1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK EX REL. JOHNSON,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- No. 74
7	SUPERINTENDENT, ADIRONDACK CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al.,
8	Respondents.
9	
10	Albany, New York October 13, 2020
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
16	Appearances:
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25	Sharona Shapiro Official Court Transcriber



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal is appeal number 74, Ex Rel Johnson v. Superintendent. Counsel? MS. FABIANO: Good afternoon, Your Honors. Μy name is Denise Fabiano, and I represent the petitioner/appellant, Fred Johnson. And I'd also like to reserve one minute for rebuttal, please. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: One minute? MS. FABIANO: Yes. So in this case, the State is claiming the absolute authority to hold an indigent person, who has been granted parole, in prison for the rest of his life simply because he can't afford a private SARAcompliant address that's not within 1,000 feet of a school. That's the absolute authority that the State's claiming

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JUDGE RIVERA: I thought their - - - their argument was they have the authority to hold them until they find SARA-compliant housing, not forever and ever, which is what I - - -

here, and that's what they're asking you to sanction.

MS. FABIANO: No.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - think you are trying to argue. I understand your point that the logical extension of the - - - their analysis is that that means you could hold someone up to life, but what they're really arguing is that this is a stopgap, this is otherwise what they're

doing until the SARA-compliant housing is available for the 1 2 individual. 3 MS. FABIANO: Actually, I mean, their argument 4 below and here has been that they have the authority to 5 hold Mr. Johnson in for the duration of his sentence, which 6 is life. WE can say, yes, we'd like to take you on your 7 good-faith representation that you won't do that, but when 8 you're balancing that against your absolute right, your - -9 - your right to liberty here, I don't think DOCCS or the 10 State, we can give them that authority that they're going to do it - - - do the right thing because they say they 11 12 will. 13 JUDGE GARCIA: But they did it here, right? 14 mean, they - - -15 MS. FABIANO: He - - -16 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - released your client, right? 17 MS. FABIANO: He was ultimately released to - - -18 to twenty-seven months past his open parole date. 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And on that point, counsel, 20 can we just back up a little bit and address the threshold 21 issue first? 22 MS. FABIANO: Um-hum. 23 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And what makes your client 24 entitled to a writ of habeas corpus here? He's out, right? 25 MS. FABIANO: Oh, why it's not moot? Because - -

- because - - - again, I don't think the State has 1 2 contested that it's likely to repeat itself. The Third 3 Department said that as well. It's - - - it's whether it's 4 going to evade review. And it will because he's out, and 5 we're here now. 6 JUDGE STEIN: Well, but if he - - - if, as you 7 say - - - first of all, it's two-and-a-half years - - -8 MS. FABIANO: Yes. 9 JUDGE STEIN: - - - which, arguably, might be 10 enough time to - - - to reach, certainly the Appellate Division, if not this court, and - - - and your argument is 11 12 it could be much, much longer. So if that is the case, and 13 - - - and your client did find SARA-compliant housing, but 14 maybe some - - - the next person won't. And it seems to me 15 that you're - - - you're making a distinction between this 16 situation and the others that we're hearing about today. 17 And if you look at the - - - actually, the times that the 18 other people were in - - - in RTFs, it is a significant 19 difference. So I guess, to me - - -20 MS. FABIANO: Well, there's, I guess - - -21 JUDGE STEIN: - - - how can you make both 22 arguments - - -23 MS. FABIANO: Well - - -24 JUDGE STEIN: - - - that it could be indefinite

but yet it will evade review?

1	MS. FABIANO: Well, first of all, there's
2	something slightly reprehensible about saying that the ver
3	illegality that allows you to hold somebody in prison for
4	life is is what's going to make it evade you
5	know, not likely to evade review, to make it moot.
6	And on top of that, we also the State
7	it would be unseemly to grant them the ability to release
8	somebody off of the list they control, and then every
9	single time they could avoid having to have this issue
LO	decided by this court.
L1	JUDGE FEINMAN: All right. If we decide it's no
L2	moot, what's the illegality you just referred to?
L3	MS. FABIANO: The illegality is I guess
4	it's a substantive due process. Mr. Johnson does have a
L5	right to liberty here, and with substantive due process,
L6	it's always a balancing. There's a ledger, right? What
L7	are Mr. Johnson's interests
18	JUDGE FAHEY: Can I just clarify? Are you
19	challenging his his incarcer you're let
20	me get this right. You're challenging his incarceration,
21	not the statute; is that right?
22	MS. FABIANO: I'm sorry yes, correct.
23	JUDGE FAHEY: You're challenging his
24	MS. FABIANO: As applied to Mr. Johnson

JUDGE FAHEY: Correct.

2	hold him in prison for life because he didn't have a SARA-
3	compliant address is
4	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.
5	MS. FABIANO: unconstitutional.
6	JUDGE FAHEY: So let me go so the next par
7	of that is, what standard of review are you asking us to
8	apply?
9	MS. FABIANO: I'm asking for strict scrutiny
10	because, at it's core, he
11	JUDGE FAHEY: And what if we say it's rational
12	basis. What's your argument then?
13	MS. FABIANO: I still don't think it meets
14	rational basis because, again, we go back to the
15	substantive due process ledger. We have Mr. Johnson's
16	right to be out in the community. He has been granted
17	parole here.
18	JUDGE WILSON: Is his liberty right a little bit
19	weaker then, let's say, Mr. Ortiz's or Mr. McCurdy's?
20	MS. FABIANO: I don't believe so. He's been
21	granted parole. He's been granted the right to be out in
22	the community. That's a significant liberty interest,
23	right? To serve your
24	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, but parole still involves a
25	restraint on liberty on some liberties.

MS. FABIANO: - - - the State's claimed right to

1	MS. FABIANO: Yes.
2	JUDGE FAHEY: So that's pretty clear. That's
3	really not a contestable point.
4	MS. FABIANO: Sure. You
5	JUDGE FAHEY: The contestable point seems to me
6	the imprisonment and the absence of a violation. Isn't
7	that what your point is?
8	MS. FABIANO: Yes, sure.
9	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.
10	MS. FABIANO: DOCCS is acting prematurely here.
11	Their
12	JUDGE FAHEY: So go ahead.
13	MS. FABIANO: On their side of the ledger
14	right, we're going to go back to the substantive due
15	process ledger nothing has been violated here. Thei
16	interest is intact. There is nothing they're acting
17	preemptively. He has not violated parole. And their
18	interest can be achieved by releasing him to avail himself
19	of his statute of his right to SARA-compliant shelte
20	in New York City as a right to shelter city under the
21	Callahan Consent Decree.
22	JUDGE WILSON: I thought there was something in
23	the record suggesting he had violated parole.
24	MS. FABIANO: Oh, well, since
25	JUDGE WILSON: Yes.

1	MS. FABIANO: He's been rearrested, Your Honor -
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3	JUDGE WILSON: Yes.
4	MS. FABIANO: since he's been out, yes.
5	JUDGE WILSON: And that's a violation of his
6	parole as well?
7	MS. FABIANO: Whether a parole violation drops o
8	not is up to parole.
9	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
LO	Counsel?
11	MR. GINSBERG: May it please the court. This
L2	case should be dismissed as moot, but if the court reaches
L3	the merits, it should reject petitioner's substantive due
L4	process claim.
L5	I want to get right to petitioner's argument tha
L 6	a ruling for the State here would authorize indefinite
L7	detention for all SARA inmates seeking compliant New York
L8	City shelter housing. That is not the case, and I have
L 9	about four limiting principles to give you.
20	Number one, this is somewhat of an exceptional
21	case on its facts, and this is an as-applied challenge.
22	Petitioner here has a trigger, a sex-offending trigger,
23	that readily applies to minors, namely, adolescent girls.
24	He's triggered by the sight of women in, quote, "a tight
25	dress and tight pants".

1	Also, petitioner's modus operandi for sex
2	offending doesn't require the sort of physicality that
3	greatly diminishes with age. His pattern of sex offending
4	has been seeing women in plain sight, approaching them from
5	behind, and rubbing up against their buttocks, not a great
6	physical hardship. So that's number one, just on attempts
7	of this
8	JUDGE RIVERA: So how does keeping him away from
9	a school address that particular risk?
10	MR. GINSBERG: Keeping him away from a school
11	addresses that risk because he at least according to
12	his own testimony at the parole hearing, there is a
13	substantial risk that he would be triggered to sexually
14	offend by anyone who resembles a woman in a tight dress or
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16	JUDGE RIVERA: But he does this on the subway?
17	MR. GINSBERG: I'm sorry, Your Honor?
18	JUDGE RIVERA: He does this on the subway?
19	MR. GINSBERG: He has done this on the subway,
20	but his self-described trig
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Has he done it other than on the
22	subway?
23	MR. GINSBERG: There's no record of him having
24	done it other places.
25	JUDGE RIVERA: Isn't it a better condition:

1	don't ride the subway?
2	MR. GINSBERG: I'm sorry, Your Honor?
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Isn't a better condition to reduce
4	the risk: don't ride the subway?
5	MR. GINSBERG: I suppose that would be a rational
6	condition as well, but I think Your Honor's colloquy is
7	pointing up the fact that the SARA restriction is working.
8	The SARA has has limited his contact with adolescents
9	and, for example, adolescent girls that you'd find at a
10	high school who might wear tight clothes and fit
11	petitioner's trigger.
12	JUDGE RIVERA: I don't know; they ride subways
13	too. I'm not so sure about that.
14	MR. GINSBERG: I'm sorry, Your Honor?
15	JUDGE RIVERA: They ride subways too.
16	MR. GINSBERG: Well, the SARA restriction doesn't
17	have to do with subways; it only has to do with
18	JUDGE RIVERA: I know that.
19	MR. GINSBERG: with right, with
20	distance from a school. And just because it doesn't
21	address every single issue does not mean it's irrational.
22	It's rational if it cuts down on the chance for petitioner
23	to reoffend.
24	JUDGE RIVERA: Let me ask you this. If all the
25	science and all the data says that this type of restriction

1	doesn't achieve goals, can it be rational?
2	MR. GINSBERG: Well, the science and the data
3	doesn't say that. It certainly doesn't say that with
4	respect to people in petitioner's circumstances, people who
5	have a trigger that is activated not by seeking out
6	victims, stalking them, or the like, that he
7	JUDGE RIVERA: I thought he said women. Did he
8	say women?
9	MR. GINSBERG: I'm sorry, Your Honor?
10	JUDGE RIVERA: Did he say women in the tight-
11	fitting clothes?
12	MR. GINSBERG: He did say women in tight-fitting
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14	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, that's not usually a child.
15	MR. GINSBERG: No, not usually a child, but the -
16	but the interest of SARA is not limited to children, as
17	we might think of a child of ten or eleven. It's limited -
18	the interest of SARA, that statute is addressed to
19	minors, anyone under the age of eighteen.
20	JUDGE RIVERA: You know, we don't usually refer
21	to a woman and equate her with a minor, is my point.
22	MR. GINSBERG: Oh, I agree with you.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: But I'd like to hear your answer
24	on the science.
25	MR. GINSBERG: Well, my answer on the science is

--- and some of the articles that we cite in our brief show that for people in --- first of all, we think that would be a legislative issue. The question would be whether the legislature should revisit the wisdom of SARA or not. But the science, according to the articles we cite, show that people like petitioner would be rationally deterred by the SARA ---

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JUDGE RIVERA: So it's your position the science is in dispute?

MR. GINSBERG: I think there's some dispute about the science. I actually - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: If there was not - - - if there was not. I understand your point, of course, about the policy decision. The legislature needs that information - - I'm not disputing that with you. But can the legislature really enact a law that goes against all of the science regarding the actual achievement of the goal?

Isn't that something that's within our bailiwick?

MR. GINSBERG: If the science was that lopsided,

I would be - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, no, not lopsided; absolutely contrary. My hypothetical is not about science where there's some dispute, there are different - - - I didn't ask that question. I understand your position on that. It's a very compelling one.



MR. GINSBERG: Well, if - - -1 2 JUDGE RIVERA: If all of the science really shows 3 otherwise - - -4 MR. GINSBERG: If all of the science really - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: It's like climate change. 6 MR. GINSBERG: Yeah, if all of the science really 7 shows otherwise, I suppose there would be a strong argument 8 that it is irrational. Although I would - - - I would go 9 back to the fact that this court's cases have always said 10 that the rational basis test and the rationality with which a legitimate interest is served can be backed up with 11 12 rational speculation. 13 So I think, really at the rational basis level, 14 aside from just an overwhelming undisputed scientific 15 consensus of the sort Your Honor is positing, the 16 legislature is allowed to engage in simple rational 17 speculation and logical thinking: if A, then B; if B then 18 C, et cetera. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: But anything short of that - - -20 anything short of that allows the legislature, of course, 21 to act and - - - and then would survive rational review - -22 - rational basis review? 23 MR. GINSBERG: I think that's right. And I do 24 want to - - -



JUDGE RIVERA:

Thank you.

MR. GINSBERG: - - - address some of the other 1 2 reasons why a ruling for the State here would not sanction 3 the indefinite detention that petitioner raises the specter 4 of. 5 JUDGE STEIN: Before you do that, I - - -6 JUDGE FAHEY: Are you particularly concerned - -7 8 JUDGE STEIN: - - - just had a - - -9 JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead, Judge. I'm sorry. You 10 finish. 11 JUDGE STEIN: A slightly different question, 12 talking about whether we're talking about rational review 13 or some other rational basis review or some other standard, 14 can there ever be a fundamental right that is based on a 15 statutory or regulatory scheme as opposed to a 16 constitutional right? 17 MR. GINSBERG: Our position is no. Our position 18 is that a fundamental - - - not constitutional rights are 19 fundamental, but all fundamental rights do derive from the 20 constitution. 21 JUDGE STEIN: And where was the right being 22 claimed here derived from, in your view? 23 MR. GINSBERG: Well, it's not only my view; it's 24 also the view of the prominent Second Circuit case that my 25 friend on the other side cites, the Victory case.

right here derives from New York State's legislative and executive parole scheme. As a constitutional matter, there is no fundamental right to release while subject to a valid prison sentence.

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And as petitioner pointed out, he remains subject to that valid prison sentence. It is a long sentence.

It's a life sentence. But strictly speaking, that sentence authorizes imprisonment up to the maximum, up to life. But there are good reasons to think that that sort of life imprisonment, for failure to satisfy the SARA condition, would not apply. And I think I tried to discuss one of them, which is the particular facts of this case, but there are also mechanisms available to the offender to try to extricate himself from the SARA law.

Number one, the sex offender can petition to modify his level 3 designation. All the arguments being made on the other side today about why, notwithstanding petitioner's level 3 designation, he's simply not that guy anymore, he's reformed, et cetera, he's aged a little bit, those are all excellent arguments to be pitched - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, but that hasn't really been the case in this case, has it?

MR. GINSBERG: No, exactly. But what I'm saying is there are avenues open to offenders to take steps to ensure that SARA does not apply indefinitely. So they can



1	- they can try to modify their designation. And if the
2	evidence is as persuasive as my friend on the other side
3	says it is, then that modification petition would be taken
4	seriously.
5	JUDGE FAHEY: He was kept in Adirondack, right?
6	MR. GINSBERG: That was the most that was
7	the facility from which he was discharged.
8	JUDGE FAHEY: Was that a residential treatment
9	facility?
10	MR. GINSBERG: No, that was not. That was
11	correctional custody.
12	JUDGE FAHEY: How long was he kept there?
13	MR. GINSBERG: I'm sorry, Your Honor?
14	JUDGE FAHEY: How long was he kept there?
15	MR. GINSBERG: I'm not sure how long he wa
16	kept in correctional custody for twenty-seven months. I'm
17	not sure the percentage of that that was at Adirondack.
18	JUDGE FAHEY: I guess my question is: was
19	Adirondack used as an RTF?
20	MR. GINSBERG: No and my answer was no.
21	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.
22	MR. GINSBERG: No, it is not. It is a
23	correctional custody. And the reason he was in
24	correctional custody is because he was he had a
25	parole sentence. He still was subject to a valid

JUDGE FAHEY: After someone has been placed on parole, can the six-month limitation ever kick in for someone who has a lifetime sentence?

MR. GINSBERG: Well, as I understand it, the six-month limitation is more geared towards folks on PRS serving definite terms. I don't think that issue has

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indeterminate term context. So I - - - I think the - - -

really been brought up in the parole indefinite - - -

the statutory framework would be a little different.

I do want to get to just a couple more of these limiting principles because I - - - the - - - the other side's argument - - - $\frac{1}{2}$

JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead.

MR. GINSBERG: - - - really does seem to be that - - - that a ruling for the State here would authorize indefinite detention.

So in addition to seeking to modify their level 3 designation, which for a petitioner like Mr. Johnson would get him out of SARA, the sex offender might sometimes have avenues, on direct review and thereafter, to try to reduce their actual penal sentence. And of course that would directly reduce the amount of time that they are within DOCCS' jurisdiction, and SARA would apply.

And also this court, I suppose, in theory, has another mechanism available to it to police these sorts of



1 situations as well. I could imagine that there would 2 always remain the judicial backstop of review for 3 government conduct that shocks the conscience, even outside 4 of the, sort of, rationality of continued applicability of 5 a legislative act that would implicate the standard 6 rational basis review. 7 So if there are no further questions - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 9 MR. GINSBERG: - - - we would ask that you 10 affirm. Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: 11 Thank you. 12 Ms. Fabiano? 13 MS. FABIANO: Just to pick up on a couple of 14 threads there. First of all, Mr. Johnson was held in 15 prison. He was in a correctional facility. 16 never even any pretense of transferring him to an RTF at 17 all times. He was in prison - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: He was never in an RTF?

MS. FABIANO: Never.

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JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.

MS. FABIANO: And that's because DOCCS claims the authority - - - that's the only way they felt they could keep him was if - - - because they felt he was within his life sentence, they had the authority to keep him in prison, pursuant to that life sentence.



Picking up quickly on, Justice Rivera, your - -1 2 your line of does the science support, what does it 3 support. I think our brief lays out fairly well, as does 4 the Third Department's concurrence, that the efficacy of 5 these restrictions is - - - is really - - - it's greatly in 6 question. It's not even in question. It shows that it's just not - - - it doesn't achieve the goals that they want 7 8 to achieve. 9 But aside from that, even if - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, why isn't he right that that - - - that really is for the legislature? 11 12 MS. FABIANO: Yeah, well, I can move on to Mr. 13 Johnson. As applied to Mr. Johnson, he - - - he doesn't 14 have a child victim; he's never had a child victim. 15 cases, up until this point, have been women on the subway. 16 JUDGE STEIN: But isn't this a point that - - -17 you know, how do you distinguish between a mature

JUDGE STEIN: But isn't this a point that - - you know, how do you distinguish between a mature
seventeen-year-old and a nineteen-year-old woman? I mean,
so - - so isn't - - isn't there still the significant
risk that his - - his particular circumstances present -

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MS. FABIANO: Well, I guess it's not locale restricted, I - - - I guess I would say. Whether he's on the subway - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, but does the restriction - -



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2	MS. FABIANO: You're around
3	JUDGE STEIN: have to cover all possible
4	risks?
5	MS. FABIANO: I'm sorry?
6	JUDGE STEIN: Does the restriction have to cover
7	all possible risks in order to be rational?
8	MS. FABIANO: No, but again, as applied to Mr.
9	Johnson, there's no there's nothing to indicate and -
LO	that it's always been a woman on the subway, four
L1	there's four or five cases.
L2	But aside from that, again, we go back to his
L3	- his he's been granted parole, and he the
L4	State can achieve its goal here by releasing him. They can
L5	achieve its goal, just as they did when they released him
L6	this time. He
L7	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. But your point about
L8	MS. FABIANO: He's entitled
L9	JUDGE RIVERA: If I can interrupt you here, this
20	point now about parole I get the bigger point about
21	parole is is that that the board of parole has
22	already determined his risk and determined it's appropriate
23	on with conditions in place, to release him?
24	MS. FABIANO: Um-hum.



JUDGE RIVERA: Is that yes or no? That's yes or

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no?

MS. FABIANO: I'm sorry.

JUDGE RIVERA: I just want to know if that's your position on that.

MS. FABIANO: That the board can determine his -

JUDGE RIVERA: Not that they can, but that they have already made this assessment about risk - - -

MS. FABIANO: They may - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: -- is that your point with this line of argument?

MS. FABIANO: They've made their assessment.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So why aren't they right, because I believe this is what they had in their brief, that that included an understanding, of course, that he would have to comply with SARA, and if he doesn't have compliant housing, that he's not going to be out.

MS. FABIANO: Well, because there's nothing to say. Imposing the condition doesn't give them the right to hold him in prison in anticipation of what they believe is going to be a violation. They - - - there's nothing in SARA to give them the right. They can impose conditions. Just like they could say, you've got to go to this drug program when you get out. Fine, I'll sign off on that. If he doesn't go when he's out, then they violate him, and

6 JUDGE RIVERA: Where's the victory in that? 7 MS. FABIANO: Well, I don't think that that's - -8 - because I don't think that's actually how it would play 9 He's entitled to the - - - to shelter. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. 11 MS. FABIANO: And he's entitled to SARA-compliant 12 shelter in New York City, and that's what he would go avail 13 himself of. That's what he requested, and that's what he 14 has the right to do. 15 But even so, as my colleague had mentioned, DOCCS 16 determines and decides how, and when, and if they're going 17 to enforce any of their conditions. They don't drop a 18 parole warrant every single time you have a dirty urine, or 19 whatever it is - - - you have a curfew violation. 20 make reasonable decisions about these things. 2.1 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but that is episodic as 2.2 opposed to you don't have a place to live that is in 23 compliance with this particular legislative mandatory 24 condition. 25 It's a condition; it's not a bar to MS. FABIANO:

they bring him back in, or they do what they will with him.

got parole, you've got to let him out. If he doesn't have

MS. FABIANO: Well, there's another - - -

SARA-compliant housing, then he's violated parole?

JUDGE RIVERA: So your approach to this is, he's

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2 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, a condition, it would seem 3 like. 4 MS. FABIANO: He can comply. He can comply with 5 the shelter system. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 7 MS. FABIANO: And - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 9 MS. FABIANO: - - - I would just point out, in 10 Kahn - - - there was a case I cited that came out in 11 September in the Second Department, Kahn v. Annucci, and 12 that sort of will give you a glimpse of what DOCCS does. 13 There, there was somebody who was already out in the 14 community, and a school opened up near him. They gave him 15 They were reasonable. So you could put them in 16 temporary housing like that, and then when a SARA-compliant 17 bed opens up, he gets it. And even in Kahn v. Annucci, 18 they allow him - - -19 JUDGE STEIN: Is there anything in the record to 20 indicate that there are enough SARA-compliant beds in the 21 shelter system to accommodate all of the people being 22 released under this condition? 23 MS. FABIANO: I think all we have to go on in the 24 record is the fact that the - - - that the Callahan consent 25 decree exists, that the City will provide a shelter bed to

release. But - - - but they can - - -



1	whoever requests one, and that the Bonilla court
2	specifically found that DHS agreed and was ready, willing,
3	and able to comply with that. When the Attorney General
4	asked, on cross-examination, what if, you know, everybody
5	came
6	JUDGE FEINMAN: All right. But that's assuming
7	we accept and don't grant the motion to strike that
8	testimony.
9	MS. FABIANO: The Bonilla decision actually sets
10	forth everything that we need to rely on anyway.
11	JUDGE FEINMAN: Okay.
12	MS. FABIANO: The Bonilla decision says that the
13	DHS recognizes its obligation and indicated that it would
14	find a bed for anyone even if there were no vacancies.
15	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Your Honor.
16	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of The People of the State of New York People Ex Rel. Fred Johnson v. Superintendent, Adirondack Correctional Facility, et al., No. 74, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Shanna Shaphe Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 Date: October 15, 2020

