1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	IN THE MATTER OF COREY KRUG,
4	Respondent,
5	-against-
6	NO. 91 CITY OF BUFFALO,
7	Appellant.
8	20 Eagle Stree
9	Albany, New Yor October 24, 201
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
15	
16	Appearances:
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25	Official Court Transcribe



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The first appeal on this
2	afternoon's calendar is appeal number 91, Matter of Krug v
3	City of Buffalo.
4	Counsel?
5	MR. LEE: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May it
6	please the court, David Lee, assistant corporation counsel
7	here on behalf of the appellant, City of Buffalo.
8	Chief Judge, may I please request one minute
9	rebuttal time?
10	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir.
11	MR. LEE: They say that a picture says a thousand
12	words. In this case, we have a thirty-second long video
13	clip.
14	JUDGE FAHEY: So the question is then, is it a
15	complete picture? Following up on your metaphor.
16	MR. LEE: I I think that it is, Judge
17	Fahey, because everything that is seen on that video is
18	what forms the basis of Devin Ford's civil complaint
19	against the City of Buffalo. So
20	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let let me ask you
21	this. Has has Officer Krug subsequently to
22	this determination had criminal charges brought against
23	him, and he was acquitted two times by a jury trial, right
24	MR. LEE: He was acquitted one time, Your Honor.
25	JUDGE FAHEY: One time, okay.

MR. LEE: And then on the retrial.

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JUDGE FAHEY: On the retrial. And since that determination, has the corporation counsel's office reconsidered its original determination based on his acquittal?

MR. LEE: No - - - no we have not, Your Honor, because they are - - - they are separate issues. Now although the indictment was one piece of information that the corporate hear - - corporation counsel relied on in forming his decision, that certainly wasn't the only piece of information.

JUDGE FAHEY: But the way - - - the way I read it, and you can correct me, because you know the record better, but I thought there were two pieces of information that they relied on. First was the indictment, and the second was the video. Right?

MR. LEE: That's correct.

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. So the indictment, he's been found not guilty. So now you've got the video, and the video is the thirty-second video, and it's certainly not favorable to Officer Krug, but you would grant that it's a rather short period of time to make an ultimate determination.

MR. LEE: I - - - I - - I don't think it is, Judge, and - - - and here's why. In - - -



JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.

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MR. LEE: In a normal case, there - - - there would never be a video. This is a rare situation where there is a video. So where there is no video, what are you doing? You're out there, you're interviewing witnesses, you're obtaining documents, you're trying to figure out exactly what happened.

But when there's a thirty-second video of what happened, and what's on that thirty-second video, and this is key, I think, that - - - those are the facts that form the basis of Ford's civil complaint. Again - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, but this was based on allegations on - - - as yet unproven in a federal indictment, to Judge Fahey's point, it's a very short, few seconds, thirty-seconds on a video, and the filing, as I understand it of the disciplinary charges. Is that fair - - a fair basis on which to deny someone a defense?

MR. LEE: I - - - I - - - think it is, Chief

Judge, because I - - - and I'll - - - I'll keep - - - I

don't mean to repeat myself, but everything that Ford

complains about in his civil complaint is shown in that

thirty-second video clip. In other words, Ford's civil

complaint has nothing to do with Krug's initial decision to

interfere between Mr. Ford and whoever else was - - - was

out in that street. It's - - - it's the way he went about

it that - - - that is the issue that takes him outside the scope of his employment.

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JUDGE WILSON: So you - - - you're pointing to a couple of portions of the city code that give the corporation counsel some discretion. But when I look at Section 1, it says, notwithstanding any provision of basically other kind of law. Why do you think that is there's any discretion that we own, and is - - isn't this just a state statute that we have to interpret?

MR. LEE: No, no, I - - - I don't think it is,

Judge, and I think the - - - the - - - this court's

decision in Salino makes clear that when there is a state

statute that provides for defense indemnification, that's

one thing. But when there's also a local ordinance, as

there is in the City of Buffalo, which gives the

corporation counsel the discretion, in the first instance,

to determine whether an employee was acting in the scope of

his employment, it's an arbitrary and capricious standard,

and the corporation counsel makes that decision.

JUDGE WILSON: Well, the state statute, you know, Section 50-j, it looks as if only in Section 6 is there discretion given to the local authority. Not in Sections 1 or 2, which is the ones you're relying on, in 6(b).

MR. LEE: I guess - - - I guess the discretion,

Your Honor, comes from - - - that does come from the city

code. I would agree that that Section 50-j(1) doesn't say anything about the corporation counsel determining anything in the first instance. Subdivision 6 does; you're correct.

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But again, I would point to the - - - the Salino case, decided by this - - - by - - - by this court, where I think it was Suffolk County who had to defend and indemnify - - - the - - - the issue of defense and indemnification was governed by a state statute. But because Suffolk County had a - - - a local ordinance that provided the corporation counsel makes that determination in the first instance, this court decided that it was an arbitrary and capricious standard, and the corporation counsel did - - - did have that discretion.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, just to go back a - - - a little bit to some of what Judge Fahey was asking you. So let's say in a case where you just base this on the indictment, and then there's an acquittal. Would that affect the decision that the city made?

MR. LEE: I'm not - - - I'm not sure that - - that it would, because I - - - I don't view - - - the - - the issues are separate, right. I mean, so you have a
criminal trial, an acquittal that Krug was found not guilty
beyond - - beyond a reasonable doubt. And in - - in
the civil context, you have the scope of employment issue.
So they're totally - - - they're - - - they're different

issues, and I don't view - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: So if - - - if - - - if the civil, if in the civil trial, they found that it was within the scope of employment, what would that mean? Would the city then possibly have to indemnify the officer for any damages assessed against him or would they have to go back and then reimburse him for his defense or - - or - -

MR. LEE: I - - - I was - - - I was - - -

JUDGE STEIN: - - - or neither one?

MR. LEE: Yeah, I mean, I was - - - I was thinking about that, and I'm not sure that I have that answer totally prepared. I think that it would - - - it would create an issue. It would be an interesting issue, if a jury did ultimately determine that - - - that Krug acted in the scope of his employment, what effect that would have on indemnity? I don't think it's before this court right now, and I'm not sure that I have a - - - a great answer.

JUDGE STEIN: So scope of employment in - - - in the city's view is not the issue here. The issue - - - was - - - was the basis of the determination the intentional wrongdoing or the violation of the department's rules? I - - I'm a little confused about that. Or is it all of them?

MR. LEE: Well, I - - - I think I - - - I - - -



it's I think it's a little bit of everything, but I
think what I really want to focus on here is that it's just
the the scope of employment issue, and what 50-j
says. What Corey Krug, on that video does that show
him per performing a public duty for the benefits of
the citizens of the community? That is the standard in 50-
j. How I don't under that if if
you take a look at that video and what what Mr. Krug
does in that video, how can anyone, respectfully, look at
that video, and say, oh, that's a public duty, performed
for the benefits of the citizens of the community?
JUDGE STEIN: So the question is, is whether
there's any basis in fact for that determination? Is that
is that is that the standard that
MR. LEE: Yeah, and and that is the
standard, Your Honor. May I I don't want to
suggest that Mr. Krug doesn't have reasonable arguments.
He very well may. But what I'm saying is the corporation
counsel also has reasonable arguments. And it
JUDGE FAHEY: Well, did did you did -
what investigation was made? Did you just look at the
video and make the determination? Was there any other
investigation?
MR. LEE: There was

JUDGE FAHEY: Did you talk to other officers?

Did you get affidavits from other officers? Were - -1 2 what was done? Tell me about the investigation. 3 MR. LEE: It was - - - it was viewing - - -4 viewing the - - - the video, Judge. 5 JUDGE FAHEY: And - - - and the indictment? 6 MR. LEE: Yes. Those were - - -JUDGE FAHEY: And that was it? 7 8 MR. LEE: Yes. And that's - - - and that's I 9 think why I wanted to start off, and I - - - because I 10 think that's what Mr. Krug's main argument is. Well, the video is not enough; it doesn't have enough context. But 11 12 you know, the video shows - - - shows enough in my opinion 13 to - - -14 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, you - - - the problem is, 15 it's not just the video that - - - that you've - - - you've 16 lost half the basis of your decision, by the - - - by the 17 acquittals. You know what I'm wondering is, you - - - you 18 said you - - - I think Judge Stein asked you about it. Did 19 - - - have you made any determination as to whether or not 20 you're going to indemnify Krug in the civil lawsuit? 21 MR. LEE: No, Judge. 22 JUDGE FAHEY: I see. 23 MR. LEE: There's - - -24 JUDGE FAHEY: I see. So how about a defense?

Usually in an insurance situation, the obligation to defend

1 is broader than the obligation to indemnify. Has there 2 been - - - any determination been made there? 3 MR. LEE: On the - - - on the issue of defense, 4 Your Honor? 5 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah. 6 MR. LEE: I believe there - - - there has been a 7 determination. 8 JUDGE FAHEY: I mean, this carries over, in other 9 words, all the way to the civil suit, is what you're 10 saying. 11 MR. LEE: Yes, yes. 12 JUDGE FAHEY: So if - - - if the obligation to 13 defend has been determined in the civil suit, then I'm 14 assuming that you've - - - that the city's also decided not 15 to indemnify? 16 MR. LEE: That would probably be the - - - be the 17 way that it goes, Your Honor, yes. 18 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so in this situation, 19 plaintiff's counsel could decide not to defend the case, or 20 it's - - - you know, well, I'm saying Krug's counsel would 2.1 say - - - not to defend the case, in exchange for a 2.2 quarantee that no recovery would be had from Krug's assets. 23 Krug could default on a complaint, refuse to challenge an 24 inquest on damages - - - this happens all the time with

plaintiffs - - - and then whatever inquest is put in, the

	agreement would be that you would go against the city,
2	rather than go against Krug directly. Is the city prepare
3	for that?
4	MR. LEE: I
5	JUDGE FAHEY: In other words is you don't
6	know, you know. Okay, all right, thank you.
7	JUDGE FEINMAN: I I have a slightly
8	different question. Can this case be resolved without
9	resort to the Buffalo City Code?
10	MR. LEE: I I don't think that it
11	that it that it can, Your Honor, only because my
12	understanding of of the posture here is that this is
13	this is an Article 78 proceeding. It is an arbitrar
14	and capricious standard, and I think that directly stems
15	from the the city code.
16	JUDGE STEIN: And both sides have proceeded unde
17	that
18	MR. LEE: Yes, that that is that is
19	not been an issue thus thus far.
20	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.
21	MR. LEE: Okay, thank you.
22	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?
23	MR. HAYES: May it please the court, my name is
24	Ian Hayes. I represent the petitioner, Corey Krug.
25	Chief Judge I'd just like to answer a question



2 important thing that just came up. The - - - I - - -3 there's no dispute in the record that the corporation 4 counsel made the decision not to defend and indemnify 5 Officer Krug, based only on the existence of the indictment 6 and the twenty-eight-second video. 7 The - - - there's nothing in the record 8 indicating that they made the decision based on the filing 9 of disciplinary charges. I don't think there's anything in the record even showing when charges were filed, so I 10 believe the appropriate analysis is whether the city had a 11 12 rational basis, based on the indictment and the twenty-13 eight-second video. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: So he argues that - - -15 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yeah, but what about - - -16 excuse me. What about your colleague's question that the 17 videotape was lined up squarely with the allegations that 18 you make, and that's what their determination was made. 19 They really don't need any more. 20 MR. HAYES: Just so I understand, the - - - that 21 the video was lined up squarely with what - - -2.2 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: With - - -23 MR. HAYES: - - - Ford alleges, right? 24 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Um-hum.

that you brought up, because I think it's the most

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MR. HAYES:

I - - - I don't think that answers

the issue here, because the video still doesn't show the 1 2 beginning of the encounter, the end of the encounter, what 3 led up to it or what happened after it. All of that - - -4 JUDGE STEIN: But can you point to any cases - -5 - I - - - I haven't found any - - - maybe - - - maybe there 6 are - - - where - - - where we've held that something was arbitrary and capricious because there wasn't additional 7 8 investigation or because there was conflicting evidence. 9 It seems to me that the - - - the mere fact that 10 we're talking about conflicting evidence means that there are two reasonable views of what it is. And - - - and - -11 12 - and it's basic administrative law that says that that's 13 not arbitrary and capricious, as long as there's some basis 14 there, some factual basis. And it seems to me that - - -15 that this video provides that. 16 MR. HAYES: Right. Well, with respect, Your

MR. HAYES: Right. Well, with respect, Your
Honor, I don't think that that is quite the question here.

I think it's a very close one. It's - - - the question is
whether - - - not - - - you know, the - - - not whether the
corporation counsel made the proper decision in January
2016 when it decided to deny Officer Krug's request. It's
whether it had enough information to make that decision in
the first place.

So I - - - I have been - - -

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JUDGE FAHEY: So what information would he have



1 had to have other than the video? 2 MR. HAYES: I - - - I don't have a concrete and 3 complete answer to that, Your Honor. I think any sort of -4 5 JUDGE FAHEY: Did you make a record below of 6 information that should have been considered that you'd 7 encourage us to look at to consider in contrast to the video? 8 9 MR. HAYES: I - - - it - - - what - - - the10 question is, is there anything in the record? 11 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, yeah. 12 MR. HAYES: No, Your Honor, because the - - - the 13 record proceeded in a very simple and straightforward way. 14 JUDGE FAHEY: Usually in these situations, 15 there'd be affidavits from other police officers, people 16 who had been at the bars before. There'd be some kind of 17 - - something like that. 18 MR. HAYES: Right. There - - - there's no 19 dispute that the city did no investigation before it made 20 its decision. And that's a crucial part of why - - -2.1 JUDGE FAHEY: So when you went before Judge 2.2 Dillon, did you offer any affidavits like that to say that 23 that - - - that - - - that this was clearly arbitrary, 24 because it was such a short snippet of time, and here's



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this other proof.

1	MR. HAYES: I understand. The the answer
2	is no, Your Honor, because I thought it was sufficient jus
3	to point out that you know, there was no argument
4	over how the corporation counsel made its decision. And w
5	proceeded on just based on the argument that that wa
6	not enough
7	JUDGE RIVERA: But
8	MR. HAYES: in itself, so we
9	JUDGE RIVERA: But I thought really what your -
LO	- your argument is that just watching the actual fight or
L1	the actual beating, let me just call it that, doesn't
L2	explain why the officer acted in this way.
L3	MR. HAYES: Correct, Your Honor.
L4	JUDGE RIVERA: And and that that's what
L5	they should have investigated, even if one looks at the
L6	video and says, that's excessive force; you can't do that.
L7	Did the officer have some reason to explain why he took
L8	this particular type of violent action?
L9	MR. HAYES: Abs
20	JUDGE RIVERA: So that they could then decide
21	whether or not, even taking that into account, it still
22	falls outside the scope of his employment?
23	MR. HAYES: Absolutely, Your Honor. That's been
24	our position all along. And the reason for that

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, so then what - - - what's

1 the story? What does - - -2 MR. HAYES: What - - - what's the story of what -3 4 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, what does your client say is 5 what would - - -6 MR. HAYES: Well - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - allow him to conduct himself 8 this way? 9 MR. HAYES: Right, so even though there isn't 10 much in the - - - in our record in this case about that, 11 there was, of course, a robust record in federal court when 12 these criminal charges were tried. And what came out from 13 that, if I may, even though it's not in the record here, is 14 that Ford and his friends got kicked out of a bar for 15 fighting. They were fighting in the street. Buffalo 16 police officers had to break them up using pepper spray,

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stop fighting.

Ford and his friends again started fighting, and again had to be broken up. After the video it happened again, at - - at least one other time. And by the way, this is not based on testimony. This is based on video from the same news crew that shot the short video on Officer Krug.

and explicitly told them to, you know, leave the area and

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so your position is



1	there's case law that would say a provocation of an office:
2	in a way you have identified it, would mean that, despite
3	the video showing heinous violence, that it still falls
4	within the scope of employment?
5	MR. HAYES: Your Honor, we didn't brief whether
6	there's, like, criminal case law on that point, so I don't
7	want to say definitively yes or no to that, but
8	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, wouldn't that be what they'd
9	have to take into consideration?
10	MR. HAYES: I I believe so.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: Is there going to be an argument
12	for this conduct falling within the scope of employment?
13	So what's the legal case law that supports that either way
14	MR. HAYES: I believe so, Your Honor, because
15	that's the nature of police work, that police officers had
16	have very broad discretion in what they do, and they
17	have a wide range of responsibilities. And one single act
18	can be act within the scope of the
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, you agree if it's
20	unprovoked, or is it your position that I shouldn't
21	say that.
22	MR. HAYES: No, Your Honor, I can't agree with
23	that, based on the information that I personally know about
24	from the criminal trial.
25	JUDGE RIVERA: So what is your understanding of

2 before the violent response that would bring the officer's 3 actions within the scope of his emplacement? 4 MR. HAYES: My understating is that Ford was 5 directly ordered not to fight with people in the street, 6 and dis - - - physically, and by his actions, disobeyed 7 that police order. 8 JUDGE STEIN: So - - - so to take it just to the 9 next step, what you're saying is, that even though this 10 video clip showed him sitting on the hood of a car, and then being - - - not apparently fighting with anybody at 11 12 that second in time, right, and then pushed to the ground 13 and, you know, pretty violently assaulted at that moment. 14 That would have been okay, if he had been fighting a couple 15 of minutes earlier? 16 MR. HAYES: I think it's - - - I - - - I think, 17 Your Honor, that the answer is that it could, 18 theoretically, be because of the nature of the - - -19 JUDGE GARCIA: Is this a scope of employment 20 determination? Is that what we're talking about here? 21 MR. HAYES: Yes, I think, all - - -22 JUDGE GARCIA: So - - -23 MR. HAYES: - - - all of these questions go to 24 that. 25 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - would this be analogous to

the case law that - - - about what would have happened

the difference between, coincidentally, a prison situation,
where you have a fight between inmates, and a guard rushes
in to break it up, and uses excessive force. Not that
that's okay, not that that's a good thing, but that that
might be within the scope of employment, as opposed to, a
guard just gratuitously goes into a prisoner's cell and
beats a prisoner for personal - - - you know, personal
vendetta.

Is that kind of the difference we're talking
about?

MR. HAYES: Ab - - - absolutely, Your Honor.

JUDGE GARCIA: And is your point that what led up to it doesn't justify excessive force necessarily, assuming even this is the case, but that it creates a situation where the excessive force resulted from a scope of the employment activity?

MR. HAYES: More or less, Your Honor. I think we don't have to even answer the question - - - nobody in this room has to answer the question of whether Officer Krug did his job properly or well. It's - - - the question is, did the corporation counsel have the information to answer that question itself in January 2016.

JUDGE RIVERA: Did - - - did they know at that time that the victim was not charged?

MR. HAYES: I - - - I don't know, Your Honor,



1	because
2	JUDGE RIVERA: But that is correct?
3	MR. HAYES: That the victim
4	JUDGE RIVERA: The victim was not charged
5	MR. HAYES: Charged oh
6	JUDGE RIVERA: He was not charged
7	MR. HAYES: That's correct, Your Honor.
8	JUDGE RIVERA: as a result of whatever may
9	have happened that evening.
LO	MR. HAYES: Right.
L1	JUDGE RIVERA: Let's just put it that way.
L2	MR. HAYES: But as as you heard though
L3	-
L4	JUDGE RIVERA: Would that change the calculation
L5	if they did take that into consideration? If they knew
L6	that in advance?
L7	MR. HAYES: Would that change the the
L8	analysis in this case, you're asking?
L9	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, yes. I'm sorry.
20	MR. HAYES: It it could because it would b
21	a step towards taking some investigation into what
22	happened, rather than just relying on a video and an
23	indictment. It would be more information and provide
24	slightly more context. Personally, I don't



JUDGE STEIN: How much - - - how much information

is necessary? They have to do a full investigation of the case or - - - you know, where - - - where - - - where should we draw that line if we agree with you?

MR. HAYES: Right, I - - - I understand, Your

Honor. I think that's a difficult question. I think this

- - - in this case, it clearly wasn't enough, but the rule

also doesn't - - -

JUDGE STEIN: We'll know it when we see it?

MR. HAYES: - - - have to be - - - you have to investigate everything. I think the rule is you have to have - - you have to investigate enough to have an adequate understanding of the context of the allegations that are being made.

JUDGE FEINMAN: So - - - so let me ask you this. If - - - if they had provided him with a defense, and in the meantime, the criminal case is going on - - - you're doing discovery in the civil case, and assuming you're not staying the discovery to see the outcome of the criminal case, and he's convicted in the criminal case. At that point, can the city come in and say, you know what? We're not going to defend you any further, and you're stuck with however we ran the discovery proceedings up until then.

I mean, you know, and - - - and what's motivating this question is my experience in the city court down in New York City, where sometimes you'd be two or three years



into the case - - - and yes, cases unfortunately took that long sometimes - - - and then the city would disclaim or you know, send a notice to the police officer saying, we're not going to defend you. MR. HAYES: Yeah, that - - - that's a very interesting scenario. Obviously, it's not before us here, but - - -JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, I - - - I understand it's

JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, I - - - I understand it's not the case before us, but you can understand that there's a benefit to having that early assessment so that if your client's going to end up with no coverage, at least he can control who he hires, who he gets to - - - to control the discovery process.

MR. HAYES: Yes, Your Honor, and I agree. I - - I think if the city had proceeded in that way that you just described, in that sequence, then they would have had a much stronger argument that the decision not - - - you know, at that point, not to defend or indemnify Officer Krug had a rational basis, unlike here.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. Hayes.

MR. HAYES: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?

MR. LEE: Yes, I'd like to close on this point.

There seems to be this issue about, well, what happened before the video? Not enough context. Well, let me just



draw a hypothetical for the court, if I may. Imagine you have a police officer who has a legitimate law enforcement reason to make an arrest. And everything's fine at that point. But then let's say, this particular suspect is in handcuffs, maybe he's put in the back of the police car, and then he gets punched in the face.

Now, would anyone say, that the punching is within the scope of employment, even though - - - $\,$

JUDGE WILSON: But it's your position that excessive force is always outside the scope of employment as a matter of law?

MR. LEE: No, Judge, it's not.

JUDGE GARCIA: Okay, so isn't that really a question in your hypothetical, though, that's extenuated here. But we don't know what happened right before this, and if, for example, this was this altercation, the police go in, they're pulling these people over, and then this happens right away after that as part of this kind of disrupting this melee.

Why - - - wouldn't you need to know that to look at this video to make a determination of whether this is in the scope of employment? Not whether or not it's excessive force, because this is what I want to recover, right, but whether or not it's scope of employment. Because we have those cases that say if this is part of the job, and then



it escalates into excessive force, scope of employment.

MR. LEE: But I guess you have to look at what are the allegations actually in Ford's civil complaint.

JUDGE GARCIA: But he's going to allege - - -

MR. LEE: Because they have no - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - excessive force, right?

MR. LEE: But they have - - - but what - - - yes, but they also had nothing to do with what the initial - - - Krug's initial response was, which was again, maybe Krug had a legitimate law enforcement reason in the beginning to actually intervene between Mr. Ford and whoever this other guy in the street is, but then he totally crossed the line, and - - -

been looking at it this way too, I think, that it seems like that's merging excessive force allegations with scope of employment, because use of excessive force can be within the scope of employment. It's just a liability issue, right? It's not was this good or not. So, of course, in the complaint you're going to get allegations of this is excessive force. Why would they be doing anything else there? But in this context, you need to look at what's the liability issue for the city, so you need to know, was that a result of the scope of duty, excessive force, or was it gratuitous, let's call it, right?



MR. LEE: Yeah, exactly, I think that's why I

tried - - - with my example, I tried to - - - sure, that's

probably an even more extreme example with the handcuffing,

back door to the police car, punch; that's totally

gratuitous. That would be outside the scope of employment.

I'm saying this situation is not far off. And maybe Krug

had a legitimate reason to intervene to begin with, but - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: But how do you know that, because there's no - - it could be two seconds before this video what happened. You - - you don't know that. You never looked at it.

MR. LEE: I - - - I guess what I'm - - - what I'm saying, Your Honor, is I - - - I would even assume for purpose of your question that that Officer Krug did have a legitimate reason to become involved in whatever was going on, and - - between Devin Ford and the other individual in the street. But that - - - then he totally crossed the line.

I think he stepped outside the scope of his employment, just as a police officer who hit - - - hits a handcuffed suspect would. That - - - that's not proper - - - that's not a proper discharge of your duties. That is totally crossing the line. And that officer should not expect the corp - - - the taxpayers to pay for his defense.



JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, your red light is off, so 1 2 I just have two quick questions. One is, did corp counsel 3 know that the charges - - - that no charges had been filed 4 against the victim, Mr. Ford? 5 MR. LEE: Well, I would - - - I would - - - I 6 would say that - - - this, Your Honor. In - - - in the 7 video, Ford, when he's hitting - - - I'm sorry - - - Mr. 8 Krug, when he's hitting Ford and saying, get up, get up. 9 And then you do see Ford - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: Walk away? 11 MR. LEE: - - - walk away. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, but - - - so you're not - -13 - but you're not able to answer my question. Is that - -14 MR. LEE: Well, I guess my other response would 15 be also that when the decision was made from the 16 corporation counsel to not defend Krug, there was some time 17 that had passed between the incident and - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. And then, the other 19 question is, generally these scope of employment decisions 20 are very - - - or determinations are very much fact driven. 21 If - - - if it's really just a question of fact as to what 22 happened in advance, what the reaction is, not what's on

the video - - - the video speaks for itself, as they say -

- - but what might have a - - - or what occurred before the

video and how one might view that. If it's a fact

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1 question, does that change the analysis in terms of what 2 counsel has to do when they're determining whether or not 3 they'll provide the defense? MR. LEE: 4 I - - - I - - - I don't think so, 5 I think that - - - and I think you're probably 6 right, that there's always going to be different 7 interpretations that a video is - - - is subject to. So 8 someone might look at a video and see one thing, and 9 someone might look and see another thing, but this is an -10 - - an Article 78 proceeding, and as long as the 11 corporation counsel's interpretation of the video is not 12 totally irrational, which I would submit to this court, 13 it's not, then I think that the - - - the court order of 14 the Fourth Department should be reversed. 15 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. 16 MR. LEE: Thank you. 17 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome. 18 (Court is adjourned) 19 20 2.1 22 23



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CERTIFICATION I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of Corey Krug v. City of Buffalo, No. 91 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Karen Schaffmille Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 October 29, 2019 Date:

