1	COURT OF APPEALS			
2	STATE OF NEW YORK			
3	PATRICK LYNCH, ET AL.,			
4	Appellants,			
5	-against-			
6	NO. 44 THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL.,			
7	Respondents.			
9	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor September 10, 202			
10	Before:			
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE			
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA			
13				
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN			
15				
16	Appearances:			
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24	Penina Wolick			
0 E	Official Court Transcribe			



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good afternoon, everyone. The first appeal on this afternoon's calendar is appeal number 44, Lynch v. The City of New York.

Counsel?

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MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor. The - - - the point I want to emphasize, of course, I'm going to start with the text of the statute, which says, "Any member who is absent without pay for child care leave shall be eligible for credit." And nobody disputes that "member" means member of the Police Pension Fund.

But the City reads the language to say "any member in tier 1 or tier 2, but not tier 3." And that's flatly contrary to the text of the stat - - - the statute. And I think it's fair to say that essentially the only basis the City has for the way it reads the statute is the theory, which comes up over and over again in their brief, that Article 14 of the Retirement & Social Security Law - - excuse me - - - the Retirement & Social Security Law, is the exclusive source of benefits for tier 3 members.

They say that if - - - when the 2000 legislature - - - this was a bill passed in 2000 - - - when they passed that statute, the legislature must have understood that if they wanted to give a benefit to tier 3 members, they had to do it by amending the RSSL and Article 14. They couldn't do it by amending the City Administrative Code.

Now, I would say that even if the legislature - -- there was some evidence the legislature thought that in 2000, I would argue that it could not overcome the plain text of the statute. But if the 2000 legislature did not have this understanding, and there's no basis for attributing that understanding to the 2000 legislature, then I think the City's case collapses completely. And I'm going to argue that there's no basis, whatever, for attributing to the 2000 legislature the idea that Article 14 was the exclusive source of benefits.

The only statute or statutory text that the City relies on for this ex - - - their exclusivity theory - - - the theory that you've got to go to Article 14, is 519(1) of the Social Security Law - - - sorry, Retirement & Social Security law, which is on page - - - I brought it in full at page 4 of my reply brief. And it just won't bear the meaning that the City gives it. There's no way to read that statute as an exclusivity statute.

JUDGE FAHEY: Mr. Smith, do we need to look at the sponsor's memorandums, particularly - - - particularly the 2005 amendment here?

MR. SMITH: Okay. I'm sorry, the - - - it's very hard to tell who's talking. Judge Garcia?

JUDGE FAHEY: No, it was Judge Fahey.

MR. SMITH: I'm sorry.



JUDGE FAHEY: No, don't worry about it. It's the masks. Everybody's had the same problem.

MR. SMITH: Yes, I apologize.

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JUDGE FAHEY: It's no problem.

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, the - - - the - - - well, the 2005 memorandum would, I think, be more relevant, if you're interpreting the 2005 statute. But I would like to talk - - since you brought it up - - about what happened five - - - five years after, and to me, more important, four years after this law was passed.

This one was passed in 2000. And then there's a little drama in 2004 and 2005 involving the corrections officer, which is a very major point to my adversary's reliance. May I say in parenthesis, he does that because there's nothing before 2000 that could possibly support - - and I mean, he says that there are things that do support it, but they don't.

But he - - - what he has to rely on primarily is what happened afterwards, and that's a weak point to begin with, because how is the - - - how does that prove what the 2000 legislature thought? But it's weaker than it looks.

What happened was, in 2004, the - - - the legislature, everyone agrees, wanted to give a benefit to all correction officers, including tier 3. So it did so by amending the Administrative Code.

And the - - - the City says, well, that - - - that was an oversight. They - - - they made a mistake.

They - - - they didn't do what they intended to do. What was the oversight? The oversight was that the 2004 legislature didn't know that they had to amend Article 14.

Well, if they didn't - - - if they didn't know it, how's the two - - - how are we supposed to think the 2000 legislature knew it? How are we supposed to believe that any legislature before 2005 had any idea that they were supposed to amend Article 14 of the Administrative Code?

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JUDGE FAHEY: I see the plain-language argument, but you know, what I wonder here is the Appellate Division seemed to rely on the concept that there was a conflict between the Administrative Code and the RSSL. Why don't you address that issue?

MR. SMITH: I don't think there's any conflict at all. The - - - Article 14 doesn't have a child care benefit in it. There's only a conflict if you accept the premise that it doesn't - - - that it - - - that an exclusion from Article - - - that - - - that anything that's not in Article 14 is excluded. And that's not right.

We have counter-examples. There's a variable



supplement fund that's not in Article 14 that applies to tier 3 - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, what about in 519, the effect of other laws provision that says, "provisions of the Administrative Code relating to procedural matters shall apply to tier 3 members covered by 14"?

MR. SMITH: Yeah, that's where I was going a second ago, Your Honor. The - - - that's a statute of inclusion, not exclusion. It says these things shall apply. The - - - the City's brief puts the word "only" there, but not in quotation marks, because the word "only" isn't in the statute.

It's in - - - 519 is an incorporation by reference statute. It says in substance, we don't want to type everything from every other statute that's going to be just the same for tier 3 as for everybody else. So we hereby incorporate it by reference.

And that's all 519 does. And they - - - and - - - and I think that's why my adversary didn't quote the full statute in his brief. If you - - if you read the whole statute, any provision of this chapter of the state - - - of several things - - including the New York City Administrative Code, shall apply to members covered under this statute, if it relates to certain subjects. That's all it says. It says "shall apply". It doesn't say

anything shall not apply. It doesn't say the only way to amend this is by amending Article 14.

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If it had said that, by the way, they - - - it would be ineffective, because you can't bind future legislatures. That is, if they had said the - - - no future legislature may amend this statute except by doing a certain thing, the next legislature could say, sorry, we don't agree, we're amending it any way we want.

But that - - - that doesn't come up. This is not - - - this - - - this is purely an incorporation by reference statute. It is not an exclusionary statute. It's never been read as being an exclusionary statute. There is no case anywhere, in fact, that adopts this theory.

JUDGE WILSON: There's also - - - there's also sort of the strain the City's papers, I think, that when "any member" was written, there were no tier 3 members, and the City knew that, and so it was meant to apply only to tier 1 and tier 2.

MR. SMITH: Actually, I - - - I don't think that's at all logical, Your Honor. First of - - - first of course, tier 3, did exist and the possibility of applying it to tier 3 members was very, very much alive. They had to - - every two years, they passed a law excluding tier 3 members.

And in any event, when you - - - the statute says any member of the police force. If you're going to - - - or any member of the Police Pension Fund, where - - is what it means. If you say "any member of the Police Pension Fund", what you - - - the - - - the only natural interpretation of that, absent some other very strong reason, is any past or future member in any tier, even the tiers that haven't been created yet, even if they'd never heard of tier 3.

If they were going to say "any member", that can be understood as meaning "any member". If they wanted to say any member who's a member today, that's different.

Then you wouldn't get to - - - to tier 3. But if you say any member of the police force shall get a badge or a cost-of-living adjustment or anything, it means any member of the police force. It doesn't mean just the tiers that happened to exist at the moment, even though tier 3 did exist at the moment, in 2000, and - - - and it was entirely possible - - and something the legislature must have been - - have been deemed to have - - deemed to have understood that it could apply to - - - to - - - to police officers.

So I don't - - - I just don't think the City even gets to first base, unless you buy the idea that there is - - which I think is an urban legend - - - that the - - -



that you have to amend Article 14 if you're going to give any benefit to tier 3 officers.

No case has ever said that. No statute has ever said that. No legislative history within five years of the --- of --- that is until five years after the 2000 legislature passed this law, had ever said that. And the 2004 legislature obviously had a completely contrary understanding.

I guess my time is up.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

Counsel?

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MR. MOORE: May it please the court, my name is John Moore, and I represent the City of New York and the New York City Police Pension Fund.

The legislature has made clear that it neither understood nor intended the child care service credit benefit to apply to tier 3 police officers.

JUDGE GARCIA: But Counsel, if - - - if we're thinking - - - you know, I understand your adversary's argument to be, look at the plain language of the statute that was passed in 2000. I understand that argument.

I think does your argument have to be: when they passed that statute in 2000, the legislature intended that only to apply to tier 2 members, knowing that every two years this thing had the possibility of rolling over into



tier 3? But that was their intention in 2000? 1 2 MR. MOORE: That - - - that's correct, Your 3 Honor. That - - - it was - - -4 JUDGE GARCIA: What in the record indicates that? 5 MR. MOORE: What indicates that is that it was 6 included in the Administrative Code but not in the 7 Retirement & Social Security Law in Article 14. There are 8 numerous provisions in the Administrative Code that only 9 apply - - - that apply to members - - - the key term here -10 - - but only apply to members in tier 1 and tier 2. Now, I want to draw the court's attention to the 11 12 - - - the 2014 decision - - -13 JUDGE GARCIA: But wouldn't you have to look at 14 each of those provisions and understand what it does and 15 what was in effect when that provision was passed? But in 16 this case we know it was 2000, we know that there was the 17 potential for roll-over, we know the intended benefit. And 18 I - - - I have a hard time constructing legislative intent here - - - if we're going to look for one, beyond the plain 19 20 meaning of the statute - - - that says we only intend this 21 to apply as long as you're in tier 2, and as soon as

MR. MOORE: Well, there - - - there's numerous places to look. And - - - and one of which is that - - - the prime example that I would point Your Honor to is the -

there's a roll-over, you're going to lose this benefit.



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- - is that the legislature understands the structure of the pension system that it's enacted.

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Now, it's a complex system. It's been amended piecemeal over decades, which is why this court has always been clear that it adopts a very holistic analysis and interprets the statute as a whole.

In doing so, you have to look at Section 519, which defines the effect of other laws. Now, the PBA claims that that's a state - - - that's a statute of inclusion, that it expr - - expressly includes the transfer of members and reserves between systems, the reemployment of retired members, and procedural matters.

Then under the PBA's reading it also includes - - and everything else. But by a second - - - by specifically naming those three sta - - - those three areas, those three categories, where the Administrative Code does apply to Article 14 members, it is, by implication, excluding things that don't fall within those three categories.

JUDGE FAHEY: Let me - - - let me address that argument and one of my difficulties with it. The way I see it is if we just stick to the plain-language argument, I don't think the plain-language argument favors your point of view. But - - reasonable minds can differ about that, however.

1	But what I'm wondering is, it seems that you're	
2	arguing that the Administrative Code that was enacted in	
3	2000 is repealed by an RSSL Section 15(h), which was	
4	enacted in 1976. Does that make any sense?	
5	MR. MOORE: Well, that that's incorrect,	
6	Your Honor.	
7	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.	
8	MR. MOORE: The the and the	
9	reason is that the Administrative Code provision was not	
10	repealed at all. It continues to apply for tier 2 and tie	
11	1 members. At this point, I suspect there are no tier 1,	
12	but it does continue.	
13	JUDGE FAHEY: But wouldn't wouldn't the	
14	court say that what we should be trying to do here is	
15	is reconcile these, is read them together?	
16	MR. MOORE: The that's correct. And what	
17	that and the way that you do that, is by reading the	
18	Administrative Code to apply to tier 1 and tier 2 members	
19	and Article 14 to apply to tier 3 members. And I want to	
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21	JUDGE FAHEY: Going back to the plain-language	
22	territory, that's the problem there.	
23	MR. MOORE: Well, so if I may, Your Honor	
24	JUDGE FAHEY: Sure.	
25	MR. MOORE: I'd like to return to to	

this court's 2014 decision in Lynch, because I think that it addressed many of the issues that are - - are being questioned in this appeal, and because the rendition of that, from the PBA is - - does not accurately reflect what the court decided.

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In 2014, the court was considering an increased take-home pay benefit that was granted in the Administrative Code, to members in Section 13-226. That was a temporary benefit that was eventually made permanent during the te - - - the per - - - the pension reform measures of - - - of the mid '70s. And so that was extended and then made permanent.

It was made permanent, by the way, after tier 3 members - - - after tier 3 had been created. In - - - in doing so, however, the - - - the court - - - this court held that in making it permanent, it made it permanent for those members who are already entitled to receive it. It didn't expand the scope of those members.

So the question became: are tier 3 members - - - are tier 3 police officers eligible to claim that benefit?

The supreme court, when it ruled on this issue, said the statute says "members", tier 3 are members, that's the end of the analysis. This court, however, rejected that reasoning. This is the language in the Lynch decision that says that in order for a benefit, even one applying to

members, to apply to tier 3 members, it has to be included in Article 14.

JUDGE STEIN: But this one doesn't have that same language. And that language is very distinctive from what's - - - what's in - - - in this case. So I mean, I think Lynch recognized that the benefit, you know, was - - was set forth in the Code.

I guess my - - - my question is, is if the legislature in this case, without any language like that, intended to limit it to tier 2 members, why didn't they just put it in Article 11?

MR. MOORE: The reason for that - - - and two - - if I may, two points on that, Your Honor? The first is that Article 11 primarily serves as limitations on the benefits to tier 2 and tier 1 members. Primary benefits are granted in the Administrative Code.

And that - - - you can actually still see that today. Last spring, on May 30th, the governor signed into law Chapter 89 of the Laws of 2020. And that created an accidental death benefit related to public employees who contracted COVID presumably during their work for - - - as public employees.

In amending that law, which also applies to members - - again, the key term here - - - the legislature added the benefit to four chapters of the - -



of the Administrative Code for police, fire, teachers, and
New York City employees of the retirement system, not
Article 11; but then also into four chapters of the
Retirement & Social Security Law.

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When the legislature wants to apply a benefit across tiers, it knows how to do so, and it does so by amending both the Administrative Code and the Retirement & Social Security Law.

JUDGE FAHEY: The problem is that logic applies to repealing an action also, and it seems to me that - - - to follow up on Judge Stein's point - - - is that you're arguing for repeal by implication rather than explicitly.

MR. MOORE: No, Your Honor. Again, it's not a repeal, because the statute remains in effect and full force for the members for whom it has always applied, which is tier 1 and tier 2 members.

If a tier 2 member today - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, you suffer there from the "any" language - - - "any member" problem, though. But I have your argument, thank you.

MR. MOORE: On - - - on that, Your Honor, I would direct Your - - - Your Honor's attention to the Lynch decision, to the - - - the amendments to the Administrative Code and the Retirement & Social Security Law, relating to "any correction member". I would - - - and the Wertheim



decision.

JUDGE GARCIA: But in Lynch - - - and I may have the facts wrong; I'm sorry - - - but in Lynch, wasn't the original statute passed before tier 3 existed? Or is that not so?

MR. MOORE: That - - - that is correct. The original statute in the Administrative Code was before tier 3.

JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah, I'm sorry, yeah.

MR. MOORE: It - - it was subsequently amended during the process by - - by which officer - - by which the new tier was added. But the - - similarly, here, the benefit was added before there were any police officers in tier 3.

JUDGE GARCIA: But it existed and there was a foreseeability that they would be rolled into that. I think they had to do it every two years. But so I - - - it strikes me as somewhat different than Lynch. When they drafted that provision, there was no tier 3.

MR. MOORE: That - - that - - that may be the case. But I - - I would say that the fact that the legislature was aware that one day tier 3 officers could become a member - - police officers, rather, could become members of tier 3, actually favors us, because we know that when they - - that they can amend the Retirement & Social

Security Law, Article 14, when they want to add that benefit. That's what they did for correction members.

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In 2012, they had the opportunity to do so. They said we've realized that police officers aren't entitled to this benefit, and rather than grant it to police officers, they canceled the benefit for newly hired correction members.

That indicates that the legislature both didn't understand police officers to have it - - - they understood the structure of the system that they were working within - - and didn't intend for tier 3 police officers to be able to claim that benefit.

I want to address one additional point, which is that the - - - the PBA cites to a variety of Administrative Code provisions that it says indicate that substantive benefits can, in fact, come from the Administrative Code, for tier 3 members. I would suggest, Your Honor, that - - that that's simply untrue.

And the variable supplement fund that the PBA specifically highlighted today, actually makes clear that it's not actually a pension benefit. If you look to Section 13-269(b), the statute says this is not a pension benefit. Payments from this fund don't count as pension payments.

So to say that that indicates that substantive



pension benefits can be granted to Article 14 members, through the Administrative Code, simply doesn't hold true.

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On a broader scale, the fact is that Section 519 creates a default rule that says here's how these statutes ought to be interpreted together. And it doesn't include substantive benefits.

To the extent that an occasional procedural issue --- which is the --- the bulk of the statutes that the --- the PBA cites --- take a hyper-cautious approach, and say well, this --- this --- this --- transfers of funds, this --- the payments that employers have to make into the different interest rates, that that doesn't apply to Article 14 members; first of all, that's a procedural matter. It's arguably within 519. And it doesn't overturn the entire pension structure.

The PBA's argument would upend that structure and say that the Article 14 is not the source of - - - of tier - - of tier 3 benefits, that 519 ought to be read to incorporate everything, and that any member, contrary to the legislature's understanding and this court's interpretation, transcends tiers, which is - - again, is simply not what this court or the legislature has ever understood that term to mean.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.
Mr. Smith?



MR. SMITH: I think I neglected to reserve 1 rebuttal time, Your Honor. 2 3 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: I reserved it for you, sir. 4 MR. SMITH: Thank you. How much did you reserve 5 for me? 6 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: 7 MR. SMITH: Two minutes. Thank you. 8 I guess I should - - - maybe I'll deal first with 9 the idea that the supplemental pension benefit - - - the -10 - - the variable supplemental benefit isn't a pension benefit, and therefore could be done without amending 11 12 Article 14. That is real hair splitting, Your Honor. 13 not a pension benefit, it's a supplement to a pension 14 benefit. 15 You - - - you can't seriously say that, oh, you 16 can - - - you can - - - if you want to amend the pension 17 benefits, you've got to go to Article 14, but if you want 18 to supplement the pension benefits, it's anything you like 19 in the Administrative Code is fine. 20 No one could understand a system that 21 complicated, and there's no basis for it. It's - - - it's 22 - - - it's essentially made-up. 23 The real difference, to the extent there is one -24 - - and I'm not saying you can make a totally consistent 25 whole, because the - - - these things do get confusing - -

- the - - - the Retirement & Social Security Law, on the whole is tier-specific. There is an article for each tier. The Administrative Code is fund-specific. You've got an article for the police, an article for the firemen, an article - - - firefighters, an article for the corrections officers. If you're trying to do something for police and you - - - and not for every City - - - not for every employee in the state, the natural place to go is the Administrative Code. And I think that's why the Administrative Code was used here.

There are other things I could say, but I think maybe the important - - - the thing I really want to say is an old saw I learned in law school. It says - - - if the legislative history is confusing - - - I don't think it's all that confusing - - - but if the legislative history is ambiguous, you're not forbidden to look at the statute.

And I suggest you look at the statute.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. (Court is adjourned)

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1	CERTIFICATION		
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