that which is usually performed
13	solely within a house. Well, I could make a lot of noise
14	solely within my house. I could blast my stereo solely
15	within my house and put the speakers near the window and
16	disturb all my neighbors, and it wouldn't violate the
17	zoning law, which is designed to prevent excessive noise.
18	And the and the Constitution doesn't end -
19	
20	JUDGE STEIN: It might violate other laws. I
21	don't I mean
22	MR. SCHINDLER: It might. But there's not
23	there's no noise ordinance, which is what would have
24	addressed the primary problem here, which was amplified



music from dusk to dawn. It could have been solved with a

simple - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, he - - - he said that they - - - they identified that there were other issues that concerned them, given the size and the length of time that the event was going - - -

MR. SCHINDLER: But that's not what he identifies

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - on.

MR. SCHINDLER: - - - as the purpose of the statute that's challenged. And the - - - and under the narrow tailoring analysis, you have to identify - - - the government has the burden of both identifying - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Let's - - - let's say we disagree - - - let's say we agree with his description of what they've identified as their concerns raised by the event and what this zoning was meant to address. How does that affect your argument?

MR. SCHINDLER: Because first of all, the - - the - -- the Constitution doesn't end when you leave the
house. His - - - the Constitution - - - the First
Amendment applies to his entire sixty-eight acres, not just
those things you could do within a house.

So these people have a right - - - freedom of association - - - to get together. And they have - - - if they want - - - 400 people want to get together in an open



field on sixty-eight acres, they have that right.

They have the right to worship in that field.

They have that right. But the minute somebody plays a song or sings, then they have now created a - - - a theater, which is prohibited by criminal statute. And that's where I think this - - - the - - - this law violates the First Amendment. There's no - - - there's no limitation in terms of - - as I've said, daytime or nighttime, indoor or outdoor, or amount of sound that's generated or not generated.

JUDGE RIVERA: All right. Let's - - - let's say
we disagree with you. Is it - - - is it your
understanding, if you looked - - - if you haven't I
certainly appreciate that - - - that there are
alternatives, with respect to the argument that there's - - there are alternatives?

MR. SCHINDLER: Right. So that's where we got into on the brief - - - on the re - - - I'm sorry - - - the respondent's brief and my reply brief, where - - - where Mr. Klein pointed out case law of this court that says well, I have to prove that it's a violation beyond a reasonable doubt. And I cited to Second Circuit case law that says it's the government's burden of proof to demonstrate, not only the nature of the significant governmental interest that the law is supposed to be

1 narrowly tailored to achieve, but also the ample 2 alternative channels. 3 And the - - - the Town did not meet that burden, 4 did not demonstrate where within the Town this could 5 happen; how much of the Town - - - what percentage of the 6 Town? Is it one percent of the Town; five percent of the 7 Town, where these activities are allowed? 8 JUDGE WILSON: But it seems that we don't - - -9 MR. SCHINDLER: They failed their burden of proof 10 on that. 11 JUDGE WILSON: - - - it seems as if we don't 12 know, because you didn't apply for a special use permit, 13 whether and to what degree some or all of this activity 14 would be allowed on Mr. Leifer's own land. And that makes 15 it sort of difficult to reach to the Constitutional 16 question. 17 MR. SCHINDLER: I understand that. I don't - -18 and I think I - - - from my point of view, I don't think 19 they would have granted. 20 I mean, they told him when he was before the 2.1 board - - - and it's quoted in - - - in the record - - -2.2 they told him that music festivals are not permitted. They 23 considered this simply a music festival. They overlooked

just told him it's not permitted. And then the - - -

the religious-observance aspect of this event. And they

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1	CHI	EF JUDGE	DIF	ORE:	Thank	you,	Counsel
2	MR.	SCHINDL	ER:	Okay,	thank	you.	
3	(Co	urt is a	djour	rned)			
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1		CERTIFICATION				
2						
3	I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing					
4	transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Town					
5	of Delaware v. Ian Leifer, No. 83 was prepared using the					
6	required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate					
7	record of the proceedings.					
8						
9	Penina waich.					
10	Signature:					
11						
12						
13	Agency Name:	eScribers				
14						
15	Address of Agency:	352 Seventh Avenue				
16		Suite 604				
17		New York, NY 10001				
18						
19	Date:	October 22, 2019				
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