1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	PROTECT THE ADIRONDACKS! INC.,
4	Respondent,
5	-against-
7	NO. 21 NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION AND ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY,
8	Appellants.
9 L0	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor
L1	March 23, 202 Before:
L2	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
L3	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
L 4	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
L5	
L 6	Appearances:
L7	JENNIFER L. CLARK, ASG (Via Videoconference)
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L9	The Capitol Albany, NY 12224
20	JOHN W. CAFFRY, ESQ.
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24	Penina Wolick Official Court Transcribe
) =	1



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Appeal number 21, Protect
2	the Adirondacks! Inc. v. New York State Department of
3	Environmental Conservation.
4	Counsel?
5	MS. CLARK: Good afternoon, Your Honors.
6	Jennifer Clark appearing on behalf of DEC and EPA. I
7	request to reserve two minutes of my time for rebuttal.
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may have two minutes,
9	Counsel.
10	MS. CLARK: Thank you. This is a case about
11	building trails in forest preserves. The Third Department
12	erred when it deemed both trails unconstitutional solely
13	due to the amount of timber cut to build them.
14	The proper test for determining constitutionalit
15	requires a consideration of context to decide whether the
16	trails would impair the wild forest nature of the preserve
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel? Counsel?
18	MS. CLARK: Yes.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Hello. Is it a fact-finding base
20	on the expert testimony that we cannot revisit
21	MS. CLARK: Um
22	JUDGE RIVERA: as to whether or not timber
23	at the time that the word was adopted, would include these
24	smaller trees.

MS. CLARK: No, Your Honor. That - - - that is

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not an affirmed finding of fact. That is a question of constitutional interpretation, the kind that this court routinely is responsible for - - - for undertaking, Your Honor.

And you know, as we're talking about the meaning of the word "timber" in the constitutional - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Let me - - - let me - - -

MS. CLARK: - - - provision here - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - Counsel, let me - - -

Counsel? I'm sorry.

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MS. CLARK: Yes.

TUDGE RIVERA: Let me - - - let me follow up on that issue. I - - I do not disagree it's a question of constitutional interpretation. But if it is argued below as a question of what was the drafters' understanding at the time, and that turns on experts testifying as to the historical context, why aren't we, then, bound by whatever are the fact - - right, the facts related to the historical context that would then inform our constitutional analysis?

MS. CLARK: So I agree with Your Honor that of course, there was historical testimony that was provided at trial and that that was part of what Supreme Court considered in making a decision that then ultimately was also considered by the Third Department.



But those were ultimately legal conclusions that 1 2 were made by those courts based upon the facts that were 3 put before them; one of those facts being historical 4 context. 5 This court is certainly free to come to and 6 should come to a different legal conclusion based on that 7 same - - - those same historical - - - historical facts. 8 And what we know here from the - - - the evidence put forth 9 is that there was a distinction in 1894 and again in - - in 1915 at both the Constitutional Conventions between 10 11 timber and trees, and that the delegates to the 12 Constitutional Conventions chose the word "timber" for a 13 reason, that there was commercial logging that was 14 occurring - - -15 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, Counsel - - -16 MS. CLARK: - - - at the time - - -17 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - can I - - - can I stop - - -18 MS. CLARK: - - - that - - -19 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - can I stop you for a second? Judge, thank you. 20 21 The 1915 Convention, that constitution was 22 rejected by the voters, wasn't it? 23 MS. CLARK: Yes, Your Honor, it was rejected by



JUDGE FAHEY: So that - - - that - - -

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the voters.

MS. CLARK: So it doesn't have - - - yes.

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JUDGE FAHEY: - - - that being the case, why would we use a 1915 argument to interpret the 1894 delegate analysis of what the meaning of the word is?

MS. CLARK: Well, Your Honor, I think that what was discussed at the convention in 1915, as you mentioned, the - - - the proposal that was ultimately rejected by the voters, was adopted by the delegates. And in making - - - in having their discussion surrounding that, it shed light on what they understood it to mean at the time, and what they - - - they understood it to mean in 1894, which was, you know, much more recent then than it was - - - than it is now.

So it provides - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well - - -

MS. CLARK: - - - additional historical context for us, and it provides additional intent information about what the delegates wanted at the time when they were enshrining this constitutional protection.

JUDGE FAHEY: Much - - - much of the argument - - once we move beyond whether trees equal timber or timber
equals trees - - - which seems to me to be an esoteric
argument that misses the underlying point, which was that
the purpose of the constitutional amendment was to preserve
as much as possible the forever wild nature of the

Adirondacks Preserve. And - - - and so whether it's 6,100 trees or - - - that we're talking about that qualify for the timber or 25,000, we're still talking about a significant reduction in the overall number of trees in the Adirondacks.

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What - - - what I'm wondering is, is most of the argument that you make appears to be the - - - it's a rational argument. And it's really what I would expect from DEC if DEC was told they did not have a rational basis to do what they're proposing to do. And you're saying, no, we do have this rational basis to go ahead and do these things.

These are very familiar arguments. You know, we studied it; we counted up the number of trees; we thought the effect would be minimal; and so we thought it would be a good idea to go ahead.

What I wonder, though, in the context of the constitution and - - - and what I see particularly in the Adirondacks v. MacDonald case, is that when they're talking about the bobsled run in 1930s being put into Lake Placid, and that was a violation of the constitution, the court ruled then, and that's still good law today.

And that analysis says to me that something may be rational, but it could still be unconstitutional. It's perfectly rational to put in an Olympic park to attract



people. It has good economic benefits. It's certainly a legitimate form of recreation and something that the State could be proud of.

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But this state made a policy choice, and the policy choice that they made and they've preserved for over a hundred years was to say that while that may be a perfectly rational choice, those economic benefits, whether it be commercial logging or snowmobiling, result in a destruction of this forest and a compromise of the - - - of the ecological validity - - actually the unique gift that we've been given from God to preserve this.

And that's why they said in 1930, it's rational, but it's not constitutional. And I'm having a hard time seeing why this is any different, I guess is where I'm at.

MS. CLARK: Okay. So Your Honor, I - - - I agree that MacDonald is certainly still good law. But there's the - - a gulf between the project that was proposed there and - - and the project that's proposed here.

And just to be clear, you know, the - - - the purpose of the constitutional provision was certainly to preserve the wild forest nature for future generations of New Yorkers, and part of that was to preserve it so that future generations of New Yorkers could enjoy access to the preserve.

So it's not a question - - - it - - - you know,



the State's not arguing that it's some kind of balancing test with different factors and that somehow you have to balance access against preservation. The idea is that you would preserve the wild forest nature, minimizing any impacts, while making sure that the primary goal of the delegates to preserve it so that future generations of New Yorkers could enjoy and access it, is accomplished.

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So in MacDonald, the - - - the court - - - this court took a contextual view. They looked at the fact that it would be not just numbers just - - - not just the numbers of trees cut in MacDonald, but how that cutting would take place. It would be in a concentrated area. It would - - - the equivalent of a clear cut. Basically one concentrated area.

It involved bringing in mechanical implements that one would not normally find - - expect to find in the forest preserve to allow this bobsled run to go up and then have a - - a return. It was an extremely wide area that they would be cutting from.

Here we have trails, trails that do not disturb the forest - - - the forest canopy. We have an affirmed finding of fact that - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: I don't - - - I don't believe that

MS. CLARK: - - - these trails are - - - are not



visible from above.

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JUDGE FAHEY: - - - let me stop you for a second. I don't believe the record supports that. I think that the destruction of the overstory in the forest has been described as minimal. And this is a case of one man's ceiling is another man's floor. The wild preservation of the forest will not survive if the forest overstory is destroyed. And that would mean it's a - - - it's a - - - it's a death by 1,000 cuts, is what DEC is presenting us with here.

They're saying this is a scientific form of forestry that we can do, and it will have a minimal impact. But 1,000 minimal impacts that - - and they will take place once we allow this to go forward. And if we should allow this to go forward, we would be saying not that what you're doing is wrong, but we're saying that all these little things that you want to do will have no impact on the forest itself. And that simply is contrary to everything we see around us today.

On a daily basis, the forests in the North

America are burning to the ground. And this proposal would

affect the overstory that protects the only truly wild

forest in the Eastern United States.

MS. CLARK: Your Honor, with regards to the - - - just to - - - to come back quickly to the forest canopy, we



- - - that is - - - that - - - both experts agree that it 1 2 would be maintained intact throughout. These trails are 3 nine to twelve feet in width. And many other trails in the 4 forest preserve also run approximately eight feet, 5 including for hiking, for cross-country, for horseback 6 riding. So this is not a - - - a new kind of trail that 7 doesn't otherwise exist in the forest preserve - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, Counsel, let me understand -9 10 MS. CLARK: - - - on - - -JUDGE RIVERA: - - - Counsel if I could - - -11 12 MS. CLARK: - - - the record that - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel? Counsel, I'm sorry. 14 I can interrupt you? 15 MS. CLARK: Yep. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: I know your red light is on. 17 the Chief Judge will permit me this one question. 18 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes. JUDGE RIVERA: If I'm understanding your 19 20 interpretation of the Constitution, that would permit every 21 seedling, every sapling that's below what the - - - the 22 entity - - - the Agency has decided is the - - - the 23 threshold of what's timber and what's a tree - - - to be 24 destroyed, and that would not be in violation of the



Constitution. What - - - why is that not a proper sort of

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end result of your analysis? 1 2 MS. CLARK: Certainly not, Your Honor. 3 - that is not at all the test that - - - that the State 4 proposes, because the - - - the first sentence - - - the 5 wild forest - - - the forever wild provision is divided up 6 into two sentences. The first sentence requires that the 7 land shall be forever kept as wild forest lands. So every 8 portion of the preserve, whether it be a seedling, a 9 sapling, a huge tree, or a vegetation that is not a tree, 10 is protected by that. 11 So everything that is done must preserve the wild 12 forest nature, and that - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: (Audio interference). 14 MS. CLARK: - - - is true regardless of how this 15 court interprets the word "timber" in the second sentence, 16 and - - - and whether they agree with the State's 17 interpretation or not. 18 JUDGE WILSON: But then, Counsel - - -19 MS. CLARK: It still remains true that - - -20 JUDGE WILSON: - - - Counsel, Counsel - - -2.1 MS. CLARK: - - - the overarching goal of the 2.2 provision, which is to preserve the wild forest nature, 23 must be - - - must be pre - - - must be maintained. 24 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Judge Wilson has a question 25 for you.

JUDGE WILSON: Thank you, Chief.

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So Counsel, if you're viewing the first sentence as independent of the second, which I understand you to be saying - - - correct me if I'm wrong - - - then why isn't it correct that the Records of the Convention supplemented by the Attorney General opinions from the twenty-five years or so after that, demonstrate that the intent of the first sentence was essentially that the forest preserve be left as untouched by man or as created by God. Those are sort of the words that are used to describe the intent at the Convention and the interpretation of several Attorneys General, from 1895 through 1915 or so.

What - - - why isn't the - - - why don't you lose under the first sentence, if it's independent of the second?

MS. CLARK: So Your Honor, just to clarify the position of the State, I think the - - - it's best understood that the second tes - - - sentence is making explicit that which is already implicit within the first sentence rather than it being necessarily operating independent of each other. Rather it's that the - - - the second sentence is highlighting specific concerns that were animating the delegates at the time.

It's more like a - - - a clarification or a specification of some of their particular concerns rather



than any argument that they're operating independently.

Actually, we say that they need to be read in light of each other rather than independently.

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And the - - - if you look at the - - - the primary conversation among the delegates at the 1894 Convention, they are discussing two animating concerns. Obviously in the background history is the commercial logging. So that - - - their goal is to stop that from happening. That is the historical context.

And their goals for the future are to preserve

the - - - the forest preserve as a great resort for the

people and to make sure that its - - - its value as a

watershed is protected. And those goals help explain what

would - - - what would preserve the wild forest nature.

Access to the preserve for New Yorkers of all abilities is perfectly in line with and is, in fact, the animating purpose of protecting the preserve for future generations.

JUDGE GARCIA: Chief, can I off - - - ask a
question?

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, Judge Garcia.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, why, if you look at the provision which has these sentences we've been talking about, there's another few pages of "notwithstandings" you can do X. And I know that some of those - - -



MS. CLARK: Yes.

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JUDGE GARCIA: - - - are roads some of those are

- - - but some of them are ski trails. I mean, why doesn't

that give the impression, at least, that this

constitutional provision is so strict that to do these

types of things, for example, to build a trail for

motorized vehicles like snowmobiles, you need a

constitutional amendment?

MS. CLARK: So Your Honor, if you look - - there - - - it's true, there's a long list of
constitutional amendments. And the - - - if you look at
what they are, they are things that look a lot more like
the bobsled run in MacDonald than what - - - than the
trails that we have here.

You mentioned - - - Your Honor mentioned ski slopes. Those are - - - we're not talking about cross-country trails - - - cross-country skiing trails. These are 150-foot, 200-foot-wide downhill ski slopes that require bringing in a mechanical implement to - - - you know, something you need to get up and down a ski slope - - that one - - - one would not expect to find in the preserve.

JUDGE GARCIA: But you're - - -

MS. CLARK: You're talking about highways that require - - -



JUDGE GARCIA: - - - snowmobiles, not ski slopes. 1 2 MS. CLARK: - - - that do disrupt the forest 3 canopy greatly and that require paving, something that also 4 one would not expect to find in a forest preserve. 5 Those are also, you know, things that don't 6 necessarily further the purpose of maintaining it so that 7 it could be enjoyed by all New Yorkers. 8 What you'll see is notably absent from the list 9 of constitutional amendments is a trail of any kind. 10 are no trails on there, because trails are in line with what this constitutional provision was - - - was put - - -11 12 put into the constitution for in the first place: 13 maintaining the wild forest nature of the preserve so that 14 it could be enjoyed by future generations. 15 JUDGE GARCIA: That - - - that might be a hiking 16 trail, I think. But this is a trail for a mechanized 17 vehicle. So you talk about putting a ski lift in, you're 18 talking about mechanized traffic going through a road, 19 which to me, looks more like a road than even a ski slope.

So you know, that looks more like some of these things that they've gotten amendments for.

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MS. CLARK: Well, Your Honor, I - - - I want to - - - I want to interject there, because plaintiff specifically did not pursue a challenge against snowmobile use. That is not part of this litigation. We're talking



1 about the trails. These are multi-use, multi-season 2 Their range - - - they're primarily nine feet in 3 width. And as I mentioned, other trails in the preserve 4 are - - -5 JUDGE FAHEY: Can I stop you there one - - -6 MS. CLARK: - - - is within - - -7 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - second? Ma'am, can I stop 8 you one second? 9 I understand that argument, and you're correct as 10 far as the record goes. I think that's unquestioned. But the way I understood Judge Garcia's question was, is the 11 12 primary use of - - - of this type of Class II trail, is to 13 allow snowmobiles to use it. And the use of snowmobiles, 14 besides having an economic benefit for the surrounding 15 community, does bring a mechanized road-like nature to the 16 - - - to the trails that are being designed. 17

There's no other purpose for a nine-foot trail than to put in a snowmobile. And it - - - it seems to me disingenuous to argue it as anything other than that.

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I mean, you're totally right. They dropped the - we're not saying that snowmobiles can be banned from
the park. I think you're right about that. But what we
are saying is that the - - - the design for these trials is
primarily a design to allow access to snowmobiles.

And my review of the record seems to show that



all the Class II connector trails throughout the park are really designed for that particular purpose.

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MS. CLARK: Your Honor, these - - - you're right, that snowmobiles are one of the uses - - - pardon me - - - for these trails. Certainly that is true. And in order to protect those who are using the park, that yes, there is a certain width requirement. That I - - - that width requirement is not a - - - a large deviation from other trails in the park that accommodate all types of other uses, like snowshoeing, cross-country ski trails, horseback riding trails, any - - - that are about eight feet in width, and hiking trails that range from three to eight feet in width.

And I would just - - - I would - - - I would disagree with the idea that the - - - the construction techniques used here are somehow more akin to what you would use to - - - to build a road. In fact, we have an affirmed finding of fact that's supported by the record evidence, to the opposite, that these trails are actually more akin in their construction, in their impact on the surrounding environment, to hiking trails than they are to roads.

And there was a thirteen-day trial at which plenty of evidence was put forth, and that was the conclusion by Supreme Court that was - - - that was upheld



by - - - by the Third Department. So the - - - the record 1 2 does demonstrate that - - - that these are much more 3 similar in construction and impact on surrounding 4 environment to - - - to hiking trials. 5 JUDGE GARCIA: Chief, I have one more - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, what would be - -- some of the practical effects of the A.D. analysis be on 7 8 DEC's policies and activities and projects? 9 MS. CLARK: Sure, Your Honor. So it is - - -10 what has happened since the Appellate Division decision is that the State has - - - has ceased construction on - - -11 12 on trails of any kind, that includes planned trails - - -13 foot trails, relocating hiking trails, building new hiking 14 trails, and have also not undertaken some projects, 15 including building new water lines for safe drinking water 16 access and other kinds of just general main - - -17 maintenance that need to be undertaken in order to maintain 18 the trails that already exist. 19 So certainly, the impact of the Appellate - - -

So certainly, the impact of the Appellate - - the Appellate Department's decision has been that it has - it has had a - - - a wide impact on what the State has
been able to do in the preserve.

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And along that same line, you know, I just want to be - - - be clear, when we're talking about you know - - I believe the phrase before was death by a 1,000 cuts - -



- there is - - - I want to make a couple points on that front.

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First, there's an - - - an upper limit that is in place to the amount of trails that are allowed in the preserve that are open to - - - to snowmobile use. There are limits in the preserve on the types of land classification that can be open to - - - to snowmobiles.

They're - - - they're only allowed in wild forest lands and not the other types of lands.

And EPA and DEC take seriously their responsibility to - - - to safeguard the preserve. That's in the State Land Master Plan which dictates that there be a trail increase in existing trails accessible to snowmobiles. So what you'll see in this - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Counsel - - -

MS. CLARK: - - - is that - - - is that because there were some additional trails that were built that were open to snowmobiles, miles of trails that had previously been opened, they're closed to snowmobile use, that they moved trails that were in sensitive interior areas out to areas that are much closer to the roadway, so that there's a net benefit to - - - to the forest preserve.

JUDGE STEIN: Counsel, if I - - Judge Stein here. If I could just follow up on the Chief Judge's question.



So you talked about what DEC has not felt that 1 2 they've been able to do. But what is the effect of that on 3 the public use of the forest preserve? 4 MS. CLARK: Your Honor, so I - - - I think, you 5 know, it's - - - it's important to remember that - - - that 6 we're not just talking about - - - of course, this case is 7 about the trails at issue in this case, but - - - but DEC and the EPA take - - - as I said - - - very seriously, 8 9 their responsibility to be stewards of the preserve. 10 So at - - - you know, with regards to overall the 11 building and maintenance of trails that would provide 12 access to the public, the - - - the Appellate Department's 13 decision has caused them to - - - to cease building and 14 maintaining trails. It has caused them to need to pull 15 back on some - - -16 JUDGE STEIN: What are the - - -17 MS. CLARK: - - - maintenance that they would 18 otherwise be doing, because the standard put forth by the 19 Appellate Division is - - - it's simply not workable and 20 impracticable for them to do what they need to do in order 21 to ensure access.

And I'm - - - I'm not just talking about these trails, I'm just speaking more - - - more generally, as Your Honor asked sort of about the overall impact.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.



MS. CLARK: Of course all of - - - (Audio 1 2 interference). 3 JUDGE FAHEY: Judge, could I ask - - -4 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Judge Fahey? 5 JUDGE FAHEY: I'm sorry we're going over this. 6 But what's your understanding of what the phrase "forever 7 wild" means, legally? 8 MS. CLARK: Well - - -9 JUDGE FAHEY: And let me tell you, it's - - -10 it's a hard question. I'm not - - - I'm not - - - if you 11 don't have the answer on the tip of your tongue, I 12 understand. And - - - and I've struggled with it myself. 13 But I think it's important for us to have a sense of - - -14 of what are we talking about here. What - - - how - - -15 what does "forever wild" actually mean? 16 Is it a balancing of interests between what 17 people could use for the forest for and the nature of the 18 forest itself? Is a snowmobile encompassed in what - - -19 what the phrase "forever wild" means? Is - - - is a ski 20 slope - - - are these things - - - or it's just simply a 2.1 constitutional barrier that can only be surmounted by the 22 People of the State of New York voting, not this court, or 23 anyone else? 24 It - - - what do you think it means? 25 MS. CLARK: Well, Your Honor, the words of that



first sentence that you're referring to are that the forest 1 2 preserve shall be forever kept as wild forest lands. And I 3 think that of course, exactly what that means, is - - - is 4 a question of interpretation. 5 But the best guide that we have is what we know 6 from the historical record, the delegates were - - - were -7 - - were convening to - - - to protect. 8 And what we know is that there was extensive 9 commercial logging taking place at the time. The delegates 10 wanted to stop that. And their concern was that - - -11 JUDGE FAHEY: Let me ask you this. Let me ask 12 you this. Wouldn't you say that it was a radical move in 13 1894 to declare twenty-five percent of the State of New 14 York off limits to all development? 15 MS. CLARK: Your Honor, I don't - - - I don't 16 know if off limits to all - - - I guess I - - - I don't 17 know what "all development" means. I don't know that that 18 --- as we know from MacDonald, there is not an absolute 19 interpretation of the destruction of timber clause. 20 court explained that to us in MacDonald already; because an 2.1 absolute - - - interpreting that term absolutely would mean 2.2 minimal or no access - -23 JUDGE FAHEY: Well - - -24 MS. CLARK: - - - to New Yorkers. So - - -

JUDGE FAHEY:

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1	MS. CLARK: so I'm not sure that one can
2	read it as a as a
3	JUDGE FAHEY: I still don't
4	MS. CLARK: as no development.
5	JUDGE FAHEY: I do struggle, too, with what
6	"forever wild" means. But I think in the struggle to deal
7	with it, if we're going to change our thinking on it, then
8	I guess the question for us really comes down to how do we
9	do that? Do we do that by a court case or or a
10	bureaucratic DEC ruling on what constitutes it, or like
11	Judge Garcia said, does do we have to vote on it and
12	do the People of the State have to vote on it to make that
13	kind of change?
14	JUDGE WILSON: And Chief, if I might, I have one
15	more if you
16	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Judge Wilson.
17	JUDGE WILSON: So Counsel, I wanted to ask you,
18	in in light of Judge Garcia's questions, my
19	understanding is that the most recent amendment to this
20	section of the constitution was by referendum in 2017,
21	which created a land bank. Are you familiar with that?
22	MS. CLARK: I am I am familiar with that
23	amendment. I don't know if I'm I would know,
24	necessarily
25	JUDGE WILSON: Okay.



MS. CLARK: - - - the historical background, but yes, I'm familiar with the amendment.

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JUDGE WILSON: So - - - so my question really is the following. At least as I understand it, the idea was that there were small things that these local communities needed to do, including sometimes putting up a pole to carry a cable wire or bracing an existing telephone pole, or you know, small things like that, that were going to require a constitutional amendment, each time, to do that, because the brace or the pole might have to be on forest land.

And the idea was to create a 250-acre bank of land that local communities, going through a bunch of hoops, could draw on so long as they at least, one for one, substituted other - - well, provided money that could be used to purchase other land to add to the forest preserve.

And so if - - - if that under - - - if my understanding there is correct about how that's working, my question is, doesn't that then suggest that this constitutional provision is so dramatic, so forceful, that the - - - even the current understanding is that to brace an existing telephone pole, if the brace is going to be on the forest preserve, you have to amend the constitution; and what the legislature after what looks like many years of negotiating finally came up with this land bank

solution.

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So my question is, isn't your interpretation sort of inconsistent with what the legislature most recently thought and what the most - - - what the People most recently voted on?

MS. CLARK: So with the caveat that --- that I don't know all of the background of that, but taking what Your Honor --- you know, what Your Honor said, I --- I would --- what really is left out of that is the idea of --- of the purpose --- of the purpose of the provision in the first place and the purpose of any kind of project that takes place thereon.

We know that the purpose of the provision is to protect the preserve so that it could be enjoyed by future New Yorkers. What Your Honor is describing does not fit inside that. It's a - - - you know, it's a - - - it's for municipal convenience, or you know, for the municipal telephone lines, or whatever. And certainly that's important, but that has nothing to do with allowing New Yorkers to enjoy - - - enjoy the wild forest lands.

So I think that is the - - - the thing that's really missing there. And if one looks at - - - at what is missing from the - - - the amendments, they are - - - they are trails that provide access to New Yorkers, which is really at the heart of the constitutional provision.



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.
2	Counsel?
3	MS. CLARK: Thank you.
4	MR. CAFFRY: May it please the Court, John Caffry
5	for the plaintiff and cross-appellant, Protect the
6	Adirondacks!. And I would like to reserve one minute for
7	rebuttal on our cross-appeal.
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Sir, we'll you don't
9	get rebuttal time.
10	MR. CAFFRY: Okay, thank you. That's fine. Then
11	I get more time now.
12	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Um-hum.
13	MR. CAFFRY: If the court follows the precedent
14	set by the Association v. MacDonald case, then the
15	defendant's appeal has to be denied, and the plaintiff's
16	cross-appeal has to be granted.
17	What they want you to do is overturn the
18	precedent set by Association v. MacDonald. We think one of
19	the primary issues to be decided here is whether the
20	prohibition
21	JUDGE STEIN: Well, what what do you
22	what do you think has to be would have to be
23	overturned over here. Just sorry.
24	MR. CAFFRY: Okay.
25	JUDGE STEIN: Because my reading of MacDonald is



that first of all, they said a reasonable interpretation in 1 2 view of the purposes of the forest preserve, and I think as 3 - - as your adversary has described what was at issue 4 there is very, very different to what is at issue here. 5 And - - - and in addition to that, as I read the 6 --- the papers in the MacDonald case, it appears to me that they only were talking about trees of three inches 7 8 So what is it about MacDonald that you think that 9 they're trying to overturn? 10 MR. CAFFRY: Well - - - well, first of all, I would disagree that what was proposed in MacDonald is all 11 12 that different from what's proposed here. The bobsleigh 13 run was proposed to be six to twenty feet wide. 14 JUDGE STEIN: So - - - so does your argument, 15 then, depend upon that interpretation that there's - - -16 there's very little difference between what was at issue 17 here and - - -18 MR. CAFFRY: That's only part of it. What - - what the MacDonald case said at its heart was yes, the 19 20 forest preserve was to be preserved for the use of the 21 people. But only if it doesn't result in the destruction 22 of a material amount of trees. So that has to take primacy 23 over the access issue. 24 JUDGE STEIN: But doesn't - - -



And -

MR. CAFFRY:

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JUDGE STEIN: - - - doesn't that have to be - - - what is material and what is substantial, doesn't that depend - - if you have a forest preserve that is - - - that is ten acres, okay, and you want to - - - you want to remove fifty percent of the trees to put in a parking lot, okay, well, that might be substantial.

Now, what if that same parking lot was a spot for two cars in - - to allow hikers to go into a forest preserve of thousands and thousands and thousands of acres, and - - and I don't know what the total number of trees would be? Doesn't the context of what you're talking about as well as the purpose make a difference?

MR. CAFFRY: I don't believe so.

JUDGE STEIN: Isn't that what MacDonald says?

MR. CAFFRY: I don't believe so. In the

MacDonald case, if you read the statute or the session law

which authorized the bobsled run and directed Commissioner

MacDonald of the Conservation Department to build it on the

forest preserve - - - and the statute is quoted in the

synopsis of the Appellate Division decision - - - that is

the only place I could find it - - it says the bobsled

run was to be for the use and benefit of the people. It

said it was to be destroyed - - - or cut no more trees than

were needed for its width. And that care was to be taken

not to damage the adjacent forest.

So there, in effect, is what the State has said 1 2 here is the context. We're being careful. We're 3 minimizing the damage. Faced with a statute that said that, the 4 5 MacDonald court still said that was not permissible, 6 because it would destroy a material amount of trees, and also because, separately, the bobsled run was not 7 consistent with the wild forest nature of the land. 8 9 JUDGE FAHEY: Can I stop you one second? 10 you saying to us that - - - they used a three-inch DBH standard in MacDonald, right? 11 12 MR. CAFFRY: Not really. No. That was the - -13 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let's - - - let's just say 14 that they did, all right? 15 MR. CAFFRY: Let's just say that they did. 16 JUDGE FAHEY: Slow down. And they're using a three-inch DBH standard here, right? And so - - - so 17 18 therefore, if I understand your argument, you're saying it 19 would be the same. And - - - and if it was wrong in 20 MacDonald, it's wrong here, right? Is that what you're 21 saying to us? 2.2 In effect, that - - - yes. MR. CAFFRY: 23 cut that many trees, a substantial or material number of 24 trees, it's wrong, regardless of the purpose. And if - - -

it's deemed desirable by the People of the State, they - -

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JUDGE FAHEY: Well - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Can - - can I follow - - -

MR. CAFFRY: - - - can go and get an amendment.

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - up on that for a second?

MR. CAFFRY: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE GARCIA: To go back, I think, to what both Judge Fahey, I guess, and particularly Judge Stein are saying. As I read MacDonald, there is this overlay and there's some almost conflicting language, but - - - that look, you have the statement that they adopted a measure forbidding the cutting of these trees to any substantial extent for any purpose, right? That's pretty broad language.

But there does seem to be the suggestion in MacDonald that the purpose has some effect on how you analyze "substantial".

So what would concern me would be would you apply the same test to action taken to prevent damage to the forest, right? And I think it's mentioned somewhere in MacDonald. Like what if you're clearing trees to prevent a fire, right, or a fire hazard? Would you count trees in the same way, so to speak, that you count trees for a toboggan slide or for a hiking trail, or - - -

So it seems there are three categories to me:



1 prevention-type maintenance on this end of the spectrum; 2 then private type of use - - - quasi-private, maybe, of 3 this toboggan slide; and then in the middle is this kind of 4 let's enhance public use purpose. 5 And so what I struggle with is, is there a 6 different approach or is it a consistent approach, but that 7 we apply differently, because this is a different purpose here? 8 9 MR. CAFFRY: I - - - I don't think it - - - it's 10 a different purpose. I think the approach is the same. If 11 you read that sentence - - -12 JUDGE GARCIA: But what about the fire hazard? 13 Would you still just count trees? 14 MR. CAFFRY: Well, I - - - I think we could have 15 a long discussion here about let burn versus natural fire 16

such as you see in the west. And you know, there's a long history of that that's really outside the record or I believe outside the scope of - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: But do you think that's a discussion the court would really want to get into on a forever wild challenge, when they come in and they say, look, we have to clear 2,000 trees out of this area, because if we don't there's X damage to the forest, and then they litigate that for ten years?

> Well, I guess, one could say that MR. CAFFRY:



1	fire is a natural part of a forest. That goes to
2	JUDGE WILSON: So but so then would the
3	constitution prevent you from fighting a fire in the fores
4	that was threatening the
5	MR. CAFFRY: No, it would not.
6	JUDGE WILSON: that was threatening
7	adjacent homes?
8	MR. CAFFRY: No, and and
9	JUDGE WILSON: But why not?
10	MR. CAFFRY: As the because
11	JUDGE WILSON: If the burned out forest is the
12	natural condition, then why not?
13	MR. CAFFRY: You've because to some extent
14	it's not necessarily natural. And I really think that
15	issue is not not here before us.
16	JUDGE GARCIA: But you're saying it's the same
17	test for every purpose, so how do we distinguish that, if
18	we wanted to?
19	MR. CAFFRY: In the case of a fire, if it was
20	threatening catastrophic damage, you may
21	JUDGE GARCIA: Or let's say if there was a burn
22	before, and now it's getting close to a you know,
23	residences, and they want to clear out some of the smaller
24	trees, and they want to, you know, create some kind of a

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thing to prevent that, in their view, from spreading into

1 this residential area, they got to get a constitutional 2 amendment to do that? 3 MR. CAFFRY: No, of course it wouldn't be con - -4 - and there may be room in MacDonald, in that particular 5 situation. On the other hand, I don't think it would - - -6 JUDGE WILSON: Well, but Judge Garcia's question 7 is - -8 MR. CAFFRY: - - - get back to the recreational -9 JUDGE WILSON: - - - Judge Garcia's question is 10 why there would be room in MacDonald for that particular 11 12 situation? Where - - - where in MacDonald is that rule? 13 MR. CAFFRY: It says all things that are 14 necessary - - - that are necessary could be allowed. But 15 it clearly - - - when it - - - if you parse that sentence, 16 it clearly says that when it comes to access for public 17 use, that is only if the amount of tree destruction is not 18 substantial and material. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so if I'm understanding 20 you with the point you're trying - - - if I'm - - - if I'm understanding what you're saying, you seem to be drawing a 21 22 -- - a distinction between actions that might at first 23 blush appear, or - - - or consistently be destruction of 24 trees, but the point of that is to save life or property

that's external to the preserve, and therefore that might

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fit within MacDonald - - - what you're quoting now, this language about what is all that is necessary?

MR. CAFFRY: Well, I think in MacDonald, they're talking about protecting the preserve itself.

JUDGE RIVERA: No, but that's why I'm asking you. I thought the question posed - - - I may have misunderstood it - - - I thought the question posed: what if - - - not the fire internally, that was one line of questioning - - - but what if the fire now jeopardizes life and property external to the preserve? Are you drawing a distinction between those two scenarios? I thought you were, but I may have misunderstood you.

MR. CAFFRY: I'm not sure MacDonald answers that question, and I don't think this court has to - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: But can I ask you this? In fairness to - - - to your opponent, what do you think "forever wild" means, and what do you think that phrase in the constitution means?

MR. CAFFRY: I think the best definition is in the - - - towards the end of the MacDonald decision, where it says to preserving the wild state now existing. I also think that it's instructive to look at the essay by Robert Marshall that was cited in the Court of Appeals decision, where it basically says there's little or no sign of man, other than trails or temporary shelters.



And those are the types of things that are - - I believe, were intended by the Court of Appeals in MacDonald, to be - -

JUDGE FAHEY: So if I understand you correctly, you're saying basically that you view the forever wild provision as one where the human use of the forest is allowed, but it's limited to that which doesn't destroy its uniquely wild nature?

MR. CAFFRY: I believe that would be a good definition.

JUDGE STEIN: So - - - so let me ask you this, Counsel.

JUDGE FAHEY: I see.

JUDGE STEIN: The - - - the State is saying, well, you know, because of where we are in this litigation, we haven't been able to do maintenance and - - - and it's affecting the access of the public. So if - - - if we assume that the access of the public is one of the purposes, if not one of the main purposes of - - - of creating this forest preserve, what do you do about maintaining the - - - the - - - the indisputably, just foot trails? No - - - not big enough for - - - for snowmobiles or anything like that; but just the foot trails that there are many miles of throughout the preserve. And can the State remove some saplings and seedlings that may be trip

1	hazards, or you know, other things of that nature? Or is -
2	are you saying that that none of that is
3	permitted either?
4	MR. CAFFRY: First, I don't believe that issue is
5	technically before this court. It was first raised in a
6	footnote in the State's brief before the Court of Appeals,
7	which is certainly not the time to raise an issue for
8	in the first instance. There's no proof of that introduced
9	at trial.
10	Secondly, it's not true that the State has
11	stopped working on trails. They may have cut back, but
12	it's simply
13	JUDGE STEIN: But
14	MR. CAFFRY: not true
15	JUDGE STEIN: Well, but if
16	MR. CAFFRY: and we've pointed out
17	JUDGE STEIN: aside from aside from -
18	
19	MR. CAFFRY: in so assume for the
20	sake of discussion yes.
21	JUDGE STEIN: Yeah. Well, you don't even have to
22	assume that. All I'm saying is is when we're
23	determining what the meaning of these words is
24	MR. CAFFRY: We're we
25	JUDGE STEIN: what are we allowing? Is



1	this are you are you do you want us to			
2	make an absolute rule here that you cannot remove? You			
3	know, and it may may take several hundred of these			
4	things to I don't know how many it takes			
5	MR. CAFFRY: It			
6	JUDGE STEIN: to to keep a trail			
7	clean and safe and to keep things from erode you			
8	know, various erosion things.			
9	MR. CAFFRY: We do not believe that the decision			
LO	from the Appellate Division or its decision in Balsam Lake			
L1	would impede normal trail maintenance or hiking trail			
L2	construction.			
L3	For instance, in the record there is tree counts			
L4	from the construction of trails on Goodman Mountain and			
L5	Coney Mountain: thirteen trees for about a mile; sixty-			
L6	nine trees for about a mile. And those were trees one inc			
L7	and up.			
L8	So you can, we believe, within the scope of			
L9	MacDonald, cut a certain number of trees to build a trail			
20	or maintain a trail.			
21	JUDGE STEIN: But are they going to have to come			
22	to court every time			
23	MR. CAFFRY: No, no.			
24	JUDGE STEIN: to determine			
5	MR CAFFRY: If it's a low number like that			

1 JUDGE STEIN: - - - whether - - -2 MR. CAFFRY: - - - if it's lower than the Balsam 3 Lake number, we're not challenging the Balsam Lake number 4 of 350 trees, one inch or larger, over two miles; 150 per 5 mile. We're not challenging that. We think that allows a 6 reasonable - - -7 JUDGE STEIN: Well, aren't some of - - -8 MR. CAFFRY: - - - amount of trail construction. 9 JUDGE STEIN: - - - aren't some of the trails 10 here less - - - aren't they removing fewer trees per - - per mile here? 11 12 MR. CAFFRY: One or two of the small trails. 13 JUDGE STEIN: Um-hum. So what if - - - so what 14 if they decided that they just wanted to - - - they - - -15 they would take it one trail at a time, one piece at a 16 time, okay? So we're not talking about either 6,100 trees 17 or -- or 25,000 trees, however you want to count them. 18 We're just going to take this piece and then we're going to take this piece, and - - - and so there you go. 19 20 MR. CAFFRY: We'd have to look at that and see if 21 they're, in effect, to borrow the term from Seeker (ph.) -22 - - which of course this isn't the Seeker case - - - but 23 are they segmenting a broader project to get it under the threshold? 24



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Here we know this is a big system of Class II

trails. We don't really have to get into that. In the future, again, if they're just maintaining a trail and they're what they call side cutting or brushing, because the branches are growing from the sides, that's not a problem. None of the - - - either Balsam Lake or the Appellate Division in this case prohibit doing that.

If a few small seedlings have grown up under one inch, it shouldn't be a problem to remove them.

JUDGE GARCIA: Chief, may I ask a question?
CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, Judge Garcia.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel?

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MR. CAFFRY: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE GARCIA: I find some guidance perhaps in this language from MacDonald to get at the issue, I think, Judge Wilson and I were - - were asking about, which is: "therefore, all things necessary were permitted, such as measures to prevent forest fires, the repairs to roads and proper inspection, or the erection and maintenance of proper facilities for use by the public which did not call for the removal of timber to any material degree."

And doesn't that kind of sound like you can take reasonable measures to prevent forest fires; you can do maintenance; or you can erect these facilities for use, as long as you don't destroy timber to any material degree?

MR. CAFFRY: Yes, Your Honor. That's the



sentence I was trying to refer to. And you could, I think, read it either way, frankly.

Does the don't cut more than a substantial number of trees apply to the whole sentence or just to the public access projects? The first couple of items in the sentence are intended, really, to protect the preserve for itself. The others having to do with public access, again, the material standard comes in at that point.

And again, we do not believe that anything that Balsam Lake or in this case will prevent the State from providing reasonable access to the forest preserve, they can create hiking trails or they can maintain the trails they have. There's no evidence to the contrary that would - - - that would dispute that.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. CAFFRY: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?

MS. CLARK: Thank you, Your Honors.

So I just want to pick up on - - - on a point that was just being discussed, which is this question about context and this numbers-only approach. And what we can - - what we can see from MacDonald is that, you know, this idea of a numbers-only approach has - - - has already been rejected. It is a material degree and a substantial extent are relative terms, and we've acknowledged that a

constitutional assessment simply can't be made in a vacuum. 1 2 And that also is borne out by sort of the 3 examples that were being discussed earlier. If you have, 4 you know, ten trees that are cut down for some kind of 5 forest fire prevention or - - - or maintenance versus ten 6 trees that would be cut down to be sold off to a company, 7 then we would have two very different situations. 8 So context and purpose do, in fact, matter. 9 the - - - the test that we are - - - that applies here, the 10 test that was laid out in MacDonald, the prohibition on 11 timber cutting is not absolute. It's a - - - it's a 12 contextual prohibition. And this is a fact-based inquiry. 13 This is the kind of fact-based inquiry that courts 14 routinely undertake. 15 So - - - so no, there's not going to be, you know 16 - - - this is not going to cause a change in - - - in 17 litigation, because MacDonald has been on the books for - -18 - for ninety years, and that has been administered. We're 19 asking for a continuation of - - - of MacDonald. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel? 2.1 MS. CLARK: And the court has to - - -2.2 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel? 23 MS. CLARK: Yes?



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JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, hi. So let me just - - - if

- if your focus is on purpose with respect to access,

yeah, if - - - if we're talking about access, I'm a little 1 2 unclear. This is somewhat in line with some other 3 questioning you - - - you and your adversary have already dealt with. 4 5 Why - - - what's the point of the - - - the 6 mechanical, as Judge Garcia calls it - - - the mechanized route? You really want access. Isn't that just about a 7 8 pedestrian trail, one that might allow for disabled access, 9 of course, in a particular way. But the - - - what - - -10 the access that you provided is for a very limited number of the population. 11 12 Why - - - why isn't that something that we can 13 consider when we're thinking about purpose, if your purpose 14 is access of the public? 15 MS. CLARK: So I - - - I - - - Your Honor, these 16 are - - - these are multi-use, multi-season trails. 17 are not designed to - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: No, I understand that. 19 MS. CLARK: - - - very small part of the - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, no, I understand that - - -2.1 MS. CLARK: - - - population. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, I understand that. 23 was not my point. 24 MS. CLARK: Okay. 25 JUDGE RIVERA: The point is that you would not



have to build them this way, they would not be constructed 1 2 this way but for the accommodation to - - - again what 3 Judge Garcia called - - - the mechanized - - - I think 4 that's the word he used - - - the - - - the machine. 5 because you're accommodating machine as opposed to access 6 by the general public. 7 MS. CLARK: So I just - - - I wanted to highlight 8 the - - - and I - - - and I may be repeating myself from 9 before, and I'm sorry. But this idea that these trails are 10 - - - are somehow different in nature from other trails on the forest preserve is, in fact, not only not borne out by 11 12 the record, but we, in fact, have affirmed findings of fact 13 amply supported by record evidence, going in the other 14 direction, regarding the forest canopy, regarding the 15 trails that are marked as hiking trails, regarding the 16 trail construction techniques that were used, that minimize 17 the impacts on the environment. 18 So the idea that these trails - - -19 JUDGE GARCIA: How about the width of the trail -20 2.1 MS. CLARK: - - - are, in their nature - - -22 JUDGE GARCIA: What about the - - -

MS. CLARK: - - - somehow different from the other trials is - - - is not accurate. And you know, we're not asking for - - - yes?

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1	JUDGE GARCIA: What about the width of the trail			
2	MS. CLARK: So Your Honor, these trails are			
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Especially on the curves, Counsel			
4	MS. CLARK: are nine feet in width			
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, especially on the curves			
6	JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah, on the curves, especially.			
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, especially on the curves			
8	MS. CLARK: On the curves that on the			
9	curves, there are some spots where the trails are are			
10	twelve feet in width to potentially accommodate snowmobile			
11	traffic. That is that is true.			
12	But I to focus on that seems to be sort of			
13	missing the point, which is that the forest canopy remains			
14	intact. That was there's evidence in the record fro			
15	our expert, and plaintiff's expert ultimately agreed and			
16	signed an affidavit, saying the forest canopy remains			
17	intact throughout.			
18	JUDGE STEIN: Counsel, can I can I			
19	interrupt you for a second?			
20	MS. CLARK: So yes?			
21	JUDGE STEIN: Counsel? So I'm a little confused			
22	here, okay? So I think the the questioning relates			
23	to: aren't we just building this to accommodate			
24	snowmobiles. My question is, what is the purpose of the			

snowmobiles? I mean, we know some people like to just go

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out and ride around in the woods and have fun with them.

But does it have anything to do with providing access to people who might not otherwise be able to enjoy the forest preserve in any way?

MS. CLARK: Yes. Yes, Your Honor, it does. You know, the - - - the goal of the provision was to protect it for future access by all New Yorkers, and all New Yorkers are not necessarily able to hike along rocky foot trails.

So having trails that accommodate differently abled individuals and individuals with - - with different abilities to traverse the forest floor, to help fulfill the purpose of protecting the preserve for access by - - - by all New Yorkers.

JUDGE GARCIA: So would a road, wouldn't it? I mean, if you built a road through there, you could get more people into the forest. But when we build roads, we get constitutional amendments.

So the idea that you're going to get people who wouldn't be able hike in through a road, I don't think, is justification for building bigger trails. I mean, it might be a justification for building it in some way, but it seems to me, then, you would have to get the same authority you'd get to build a road, which lets you get people in, in cars.

That opens the park up for many, many more people



1 who wouldn't be able to get to the park. The more roads 2 you build the more people are going to have access, 3 particularly people who have difficulty getting around and 4 may have physical challenges to get into the park. 5 But that doesn't answer the question of whether 6 or not it's a forever wild problem. 7 MS. CLARK: No, that - - - that does not answer 8 that question, Your Honor. But I - - - this is not a - -9 a question of - - - of balancing access against preservation. What we have here are trails that allow 10 individuals to enjoy the wild forest nature in a - - - in a 11 12 way that, you know, quite frankly is different from looking 13 at it from a window of one's car on a highway and - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but Counsel, the - - -15 MS. CLARK: - - - allows still - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - reality - - - Counsel, if I can just - - - I'm sorry to interrupt you there. Well, I'm trying to interrupt you, but the - - - you say sort of "access", but the point is access to "forever wild".

MS. CLARK: Yes.

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JUDGE RIVERA: It's - - - otherwise, you can have access to the park across the street. But that's not what the constitution is talking about. It's access to the preserve in a particular state. So it - - - it's a circular response it seems to me, to simply say well, it's



access to the preserve, when the point is, is - - - is the preserve being maintained in the way the constitution requires, given the way you're trying to provide access?

MS. CLARK: So - - - okay. So yes, I mean, it is. And I - - and - - - you know, there - - - there was some discussion before about deference and whether you were asking for deference. No. There was a thirteen-day trial here where evidence was - - - was put forth and - - - and findings were made about whether or not the wild forest nature was being maintained. And the answer to that question was yes.

And of course, this court can come to a different legal conclusion, but the point being that there was ample evidence offered that showed that it wasn't simply about increasing access and that these trails managed to do that, which is one of the constitutional goals - - - goals of the constitutional provision, while preserving the wild forest nature.

So it's not an either/or. And of course, there would be some point at which, you know, you would cross a line. But that is not - - - that is not where we are here. And we know that because we have the context of these trails which are, you know, situated in the exterior forest land areas throughout the park and - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: If - - - if you cut - - - Counsel?



MS. CLARK: Yes.

JUDGE RIVERA: If you cut every seedling and sapling along those trails, did you cross - - - would that have crossed the line? Every single one?

Since your argument is they're not timber - - -

MS. CLARK: If the - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - so they're not protected - -

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MS. CLARK: Right.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - in - - - in terms of the second sentence?

MS. CLARK: In terms of the - - - the first sentence that you - - yeah. So if you were to go through and - - and cut every seedling and sapling, then certainly there would be an - - an argument, of course, that that would impair the wild forest nature. You are impacting the future of the preserve, and I - - - I don't know kind of what the - - - what the purpose was. I don't know what the - - - the project would be that you would be doing that for.

But that would - - - that's very different from what we have here. And you know, it has never been the State's argument at all that - - - that seedlings, saplings, anything that's smaller than timber size, is somehow unprotected or not - - - doesn't get constitutional



Thank

protection. It does, through the first sentence. And if you go back and look at the - - - the record evidence from trial, there are - - - there are many stages at which the consideration of impacts on all forms of vegetation were considered. And decisions were made ahead of time and on the ground as trails were being sited and - - - and actually put in place, to move this way, move that way, to make decisions on the ground that would minimize impact on all forms of vegetation. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. you. MS. CLARK: Thank you. (Court is adjourned)



1		CERTIFICATION	
2			
3	I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing		
4	transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of		
5	Protect the Adirondacks! Inc. v. New York State Department		
6	of Environmental Conservation and Adirondack Park Agency,		
7	No. 21 was prepared using the required transcription		
8	equipment and is a true and accurate record of the		
9	proceedings.		
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18		Suite 604	
19		New York, NY 10001	
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