| 1  | COURT OF APPEALS  |
|----|---|
| 2  | STATE OF NEW YORK   |
| 3  | GREGG LUBONTY,  |
| 4  | Appellant,  |
| 5  |   |
| 6  | -against-<br>NO. 85   |
| 7  | U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,                                   |
| 8  | Respondent.   |
| 9  | 20 Eagle Street<br>Albany, New York<br>October 17, 2019           |
| 10 | Before:   |
| 11 | CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE   |
| 12 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA<br>ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN   |
| 13 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA |
| 14 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN      |
| 15 |   |
|    | Appearances:  |
| 16 | PETER K. KAMRAN, ESQ.   |
| 17 | LESTER & ASSOCIATES, P.C. Attorney for Appellant                  |
| 18 | 600 Old Country Road, Suite 229<br>Garden City, NY 11530          |
| 19 |   |
| 20 | SCHUYLER B. KRAUS, ESQ.<br>HINSHAW & CULBERSTON LLP               |
| 21 | Attorney for Respondent<br>800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor           |
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| 23 |   |
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| 24 | Karen Schiffmille:  |
| 25 | Official Court Transcribe:  |



1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on this 2 afternoon's calendar is appeal number 85, Lubonty v. U.S. 3 Bank National Association. 4 Good afternoon, Counsel. 5 MR. KAMRAN: May it please the court, good 6 afternoon. It's Peter Kamran, Lester & Associates, for the appellant, Gregg Lubonty. I would like to reserve three 7 8 minutes for my - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Of course. 10 MR. KAMRAN: - - - rebuttal. Thank you, Your 11 Honor. 12 This appeal concerns the interpretation of CPLR 13 204(a), which is the - - - the tolling statute. 204(a)14 says when the commencement - - -15 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel - - - Counsel, how would 16 you - - - we know - - - we know the statute, but how would 17 you apply that statute? So what would your rule be, when 18 looking at the next case? What would your rule be on 19 application of these two statutes, the bankruptcy toll and 20 our CPLR stay? 2.1 MR. KAMRAN: Well, the way the statute is 22 written, if - - - if an action has already been commenced -23 - - a foreclosure action or - - - or whatever action, and a 24 bankruptcy is filed, the commencement was not stayed by the 25 - - - by the bankruptcy stay or any other stay.

1 JUDGE GARCIA: So no time would be excluded, 2 what, forever? For the length of the underlying 3 foreclosure action in this case? What would your rule be? 4 What would you deduct from the period of this stay? 5 MR. KAMRAN: I wouldn't deduct anything. 6 Section 108 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a - - - a savings clause in - - - in just that event that says thirty 7 8 days after - - - after the - - -9 JUDGE GARCIA: Sure, the Bankruptcy Code has its 10 own stay, but that and the history of that stay says you look also to the state law. So I think the bankruptcy stay 11 12 is - - - is not particularly relevant here. So let's go to 13 the CPLR and the bankruptcy provision, that says, you know, 14 these are stayed - - - continuation is stayed. You have 15 this case with these stays; why do you not count, under 16 your rule, how do you apply it? Is it for the time where 17 the first two foreclosure actions were pending? So let's 18 say, instead of the facts we have here, in the first foreclosure action, it's dismissed within a month, but the 19 20 bankruptcy stay goes on. Would that count? 21 I - - - I'm not sure I understand. MR. KAMRAN: 22 When you say it's dismissed within a month - - -23 JUDGE GARCIA: But the - - - the foreclosure 24 action is dismissed, right? It's gone.

MR. KAMRAN: Prior to the bankruptcy filing?

| 1  | JUDGE GARCIA: The bankruptcy stay is still in              |
|----|--|
| 2  | effect, let's say for three more years. Does that count    |
| 3  | for the next time you commence a foreclosure action?       |
| 4  | MR. KAMRAN: But was the foreclosure dismissed              |
| 5  | while the bankruptcy stay was in effect?                   |
| 6  | JUDGE GARCIA: Yes.   |
| 7  | MR. KAMRAN: I I don't see how that could                   |
| 8  | happen.  |
| 9  | JUDGE GARCIA: So no no toll for any of the                 |
| 10 | period of that bankruptcy filing?                          |
| 11 | MR. KAMRAN: No, not at all.                                |
| 12 | JUDGE STEIN: So what you're saying is, is that             |
| 13 | there couldn't be proceedings in the foreclosure action to |
| 14 | effectuate a dismissal while the bankruptcy stay was       |
| 15 | pending; is that is that what you're saying?               |
| 16 | MR. KAMRAN: Correct, Your Honor.                           |
| 17 | JUDGE STEIN: Could could                                   |
| 18 | MR. KAMRAN: The bank would have to lift the                |
| 19 | stay.  |
| 20 | JUDGE STEIN: Could the the bank that's                     |
| 21 | foreclosing go to the bankruptcy court and say, would you  |
| 22 | just let us resolve would you effectively stay the         |
| 23 | stay, so that we could resolve this issue?                 |
| 24 | MR. KAMRAN: Banks always make motions to lift              |
| 25 | stay in fore in hankruptcy court                           |

| 1  | JUDGE STEIN: Lifting stay, yes.                             |
|----|---|
| 2  | MR. KAMRAN: and to proceed with a                           |
| 3  | foreclosure. That's exactly what you want.                  |
| 4  | JUDGE GARCIA: So that's the point. So you would             |
| 5  | have the foreclosure action. It's stayed. So as long as     |
| 6  | that bankruptcy stay is in in effect, it's                  |
| 7  | you're kind of in limbo, because you can't dismiss; you     |
| 8  | can't do anything.  |
| 9  | MR. KAMRAN: But both parties are in limbo, yes.             |
| 10 | JUDGE GARCIA: Then it li well it                            |
| 11 | lifts, and then that motion in the first foreclosure is     |
| 12 | dismissed. So now if you're going to refile under your      |
| 13 | theory, the second foreclosure action, you've got no period |
| 14 | of stay that you can take advantage of.                     |
| 15 | MR. KAMRAN: Correct, Your Honor.                            |
| 16 | JUDGE STEIN: But you have CPLR 205, and                     |
| 17 | and also you can ask for additional time to serve under     |
| 18 | _   |
| 19 | MR. KAMRAN: Correct, that was our argument.                 |
| 20 | JUDGE STEIN: 306.   |
| 21 | MR. KAMRAN: If there are carveouts in 205,                  |
| 22 | and one of them is lack of personal jurisdiction, which is  |
| 23 | relevant  |
| 24 | JUDGE GARCIA: What if I had a fraud claim from              |
| 25 | the same transaction, but I hadn't brought it, and now,     |

the same transaction, but I hadn't brought it, and now,

| 1  | this happens both these things happen. But instead          |
|----|---|
| 2  | of filing a foreclosure action in December '17, or whatever |
| 3  | it is, I file a fraud claim. Do I get a toll?               |
| 4  | MR. KAMRAN: For a fraud claim? I I don't                    |
| 5  | see why not.  |
| 6  | JUDGE GARCIA: So it's not a could-have-brought              |
| 7  | type of thing. It's not a subject matter test.              |
| 8  | MR. KAMRAN: Not at all, Your Honor. I think if              |
| 9  | if there's a different cause of action that's brought       |
| 10 |   |
| 11 | JUDGE GARCIA: Even related to the same                      |
| 12 | underlying facts. So instead of a contract, I have a        |
| 13 | fraud.  |
| 14 | MR. KAMRAN: I   |
| 15 | JUDGE GARCIA: So what would the purpose of not              |
| 16 | counting the tolls on the other one be then?                |
| 17 | MR. KAMRAN: Well, if if you're bringing a                   |
| 18 | fraud claim, it's and it's based on the same                |
| 19 | the same, I guess, the it would be on the obtaining         |
| 20 | of the mortgage.  |
| 21 | JUDGE GARCIA: Right.  |
| 22 | MR. KAMRAN: That's different than a default on a            |
| 23 | mortgage. It's a completely different cause of action.      |
| 24 | And it's actually not, I think, based on the same the       |
| 25 | same facts.   |

| 2  | test on how related it was to the original cause of action |
|----|--|
| 3  | MR. KAMRAN: I $ -$ I would think that would                |
| 4  | obviously have to be done be I haven't seen that           |
| 5  | happen, myself, but  |
| 6  | JUDGE FAHEY: Well, is there is there any                   |
| 7  | basis for that in the statute? Because what I struggle     |
| 8  | with with your claim is that service is it's               |
| 9  | it's the second time around. The foreclosure service is    |
| 10 | improper on the second time. It's thrown out, and so       |
| 11 | there's an anticipated third action that isn't brought, an |
| 12 | isn't the the commencement provision of 204,               |
| 13 | doesn't it work the same against the first time you bring  |
| 14 | it as the third time you bring it? It's still the same     |
| 15 | cause of action. And you seem to be saying, no, that we    |
| 16 | have to look behind commencement to see what the cause of  |
| 17 | action is, to determine whether or not it would count.     |
| 18 | MR. KAMRAN: That's in the case. If it was a                |
| 19 | different this is a mortgage foreclosure action.           |
| 20 | JUDGE FAHEY: Right.  |
| 21 | MR. KAMRAN: The all these                                  |
| 22 | JUDGE FAHEY: Right, right, right.                          |
| 23 | MR. KAMRAN: and that would be a fraud                      |
| 24 | action. If   |
| 25 | JUDGE FAHEY: So do we have to look behind the              |

JUDGE GARCIA: So you'd have to have some kind of

| 1   | cause of behind the just commencement of any             |
|-----|--|
| 2   | action, or does it do we have to look to say, no,        |
| 3   | here the bankruptcy stay apply stay applies in a 204     |
| 4   | here it doesn't?   |
| 5   | MR. KAMRAN: I I think you would have to                  |
| 6   | look behind, if there were                               |
| 7   | JUDGE FAHEY: So state law then would pick and            |
| 8   | choose between which ones could go forward to the        |
| 9   | bankruptcy?  |
| LO  | MR. KAMRAN: What do you mean? I'm sorry.                 |
| L1  | JUDGE FAHEY: Between a fraud, say, and a                 |
| L2  | foreclosure action.                                      |
| L3  | MR. KAMRAN: I well, if they were both                    |
| L4  | brought at the same time, the same the same test         |
| L5  | would would apply to both of them, or the same rule      |
| L6  | would apply. But if instead of the third action being a  |
| L7  | foreclosure action, it was a fraud action, you'd have to |
| L8  | look at it to see if that those circumstances            |
| L 9 | JUDGE FAHEY: Maybe my question isn't clear. Yo           |
| 20  | understand on the third action, assume that it's a       |
| 21  | foreclosure action, all right? On that third action,     |
| 22  | you're saying they can't bring it, right?                |
| 23  | MR. KAMRAN: Yes.   |
| 24  | JUDGE FAHEY: All right, okay. So I'm saying to           |
| 25  | you, they've already brought it twice. What's the        |

different - - - and - - - and the foreclosure - - - and the stay would have treated those other ones differently, right?

MR. KAMRAN: Yes.

JUDGE FAHEY: All right. So what's the difference between this one and those previous actions?

MR. KAMRAN: This new one being - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Right.

MR. KAMRAN: - - - the foreclosure action?

JUDGE FAHEY: Right.

MR. KAMRAN: It's past the statute of limitations. The - - - the tolling didn't apply to the first two. So as soon as the second bankruptcy was - - - was - - - was dismissed or that the stay was lifted in the second bankruptcy in November of 2013, the statute of limitations ran. Maybe there was thirty days after it, but the second foreclosure wasn't dismissed until the next year. Once that - - - once that foreclosure was dismissed, the six years had run.

JUDGE GARCIA: But isn't this a particularly bad toll to apply your rule to, because again, as we were discussing earlier, you can't even dismiss your action. I mean, you could go to the bankruptcy judge, but you can't go into a New York court and say, I want to dismiss this action, and then, you know, I would get the toll, because I

realize there's a problem here. I'm stuck, I'm in limbo, 1 2 and this time is ticking off the clock. But it's not 3 counting as - - - as part of the toll; it's counting as 4 part of the statute of limitations. 5 So for this one, it's kind of a particularly bad 6 one it seems. MR. KAMRAN: With respect to this case, I don't 7 8 think it is, though. Prior to the second bankruptcy, the -9 - - the appellant had filed a motion to dismiss based on 10 lack of service. That motion was stayed for approximately two and a half years. They had plenty of time to look at 11 12 it and see what they wanted to do with it. 13 JUDGE GARCIA: But what could they do then? 14 mean, again, putting aside going to the bankruptcy court, 15 what could they do in that New York action at that point, 16 even if they realize service is bad. What could they do? 17 MR. KAMRAN: If they realize service was bad or 18 that they had an issue, they could have made a motion to lift the stay and fix - - -19

JUDGE GARCIA: To the bankruptcy court.

MR. KAMRAN: Yes, and - - and fix or try to fix whatever they wanted to fix. What they did afterwards was - - - was decide to fight it out on service - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: And - - - and if the court - - 
JUDGE STEIN: Or they - - -



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| 1   | JUDGE RIVERA: and if the court didn't                    |
|-----|--|
| 2   | grant if the bankruptcy court didn't grant that          |
| 3   | motion, is there anything else under New York law, that  |
| 4   | they could do?   |
| 5   | MR. KAMRAN: Under New York law? I don't believ           |
| 6   | they could have voluntarily discontinued                 |
| 7   | JUDGE STEIN: But could have could they                   |
| 8   | have moved under 306(b) for additional time to serve?    |
| 9   | MR. KAMRAN: After the stay had lifted                    |
| LO  | JUDGE STEIN: Uh-huh.                                     |
| L1  | MR. KAMRAN: been lifted?                                 |
| L2  | JUDGE STEIN: Yeah.                                       |
| L3  | MR. KAMRAN: Yes, of course.                              |
| L4  | JUDGE RIVERA: How much time was left after the           |
| L5  | stay was lifted?   |
| L 6 | MR. KAMRAN: Of the 120 days to serve, I think            |
| L7  | they were at 136, if you take out the bankruptcy time. I |
| L8  | think that motion would have been granted, almost as a   |
| L 9 | matter of course.  |
| 20  | JUDGE RIVERA: They certainly had enough time to          |
| 21  | think about it.  |
| 22  | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.                 |
| 23  | MR. KAMRAN: That's my argument.                          |
| 24  | Thank you.   |
| 25  | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?                            |



1 MR. KRAUS: May it please the court, Schuyler 2 Kraus for the respondent, U.S. Bank National Association, 3 as trustee. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: So why isn't he correct that you -5 - - you did have an opportunity under New York law to avoid 6 these harsh consequences by, at a minimum, seeking - - - or 7 - - or putting in a motion to extend the time to serve. 8 MR. KRAUS: Well, I - - - I dis - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: Proper service. 10 MR. KRAUS: I dis - - - I disagree with the proposition. Under 306(b) - - -11 12 JUDGE RIVERA: What part of the proposition? 13 MR. KRAUS: Well, the - - - the entire 14 proposition actually, Your Honor. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 16 MR. KRAUS: Because under 306(b), first of all, 17 you need to make that application within the time frame of 18 the 120 days from the beginning - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: Within the 120, not outside? 20 MR. KRAUS: Correct. Secondarily, there had been 2.1 no determination that service was improper. It was unclear 2.2 what needed to be fixed, perhaps. And you can come up with 23 a variety of examples as to why that rule wouldn't work. 24 In fact, in his case, the motion was made. The appellant 25



was served with process. Three weeks later, he files a

motion. Within two weeks - - - within days, he files 1 2 bankruptcy. It is not until the bankruptcy is dismissed 3 that then motion practice continues. Then - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: Sure, because you've got the stay 5 in place. 6 MR. KRAUS: Right, and so there's no - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Well, you certainly had enough 7 8 time to think about the motion that there was not proper 9 service to determine whether or not there was proper 10 service, correct? 11 MR. KRAUS: Certainly, it is - - - you have time 12 to think about the issue and the motion that's made, but 13 there - - - there could be many factual circumstances which 14 would - - - which would prevent you from be - - - from 15 determining the risk on going forward or - - - or having a 16 motion. 17 18

JUDGE FAHEY: What - - I guess what I struggle with in - - in your case is, I - - I count five options that U.S. Bank would have had and I - - the first one would have been, you could have moved for relief from the bankruptcy stay in order to settle the personal jurisdiction issue when the issue arose. Second, you could have moved for an extension of time, to serve process for 306(b). Third, you could have moved to reopen the bankruptcy proceeding itself. Fourth, you could have moved

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| 1  | to commence a new action to the thirty-day window. I think  |
|----|---|
| 2  | it's 11 U.S.C. 108(c)(2).                                   |
| 3  | And of course, you could have served Lubonty                |
| 4  | correctly in the first place, which would have been easier  |
| 5  | for everybody, probably.                                    |
| 6  | JUDGE FEINMAN: Other than that last one, are all            |
| 7  | those options available while the stay is in place?         |
| 8  | MR. KRAUS: Are all the those options                        |
| 9  | available I mean  |
| 10 | JUDGE FEINMAN: What just that he's just                     |
| 11 | listed.   |
| 12 | MR. KRAUS: An application can certainly be made             |
| 13 | to the bankruptcy court, whether or not it's granted.       |
| 14 | JUDGE FEINMAN: So it all depends on what the                |
| 15 | bankruptcy court does?                                      |
| 16 | MR. KRAUS: Correct. And in terms of                         |
| 17 | JUDGE FAHEY: But that that's in a                           |
| 18 | situation like this, that that that doesn't                 |
| 19 | seem unusual. I I mean, to the point where the              |
| 20 | petitioner had been castigated by one of the courts as      |
| 21 | using the stay as a sword rather than a shield, it seems to |
| 22 | me that it would have been quite easy to make an interest   |
| 23 | of justice argument here.                                   |
| 24 | MR. KRAUS: Under 306(b)?                                    |
| 25 | JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah.  |

| 1  | MR. KRAUS: Well, I I understand, Your                      |
|----|--|
| 2  | Honor. I I think alternatively, I a litigant               |
| 3  | should be allowed to rest on their proof, and and          |
| 4  | given the benefit of a statute of limitations and determin |
| 5  | at some point, we believe that service was proper, and if  |
| 6  | it is determined to be improper or ineffectual, then we    |
| 7  | will have enough time to then serve and correct. And here  |
| 8  | a six-year statute of limitations, because of these        |
| 9  | bankruptcy filings was reduced from six years to really a  |
| 10 | year and a half.   |
| 11 | And and to the point of the witness and th                 |
| 12 | last point you raised, Your Honor                          |
| 13 | JUDGE RIVERA: So you want another four and a               |
| 14 | half years; is that what you're saying?                    |
| 15 | MR. KRAUS: Pardon me?                                      |
| 16 | JUDGE RIVERA: You want another four and a half             |
| 17 | years  |
| 18 | MR. KRAUS: Well, I think he should                         |
| 19 | JUDGE RIVERA: after the stay was lifted?                   |
| 20 | MR. KRAUS: Our our position, Your Honor,                   |
| 21 | is that the respondent in this case should be given, and   |
| 22 | was given according to the Second Department, the credit   |
| 23 | for the amount of time that they were prevented from eithe |
| 24 | continuing or commencing.                                  |

JUDGE STEIN: But it seems to me that your

argument is based on what you think is an unfair result in this case. And that's not generally how we make law. And here, we're interpreting a statute. And we have to look at the language of the statute, and the language talks about commencement. And the other thing that we have to look at, when it's not entirely clear, maybe there are - - I'm not - - I'm not conceding that there's ambiguity, but let's assume there is some ambiguity - - let's look at the context; let's look at the whole statutory scheme. And here, you have these other pieces.

I mean, to me, 205 says that the legislature realized that sometimes when you get dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, you know, you're going to be out of luck. But it - - - it - - - it provided that - - - that avenue. It provided 306(b). It pro - - - you know, there are just so many ways that this could have been avoided, that I'm not sure how we as a court, as opposed to what the legislature might want to do, gets to read this statute, in a way that there's no indication that it was intended to apply.

MR. KRAUS: Two - - -

JUDGE STEIN: It says commencement.

MR. KRAUS: Two points.

JUDGE STEIN: Right?

MR. KRAUS: And - - - and to that last point,



Your Honor. Actually, I believe that it could be read, 362 pro - - - provides that there is a stay from continuation and from commencement. And so if you - - - if you look - - - that's the Bankruptcy Code, right? You're not allowed to commence or continue and - - - and a variety of other actions, by creditors against a debtor.

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So if you look at 204(a), 204(a) if you're reading the - - - the - - - the text of it, and just applying the words as they appear, the statutory prohibition under 204(a) is 362. And 362 says you cannot commence, as well as other actions. And so I think it could be read that - - - that the statutory prohibition that triggers 204 here does prevent commencement.

Now, it's irrespective, I would argue, on whether or not an action has previously been commenced or is currently pending. The statute that triggered 204(a) prevented commencement. We could not con - - - we could not dismiss without permission of the court - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But it was already - - -

JUDGE STEIN: It was already commenced. So that

- - - that's where I think maybe the ambiguity comes in,

and - - - and the - - - the legislature could have said

commencement or continuation. It didn't say that. It said

commencement.

| 1  | MR. KRAUS: If I may  |
|----|--|
| 2  | JUDGE RIVERA: But I thought I thought in                   |
| 3  | part your response to many of the questions that Judge     |
| 4  | Stein was asking and the question I asked before is that   |
| 5  | there is not another provision of the CPLR that would have |
| 6  | prevented this harsh result. That there is nothing you     |
| 7  | could have done, other than, of course, as Judge Fahey's   |
| 8  | already pointed out, as your adversary points out, serve   |
| 9  | properly to begin with. Put that aside for the moment.     |
| LO | MR. KRAUS: Well  |
| L1 | JUDGE RIVERA: Am I misunderstanding you?                   |
| L2 | MR. KRAUS: I I that is                                     |
| L3 | JUDGE RIVERA: That that that these                         |
| L4 | other provisions were just simply not available to you     |
| L5 | _  |
| L6 | MR. KRAUS: Or  |
| L7 | JUDGE RIVERA: even though he's pointed to                  |
| L8 | them.  |
| L9 | MR. KRAUS: And correct, Your Honor. And                    |
| 20 | and if I may just on the two                               |
| 21 | JUDGE RIVERA: Is there is there was                        |
| 22 | there any equitable argument you could have made?          |
| 23 | MR. KRAUS: At at   |
| 24 | JUDGE RIVERA: Equitable tolling? Anything                  |
| 25 | MR. KRAUS: Equitable tolling, below?                       |



| 1  | JUDGE RIVERA: If you if your position is,                   |
|----|---|
| 2  | we thought we properly served, until the court told us      |
| 3  | otherwise; we see no need to make a motion. And and         |
| 4  | in any event, by the time the stay is lifted, we can't      |
| 5  | proceed under any of these provisions.                      |
| 6  | MR. KRAUS: If if the rule is that you do                    |
| 7  | not get any tolling credit because you, as a claimant,      |
| 8  | actively sought to pursue your claim, and you're punished   |
| 9  | by the fact that a bankruptcy followed, then I'm not sure   |
| 10 | what the equitable tolling would be, if if                  |
| 11 | because then  |
| 12 | JUDGE RIVERA: Well, the argument it's just                  |
| 13 | unfair, because you could not, right?                       |
| 14 | MR. KRAUS: Well   |
| 15 | JUDGE RIVERA: The it's the                                  |
| 16 | argument I thought you were trying to make                  |
| 17 | MR. KRAUS: Right  |
| 18 | JUDGE RIVERA: which is there is no other                    |
| 19 | provision that addresses this particular situation          |
| 20 | put aside your arguments that you think he was gaming the   |
| 21 | system that there's nothing else that addresses this        |
| 22 | When you've got the stay, you can't act in the state action |
| 23 |   |
| 24 | MR. KRAUS: Cor correct.                                     |

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - even if you went to federal

| 1  | court. Let's say they turned down your motion; they    |
|----|--|
| 2  | rejected the motion, denied it. You're stuck; no other |
| 3  | provision applied.                                     |
| 4  | MR. KRAUS: I I misunderstood your question             |
| 5  | previously; I apologize.                               |
| 6  | JUDGE RIVERA: I could understand how you would         |
| 7  | misunderstand. It's okay.                              |
| 8  | MR. KRAUS: I agree with that proposition that          |
| 9  | yes, there is no there is no it would be               |
| 10 | inequitable, and it is inequitable. And if if I may    |
| 11 | just address it.                                       |
| 12 | JUDGE RIVERA: You did not seek to make any of          |
| 13 | those arguments to in state court                      |
| 14 | MR. KRAUS: Those are                                   |
| 15 | JUDGE RIVERA: correct?                                 |
| 16 | MR. KRAUS: Those are not in the record, no.            |
| 17 | JUDGE RIVERA: And you did not raise that here?         |
| 18 | MR. KRAUS: That that it would be                       |
| 19 | inequitable? I believe we have raised                  |
| 20 | JUDGE RIVERA: Well, no, that there might be some       |
| 21 | type of equitable relief.                              |
| 22 | JUDGE WILSON: Let me ask you this. While your -        |
| 23 | your foreclosure action is pending, is there anything  |
| 24 | in the CPLR that prevents you from filing an identical |



action?

MR. KRAUS: Yes.

JUDGE WILSON: What?

MR. KRAUS: And - - - and that's actually - - - it was pointed out in the reply brief that 3211 suggests that you could have another action. In a for - - in a foreclosure context, you cannot. RPA PL 1301 prevents you from filing a second action.

If I - - - if I may just address the 205 argument and issue? Yes, under a service - - - service is the issue. We've - - - we've discussed why there is a carveout for that and perhaps 306(b) could be a remedy. However, voluntary discontinuance is also one of the carveouts, and I don't think it would be difficult for the court to come up with various circumstances where it would not only be inequitable, but it would also be counter to the administration of justice, and - - - and overwhelm the courts. You could - -

JUDGE STEIN: I - - - I guess what - - - what I - - - my point there was, that the legislature did create these carveouts, but we have to presume they knew what they were doing, so that it wasn't intended to give a break in this particular situation. But - - but as Judge Fahey has indicated, there may have been other remedies.

MR. KRAUS: And for a voluntary discontinuance if there - - let's say, predicate notices - - - there's some



issue as to whether or not they were served, or an issue of fact. You could file an action. You could believe that you properly sent those to the right address. A bankruptcy could be filed. You could realize after the bankruptcy that goes on for years, and exhausts your statute of limitations, that the - - - that predicate notice, there's an issue there, and that you should not be proceeding.

However, in - - - in this circumstance, if this is the rule, then a plaintiff will have to proceed, because you'll have to proceed and then lose on the merits as to the predicate notices. And then you could recommence under 205(a). But if you voluntarily discontinued, you would be carved out and it would be inequitable.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. KRAUS: Thank you very much.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?

MR. KAMRAN: Just briefly. With regards to the 306(b), and - - and there's a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, which was pending, when the ba - - - bankruptcy was filed. They knew how they had allegedly served the - - - the defendant, and at which property. All during the bankruptcy, which respondent had participated in, it was clear what - - what appellant's address was, his correct address.

They had plenty of time to plan on what - - -



what they wanted to do. And there is no - - - there is no 1 2 guarantee that the bankruptcy court would have granted a 3 motion - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: So what - - - what could they have 5 done, because there's a stay. Is it that they could only 6 go to the bankruptcy court and say, lift the stay, period, or, let us serve. Could they ask the bankruptcy court if 7 8 they could serve properly? 9 MR. KAMRAN: That would essentially be the same 10 motion. If they wanted to lift the stay - - -11 There's one thing to lift the stay JUDGE RIVERA: 12 completely and let the proceeding proceed, versus just to 13 allow service? 14 MR. KAMRAN: I think if they made a motion to 15 lift the stay just to allow service, I don't see any way 16 that we could have opposed that. I - - - I think the 17 bankruptcy court would have granted that. If it was to 18

lift the stay just to allow service, I don't see any way that we could have opposed that. I - - - I think the bankruptcy court would have granted that. If it was to lift the stay as to the whole foreclosure action, it could have been opposed, but there's no - - - there's no dispute that the - - - the appellant had not made any payments at all. So there are numerous grounds to lift the stay. I think a motion would have been granted. There's no guarantee on that, though.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. KAMRAN: Thank you.

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(Court is adjourned)





| 1  |  | CERTIFICATION                                 |
|----|--|---|
| 2  |  |   |
| 3  | I, K   | aren Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing |
| 4  | transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Gregg |   |
| 5  | Lubonty v. U.S. Bank National Association, No. 85 was      |   |
| 6  | prepared using the required transcription equipment and is |   |
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| 12 |  |   |
| 13 | Agency Name:   | eScribers                                     |
| 14 |  |   |
| 15 | Address of Agency:   | 352 Seventh Avenue                            |
| 16 |  | Suite 604                                     |
| 17 |  | New York, NY 10001                            |
| 18 |  |   |
| 19 | Date:  | October 23, 2019                              |
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