1	COURT OF APPEALS				
2	STATE OF NEW YORK				
3					
4	MICHAEL CUTAIA,				
5	Respondent,				
	-against-		2.4		
6 7	THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE 160/170 VARICK STREET CONDOMINIUM, ET AL.	NO. 2	24		
8	Appellants.				
9			20 Eagl		
10		A.	lbany, March		
11	Before:				
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFI				
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY R. ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E.		1		
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J.				
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D.				
15					
16	Appearances:				
17	MICHAEL J. KOZORIZ, E	SQ.			
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1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good afternoon. This is
2	appeal number 24, Cutaia v. The Board of Managers of
3	160/170 Varick Street Condominium.
4	Counsel?
5	MR. KOZORIZ: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May
6	it please the court, my name is Michael Kozoriz from the
7	Law Office of James J. Toomey, and I represent Trinity
8	Church and Michilli. I respectfully request three minutes
9	for rebuttal.
10	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may have three minutes,
11	sir.
12	MR. KOZORIZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
13	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome.
14	MR. KOZORIZ: On this appeal, we're simply asking
15	this court to apply its own precedent in Nazario and to
16	reverse the Supreme I'm sorry the First
17	Department, to bring it in conformity with the other three
18	Appellate Departments and with this court's guidance in
19	Nazario.
20	Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on
21	his Labor Law 240(1) claim, absent proof of a statutory
22	violation and that the violation was a proximate cause of
23	his injuries.
24	JUDGE GARCIA: But Counsel up here.
25	MR. KOZORIZ: Yes.

JUDGE GARCIA: Can we - - - I struggle with this, because let's assume - - - let's just assume for this question that placing the ladder against the wall in this position is wrong, right? You can't do it. It's not open. It's not locked. And I take your point on causation. But why isn't the response to that this is partial summary judgment, and you prove that up in damages?

MR. KOZORIZ: It's not partial summary judgment,

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MR. KOZORIZ: It's not partial summary judgment, because the improper placement of the ladder would be irrelevant if it was not the proximate cause of the - - - of the fall. If the electric shock was the proximate cause, which the Supreme Court found that it was, and awarded the plaintiffs summary judgment on its 241(6) claim, which we're not challenging, then whether the ladder was improperly placed or not, if the ladder didn't move or didn't fall or was not defective, there's no proximate cause.

JUDGE GARCIA: But could the injuries have been different if the ladder was being used the way it should have been used, even with the electric shock?

MR. KOZORIZ: Well, Your Honor, I think we get into speculation at that point.

JUDGE GARCIA: But does it get you to a jury trial - - -

MR. KOZORIZ: I - - -



JUDGE GARCIA: - - - on whether or not that caused any of the damages, right?

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MR. KOZORIZ: - - - I think this - - - I think this is an issue for the jury. It recently - - - the First Department decided another case, Goundan, 188 A.D. 3d 596, where they cited the Vukovich case to grant summary judgment for the plaintiff when he fell off a scaffold under all - - - very similar circumstances here.

So before it was a ladder, it wasn't sufficient; and now a scaffold is not sufficient. It's our position that the First Department or certain panels of the First Department are using Vukovich to rubber stamp summary judgments in favor of plaintiffs on electrical shock cases, without having them show a statutory violation and that the violation was the proximate cause of the injuries.

To the extent that my - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: I guess my question is, can you say here - - - again assume you have a statutory violation; your question is proximate cause; you've got summary judgment on statutory violation; why can't you let the jury figure out proximate cause? Because you don't have any injuries proved yet, right?

MR. KOZORIZ: I don't think we get to summary judgment on 240 unless there's been proven a violation and proven proximate cause. I think that all has to wait for a



jury.

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To the extent that my written or oral arguments fall short here, I would refer the court to Justice Tom's dissent in the case below, and in his reluctant cur - - - concurring opinion in Nazario as our position. I could not have stated it any better than Justice Tom did below.

JUDGE FAHEY: It seems one of the things we may have to grapple with here - - - and maybe not, but - - - is the distinguishing of Nazario and if Nazario can't be distinguished, then you would argue that you would be successful; is that right?

MR. KOZORIZ: Yes.

JUDGE FAHEY: All right, and then if it can be distinguished, what would be the basis of the distinguishment?

But before we do that, can we analytically just take a step back a second and say: don't we really have to answer the question now, the adequacy of the safety device in the first instance is what 241 - - - not 241(6), but 241 - - - has to look at.

And that responsibility for providing the adequate safety device in the first instance would be your client's responsibility. You would agree with that premise?

MR. KOZORIZ: Under the statute, yes.



JUDGE FAHEY: Sure, under the statute. It's pretty straightforward basic labor law stuff.

That being the case, wouldn't it - - - you have to be protected from both - - - you have to provide a safe work environment, a safe way to do it, so if the device that's provided for you to work in an elevated setting on a particular location that could result in electrical shock, doesn't it have to both protect you from working in an elevated 241 circumstance and also from the electrical shock; which means that the device that you're on - - - whatever it's on, a scaffold or platform or whatever - - - has to be adequately grounded so that you won't get shocked?

And in this instance, the question is whether or not that safety device in the first instance was adequate?

Wouldn't that precede any other analysis? And that seems - you know, that seems kind of a straightforward analysis.

MR. KOZORIZ: Is Your Honor's question whether the safety device itself was required to anticipate that the worker would receive an electric - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, it's not - - -

MR. KOZORIZ: - - - shock?

on electrical device, and then you're elevated. So because you're elevated, he has to be able to work safely.

That means you don't fall off and you don't - - - you don't get shocked or damaged by electricity, just in the same way as if you were working on an elevated device and you had to perform another type of activity where the activity itself could hurt you. Wouldn't we first have to look at the adequacy of the safety device, which would here be the ladder, and the ladder had to protect you from both falling and from falling as a result of your shock.

MR. KOZORIZ: Well - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Wouldn't it have to protect you?

MR. KOZORIZ: - - Your Honor, respectfully, I think you misspoke when you said that he was there to work on - - on an electrical situation.

JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead.

MR. KOZORIZ: He was a plumber, and it was not anticipated that there were any live electrical wires up there. It was simply an accident that one of the caps on the wires fell off and happened to make contact with one of the pipes.

JUDGE FAHEY: No, I understand that.

MR. KOZORIZ: Right.

JUDGE FAHEY: I'm not questioning your recitation of the facts. I'm just wondering if the safety device has

to protect you from working around and in an environment 1 2 where you could be injured in various ways, and one of them 3 is through electrical shock, and you're in an elevated 4 environment? 5 MR. KOZORIZ: I don't think so, Your Honor, 6 because - - -7 JUDGE FAHEY: And why is that? 8 MR. KOZORIZ: Because the safety device itself is 9 to prevent - - - is to provide adequate protection and 10 access to the work area. JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 11 12 MR. KOZORIZ: Now, certainly it has to be safe, 13 but the law in this state and set forth by this court isn't 14 that owners and general contractors have to anticipate 15 every single possible danger that a worker may encounter on 16 a work site. 17

JUDGE STEIN: So let's assume, for a second, that this ladder, you know - - - that there - - - at least there's a question about whether the ladder was appropriate. Do - - - does the - - - do you think the plaintiff has to show that there was another enumerated safety device that would have made that ladder safe?

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MR. KOZORIZ: I don't think he has to do that if he can show, under the case law, as instructed by this court and all the other Departments, that if the ladder



failed him as a result of the electric shock - - - in all
the other cases where summary judgment was affirmed for
plaintiffs in the 240 case, it was demonstrated that the
ladder itself did not provide the proper protection,
because it collapsed or slipped or was otherwise defective.

Here in this case, there's no evidence that the
ladder fell or slipped or was defective in any way.

JUDGE STEIN: Does it matter - - - does it matter
whether the ladder wouldn't fit in the open position in

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to get?

MR. KOZORIZ: I don't - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Does that make a difference?

that space versus whether it wouldn't reach where he needed

MR. KOZORIZ: I don't think it does make a difference, because he was using the ladder for five to fifteen minutes before his accident. He had no problem reaching the work space.

Now, granted, he should not have set up the ladder in that position. But the ladder itself and the positioning of the ladder was not the proximate cause of the accident. It was the electric shock.

JUDGE FAHEY: So let me ask this, then, are saying that the Court of Appeals - - - well, let me ask you this. Are you - - can you point to something where the Court of Appeals has ever suggested that all elevated falls



1	following an electrical shock are carved out of the
2	protections of the statute?
3	MR. KOZORIZ: Absolutely not. That was touched
4	upon
5	JUDGE FAHEY: Is there some form of an electrica
6	shock exception that you're arguing for?
7	MR. KOZORIZ: Absolutely not. And
8	JUDGE FAHEY: So shouldn't the safety device,
9	then, protect you from an electrical shock, if you're
10	working around electricity in an elevated situation?
11	MR. KOZORIZ: Well, what device would that be?
12	As
13	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, you ground it.
14	MR. KOZORIZ: You ground the
15	JUDGE FAHEY: I mean, probably none of us here
16	are electricians, but it my minimal understanding,
17	you just simply have a grounded device if you're working
18	around
19	JUDGE GARCIA: Would that require us to overrule
20	Nazario? I mean, wasn't Nazario a shock case where the
21	ladder was properly used and we said no, you don't have
22	strict liability there?
23	MR. KOZORIZ: It would not require you to
24	overrule Nazario, Your Honor.
25	JUDGE GARCIA: No, no, I'm saying would Judge

Fahey's point - - -1 2 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - require us to overrule 4 Nazario? 5 MR. KOZORIZ: Oh, yes, I think it would. I think 6 --- you know, I'm not an electrician either. I don't 7 think grounding the ladder would have provided the 8 protection to the plaintiff, because - - -9 JUDGE GARCIA: But here the difference with 10 Nazario to me is not do we need a rule that says any time you go up on a ladder you have to be protected for - - - by 11 12 - - - from electric shock. It's, does it make a difference 13 that this ladder was not open and locked as an A frame? 14 that the difference that gets you out of Nazario? 15 MR. KOZORIZ: I do not think so, because if the 16 plaintiff had testified that the ladder fell, and part of 17 the reason was because I couldn't access my work area and I 18 had to fold it up, and a proper ladder wasn't provided, and that's why I fell, then no. That would be an easy 240 case 19 20 for the plaintiff. 21 JUDGE WILSON: Well, doesn't he say part of that? 22 Doesn't he say I couldn't use the ladder in its open and 23 locked position; I had to fold it and put it against the 24 wall? He says that part of it, right?



MR. KOZORIZ: Correct.

JUDGE WILSON: And there is evidence that the 1 2 ladder was sideways after the accident, on the floor, no? 3 MR. KOZORIZ: There's evidence that a ladder was 4 sideways on the floor, not necessarily the ladder. There's 5 testimony from Mr. Renna that he doesn't recall if he saw more than one ladder in the room. 6 He testified that he saw a wooden eight-foot A-7 8 frame ladder on the floor. But the plaintiff testified he 9 was using a ten-foot blue fiberglass ladder. So the ladder 10 that Mr. Renna saw on the floor was not the same ladder 11 that the plaintiff was using, if we believe plaintiff's own 12 testimony as to what ladder he was - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: But let me ask you, other than 14 going to his credibility, what is the point of that? 15 MR. KOZORIZ: The point is, is that plaintiff has 16 not met his prima facie burden to show that the ladder 17 failed, that there was any - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I'm not understanding why 19 the fact that he called it one - - - the ladder is made out 20 of one kind material and someone speculates it's made out 2.1 of another kind of material, why is that - - -2.2 MR. KOZORIZ: It's two different - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - matter to the - - - to the 24 ladder that's actually next to him shortly after he's 25 crying out?



1	MR. KOZORIZ: Well, it wasn't next to him. Mr.
2	Renna didn't see the plaintiff until the plaintiff was
3	already outside of the room where the accident happened.
4	What Mr. Renna saw was a ladder lying on the floor.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
6	MR. KOZORIZ: There were other ladders or could
7	have been other ladders in the room. And that ladder on
8	the floor might not have been the ladder that the plaintiff
9	was using.
10	JUDGE RIVERA: Again, I'm sorry. Perhaps I'm not
11	being so clear. Why would that matter if his testimony is
12	I'm working on a ladder you seem to not dispute that
13	and then he says I got electrocuted, I'm on the
14	ground, I don't remember how that all happened?
15	MR. KOZORIZ: Well, the fact that there's a
16	ladder on the ground
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
18	MR. KOZORIZ: is some evidence that perhaps
19	that was the ladder he was using, and maybe it fell over.
20	But there's also evidence
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but I thought your position
22	is there's nothing wrong with the ladder?
23	MR. KOZORIZ: We there our position
24	is, is that we don't know if the ladder that plaintiff was
25	using at the time

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
2	MR. KOZORIZ: of this accident failed him
3	in any way. We don't know if it fell over.
4	JUDGE RIVERA: But again, this distinction of
5	what material it was made out of, I'm not really
6	appreciating why
7	MR. KOZORIZ: It
8	JUDGE RIVERA: that goes to that question,
9	let me put it that way.
LO	MR. KOZORIZ: it's it's because
L1	it's because the ladder that Mr. Renna saw on the floor -
L2	_
L3	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
L4	MR. KOZORIZ: which everyone in this case,
L5	the lawyers throughout the depositions, were presuming
L 6	_
L7	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
L8	MR. KOZORIZ: was the ladder that the
L 9	plaintiff was using and that it was on the floor because i
20	collapsed
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
22	MR. KOZORIZ: was an eight-foot wooden A-
23	frame ladder. Plaintiff has denied using a wooden eight-
24	foot ladder as he was doing his work. So that raises an

issue of fact as to whether or not the ladder Mr. Renna saw

on the floor was the ladder, or if it was another ladder 1 2 that was standing erect against the wall that had it moved. 3 JUDGE WILSON: We do know, though, that the 4 ladder provided to him was not an appropriate safety device 5 for the job; is that fair? 6 MR. KOZORIZ: I would agree with that. Yeah. 7 But it's - - - it does - - - we don't get to the - - -8 JUDGE WILSON: I understand. 9 MR. KOZORIZ: - - - point of that being relevant unless that ladder failed him. And in this instance, 10 there's a question of fact as to whether that ladder failed 11 12 him. 13 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. 14 MR. KOZORIZ: Thank you. 15 THE COURT: Counsel? 16 MR. GRANDELLI: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My 17 name is Louis Grandelli. I'm the attorney for the 18 plaintiff, Michael Cutaia. 19 Just with respect to the discussion of the 20 ladder, the only evidence that we have in the record is 21 that there was one ladder in that room. I asked all the 22 witnesses, and no one recalls seeing any ladder other than 23 the A-frame ladder that Michael Cutaia was using and that 24 was found under the exposed wire and the pipes by the

defendant's project manager immediately - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Except that that's - - -1 2 MR. GRANDELLI: - - - after the - - -3 JUDGE STEIN: - - - not the ladder that the 4 plaintiff testified he was using. And it's certainly 5 possible that nobody was particularly paying attention to 6 whether there was another ladder in the room or - - - you 7 know, if it was standing up against the wall - - -8 MR. GRANDELLI: Well - - -9 JUDGE STEIN: - - - or what - - -10 MR. GRANDELLI: - - - let - - - let me just go 11 through space with you. This is - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: Can you address why it matters? 13 I'm still - - - obviously answer Judge Stein. But I still 14 don't understand why it matters. 15 MR. GRANDELLI: It - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: I may not be appreciating the 17 argument. 18 MR. GRANDELLI: It an A-frame ladder either way, 19 whether it's fiberglass or whether it's wood. There's only 20 one ladder in that room. This was not a room that was used 21 for storage. 2.2 And there was one thing that I missed in my brief 23 I should have pointed out to you. There's testimony from 24 the electrical contractors foreman George Lopez in pages

1433 and 1434 of the record, where he goes there the day

after the incident and he says: this room is a wide-open room, concrete floor, four walls, pipes and electricity in the ceiling. It wasn't a room that was used for storage.

There was no tools and no other ladders.

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Michael Cutaia was using one ladder, the same A-frame ladder, all day. He said he regularly used that ladder. And he was able to use it that entire day in its intended fashion by opening it up, engaging its safety mechanism, and performing different tasks throughout the room.

JUDGE STEIN: Is there any indication in the record as to what the size of the space was? I could - - - I can see how you could read the plaintiff's testimony in a couple of different ways, and - - - you know, and some choose to read it in - - - to say that he couldn't reach the spot, and some would read it as saying without putting it up against the wall. And some people were saying that there wasn't room in - - - to get to the area he was working to open it up and lock it.

MR. GRANDELLI: Okay.

JUDGE STEIN: So - - -

MR. GRANDELLI: So let me - - -

JUDGE STEIN: - - - can we - - -

MR. GRANDELLI: - - - address that. So the room is intended to be a men's bathroom with two toilets, two

sinks, and a urinal. But at the time of the incident, 1 2 Cutaia's uncontested testimony is it's just the roughing 3 for the plumbing. There's no stalls. There's no urinals. 4 There's nothing like that. 5 JUDGE STEIN: Okay, but I - - - but - - -6 MR. GRANDELLI: And - - -7 JUDGE STEIN: - - - that doesn't - - - for 8 example - - - just for example, tell me the width or how 9 they were - - -10 MR. GRANDELLI: I will. 11 JUDGE STEIN: - - - because - - - and you know, I 12 ask because you know, I have two bathrooms in my home. And 13 they have the same fixtures, but they're very different 14 sizes. 15 16

MR. GRANDELLI: So this is pages - - - the pages
I just mentioned. George Lopez's testimony, pages 1433 and
1434, they ask him to estimate the size of the room. He
goes ten by twenty-five. And that's consistent with the
size of any bathroom that contains urinals and toilets and
two sinks.

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But again, it was a wide open area. There's zero testimony anywhere in this record that there was any partitions or anything in that room other than things I mentioned. And it was only for this particular task, after lunch, when Cutaia said - - and this is different than

any case they cite - - - I tried to open the ladder. 1 I did 2 the best I could. I tried to position it where I could get 3 to the pipes. 4 So this part - - - this particular area was above 5 the ten-foot wall, but it was over. And if you look at his 6 testimony on pages 491 - - - sorry, 499 to 500, right in 7 that area - - - he says the pipes were in front of me. 8 So if you have an A-frame ladder like this, and 9 the worker's on the far side, he can't reach over the wall 10 with - - - because he's on the far side with an A-frame 11 ladder. So it was only after attempting to do that, that 12 he folded the ladder, because there was no other way for 13 him to use both of his hands to do the work that was 14 necessary. 15 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. But for example, does that -16 - - does that answer the question for us which I didn't see 17 particularly answered by anyone, as to whether alternative 18 safety devices such as the scaffolding, the manlift - - -19 MR. GRANDELLI: Yeah. JUDGE STEIN: - - - would - - - would be able to 20 be placed in that area to make it safer for him - - -21 22 MR. GRANDELLI: Yeah, so - - -23 JUDGE STEIN: - - - to do that work? 24 MR. GRANDELLI: - - - our expert reviewed all the 25 testimony in the record and all the evidence that you have

in your - - - in - - - in the record. And what he said, 1 2 for this particular task, due to the nature of the work, 3 and considering the location of where it was being done, 4 that a Baker scaffold or lift, something with a secure 5 platform or rails, were the appropriate device for this 6 work. And had they been provided, even with the shock, he 7 would not have fallen over the side. 8 JUDGE STEIN: I - - - I don't - - -9 MR. GRANDELLI: And that's similar to the Barreto 10 case from this court - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: Did he inspect the area? Was he 12 there? 13 MR. GRANDELLI: No, he did not - - -14 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. 15 MR. GRANDELLI: - - - do a physical inspection. 16 JUDGE STEIN: So the question is, is what would 17 be his foundation for saying - - - I mean, I can see him 18 saying sure, if he was on a lift or he was on a scaffold, 19

obviously that would make it safer. But how would he know that that was possible in that space?

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MR. GRANDELLI: So - - - well, a few reasons. Well, the - - - there's two different concepts. of all, the - - - can you fit a Baker scaffold or lift? was not a confined area. Scaffolding could be assembled and disassembled very easily. It goes through any door - -

- any doorway you can get scaffolding in and it could be 1 2 assembled, and it provides a safe platform with rails. 3 And he says if he had been on such a device, even 4 with that shock, he would not have gone over the rails. 5 would have been protected from the elevated-height danger 6 that occurred in this case, which necessitated five 7 operations. 8 Same thing with a manlift. A manlift - - -9 JUDGE STEIN: Well, did he address - - - if that 10 was the case, even if he - - - I know this is another 11 question, but in my mind a possible question of fact as to 12 whether if he was thrown off by the electrical shock - - -13 MR. GRANDELLI: So - - -14 JUDGE STEIN: - - - if it was enough to throw him 15 16

off, would a narrow scaffold like that - - - would it have prevented his fall? Does he - - - does the expert actually talk about that?

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MR. GRANDELLI: Well, let me - - - first let - -- a manlift also, you can get a portable manlift. easily found. They're like two-and-a-half feet by like five feet. They can go through any doorway. So a manlift is very similar to a scaffold, with a platform and rails.

What you're saying, Your Honor, I think, is you're getting to the thrust of the electricity. And the dissent in this case is saying that electrical thrust - - -



electrical shocks have been known to thrust people - - -1 2 people across the room. 3 There's no evidence that - - -4 JUDGE GARCIA: But that to me - - -5 MR. GRANDELLI: - - - that's what occurred in 6 this case. 7 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - but that to me, goes back to 8 this causation issue. And I think in a way this lift and 9 the scaffolding - - - I mean, in Nazario, we didn't say you 10 have an A-frame ladder, you got shocked, you got knocked off, you should have had a lift or you should have had 11 12 scaffolding. 13 That's not the rule. So it comes back to me is, 14 is there a causation difference between leaning this ladder 15 up against the wall and a locked A-frame? Because the 16 locked A-frame we decided - - -17 MR. GRANDELLI: Yes. 18 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - already in Nazario. 19 MR. GRANDELLI: I - - -20 JUDGE GARCIA: So I think what if, instead of - -21 - we have the exact same facts here, but instead of he gets 22 shocked and winds up on the ground - - - the entire floor 23 just collapses through some structural flaw, and he lands -- - falls and lands in the floor below. 24



Would you have the same strict liability, because

1	you could have tacked him onto the wall? I mean, you have
2	the ladder leaning against the wall, the floor collapses,
3	he falls down, would you have strict liability in that
4	case?
5	MR. GRANDELLI: We have strict liability in this
6	situation because this ladder was
7	JUDGE GARCIA: No, no.
8	MR. GRANDELLI: not open and locked.
9	JUDGE GARCIA: Not this. Not this.
10	MR. GRANDELLI: I'm trying to understand the
11	hypothetical, Your Honor. I'm sorry.
12	JUDGE GARCIA: So same facts here.
13	MR. GRANDELLI: Yeah.
14	JUDGE GARCIA: He leans the ladder against the
15	wall. He's working up there. But instead of getting
16	shocked, the floor collapses
17	MR. GRANDELLI: Okay.
18	JUDGE GARCIA: and he falls down, because
19	the floor collapses, and he's injured from the fall. So
20	would you have strict liability in that case, because you
21	leaned the ladder against the wall, right? You shouldn't
22	do that. And
23	MR. GRANDELLI: Well
24	JUDGE GARCIA: you shouldn't work on that
25	ladder

2	even if he was on an open A-frame ladder, the the
3	ladder would have fallen whether it was closed or open.
4	JUDGE GARCIA: So isn't that the issue of fact
5	here that has to go to the jury?
6	MR. GRANDELLI: There but that's not the
7	case that that's in front of us. The case in front of us
8	is he's dealing with things that he's tasks that he'
9	performing in the ceiling, which includes using both of hi
10	hands to cut pipes, where there is electricity in the
11	ceiling.
12	He has to solder with hand tools. He could burn
13	himself. He could sneeze. Anything can happen while he's
14	on that unsecured and unsupported ladder.
15	JUDGE GARCIA: Is there a difference between wha
16	would happen when this happens on an unsecured ladder and
17	secured ladder? That's the similarity in my hypothetical.
18	MR. GRANDELLI: It
19	JUDGE GARCIA: Because clearly in my
20	hypothetical, there is not.
21	MR. GRANDELLI: If if
22	JUDGE GARCIA: You're going to go.
23	MR. GRANDELLI: if he's using a secure
24	ladder, an A-frame ladder, in an open position, then he's
25	using it in its intended fashion, and that would be a

MR. GRANDELLI: - - - under that hypothetical,

question of fact under Nazario, as to whether or not it was an adequate safety device.

But that is not the facts here. In this case, one thing that hasn't been spoken about is our expert affidavit not only said that a Baker scaffold or lift was necessary for this work and would have prevented this accident from happening, but he also said even to the extent that a ladder was used, a safety belt or a harness would have prevented Cutaia from hitting the floor.

The defendants had those papers, and all they submitted in opposition was an affidavit from their project manager saying we didn't provide any tools, we didn't provide any equipment; we had no obligation.

Nowhere in that affidavit from their project manager that was submitted in opposition to my motion, did they controvert that the $-\ -\ -$

JUDGE GARCIA: So in Nazario - - -

MR. GRANDELLI: - - - the plaintiff's expert testimony, at all.

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - in Nazario, if you had had an affidavit like that, it would have come out differently?

MR. GRANDELLI: Again, it's a hypothetical. I wouldn't know what would be in that affidavit. But in this case, the affidavit was uncontroverted. And in Blake, this court said that once the plaintiff makes a prima facie



showing of a 240 violation, the burden shifts to the defendants to raise evidence showing that there's an issue of fact as to how - - - whether the ladder or the device was inadequate or whether the plaintiff's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the incident.

And the defendants have not proffered anything to contest the plaintiff's expert's affidavit in this case.

They haven't shown that this ladder could be used in its intended fashion at all. It's completely distinguishable from Nazario and from Blake.

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Blake, the holding in that case was really sustaining a jury's verdict showing that the ladder wasn't being used as intended, because the worker didn't recall if he locked the extension lip - - - clips in place when he ascended the ladder, leaving a jury of evidence to find that it was - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But - - -

MR. GRANDELLI: $-\ -\ -$ completely the sole proximate cause of the incident $-\ -\ -$

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - it can't be - - -

MR. GRANDELLI: - - - was plaintiff's conduct.

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - just not being used as intended, because in my hypothetical, the ladder wasn't being used as intended, either. And you're not going to recover if the floor collapses, right?

in a way it's not intended. That's the same. So what's
the difference from my hypothetical to yours? It's that
he's working on something related to where he's actually
working that it happens?
MR. GRANDELLI: Your Your Honor, I'm just -
I'd like of all the cases and I've cited
we've gone through 100 cases, there's no real cases that I
recall where the floor collapsing, and considering whether
or not that's an elevated height danger. So it's very hard
for me to really articulate
JUDGE GARCIA: But he falls. I mean
MR. GRANDELLI: what what the
argument be under those circumstances, because I wouldn't
know
JUDGE GARCIA: He falls.
MR. GRANDELLI: the facts in that case.
JUDGE GARCIA: I mean, I'm on a ladder and I
fall. The ladder's not being used the right way. So you
have to look at what caused the fall, is my point.
MR. GRANDELLI: Well
JUDGE GARCIA: In this hypothetical, I it's
the floor collapses. But I fall off a ladder that's not
being used the right way.

MR. GRANDELLI: Well, if you had an expert

affidavit in that case that a safety belt or a harness 1 2 should have been used to protect the worker from falling to 3 the ground, then even with the floor collapsing, the - - -4 the plaintiff would have been protected from an elevated 5 height danger. 6 JUDGE GARCIA: So that means that any time you fall off a ladder, no matter what the cause, you could have 7 8 secured yourself in some way to a wall or a ceiling or 9 something, you're going to have strict liability? This is 10 really a ladder rule?

MR. GRANDELLI: Not necessarily. If the ladder is being used like Nazario, it's an intended fashion. You don't - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But if you would have - -
MR. GRANDELLI: - - - always need - -
JUDGE GARCIA: - - - if that person - - -

MR. GRANDELLI: - - - a safety belt or a harness.

JUDGE GARCIA: In Nazario - - -

MR. GRANDELLI: In the - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: - - in Nazario, if he had been harnessed to the ceiling, he wouldn't have fallen. So under your theory, if I could get an expert to come in in Nazario and say if I harnessed this guy - - - plaintiff to the ceiling, he wouldn't have fallen, I get strict liability.

1 MR. GRANDELLI: Your Honor, whether or not you -2 - - Nazario obviously did not produce an expert affidavit. 3 Whether this court would rule differently if they had 4 uncontroverted expert testimony, that is - - - that a 5 safety device, a personal fall arrest system was necessary, 6 that would be for this court to decide. 7 It could just be evidence for the plaintiff to a 8 jury if you decide it's a question of fact. But again, 9 that's not what we have in front of us. But in this case, under this set of facts, we have an expert saying a safety 10 belt or a harness would have prevented the plaintiff from 11 12 falling to the ground, and we have nothing from the 13 defendants to rebut that. So they did not sustain their 14 burden of rebutting the plaintiff's prima facie proof. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, under - - - under - - - over 16 Sorry. Hello? Hi - - - counsel? 17 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, Judge Rivera has -18 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel? 20 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: - - - a question. 2.1 MR. GRANDELLI: I'm sorry. 2.2 JUDGE RIVERA: It's very hard to see all of us. 23 I know. 24 Under Judge Garcia's hypothetical, one could not 25 even be working and fall through the floor.

1	related to the work in that particular example. You might
2	be on the work site, right, but you could be on a lunch
3	break, just standing there when the floor collapses
4	floor
5	MR. GRANDELLI: Yes.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: collapses, right?
7	MR. GRANDELLI: Yes.
8	JUDGE RIVERA: And your point was about the
9	ladder and the connection of the ladder to the injury?
10	MR. GRANDELLI: Yes, that if the ladder had not
11	collapsed, which it did the only evidence you have is
12	this case is that there was one ladder in the room and it
13	fell to the floor at the same time as him.
14	Even though he didn't recall, the ladder didn't
15	fall on its own.
16	JUDGE RIVERA: But.
17	MR. GRANDELLI: It had to have fallen at the time
18	he fell. So
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Then
20	MR. GRANDELLI: even though he didn't
21	recall what happened, he crawled out
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.
23	MR. GRANDELLI: this court has said in
24	Felker and in Gordon, the plaintiff need not recount the
25	precise manner in which the

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Can there be
2	MR. GRANDELLI: accident happened.
3	JUDGE RIVERA: more can there be more
4	than one proximate cause under the Labor Law?
5	MR. GRANDELLI: Yes. And in Gordon, this case -
6	this court had a case where a worker was up on a ladder
7	using a defective sandblaster. And in that case, the cause
8	of injuries was partially due to the defective sandblaster
9	and also due to the ladder failing its core purpose to
10	protect the plaintiff from falling to the ground.
11	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, isn't that
12	MR. GRANDELLI: So there's two proximate causes
13	to one
14	JUDGE FAHEY: don't we have don't
15	- one of the problems, I think with these this
16	particular line of cases, it's an analytical problem of a
17	dual risk that a worker confronts in a particular
18	situation.
19	And I think it's difficult for the court's
20	struggling with it now, and the members of the bar are
21	also, I think, struggling with where we're going on this.
22	And you have to look back at, I think, a line of
23	cases, starting with Felker, which is a ladder case, going
24	forward, in how to deal with this dual-risk problem. And
25	I'm not sure that this case will necessarily resolve it.

But Judge Rivera's point is particularly important. Because when you have a dual-risk situation, what you have is a situation where there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury. And here we have a possibility there are two proximate causes of an injury.

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And I think we've got to, in some ways - - - and both of you can comment on this if you want - - - we've got to go back and look at the basics. And the basics are that proximate cause isn't the only cause of an injury, but was it a substantial factor in causing those injuries.

So you could have a dual-risk situation where the failure of the ladder could cause the injury and also the electrical shock can be a substantial factor. And they're both substantial factors that could individually cause an injury or together cause an injury.

And it's - - - it's a difficult thing. I - - - it's really hard to even fault anybody. It's just a difficult thing to disentangle those things in the context of strict liability.

Not that I know the answer, but hopefully you'll provide us with an opportunity to write on it.

MR. GRANDELLI: Yeah, well, under this court's cases, it just - - - we have to show that the violation of 240 was a contributing cause to the incident. We don't have to rule out any other causes.



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2	MR. GRANDELLI: And Felker, Your Honor, is
3	materially indistinguishable. Felker was using a ladder
4	all day with no incident.
5	JUDGE FAHEY: The problem you have, though, is
6	that Nazario comes in the way. And so Judge Garcia
7	correctly points out that it is such a recent case, you're
8	really in the land of distinguishing the case not
9	overruling it.
10	And the problem you had is it could be either one
11	of those substantial factors. So I can see problems with
12	both arguments, I guess is what I'm saying to you.
13	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.
14	MR. GRANDELLI: Okay.
15	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, your rebuttal?
16	MR. KOZORIZ: Your Honors, it's our position that
17	the plaintiff didn't even get to the point of making out a
18	prima facie case.
19	JUDGE STEIN: Why didn't why wasn't there
20	enough to show prima facie that the ladder fell or failed?
21	MR. KOZORIZ: Because
22	JUDGE STEIN: What's missing?
23	MR. KOZORIZ: Because there's no sufficient
24	evidence and there's disputed evidence as to whether or not
25	the ladder that the plaintiff was using fell or collapsed

JUDGE FAHEY: Well - - -



at all.

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Mr. Grandelli said that - - - that the evidence is undisputed that there was only ladder in the room.

That's simply incorrect.

Page 501 of the Appendix, Mr. Renna says that there could have been other ladders in the room, but he saw the wooden ladder on the floor. Page 507 of the Appendix, Mr. Renna says other ladders may have been upright, but he doesn't recall. Mr. Renna says that Mr. Alonzo's version that he gave to him of the plaintiff's accident was based on an assumption. And that's page 635 of the Appendix.

The witness that told Mr. Renna that - - - what the ladder was that the plaintiff was using at the time of the accident, Mr. Alonzo, he wasn't even in the room at the time of the accident. He told Mr. Renna that it was based on an assumption.

We can't give summary judgment to plaintiffs on 240 cases based on assumptions. We don't even know - - - for example, in Nazario, the ladder in Nazario was set up properly and it still fell over. And this court found that there was an issue of fact.

Here we have a ladder - - - a ladder that was admittedly not set up properly, but there's no evidence or at least reasonably disputed evidence that that ladder moved at all, that it fell over.



1	And that's the key here, is that there's no
2	proximate cause, because there's disputed evidence that th
3	ladder that the plaintiff was using
4	JUDGE RIVERA: So the scenario you're arguing
5	that might have been the factual scenario is he's on the
6	ladder, it's propped up against the wall, it's not open,
7	just closed propped up against the wall; he gets the
8	electrical shock. He's thrown off the ladder, but the
9	ladder doesn't move at all. He's just thrown off himself?
10	MR. KOZORIZ: Right.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: Right? Okay. And so the argumen
12	there is that even if he had had a safety device that woul
13	not have made a difference? Is that
14	MR. KOZORIZ: It's that
15	JUDGE RIVERA: what you're saying?
16	MR. KOZORIZ: even if he had
17	JUDGE RIVERA: A different safety device
18	MR. KOZORIZ: Right, if he had
19	JUDGE RIVERA: my apologies. The ladder i
20	a safety device.
21	MR. KOZORIZ: If he had a ladder that was opened
22	or could have been opened
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
24	MR. KOZORIZ: he still could have fell off
25	As I mentioned earlier, the recent case in the

First Department, 188 A.D. 3d 596, the court there cited Vukovich, very similar fact pattern, except the plaintiff

The First Department said, well, a scaffold's not enough, because he fell of the scaffold. They're using an electric shock as a means of skirting around the requirement that a plaintiff prove a violation and that the violation was the proximate cause of the accident. that's contrary to all the other Departments and it's contrary to this court's ruling in Nazario. And that's why I believe that the decision and order of the First Department below here should be reversed.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. KOZORIZ: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome.

(Court is adjourned)

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1		CERTIFICATION
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3	I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing	
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6	Varick Street Condominium, No. 24 was prepared using the	
7	required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate	
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