1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	CAROL HENRY,
4	Appellant,
5	-against-
6	No. 72 HAMILTON EQUITIES, INC., et al.,
7	Respondents.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York September 10, 2019
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
15	Annoarangos
16	Appearances:  ALAN S. FRIEDMAN
17	LAW OFFICE OF ALAN FRIEDMAN  Attorney for Appellant
18	875 Avenue of the Americas Suite 1802
19	New York, NY 10001
20	MICHAEL J. TRICARICO, ESQ.  KENNEDYS CMK LLP
21	Attorney for Respondents 570 Lexington Avenue
22	Floor 8 New York, NY 10022
23	New Tork, NT 10022
24	Sharona Shapiro Official Court Transcribe:
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1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good afternoon. The first 2 appeal on this afternoon's calendar is appeal number 72, 3 Henry v. Hamilton Equities. 4 Counsel? 5 Thank you, Your Honor. May it MR. FRIEDMAN: 6 please the court, Your Honor. My name is Alan Friedman. 7 represent the appellant, Carol Henry, in this case. 8 respectfully request three minutes' time for rebuttal. 9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may have three minutes, 10 sir. 11 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. FRIEDMAN: 12 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome. 13 MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honors, there are two 14 separate grounds why the Appellate Division First 15 Department should be reversed. The first ground is that 16 the Appellate Division First Department incorrectly added 17 another prong to the second Restatement of Torts which this 18 court adopted in Putnam v. Stout in 1976. 19 The second reason this court should reverse the 20 First Department - - - Appellate Division First Department 2.1 is that the respondent was never truly an out-of-possession 2.2 landlord because they had a nondelegable duty to continue 23 to keep the property in good repair. In 1976, Your Honors,

JUDGE FAHEY: What'd they add to the first prong?

this court adopted - - -

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1	MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, the first prong, Your Honors
2	is that as this court knows, the second Restatement
3	of Torts, where a party contracts, by covenant in a lease
4	or otherwise, to keep the land in repair. It could be
5	_
6	JUDGE GARCIA: But doesn't that prong of the
7	restatement say "the lessor, as such, has contracted"? So
8	what does the "as such" mean?
9	MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, the "or otherwise" or
LO	JUDGE GARCIA: To me, it means the lessor, as a
L1	lessor, has contracted. Or otherwise the lessor, I think
L2	our cases can do it in orally; they don't have to do in a
L3	contract. But they still have to be doing in the capacity
L4	of a lessor. That's what "as such" means to me in that
L5	provision.
L6	MR. FRIEDMAN: I don't disagree, Your Honor, but
L7	what what happened in this case and
L8	JUDGE GARCIA: But then the one that you want to
L9	incorporate is from a mortgage. They're not acting as a
20	lessor when they make that representation.
21	MR. FRIEDMAN: I'm not trying to incorporate from
22	a mortgage, Your Honor. This is a regular tort agreement
23	that was that was entered into between the lessor and
24	the federal government. The less

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JUDGE GARCIA: But he's not acting as a lessor

there.

MR. FRIEDMAN: In a sense they are, Your Honor, because what the purpose of HUD is - - - the core mission of HUD is to promote sustainable housing for the express purpose of building communities and improving the quality of life.

JUDGE STEIN: Yes, but they do that by loaning money or guaranteeing - - - guaranteeing mortgages and providing buildings that can be kept up, right?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, yes, Your Honor, but the whole - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But - - -

MR. FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry.

JUDGE STEIN: And their purpose is to make sure that the - - - the property that's being mortgaged is kept in - - in a - - - in reasonable repair. And - - - and if it's not, their agreement with the mortgagor says you're in default of the mortgage, right?

MR. FRIEDMAN: No. No, the - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Or you're in default of our agreement, but - - - but there - - - there are consequences to that. But it doesn't say anything about third-party liability.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, if I may, if I could respond, the Restatement of Torts looks at it from the



1	landowner's responsibility to the public. It doesn't look			
2	at it from the the injured person that's injured;			
3	from their perspective, do they have a benefit do			
4	they get a benefit to sue? The Restatement of Torts looks			
5	at it from the landowner's responsibility to the public.			
6	And as I just previously said, a review			
7	JUDGE FEINMAN: So you're not arguing then that			
8	the plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary of this contract			
9	between HUD and the landlord/lessor?			
10	MR. FRIEDMAN: No, I'm not arguing they're a			
11	third-party beneficiary.			
12	JUDGE FEINMAN: Okay.			
13	MR. FRIEDMAN: In fact, the Restatement of Torts			
14	was the modern trend, as of 1976, was to do away with			
15	the necessity of privity. And they're not necessarily a			
16	third-party beneficiary. But the restate			
17	JUDGE FAHEY: Let me just ask you about that			
18	then. It seems to me that you're arguing that the contract			
19	creates a duty on the landlord's part to keep the property			
20	in good repair; am I right about that?			
21	MR. FRIEDMAN: Absolutely, Your Honor.			
22	JUDGE FAHEY: And that's where the tort			
23	obligation arises			
24	MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes.			
25	JUDGE FAHEY: out of this contractual			

relationship, and the contractual relationship is based in 1 2 a desire to keep a mortgageable asset in good repair, 3 right? 4 MR. FRIEDMAN: Absolutely, Your Honor. 5 JUDGE FAHEY: So how does it - - - to follow up 6 on - - - on Judge Feinman's question, how is that not then 7 creating, through a contract, like in Espinal, a third-8 party beneficiary problem for us? Tell - - - tell me why 9 that - - - this isn't the creation of a third-party 10 beneficiary to that contract, how this tort duty is different from the contractual duty. Explain that to me. 11 12 MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, if I may, Your Honor? 13 JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead. 14 MR. FRIEDMAN: My understanding is, in the 15 Restatement of Torts, in Putnam v. Stout it did away with 16 the outdated modes of there had to be a contract between 17 parties to - - - for, in this case, Ms. Henry to bring a

lawsuit.

JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.

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MR. FRIEDMAN: And that - - - that's - - - and the court adopted the Restatement of Torts, a second Restatement of Torts. So there is no necessity of a contractual relationship where the - - - Ms. Henry would be a third-party beneficiary of a contract. There's no need for that contract anymore pursuant to Putnam v. Stout.



Now, just - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But when we overruled Cullings in Putnam and essentially adopted the - - - the second Restatement of Torts, we relied on certain policy reasons, didn't we?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

reasons are furthered here. How, in any way, we're - - - we're worried about the - - - the tenant's ability, financial ability to make repair, how there's any evidence in the record that - - - that Grand Manor relied on anything in any agreement between - - between the owners and HUD to refrain from making repairs when in fact there was this escrow fund and they - - - they went into the fund all the time, and they got permission of HUD, and they made repairs, and everybody knew that's what was going on.

Nobody ever went to the owners and said, you make these repairs, right?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, Your Honor, I believe they went to the escrow fund one time to make the repairs; that is correct.

JUDGE STEIN: One time?

MR. FRIEDMAN: I think - - - I think it was one time, Your Honor that they went to - - - it wasn't - - - it wasn't more than one time.



One thing about the - - - you know, legal liability to a third party is a financial consideration, which is a social policy issue in this case, as Putnam v. Stout. Again, legal - - - this wasn't addressed by the third - - by the First Department. Legal liability to a third party, in this case Ms. Henry, is a financial consideration which was discussed in the - - - in the lower court, in the First Department Appellate Division.

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There's - - - this is forty-six years later also then, Putnam - - Putnam v. Stout. Social issues have changed. And the purpose and mission of, like I said before, of HUD, is to promote sustainable housing for the express purpose of building communities and improving quality of life. But there's also other vested interests - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: The way I understood the issue was is that I thought the First Department was saying that if the contract had been between the owner and the tenant, then the duty would have been created. But here the contract was not between the owner and the tenant but - - but between the financier and the owner and therefore the duty wasn't created.

So the question for us then - - - and you can correct me if you think I'm wrong because I don't know if I know the answer to this question, but it was a duty created



in tort, or was a contractual obligation created as a result of this contract that only extended between HUD and the owner of the property, as opposed to once you - - you've made that contract, you had a duty to anyone who uses the property that you own like you would in any other situation as an owner. That's the nub of what I see is the problem here. Sure. Well, there's two points to MR. FRIEDMAN: that, Your Honor.

JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.

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MR. FRIEDMAN: Number one is the lower court talked about the - - - well, first the Restatement of Torts - - - again, I said this before - - - puts the duty on the landlord, looks at a perspective from the landowner - - -JUDGE FAHEY: That's clear.

MR. FRIEDMAN: - - - not as a - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Right. No, you're right about The only question is is: does that duty extend here when the contract is not between the owner and the tenant? And there's case law in the lower courts that seem to go both ways.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, I will say this, Your Honor. Number one, it does extend because this landowner knew - -- was getting a benefit. They want all the benefits but without any obligation to the public. They're getting



public money to build this - - -1 2 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, what about the circumstance 3 were the landlord makes an agreement with the tenant to 4 clearly transfer all responsibility for repair and 5 maintenance to the tenant? 6 MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, would that - - - would that 7 --- well, that's not the case here. This is a regulatory 8 agreement. We - - - may I finish my answer? 9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, please. 10 MR. FRIEDMAN: In the context of this case, Your 11 Honor, the regulatory agreement put the burden on the 12 landowner to continue to take care of the property. And 13 there are a lot of social issues that exist now such as 14 other vested interests, Medicare and Medicaid, in many 15 instances. This will have far-reaching implications 16 because Medicare and Medicaid now has clawback rights in 17 many cases to get their money back for when they pay for 18 health benefits for people that are injured by landowners. So this will have far - - - far-reaching - - -19 20 JUDGE GARCIA: May I ask - - -21 MR. FRIEDMAN: - - - implications to the public 22 money. 23 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes. 24 JUDGE GARCIA: What would be the remedy that HUD 25 would have for violation of those terms? What's the remedy

1	under the agreement the landlord has with HUD?			
2	MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, I I think there are a			
3	number of factors, if I if I can it's not a			
4	direct answer, Your Honor. But I'll I'll try to			
5	answer it the best I can.			
6	JUDGE GARCIA: How about a direct answer?			
7	MR. FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry?			
8	JUDGE GARCIA: How about a direct answer?			
9	MR. FRIEDMAN: I will try to			
10	JUDGE GARCIA: Like, what are under the			
11	contract			
12	MR. FRIEDMAN: The point is			
13	JUDGE GARCIA: what are the remedies that			
14	HUD would have for a violation of this provision? Aside			
15	from whatever liability they might have to a tenant, what			
16	is HUD's enforcement ability of that provision? What can			
17	they do?			
18	MR. FRIEDMAN: Honestly, Your Honor, there was			
19	nothing in the regulatory argument that I read where there			
20	were any there were any			
21	JUDGE GARCIA: Well, what are the consequences of			
22	the landlord here, this party, violating the HUD agreement?			
23	What are the consequences, generally, for violations of the			
24	terms of that agreement?			
4	cerms or chac agreement:			

 $\mbox{MR.}$  FRIEDMAN: Well, in this case, a third party

with a - - - if their property's not kept in repair - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: No, but there are other provisions, other covenants, I'm assuming, in the HUD agreement. What are the remedies, what enforcement mechanism does HUD have if this party, the landlord here, doesn't comply with - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: So for example, sometimes a bank and a mortgage says if you let the property go to waste we're going to come in and we're going to make the repairs and you're going to be responsible for that in addition to whatever you borrowed.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, in this specific case, Your Honor, what happened was - - - I could speak to the facts of this case - - - HUD actually went in and issued reports, issued - - - conducted inspections of the property. And they issued reports. And those reports were not sent to the tenant, they were sent to the landlord, in this case the Hamilton companies. And my understanding is that there would - - - there would be fines that would be imposed in this - - in this case. But that's just - - - that's just one of the remedies.

And if we look at it, as I clearly stated in - 
- if I may finish my answer - - - the legal liability to

third parties is a financial - - - is a financial

consideration. And there are so many other, as I said,



1 social policy issues that exist today, where there's 2 clawbacks, we have Medicare and Medicaid and other 3 interests that have a lawsuit, not just Ms. Henry, through 4 Ms. Henry other entities want - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, isn't it also a 6 consequence that if you breach the terms of these kinds of 7 agreements that you will not be able to get any more of 8 these federally-subsidized loans? You're basically going 9 to be put out of business. 10 MR. FRIEDMAN: I would agree with that, Your I would agree with that. We - - -11 12 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 13 MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you. 14 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. 15 Counsel? 16 Counsel, what difference does it make if the 17 landlord makes the promise to keep the property in good 18 repair in an agreement with the tenant or with a third 19 party?

MR. TRICARICO: Well, first of all, may it please the court. My name is Michael Tricarico, and I represent some of the respondents here.

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I just wanted to make one point clear before I answer that question. The respondents that I represent are Chait Hamilton Management Company, Hamilton Equities, Inc.,



Hamilton Equities Company, and Suzan Chait-Grandt, as

Administrator of the Estate of Joel Chait. And Chait

Hamilton Management Company is not a party to this appeal

because the plaintiff and appellant has agreed not to

pursue the claims against that entity.

Now, I'm sorry; what was your question?

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So my question is: what difference does it make if the landlord makes the promise to keep the property in good repair and that promise is in an agreement with the tenant or with some third party?

MR. TRICARICO: Well, I think that creates a very

- - - a very significant problem. And I think that if - 
- if the court were to decide that the plaintiff has a - 
- has a cause of action based upon that, it would basically

undo significant precedent in the area of - - - of property

owner liability as well - - - as well - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Tell me where it is in your contract that the language is that limits this duty to a relationship between HUD and the defendants? The duty to keep it in good repair, once it's created, is it limited by contract in any way?

MR. TRICARICO: Well, the duty to make - - - to keep the premises in good repair, the consequence of that, I think, to get back to the question that Judge Garcia asked before, and I think that answers your question as



well, is that it's an acceleration of the mortgage. 1 So 2 basically, HUD is guaranteed the mortgage. 3 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, that's the penalty for 4 failure to do it. 5 MR. TRICARICO: Yes. 6 JUDGE FAHEY: But my question is, as opposed to 7 the contractual relationship between the parties - - - I 8 understood the judge's question that way. 9 concerned about is does - - - does that contractual duty, 10 once that duty's created through a contract, is it limited in any way to whom it extends to? 11 12 MR. TRICARICO: Yeah, I think it's limited - - -13 actually, there's federal case law on this. And actually 14 there's a case that I've cited in my brief that is actually 15 between Grand Manor and Hamilton, and that's a federal 16 court case at 94 F. Supp. 2d 406. And in that case it 17 deals with the issue, and it talks about who is the 18 intended beneficiary of these HUD agreements. And what the 19 court concluded there, and basically all of these cases 20 with HUD involving regulatory - - -2.1 JUDGE FAHEY: Is this a Second Circuit case? 22 MR. TRICARICO: That is a - - - I apologize if I 23 said Second Circuit; I meant Southern District.



JUDGE FAHEY: No, that's okay.

MR. TRICARICO: But it is a trial court case in

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the Southern District. What I'm - - - what I'm - - - what
you find is these HUD cases tend to appear in federal court
because HUD can move the cases to federal court.

But in any event, they were dealt - - - they
dealt with not only HUD agreements in general but the HUD

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dealt with not only HUD agreements in general but the HUD agreements that were at issue in this very proceeding. In fact, as - - as the court knows from the requests that I've made that it take judicial notice of certain information in that case, there are actually two - - - two HUD agreements. There was one with Grand Manor, and there was one with - - with Hamilton, and the Hamilton one is an exhibit that's been marked in this case. But in any event - - -

JUDGE WILSON: But isn't it a fair way to look at those that each of them represents an independent obligation that HUD saw from both Grand Manor and Hamilton?

MR. TRICARICO: Right, and what's interesting about that and the federal case that involves the two parties is basically it involves Hamilton and Grand Manor. Basically what they said is that those regulatory agreements exist solely for the benefit of HUD. And the --

JUDGE WILSON: That's in terms of who can enforce them; is that right?

MR. TRICARICO: That's in terms of who can



enforce them and who has rights under them because - -

questions? And that goes back to Judge Fahey's question. That is, if someone is a third-party beneficiary to a contract, that person has standing then to enforce the contract himself or herself. But somebody might be the beneficiary of a duty, not have any ability to sue to enforce the contract - - - so for example, the plaintiff here couldn't have sued saying the conditions are unfit, but if injured by the - - - by the duty that's created, that person might be - - - I'm not saying is but might be covered by the duty.

MR. TRICARICO: Well, no, I don't think so because I think the courts below, and the court in the Southern District dealing with this issue, and other federal cases that dealt with it, basically say - - - and the court expressly said this in - - - in the federal case that I'm talking about. It said that neither party has a right - - has any rights to enforcement of the other party's contract. So neither party is an intended third-party beneficiary to that contract. The only beneficiary of it is - - - is HUD, so - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: No, but that doesn't go, I think, to the point that's being made here as to whether or not someone who's injured who's not a party to that contract



1	can seek to get some kind of civil relief	
2	MR. TRICARICO: Well, I think then	
3	JUDGE RIVERA: monetary relief or	
4	otherwise.	
5	MR. TRICARICO: I think then you would be	
6	extending third-party beneficiary law in the State of New	
7	York well beyond whatever	
8	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, but I think that it	
9	MR. TRICARICO: it is or	
10	JUDGE RIVERA: That's really what we're arguing	
11	about.	
12	But let me ask you a different question. I want	
13	you to explain to me what your client's view and your	
14	your advocacy on this is of the state of the relationship	
15	between the lessor and the lessee post the amendment to the	
16	lease, that is, after the regulatory agreements	
17	excuse me, after the agreements with HUD are entered into,	
18	now you're now subject to these provisions, what what	
19	effect did this amendment to the lease have?	
20	MR. TRICARICO: In all honestly, to tell you the	
21	truth, Your Honor	
22	JUDGE RIVERA: That would be a good thing, yeah.	
23	MR. TRICARICO: as a practical matter, it	
24	didn't have much of an effect because	

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, doesn't it, at a minimum,

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1 put the lessee on notice that the federal agreement 2 supersedes the lease - - -3 MR. TRICARICO: I think - - -JUDGE RIVERA: - - - if there's a conflict? 4 5 MR. TRICARICO: Well, I don't think it's a 6 conflict, and I don't think it's an inconsistency, which is 7 the term that's used in the amendment. I think that 8 clearly the parties didn't treat it as an inconsistency. 9 And it has - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, if the lessee says that - -11 - or excuse me, if the lessor is saying I have no duty 12 under the lease, and the argument here is that the federal 13 agreement imposes a duty, don't you then have a conflict? 14 MR. TRICARICO: No, because I don't think the 15 federal agreement imposes a duty. I think, ultimately, we 16 do have a duty to - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: If we disagree with you, do you 18 lose? 19 MR. TRICARICO: I don't think so. I don't think 20 so. If there's a conflict, like I said, I don't - - - if 21 you find that these two things are in conflict, I don't 2.2 think that - - - that we lose because I think that - - -23 JUDGE STEIN: Well, does it make a difference 24 whether HUD recognized that the defendants could delegate 25 their duty to a third party as long as the property was



kept in good repair?

MR. TRICARICO: Yeah, and I think that's the key question here. Actually, HUD, as we know from the federal case that I was talking about between Grand Manor and Hamilton, HUD actually entered into a separate regulatory agreement, which I've asked the court to take judicial notice of, which is in the record of the case that I cited, and it's in the docket at 12 Civil 04916.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but that doesn't in any way state that it relieves the lessor of their promise and covenant to HUD.

MR. TRICARICO: Right. Well, I think to answer your question simply, what happens here is I don't think that the - - and it's clear from the two regulatory agreements that we have the ability to delegate someone to perform the repairs. However, if they don't perform the repairs properly, we bear the consequences of what the agreement with HUD tells us, and that is a foreclosure or acceleration of the mortgage, not third - - not liability to some third party that gets injured because, as I said before, the tenant is not a third-party beneficiary - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: And basically a breach of a contractual duty is not the same as a breach of a duty in tort.

MR. TRICARICO: I think that's correct. And I



1 think that - - -2 JUDGE FEINMAN: I mean, at a very basic level. 3 MR. TRICARICO: Right, and I think - - -4 JUDGE FEINMAN: All right. 5 MR. TRICARICO: Well, and I think - - -6 JUDGE FEINMAN: So can we decide this case 7 without actually getting into consideration of the purpose 8 of the HUD agreement? 9 MR. TRICARICO: Well, I think it's all relevant 10 based upon the arguments that have been raised by the 11 appellant here. But clearly the - - - the stated purpose 12 of the HUD agreement, by their own expert and by the lower 13 courts, is to protect the physical property and its fiscal 14 integrity. But yes, I think - - - I think you can - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: But the way it does that is by 16 requiring something of the landlord, which is this duty to 17 maintain - - - to maintain the premises in good condition. 18 MR. TRICARICO: Right, and the consequence of 19 that is, like I said, if it does not, is an acceleration of 20 the mortgage, not - - -2.1 JUDGE FEINMAN: Yes, but we've adopted the 2.2 restatement, and the restatement says if you agree - - -23 the landlord agrees to be responsible for repairs, that 24 they're responsible to someone who's injured, as a



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consequence.

MR. TRICARICO: Well, I think that the way the restatement is written, and I think that - - - that Judge Garcia touched on it before, talking about responsibilities as a lessor - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, but that goes to the first provision. It actually adds nothing because it says: "The lessor, such as contracted by a covenant in the lease", but that is how the lessor would contract pursuant to a lease -

MR. TRICARICO: Well - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: --- in the position as a lessor. The question that's raised is what the rest of it means "or otherwise".

MR. TRICARICO: Right, "or otherwise", I would submit that the lower court got that correct, and it has to be - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But what's the point of "or otherwise"?

MR. TRICARICO: Because it can be outside of the scope of the lease. For example, there are cases in the lower courts that illustrate that. The - - - the landlord says to the tenant, don't worry, I will shovel the snow off of your steps, you know, during the winter, you know, I will be responsible for repairing the driveway. It's not in the lease but it's a communication outside of the lease



where you've - - - where you've - - - where you have 1 2 assumed that responsibility. It's really all about a 3 manifestation of intent. 4 JUDGE FEINMAN: And a conduct, without saying 5 anything. 6 MR. TRICARICO: Yeah, a con - - in - - in 7 some ways I guess conduct could be, but I think that 8 conduct is evident of - - - of what your intent or what 9 your communication was to - - - - to the - - - to the lessee. For example, you know, if you're - - - if you're a 10 11 lessor and you're going to agree to, you know, repave the 12 parking lot in a - - - in a shopping mall, like is 13 discussed in Putnam, you're not going to just show up one 14 day and - - - and start repaving, in all likelihood, you're 15 going to tell - - - you're going to tell the tenant, look, 16 the property - - - the parking lot's in bad shape, I'm 17 going to take on the responsibility of - - - of performing 18 that, and I'm going to fix it. 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 20 Counsel? 21 MR. TRICARICO: Thank you. 22 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome. 23 MR. TRICARICO: Sorry. One second. 24 MR. FRIEDMAN: No, take your time.



JUDGE STEIN: Counselor, can you point to any

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1	cases in which we have applied the Putnam rule to to
2	an agreement between the owner and someone other than the
3	tenant?
4	MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, Your Honor, that's th
5	trial court actually mentioned that, that this is a case o
6	first impression. In this case we have a regular tort
7	agreement which is
8	JUDGE STEIN: So we would be creating new law.
9	mean, you're not basing this on on Putnam or o
LO	any precedent of ours?
L1	MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, that can be answered in two
L2	I have two responses to that, Your Honor. You're no
L3	creating a new law because what the court has already done
L4	it's already it's already adopted the second
L5	Restatement of Torts that puts a duty on the landowner to
6	keep the when they enter into a contract to
L7	JUDGE STEIN: But we've never said what that "or
L8	otherwise" means, right?
L9	MR. FRIEDMAN: That's fair, Your Honor.
20	JUDGE STEIN: And if we were to say what you say
21	it means, it would we would be creating new law in
22	the State of New York because we have never applied that
23	language in that way
24	MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, I think
25	JUDGE STEIN: so far.

1 MR. FRIEDMAN: I think the court, yes, would be 2 defining what "or otherwise" means. But as - - - as well, 3 Your Honor, in this specific - - - in the specific facts of 4 this case, one, there's a regulatory agreement. In this 5 case the landowner had a nondelegable duty to continue to 6 take care of the property, so they're not even really an 7 out-of-possession landlord. 8 JUDGE STEIN: That's the conclusion that you want 9 us to reach is that it's nondelegable. 10 MR. FRIEDMAN: No, it is. 11 JUDGE STEIN: That's the question that we're here 12 to answer. That - - - that's not - - - that's not

specified or explicitly stated anywhere.

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MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, actually, there's an expert's report, Mr. - - I think his name is - - - first name was Mark, Mr. Klion, K-L-I-O-N, where he had - - - he was a commissioner for the Department of Housing and Urban Development. And that's - - - that's part of the record where he said that these regulatory agreements mandate a nondelegable duty upon - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Right, that's his opinion, and as - and that - - - that coincides with your opinion.

JUDGE GARCIA: And that's in terms of HUD's perspective of this agreement. What I have a problem with in all this third-party duty talk is it disassociates this

from Putnam because this isn't a general contract issue. In Putnam we changed the law where you could have an agreement between the landlord and the tenant, and then somebody was injured, and we were saying even that didn't create a third-party obligation to the person who was injured. And we changed that rule. It wasn't a contract rule; it was an out-of-possession landlord rule, and we changed that rule.

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So now I think you have to look at what are we making this change to. It's not, well, we're going to examine this as is this a third-party beneficiary of a HUD agreement. This is: are we going to extend that Putnam ruling to encompass agreements between an out-of-possession landlord and someone else besides the tenant. And that, as I think Judge Stein is alluding to, is a big step, and I don't see any other state that's done that.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, this is not just any other party that - - - that the landowner agreed to. This was a federal government.

JUDGE GARCIA: So it would be a rule that where you make a third-party agreement with a federal regulatory agency?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, I think that's a factor to consider. I mean, what has got - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: So what would the rule be?



1 MR. FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry? 2 JUDGE GARCIA: What would the third-party rule 3 be? 4 MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, I think the third-party rule 5 would be is I don't - - - I think we're just - - - the 6 court would just be, not necessarily expanding on the 7 Restatement of Torts, it's just reinforcing the Restatement 8 of Torts, the first prong where, you know, a party - - -9 where a landlord contracts to continue to take care of the 10 property. You're just - - - you're just reinforcing it. 11 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let's take a step back here. 12 In New York, third-party beneficiaries can receive a 13 benefit that they have not contracted for in a tort 14 situation under the Espinal - - - I forget the full name of 15 the site, and there are a specific series of - - -16 JUDGE FEINMAN: Espinal - - -17 JUDGE FAHEY: I'm not sure of the rest of the 18 cite, Judge, but there are three rules they set out, and 19 those three rules I don't think you're arguing would apply 20 here. So the Espinal third-party beneficiary rules, you're 21 not saying they apply in this circumstance, are you? 22 MR. FRIEDMAN: Absolutely, not. I'm not saying 23 Espinal - - -24 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. So but, in point of fact, 25 third-party beneficiaries who are not parties to contracts



can benefit in a tort-like situation to a contract. A 1 2 classic example is a snow plowing contract, you know, those 3 kind of situations. You're familiar with that, right? 4 MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes. 5 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. So - - - so the question for 6 us, though, is - - - is a little bit different. Here we're 7 talking about an out-of-possession landlord who has a 8 contract that's unrelated to the beneficiary of the 9 contract and whether or not on the duty that arises between 10 those two or the - - - or as Judge Feinman put it, the contractual obligation that arises between those two 11 12 extends to the - - - the third party, the plaintiff in this 13 action. So the question still goes back to: is a tort 14 being created here, or is it simply a matter of - - - of 15 contract law? 16 MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, it's not a matter of 17 contract law because contract law - - - may I? I noticed 18 my time expired. 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may. 20 MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Please. 22 MR. FRIEDMAN: As this court knows, in Putnam v. 23 Stout, you did - - - you did away with the necessarily of

JUDGE FAHEY: No, I'm not saying there has to be

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privity. So - - -

1	privity. I think the third-party beneficiaries can
2	can recover. I think you're totally right about that. Th
3	question is: under this contract, can they recover?
4	MR. FRIEDMAN: Absolutely, Your Honor. Even
5	under there was a case decided in the First
6	Department by the name of Rojas v
7	JUDGE FAHEY: And if they could recover le
8	me ask this. I accept that. Let's say they could under
9	contract, they could only recover under tort law, right,
10	not under contract law?
11	MR. FRIEDMAN: Under tort, yes.
12	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. Thank you.
13	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
14	MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Your Honors.
15	(Court is adjourned)
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1		CERTIFICATION		
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