1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	PEOPLE, EX REL. EVANS D. PRIESTON, on behalf of KENEL BEAUBRUN,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- NO. 90
7	NASSAU COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York
10	October 23, 2019 Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
16	Appearances:
17	SARAH S. RABINOWITZ, ADA
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24	Karen Schiffmiller
25	Official Court Transcriber



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on this afternoon's calendar is appeal number 90, People ex rel. Prieston v. Nassau County Sheriff's Department.

Good afternoon, Counsel.

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MS. RABINOWITZ: Good afternoon. May I proceed?

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may.

MS. RABINOWITZ: May it please the court, my name is Sarah Rabinowitz, and I represent the appellant, the Nassau County Sheriff's Department. First may I reserve two minutes for rebuttal?

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may.

MS. RABINOWITZ: Your Honors, as this court is aware, this case is about judicial discretion, and it really comes down to a question of who should have the last word on whether a bail bond package contravenes public policy: the criminal justice system, whose primary interest in setting bail is to secure a defendant's return to court, or a for-profit industry, which stands to make a profit, regardless of whether the defendant returns to court or not.

Amici for petitioner really tries to frame the issue here, that this is all about appellant throwing an obstacle in front of indigent defendants to prevent them from achieving pre-trial release. That is not at all what this is about. A judge having discretion at a bail source



hear - - - hearing to determine whether the bond agent is reliable, the value and - - - and sufficiency of any security offered, and whether any feature of the bond package contravenes public policy, does not equal indigent defendants have to sit in jail.

Amic - - - as Amici argues, many of the bond packages presented by indigent defendants do pass muster under CPL 520.30. It is not an extremely high bar to reach, and judges are sympathetic to indigency arguments, but those arguments are appropriate for the bail source hearings, not here, where the question is as to the scope of the court's authority at those hearings, and the legislative intent behind the pertinent statutes.

Nor would it drastically change the scope of these hearings, or significantly increase the amount of bond packages disapproved. If - - - if this court were to determine that the Supreme Court here acted within its discretion when it disapproved this bond package - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Do you think the court can challenge the bond company's assessment numbers? Like, oh, the property's not really worth 250,000 dollars.

MS. RABINOWITZ: Well, Your Honor, that's - - that's not what the court did here. They - - - the - -
JUDGE GARCIA: But why is that different?

MS. RABINOWITZ: What's different is that here



the court looked at the nature of the collateral, in the sense that, did the indemnitors here really have enough to lose to incentivize the defendant to return to court. But it - - - that's very different from the insurance company's calculus as to the risk it - - - the - - - the company's willing to take - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Let's say a company comes in and says the property's worth 250,000, and the judge is inquiring, maybe it's worth 150 and you own it. So isn't that kind of go to what the value is, the same way your equity would?

MS. RABINOWITZ: Well, Your Honor, but that's not what the Supreme Court did here.

JUDGE GARCIA: Okay.

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MS. RABINOWITZ: The - - - the bond agent testified that the pro - - - testified very clearly about what the equity was in each piece of property, and the Supreme Court determined, and it would - - - acted fully within the ambit of its statutorily imposed discretion in doing this, that not only that the - - - that the value was insufficient, but that the nature of the collateral was insufficient.

The Supreme Court also didn't - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Well, what is it - - what is it you point to exactly for the nature as opposed to the



sufficiency of the amount?

MS. RABINOWITZ: Well, Your Honor, the Supreme

Court questioned - - - there was strong evidence here that,

first of all, a big part of this collateral, which was the

codefendant, John Beaubrun's house, was - - - there was

strong evidence that it was the product of ill-gotten

gains.

JUDGE WILSON: Where is the evidence in the record of this case for that? I see that the judge said that, but I didn't see anything in the record that - - - that suggested it.

MS. RABINOWITZ: Your Honor, in - - - in the search warrant affidavits, which were before the judge here, the - - it - - - it was all lined out in - - - in those affidavits, and the judge did state in his ruling, that there was strong evidence - - - or I should say, that it was alleged that a large-scale drug transaction occurred in the driveway of this property. And it was all laid out in the search warrant affidavits that there was a - - - a - - - -

JUDGE WILSON: But a drug transaction occurring in the - - - in the driveway of the property is different from the house being acquired by the fruits of illegal activity, right?

MS. RABINOWITZ: Your Honor - - -



JUDGE WILSON: It's a forfeiture versus a "where did the funds come from" issue.

MS. RABINOWITZ: Your Honor, I'm sorry to be repetitive, but in the search - - - search warrant affidavits, it's - - - it specifically stated that two kilos of drugs were seen changing hands in - - - in this - - - in the driveway of this property. As well, there was a 2011 - - -

JUDGE WILSON: But why does that go to whether the source of the funds to buy the house came from a drug transaction. The house had been owned for twenty years?

MS. RABINOWITZ: Well, Your Honor, the - - - the - - - this property and there was evidence of this, it had a rich history, stretching back, having to do with large-scale drug transactions. In 2011, in a Queens case, both petitioner and his cousin, John Beaubrun, had been convicted of drug possession, weapon possession, that were found in this house. So of course, there's never really going to be evidence, in the sense that at the - - - at the closing on a property. It's not as if there's - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: The argument that only actually matters if you're restricted to only looking at whether or not this - - - is this - - - you know, the criminal activity as the source of the funds. And - - - and I'm not sure that the statute restricts it that way.



1	MS. RABINOWITZ: It it does it does -
2	it does not, Your Honor. There's very broad language -
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4	JUDGE FEINMAN: Okay.
5	MS. RABINOWITZ: that any that the
6	court has a statutory mandate to analyze whether any
7	feature of the undertake taking
8	JUDGE FEINMAN: Is there anything that you see in
9	the statute that distinguishes between insurance company,
10	bail bonds, versus cash bond?
11	MS. RABINOWITZ: Absolutely, Your Honor.
12	Although there is a public policy component when conducting
13	a bail source hearing as to either of them
14	JUDGE FAHEY: And that's that's the key
15	point here, isn't it? Is that the public policy component
16	really defines the difference here. One, it's it's
17	fine for an insurance company or a bail-bond company to
18	say, we've made a business decision here that we're going
19	to get repaid.
20	It's another thing to say, their business
21	decision, though, has nothing to do with insuring that a
22	particular defendant shows up. They're they're
23	calculating the business decision by a profit motive, which
24	is appropriate, but it has nothing to do with fulfilling

the court's public purpose. And the court is allowed to

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look to that public purpose, which is that, whoever's accused shows up.

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Isn't that really what this is about?

MS. RABINOWITZ: That is what this is about, Your Honor. And the - - - back to your question, the - - - the difference between - - - there - - - there is a threshold requirement for a court to conduct a bail source hearing as to cash bail. That is not there when - - - when conducting the inquiry into insurance company bail bonds. And that is that upon application by the district attorney, there - - - the court must have reasonable cause to believe that the person posting a cash bail is either not in rightful possession of that money, or that the money is the product of ill-gotten gains.

I think it's very sig - - -

really two questions. Is it - - is it - - is there - - is the collateral sufficient to ensure that the defendant will return to court, not is the collateral sufficient for them to be able to make the percentage of six percent or whatever it has to be charged, and some future date to pay back the - - the bail bond company. The court doesn't care if the bail bond company gets paid back or not. What they care about is whether or not he'll show up. If the collateral's insufficient to do that, then there's a

legitimate thing for the court to look at. That's the way

I understand the judge's question.

MS. RABINOWITZ: Well, absolutely, Your Honor.

It's - - it's an entirely different calculus. The - -
insurance company's one and only goal is to make a profit,

insurance company's one and only goal is to make a profit, and generally that is achieved as soon as the company collects a nonrefundable premium on the bond, but that is not the job of the bail set in the court at the bail source hearing.

JUDGE FAHEY: Do you know in this case if $-\ -\ -$ if after the forfeiture, there $-\ -\ -$ there was actually paid out on to the city or $-\ -\ -$

MS. RABINOWITZ: I'm sorry, Your Honor?

JUDGE FAHEY: Do we know if the forfeiture was paid out on? Because I know it has happened that a number of them have not been paid out on.

MS. RABINOWITZ: Well - - - well, Your Honor, I don't believe there - - - there actually was a forfeiture in this case.

JUDGE FAHEY: Oh, okay.

MS. RABINOWITZ: But that is true, that at - - that it's a common and often unpunished practice for
forfeitures to go unpaid, and there are several reasons for
that. It's - - - the district attorney's office is tasked
with collecting on the forfeiture, and very often it



expends more time and resources going after that money, than the money itself, and there's always the remedy of remission, that - - - which is a common remedy, often used under 540.30, and the insurance companies can even negotiate with the court and the prosecutor to lower the amount of money to - - - to satisfy the judgment.

It - - - it show - - - it actually shows remarkable vision on the part of the legislature in light of what had been described as unscrupulous practices, predatory practices by the insurance company industry in issuing these bail bonds. This court in 2017 in Gevorkyan declared a legal one such practice of retaining premiums even - - even after a bail application has been denied.

There's a well-documented history in the bail bond industry of pre - - - presenting bond packages with little or no collateral. That sounds familiar in this case. And then - - - and then lie - - - even lying in court papers about the amount of collateral.

And in light of all of this, the same people who have called for the reforms in the bail laws are - - are also the people who have called for more regulation and more transparency and more scrutiny on the bail bond industry. People like the Governor, people like former Chief Judge Lippman, and - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But to be clear, the - - - the way



you're - - - you're analyzing, or - - - or advocating for construction of the rule in what - - what a judge should do is that based on what is presented at the hearing - - affidavits, testimony, whatever - - - that based on that information, that that's where the judge decides whether or not I'm persuaded that what is being put up for the bail will be enough to ensure or, at least, increase the likelihood of the appearance at court proceedings.

MS. RABINOWITZ: Your Honor - - - JUDGE RIVERA: You're not saying the judge has to sit there and say, as I think Judge Garcia was - - - was trying to ask you about - - I - - I see you say it's worth 200,000, but I just don't think so. I know that

100,000. You're - - - you're not arguing that's what - -

MS. RABINOWITZ: No, not - - -

neighborhood and it can't possibly sell for more than

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - a judge should be doing.

MS. RABINOWITZ: - - - not at all.

JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying the judge going from, you say, it's 200,000; let me see what else is in the evidence, whether or not I think that this may be enough.

MS. RABINOWITZ: Absolutely, Your Honor, but that is not what appellant is - - is requesting at all. And that - - that calls up a significant distin - - distinction between this case and Savage. In Savage, the



bail set in court made it no - - - just set - - - stated without further elaboration that the collateral was insufficient. And so as a result - - - and that was the sole purpose for the dis - - - basis for the disapproval of the bond package.

JUDGE FAHEY: So what are you asking then? Are you asking that the court - - - for a rule that says, the court can only question the business judgment rule of an issuing company if the court finds that there's a potential violation of public policy? In other words, if the defendant will not be brought back by what I see here.

MS. RABINOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. Well, appellant - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Is that the kind of rule you're asking for?

MS. RABINOWITZ: Appellant is asking for this court to confirm or validate the clear intent of the legislature, that there is a statutory mandate under 510.32(a), and under 520.30 for the court to conduct this public policy analysis, as to the overarching reason for all bail, and which continues into the bail source hearing, securing a defendant's court attendance. And - - and appellant is al - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Did the court properly consider testimony that it had heard the day before or that it was



aware of - - - of one of the owners of the property saying
- - - a codefendant, I believe - - - saying that he was - - he was, in fact, indigent and he was underwater, and he
had - - he had no means for - - - for counsel?

MS. RABINOWITZ: I - - - I think the court did properly consider that - - - that, and that was particularly significant as to the Supreme Court's ruling, that it - - it didn't - - - it - - - that it did not find the bond agent reliable. He - - - he - - - the - - - Andre Hunter, the bond agent, testified on the stand, that he was not aware of when he put together this bond package that codefendant John Beaubrun was indigent and underwater, as he stated. And the - - - and Judge Schwartz specifically stated in his ruling that he did not credit Andre Hunter's testimony as to his - - - in particular, his investigation of this Rosedale property.

And that really wa --- that --- it --- I would like to take a moment to highlight how well reasoned and detailed this ruling was. I --- I believe that this is exactly the kind of 520.30 ruling that the legislature contemplated when it enacted 520.30, in the sense that I'm sure --- it cannot be that the legislature intended to have rubberstamped approvals of bond packages, many of which could be illusory. Judge --- it was as if Judge Schwartz really was going through a checklist of 520.30,



and went through each independent basis, for disapproval of this bond package, which went to the nature and the value.

And I see my time is expired. In closing, Your Honors, appellant really only asks this court to validate the clear intent of the legislature, that the business judgment of a - - of an insurance company is no substitute for judicial scrutiny as to whether a bond package contravenes public policy. Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. Counsel?

MR. PRIESTON: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm Evans

Prieston. I've kind of - - - I represent the respondent,

Mr. Beaubrun, who's made nineteen appearances since his

bail has been posted.

Your Honor, the - - - the court sets bail. The court has nine choices. The court then has a right under certain circumstances to decide whether or not it wants to look at the collateral; the People make the motion. In this case, Savage has said that the insurance company makes a business decision, based on the collateral. Bail is a form that's paid through insurance, just like everyone who has insurance on their house pays a small part every year, and it's a - - - it's the law of large numbers.

The bail bond business doesn't stay in business if people don't go to court. In New York County, for



2 bail is not paid off in New York County, nobody for that 3 company can post bail again in New York. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but the - - - the question I 5 don't think is the one that you're - - - you're trying to 6 get to. The question isn't whether or not you can justify 7 your conclusion that there's enough there for you to put 8 your money and name behind it - - - behind the bail, but 9 rather whether or not the court has an independent 10 obligation and duty under the statute - - -11 MR. PRIESTON: I think - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - to decide for itself - -13 MR. PRIESTON: I think - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - whether - - - excuse me - -15 - whether or not the bail package is of the kind that will 16 put the pressure and encourage the defendant to appear in 17 court - - -18 MR. PRIESTON: Inevitably - - - inevitably, Your 19 Honor, all bail is less than the full value of the bail 20 when it comes to a bond, and the courts know that. 2.1 Indigent families gather, collected friends, and they come 2.2 before - -23 JUDGE GARCIA: Right, but I think Judge Rivera's 24 point is, doesn't the court have a role in saying, is it 25 enough?

instance, you get a judgment within 120 days, and if that

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Well, I think the court has - - -

Whatever the percentage is.

3 MR. PRIESTON: I think the court in - - in - -4 - in examining the - - - the background character and 5 nature of the indemnitors does that. They look at those 6 kinds of people, and they say, yes, we think the nature of 7 these people, the income of these people, in that process. 8 Yes, they do take a role, and I think it's only reasonable. 9 Otherwise - - - but there is a - - - there is another 10 weight here that the insurance companies would not be in business very long, if they didn't have a business 11 12 judgment. 13 And - - and what the appellant is asking is, 14 well, once we don't like that the fact that - - - they want 15 a second look, and the policy is, if - - - if you make 16 these steps, then we have to accept to some level, because 17 when the court sets a bail, it knows inherently, it's 18 taking less than the full amount of bail. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: But then the statute would read 20 that way. I mean, the statute doesn't read that a judge 21 has no role. 22 MR. PRIESTON: No. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: And that - - - that's the problem 24 with my argument. The judge has a role, and the judge - -25 - right, the legislature from the statutory language

MR. PRIESTON:

JUDGE GARCIA:

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doesn't seem to intend for the judge not to have some role in determining whether or not, indeed, they're persuaded that the package is enough, the defendant will, indeed, return for appearances.

MR. PRIESTON: The - - - the - - - JUDGE RIVERA: Or the - - - the likelihood is very great that they would.

MR. PRIESTON: The difficult but I - - - obviously the court has a role to make sure that the law

JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.

has not been violated - - -

MR. PRIESTON: - - - and that public policy is -

JUDGE FAHEY: But can - - - can I stop you for one second? The - - - the problem with - - - with the law as it stands now, in a business judgment rule, is that the business judgment of a private insurance company is determinative of the validity of the underlying collateral.

And that's - - - and that does not satisfy, on its face, public policy, because public policy is not for you to make a good business judgment, but for the court to be assured that a defendant will show up in court. And those are two different things. And if they conflict, you're going to follow your business judgment, because that's what you're in business for. You're right about

that. Everybody understands that. We need you. 1 2 But the other side of it is, is that - - - that 3 does not satisfy the public policy concerns. 4 MR. PRIESTON: I - - - I - - -5 JUDGE FAHEY: So how - - - what do you propose -6 - - what process do you propose that would satisfy the 7 public policy arguments to - - - to look at your underlying 8 business judgment? If it's not this hearing, how else will 9 we do it? 10 MR. PRIESTON: Well, I think the court - - - I 11 12 it's done every day, when the bail bondsman swears in 13 before the court, the court - - - the bondsman will come 14 before the court and say, what are you putting up. And

think the court can set a rule to ask the indemnitor, and there will be a colloquy between the bondsman and the court. It happens every day. And the court will say, you know what? The car is not enough, or the mother isn't - -

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JUDGE WILSON: But what does the - - -

MR. PRIESTON: - - - she's on welfare.

JUDGE WILSON: What does the "not enough" mean? Does it mean not enough amount of money or does it mean not enough of a tie to the defendant? And let me give you an example that one of my law clerks gave me, that I'm having a tough time with. Let's see if you can do better than I.



Suppose I'm arrested; bail's set at a half a million dollars. And what I do is I start a Kickstarter campaign, and I get 1,000 people to contribute small amounts of money to make that. I take that whole amount of money, which is more than the 500,000 dollars. I put it into an escrow, give it to a bail bond agent, with a - - - let's say, a letter of credit or something like that. So you're absolutely guaranteed you're going to get your money.

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And let's say that all these people who are contributing, they're not criminals; they're - - - there's no nefarious way that they got their money. It's all legitimate money and it's sitting right there. Couldn't the court say, but wait a minute; Judge Wilson has got no tie to this money at all. And despite the fact that the bail-bond company is going to be made whole, this is not sufficient. He's not going to come to court; he's going to skip.

MR. PRIESTON: You know, the courts do that, and they do that - - - they do that in cases where members of churches will come in and they'll say, we would like to help a parishioner.

JUDGE WILSON: So why isn't that what the court did here?

MR. PRIESTON: Well, I think the - - - the



difference in here is I think the People here know the defendant. There are twenty relatives here who came forward. I think the difference here is the fact there - it's more of an economic issue in this case, then it really is about whether or not these people are going to stand by this person and collectively put together - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, aside - - - aside from the fact that there were some other, you know, ancillary things going on in this particular case, it seems to me that, again, that is what the court did. By looking at the individual people that were coming into support the defendant, and looking to see do - - really, do any of them have enough skin in the game, so that they could be hurt badly enough that - - - that the defendant, in - - - in trying to protect them would be incentivized to return to court?

MR. PRIESTON: I think the court in this case - - - per - - - perhaps if the court were more explicit in saying I don't trust these people to pay, I think that the - - - in the business judgment in this case is the fact that these people are connected. They've - - - they've satisfied 520.30, that they're - - - that they're the kind of people that will pay. And to a certain extent, bondsman count on that. And if they didn't do it - - - I mean, two percent of bonds fail.

whole profit and loss analysis here. First of all, they don't look at each case individually. They're looking - - any insurance company, right, is looking at its - - - you know, its payouts, and what it takes in as premiums. So there's a whole weighing and balancing there, that differs, it seems to me, a lot from the individualized analysis that the court has to do about this defendant.

So they may be willing to take a different kind of risk that they're going to get paid back, if the de - - defendant doesn't show up, than a court is willing to do in terms of our system of justice if the defendant doesn't show up.

MR. PRIESTON: I - - - I think - - - if - - - I think to - - it helps defendants, because when they - - - because every judge has a different threshold today. There are certain judges that take five percent. There are certain judges that take ten percent. And so there's a different threshold.

And I think part of this, the value of the business judgment rule is when the court sets a bail bond bail, to some extent, they're aware, unless public policies contravene where there's no ties, where there are not somebody that comes under the factors set in 520.30, that it really is a more predictable result, which I think is

also important to people, that there is a predictable 1 2 result, and if - - - both to the court, to the defendants, 3 and to defendants' families. 4 And I think because we have a large number of 5 poor people in the criminal justice system, you're going to have - - - if - - - if it's truly so personal to the court, 6 7 and the comfort level just to the court, I think that's not 8 helpful to defendants, and it doesn't facilitate a 9 predictable result in - - - in these cases, as well. JUDGE RIVERA: But of course - - - the 10 11 legislature understood that when it - - - when it carves 12 out a role for the judge. Otherwise, the rule would be if 13 you can find a bail company that'll give you bail, that's 14 good enough. 15 MR. PRIESTON: Well, I - - -JUDGE RIVERA: There'd be no need for the 16 17 hearing. I mean, the way you've described it, that really 18 devolves to there's never a role for the judge and there's 19 no hearing. 20 MR. PRIESTON: Well - - -21 JUDGE RIVERA: But that's clearly not what the 22 legislature - - -23 MR. PRIESTON: Well, the - -24 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - chose. 25 MR. PRIESTON: Right, but there clearly - - -



1 there was always - - - I - - - it's hard to have a perfect 2 system, but in the court - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: True. 4 MR. PRIESTON: - - - but in - - - in - - - when 5 the - - - when defendants stand up and they say what we're 6 doing, I think the - - - in balancing this, I think you 7 have to give more discretion perhaps to the judgment of a 8 company, because most people aren't going to have the 9 money. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: But again, that - - -11 MR. PRIESTON: Know that. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: You may think that's better 13 policy. You may think that's - - - that in practice, that 14 makes sense. But it's hard to read the statute in that 15 way, and that perhaps is a reason that the legislature may 16 want to reconsider the language. 17 MR. PRIESTON: We know that there's a whole new 18 bail law in existence next - - - next year. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Correct. 20 MR. PRIESTON: And - - - and - - -21 JUDGE RIVERA: Correct. 22 MR. PRIESTON: - - - they didn't touch this 23 subject matter unfortunately - - -24 JUDGE RIVERA: Right. 25 MR. PRIESTON: - - - so we're here. Thank you.



1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. 2 MS. RABINOWITZ: Your Honor, it's true that we 3 will have all new - - - many new bail laws going into 4 effect in a few months, and I think it is very significant 5 that the legislature did not touch CPL 520.30. It is clear 6 that all - - -JUDGE RIVERA: But it did allow for charities. 7 8 MS. RABINOWITZ: Ab - - absolutely, Your Honor. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: And that sounds like - - - not 10 quite the Kickstarter, but it's - - - it's kind of along the same lines of what Judge Wilson - - -11 12 MS. RABINOWITZ: Your - - - Your Honor - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - suggested before. 14 MS. RABINOWITZ: - - - you're referring to the 15 Charitable Bail Act? 16 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, yes. 17 MS. RABINOWITZ: Well, addressing that, Your 18 Honor, comparing - - - and amici for petitioner focused on 19 this a great deal. Comparing the legislative intent behind 20 the Charitable Bail Act, and that - - - and the intent 21 behind CPL 520.30 is really comparing apples and oranges. 22 Just the way the Charitable Bail Act is drafted, 23 the significant limitations on the defendants who are able 24 to be helped under that act. We're talking about 25 defendants who are low-level defendants with - - - at - - -

the way the law is now, it's only - - - it only applies to misdemeanors. There's a 2,000-dollar bail cap. These are not defendants who pose a high risk of flight. So it's clear that the intent behind the Charitable Bail Act was to help defendants who could not afford to pay 500 dollars of bail, 1,000 dollars, even 2,000 dollars.

JUDGE RIVERA: Who might not find a company who would - - - who would - - - who would give them the bail, right?

MS. RABINOWITZ: Well - - - well, Your Honor, even - - even if they did find a company, the - - - the nonprofit organizations that - - - that do post bail under the Charitable Bail Act, unlike the for-profit industry of the insurance company bail bonds, these are organizations that really - - - it has been documented - - - carefully vet the defendants that they help.

In that sense, their interests align with the state's. It's - - - it's about - - - $\frac{1}{2}$

JUDGE RIVERA: But that was his argument, that the - - - they too are very careful, because they want to make money. They don't want someone not to show up, or they're going to lose money.

MS. RABINOWITZ: Well, Your Honor, as - - - as I've said before, there are many factors that reduce the risk of losing money, even if a defendant does abscond.



And - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I thought your point on the Charitable Bail Act was - - - I thought this what you were saying; perhaps I misunderstood you - - - that you're talking about a group of defendants that are very low risk.

MS. RABINOWITZ: Absolutely.

JUDGE RIVERA: And that's what perhaps - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, I - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: -- is something that distinguishes it.

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - I - - - I see your light is on, but I have a question. In cash bail, under this statute, when someone comes in with cash bail, are there limitations - - - it's a difficult statute to read - - - but are there limitations in what has to be a threshold showing before the judge can inquire into cash bail?

MS. RABINOWITZ: Your Honor, that threshold showing that I talked about before, I really - - - I really think that is so significant, because I think it highlights the legislature's intent here, that there should be a difference between cash bail and insurance company bail bonds, in light of the well - - - well - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But the way I read it then is, if I come in with 250,000 cash bail that I've raised, in order to have an inquiry into that, there has to be some showing



first, a preliminary showing, that there's suspect source or - - so in Judge Wilson's hypothetical, where it's essentially cash bail coming in, would there still need to be that threshold showing or no?

MS. RABINOWITZ: There - - - there would have - - - under the statute, Your Honor, the wording - - - plain

- under the statute, Your Honor, the wording - - - plain wording of the statute, there would have to be that threshold showing. And I think that that's there because the legislature in - - in - - in furtherance of the state's interests in promoting pre-trial release, the legislature did want to limit the court's discretion, to some degree, as to cash bail - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: So let's say - - -

MS. RABINOWITZ: - - - but not - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - if the church gives me

100,000 dollars cash bail, under this statute, does there
have to be a showing that money is suspect, before the
judge can weigh whether it's sufficient or whether there's
a policy reason to reject it?

MS. RABINOWITZ: By the plain reading of the statute, Your Honor, there does. Upon - - - even after the district attorney's application, there has - - - the - - - the court must have reasonable cause to believe that either the person posting bail is not in rightful possession of the money, or that it's the product of ill-gotten gains.

But again - - -JUDGE FEINMAN: Of course, this is not about the cash bail situation here, right? So we can leave that for another day. MS. RABINOWITZ: Well, Your Honor, the reason - -- the reason I was emphasizing it, is because I really think it highlights the legislature's intent for 520.30 to be a further regulation on the bail bond industry. that judges should not be forced to compel - - - to defer to it. If there are no further questions, I'll rely on appellant's brief. Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. (Court is adjourned)



CERTIFICATION

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I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People ex rel. Evans D. Prieston o/b/o Kenel Beaubrun v. Nassau County Sheriff's Department, No. 90 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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October 29, 2019