1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	EEDDE ID A
4	FERREIRA,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- NO. 10
7	CITY OF BINGHAMTON,
	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York February 8, 2022
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN
15	Appearances
16	Appearances:
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20	BRIAN S. SOKOLOFF, ESQ.
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24	Cheryl Odor
25	Official Court Transcriber



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Appeal number 10, Ferreira
2	v. the City of Binghamton.
3	Counsel?
4	MR. GENIS: Thank you. And Your Honor, if I may
5	please have two minutes for rebuttal?
6	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir.
7	MR. GENIS: Thank you. May it please the court,
8	my name is Bob Genis, and I represent the plaintiff-
9	appellant, Jesus Ferreira. And I tried this case.
10	This is not a special duty case because of the
11	judicially affirmed findings of fact establish that the
12	city's police department was negligent in violating
13	required police standards of care and good and accepted
14	practices and planning and execution of a no-knock warrant,
15	as conceded by the Chief of Police and others. There was
16	no
17	JUDGE SINGAS: Counselor?
18	MR. GENIS: exercise of discretion. I'm
19	sorry.
20	JUDGE SINGAS: Counselor, how do you get around
21	Lauer?
22	MR. GENIS: Lauer's distinct on two different
23	grounds. First of all, in Lauer, there was no direct
24	contact between the medical examiner and the plaintiff.
25	Here, there is direct contact between Miller, the police

officer, and the Binghamton Police Department and Mr. 1 2 Ferreira. The second distinguishing feature is in Lauer, 3 you have two different departments. We've got the Office 4 of the Medical Examiner, and you've got the police 5 department. Here, it's only the police department. 6 is the police, plain and simple, so that Lauer has - - -7 JUDGE SINGAS: But the court didn't make that 8 distinction. The court said there's a special duty if a 9 municipal employee causes injury. 10 MR. GENIS: Your Honor, but however, in Lauer, 11

MR. GENIS: Your Honor, but however, in Lauer, the injury here was far more attenuated. You have the - - what was the duty? The medical examiner has a duty to do with their discretion of how they do an autopsy report. Here, there was no discretion whatsoever. They failed. They violated required police procedures with respect - - by - - according to the Chief of Police, Hendrickson, the head of the SWAT unit, they failed to do what they were required to do. There was no discretion here whatsoever, at all. They just said, mount up and go get them, boys. They did not have any discretion.

JUDGE GARCIA: Do we have - - -

MR. GENIS: Yes.

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JUDGE GARCIA: - - - to agree with that characterization to find for you, that they didn't exercise any discretion here?

MR. GENIS: Well, there's been a judicially determined determination of that. When the Second Circuit reviewed the findings of fact of the jury - - - unanimous jury verdict - - - that is what they, in fact, found. And with all due respect, this is a court of limited jurisdiction of law, not of fact. And here they sent you a certified question, a specific question, so that nothing else is - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But they always say in the certified question that we can answer anything we think helpful.

MR. GENIS: No. What they - - - in - - - in the past, there have been other cases where they have asked this court, if you'd like to find other things, you're welcome to do so. Here, they asked a limited, narrow, specific question of law. They've already made factual determinations and upheld the factual determinations made by the unanimous jury.

JUDGE WILSON: Did - - - did the jury make - - - over here. Sorry. Did the jury make anything other than a general verdict of negligence? Did they make factual - - - were there special interrogatories or anything like that?

MR. GENIS: Well, the - - - it was a general interrogatory. However, first of all, the City of Binghamton did not request specific interrogatories, so



they waived it, and that the Second Circuit reconciled the verdict.

JUDGE WILSON: All - - - all I'm getting at is the facts that you're saying have been established are sort of an inference from a finding of negligence against - - - by the jury, against the city?

MR. GENIS: Well, as the Second Circuit has the authority to do, to reconcile the verdict, as do the appellate courts in this state as well.

JUDGE WILSON: Okay.

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JUDGE CANNATARO: Going - - in response to the first question you were asked about distinguishing Lauer, you said that there was no direct contact. And direct contact seems to be an element of a special duty test that involves other things like detrimental reliance and knowledge that harm can be done. That doesn't seem to play into your distinction here because you're claiming this is not a special duty case at all.

MR. GENIS: Correct.

JUDGE CANNATARO: So - - so what - - what is the significance of the absence of direct contact here?

MR. GENIS: The significance of absence of direct contact in Lauer or - - or in our case? Because in here, we do have the direct contact, so I'm not following your question, Judge. I'm sorry.



JUDGE CANNATARO: Oh, I'm sorry. So you're saying that direct contact here occurred because the police officer entered the premises?

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MR. GENIS: The police department have direct contact here because, yes, they entered the premises, and yes, they shot my unarmed client while he was lying in bed - - or couch.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Okay. So my question is this. When you talk about direct contact, it's in the context of creating a detrimental reliance on the part of the plaintiff and establishing that the municipality had knowledge that harm could be done through certain action or inaction, and even if there is direct contact here, you don't have those other elements, or do you have those other elements?

MR. GENIS: Two separate issues, Judge. One can have direct contact and have nothing at all to do with special duty, or one can use it. It's - - - it's - - - it's - - - it has two purposes. Here, the purpose is not to do with special duty if this is not a special duty case.

Here, there was - - - as the court found below - - - I should say in the Second Circuit; I shouldn't say below - - - that the issues of discretion have already been resolved. There - - - it was no discretion exercised here. So this court has a factual record where there is no

discretion being exercised. There are no immunities. They violated required procedures. This is a Haddock case, plain and simple, and that special duty does not apply.

JUDGE CANNATARO: So just to follow up, the distinction that you're making with Lauer just is - - - just is a factual difference between the two cases; it doesn't relate to the special duty question?

MR. GENIS: It is a factual distinction, Your Honor, yes.

JUDGE WILSON: And it go - - - if I understand you correctly, it goes to - - - when you say it has nothing to do with special duty, it - - - it's a question of what the general duty the police have to people who are, let's say, innocent bystanders or happen to be somewhere where there's a police activity. And what you're asking us to do, I think, is to - - - I don't want to say - - - let's say infer a - - - a common law duty on the part of police who are planning at least a no-knock warrant but some - - some sort of activity to - - - that runs to the general public. It's not a special duty; is that - - -

MR. GENIS: It's not a special duty. However, there is a duty to the occupants of the home. And - - - and Mr. - - -  $\,$ 

JUDGE WILSON: Well, I guess what I'm asking is -

1 MR. GENIS: - - - Ferreira was not - - -2 JUDGE WILSON: - - - is it - - - is it the same 3 sort of duty that would also apply to a police officer who 4 shoots in - - - in - - - negligently and doesn't notice 5 that there's a crowd of people that he's shooting into and 6 hits a bystander? It's that same sort of duty? 7 MR. GENIS: Yes, but here it's even more 8 controlled because here, they are intentionally - - - they 9 know they're going to this house. They have a duty. 10 is not where somebody on the street started doing something 11 JUDGE WILSON: Well, yeah, I guess - - - I guess 12 13 what I'm - - -14 MR. GENIS: -- and we have --15 JUDGE WILSON: - - - getting at is the - - -16 trying to get at is the attenuation point, right? Because 17 it seems to me you're distinguishing Lauer by saying, look, 18 in Lauer - - - you said two things. One is they're two 19 different parts of the municipality involved. Okay. And 20 the other thing you said is that there was direct contact. That seems to me, maybe, makes a difference in terms of the 21 22 type of duty you're trying to impose. But I don't actually 23 see - - - and maybe you can elaborate - - - elaborate on 24 this - - - how the officers who were in charge of planning

had direct contact with Ferreira.

2	instrumentality at launch. They launched the
3	instrumentality of harm. And that is they knew they were
4	sending people out with no plan, with no intelligence. One
5	of the things
6	JUDGE WILSON: But but isn't that true
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8	MR. GENIS: for example, Hendrickson said -
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LO	JUDGE WILSON: Isn't that same thing
L1	MR. GENIS: I'm sorry?
L2	JUDGE WILSON: Isn't that same thing true of the
L3	medical examiner in Lauer? He set the instrumentality,
L 4	launched it. I mean, I take the point that it's a
L5	different and maybe that has significance or not.
L 6	It's a different arm of the government.
L7	MR. GENIS: It's not only a different arm of the
L8	government. It's a far different thing. I'm a doctor; I'm
L 9	doing an autopsy. That's a far different thing than
20	saying, I'm a police chief; I'm sending seventeen men with
21	AR-15s into someone's home, not knowing the layout, not
22	knowing who's there, having no surveillance. The cops
23	themselves, they endangered their own police.

MR. GENIS: They - - - they set the

heightened danger, which was - - - Hendrickson said must be

That's why Miller, who is a good cop, had

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avoided at all cost, the heightened danger, because that's why Miller - - - the door opened. All the other police have testified to that split second it opened, he shot because he's scared. He saw the first thing he saw. He didn't expect to see it, so he shot.

They put Miller in this horrible position, and that's why the jury found that they proximately caused the

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They put Miller in this horrible position, and that's why the jury found that they proximately caused the harm here, as affirmed by the Second Circuit. It's wrong what they did to the police. They endangered their own police. They didn't do any planning. They went in blind.

Could you imagine being sent on an operation?

You don't know if there's twenty guys there with submachine guns waiting to get at you. You've now spent a minute to try to break into this door because nobody planned anything; nobody brought equipment; nobody thought about anything. And now you're on - - up the creek.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. You'll have your rebuttal time.

MR. GENIS: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?

MR. SOKOLOFF: May it please the court, Judge DiFiore and Associate Judges, my name is Brian Sokoloff, and I represent the City of Binghamton.

First, the Second Circuit has invited this court "to reformulate or expand upon the certified question as it



deems appropriate to determine whether Ferreira failed to establish the city's liability for its negligence in planning the raid."

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There are two different issues on which the Court of Appeals, the Second Circuit, found New York law uncertain, one that they chose to ask a certified question, and the other they chose to decide, but they decided it against the weight of authority from this court. And because these two immunities are interrelated, and sometimes in prior decisions, this court has gotten them mixed up - - they're intertwined - - I suggest that this court can deal with either or both of those issues. But let me start with the special duty issue.

I'm on the screen, if I may interrupt you on that. Just - just to be clear, if - - - if the Circuit viewed that
within the confines of the rule regarding certification
that the only issue to which the - - - the panel could not
be certain of the proper application of New York law was a
special duty, can you clarify why, as you've just
suggested, this court is free to reformulate, under the
rule for certifying the question, this other part where the
Circuit has - - - has - - - unless you - - - unless I'm
wrong - - you can correct me if - - - if you think I'm
wrong - - has - - - has not opined that it cannot

properly apply its understanding of New York law?

MR. SOKOLOFF: I think the Second Circuit went out of its way. It did more than pose the certified question and say, answer us yes or no, like it sometimes does. It invited you to reformulate the question in a manner that, frankly, makes sense of New York law. And these two immunities are so intertwined. I think it would be proper for this court to deal with the discretionary immunity issue.

JUDGE CANNATARO: When you say "deal with," Counsel, you really mean correct them?

MR. SOKOLOFF: Yes.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Reverse their holding with respect to discretionary immunity?

MR. SOKOLOFF: Yes. And - - - and - - - and doing so would, in a way, make your job easier because it could defer to another day, perhaps, the more difficult, the more uncertain issue of - - - of special duty. That would take care of the case, and it should've taken care of the case.

JUDGE WILSON: Can I ask you about special duty for a moment? Sorry. Over here. As I understood your - - and you correct me if I'm wrong. As I understood your brief, had the officer gone in, closed his eyes, and just started shooting, you wouldn't say that there's any special



duty requirement there; the - - - the municipality could be 2 held liable for the officer's conduct, right? 3 MR. SOKOLOFF: I would say that the officer was 4 in direct contact with the people in the house - - -5 JUDGE WILSON: Yes. 6 MR. SOKOLOFF: - - - knew that they were there. 7 JUDGE WILSON: Yes. 8 MR. SOKOLOFF: They knew that he was there. 9 were relying on him acting safely and appropriately. 10 arguably, I would say, yes, that officer in that situation 11 had a special duty. Well, so okay. So how about a 12 JUDGE WILSON: 13 crowd of people where an officer is chasing a suspect and 14 shoots negligently and injures a bystander? Is - - - is 15 the special - - - would - - - could you recover against the 16 municipality? 17 MR. SOKOLOFF: So I - - - I would answer it this 18 There is always a - - - always has been - - - always, 19 until today, always been a special duty requirement. And 20 you could argue about the facts of that case to say, well, 21 there was, or there wasn't. But it's always the 22 plaintiff's burden to show - - -23 JUDGE WILSON: What would - - - what would the 24 special duty be in my hypothetical? Why doesn't that run 25 to the general public? I mean, to take your prior answer,

none of the people in the crowd know the police officer's there, are aware of him. He might not have known they were there.

MR. SOKOLOFF: You know, the - - -

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JUDGE WILSON: There are cases like that, right, where bystanders are shot?

MR. SOKOLOFF: It's true. And - - - and this brings up the earlier point. The court, to my knowledge, has not discussed your hypothetical in the - - - in the special duty context because it's dealt with those shooting-into-crowd cases on discretionary immunity and said, well, we don't have to get to the special duty issues. So that's why they're intertwined.

Now, this court has never, ever dispensed with the plaintiff's burden to show a special duty for negligence cases against the government acting in a governmental capacity, like the police. And it should not do so here, for two reasons.

One, a jury has already determined that Ofc.

Miller's shooting of the plaintiff was not excessive force and was not negligent. So if you were to find a special duty here, you would say that the - - - some unknown person - - and that's a whole different issue. We don't know whose negligence this was. Some unknown person didn't prevent the plaintiff from doing something that was legal,



Constitutional - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But isn't - - -

MR. SOKOLOFF: - - - and proper.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Counselor? But wasn't there more than one police officer involved?

MR. SOKOLOFF: Yes, there were.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So couldn't the collective manner in which it was done - - - so couldn't you find that one - - - the jury could find as to the one officer but still consider the overall manner in which the execution of the no-knock warrant took place?

MR. SOKOLOFF: Well, Your Honor, thank you for that question. And it brings up a very important point. This entire operation was not exclusively Binghamton employees. In the SWAT team, there were members from the Town of Vestal and the Village of Johnson City, right? I might have the town and village reversed, but two other municipalities were part of it. And also, this was connected to an investigation by the Broome County Task Force. And that involved the Broome County Sheriff.

The record here does not tell us who decided there wasn't enough surveillance, when it was decided, and most importantly, who that person worked for and what that person's job duties were. The record on that is a total - - I - - I'll say a mess. It's - - - it's not a mess.



It's empty. You can't use this case - - - it would be - - it would be a mistake to use this case to create these
kind of rules, now, that the plaintiff is asking you to do
because the facts are not there to support it.

But let me go back to the second reason why. In

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But let me go back to the second reason why. In this case - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, I - - - I'm going to interrupt you on that just to clarify. But when you say that there were other municipalities, but wasn't - - - again, you can correct me if I'm wrong. Isn't - - - isn't Binghamton's police department running the show?

MR. SOKOLOFF: The record doesn't bear that out.

Who - - - the record does not show, Judge Rivera, who made
the decision we had enough surveillance. That person has
not been identified, nor has that person's employer been
identified.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Could I just ask, as a point of clarification, that decision whether we have enough surveillance, is that a discretionary decision, or is there really just one clear answer to that question?

MR. SOKOLOFF: It's totally discretionary. And they have not identified - - - the record contains nothing saying that it's mandatory. They did an hour of surveillance to make sure that the guy actually lives where they're going to go the next morning. But there's nothing



that says you have to do two hours, three days, a week; you have to sit there to know exactly every person that's in the apartment, which, by the way, wouldn't tell you where everybody is exactly located. Even if you knew, even if they did enough surveillance - - 
JUDGE TROUTMAN: So Counselor, are you saying that the police aren't required to make sure they know that the person they seek is actually present at the time that the warrant is executed?

MR. SOKOLOFF: It would be a good idea for them

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MR. SOKOLOFF: It would be a good idea for them to do that, but I don't know of a legal requirement that they - - - that they know that. They - - - just before they - - - they went on this operation, they satisfied a criminal court judge that New York law and the Constitution were satisfied. A judge gave them permission to use speed

JUDGE RIVERA: And - - - and Counsel, how - - - how far in advance of the actual entry did that determination occur, which was based on surveillance that happened even before that?

MR. SOKOLOFF: The - - - the warrant was gotten at, like, 3 o'clock in the afternoon. They went in 6 o'clock in the morning. So I'm not sure how much surveillance they would need to know - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: And when - - - and when did they



1	do the surveillance before they went to the judge?
2	MR. SOKOLOFF: The evening before, like, 8 to 9
3	o'clock at night.
4	JUDGE RIVERA: So so how many days had
5	passed before they actually went in?
6	MR. SOKOLOFF: No, no, no. It was less than a
7	day.
8	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. From the surveillance?
9	MR. SOKOLOFF: Yes. It was what
LO	JUDGE RIVERA: I thought you said the
11	MR. SOKOLOFF: It was
L2	JUDGE RIVERA: I thought you said the
13	surveillance was the evening before they went to the judge
L4	and then the judge
L5	MR. SOKOLOFF: No, no, no. I I'm sorry.
L6	JUDGE RIVERA: a day before they oh,
L7	I misunderstood, then.
L8	MR. SOKOLOFF: They got the warrant in the
L9	afternoon, 3 o'clock in the afternoon. 9 o'clock, they di
20	9 o'clock at night, they did one hour of
21	surveillance. Their plan was to go in first thing in the
22	morning, 6 o'clock in the morning. And that's what they
23	did. It was all in less than a day.
24	Now, this whole thing is premised on the idea,

well, they didn't know that Mr. Ferreira was in the

1	apartment. Well, Mr. Ferreira was visiting. What if he
2	was in the apartment for two days or three days? Maybe he
3	was sick, and he and he didn't go outside. How much
4	surveillance is a negligence court going to tell a police
5	department you have to do before you execute something that
6	a criminal court has said merits
7	JUDGE TROUTMAN: But it's
8	MR. SOKOLOFF: emergency action?
9	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Counselor, it's an extraordinar
10	power to be given the right to enter unannounced to a
11	residential home.
12	MR. SOKOLOFF: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I didn't
13	hear the beginning.
14	JUDGE TROUTMAN: It is an extraordinary power to
15	be given the right to enter unannounced to a residence.
16	MR. SOKOLOFF: Absolutely.
17	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Would you not agree?
18	MR. SOKOLOFF: I would agree.
19	JUDGE TROUTMAN: So I'm not understanding why
20	there shouldn't be an expectation that there is
21	responsibility involved with that power.
22	MR. SOKOLOFF: Because if you were to dispense
23	with this really, what this involves is a question
24	about the allocation of police resources. What this boils
25	down to is alleged negligence, that they didn't do enough

surveillance. Nothing else was done wrong, according to the Second Circuit. They didn't do enough surveillance.

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Now, if you're going to impose a duty without - - a special duty on the police, then you're going to do exactly what this court's cases have said courts should not do, and that is second-guess police on the allocation of resources.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel, if I could reframe

Judge Troutman's question another way, though, maybe - - 
maybe the issue here isn't how much surveillance do you

have to do before you'll say that it's enough, but how

little surveillance can you do before you say it's a

complete abdication of your discretionary decision-making

authority?

MR. SOKOLOFF: Well, and Judge, let me just point out that the alleged flaw here is not that they - - - they did bad surveillance. Didn't you see an infant going in; the officer was asleep in the police car; that's not real surveillance. That's not what they're saying here.

They're saying that one hour was not enough. So how much - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: No, but Counsel, I mean, the surveillance that you're talking about, the last surveillance, is that the individual had left. There's no surveillance about him returning. Doesn't that go to sort



1	of the quality of the surveillance? It's not so much abou
2	resources but the value of the surveillance. I mean, if
3	your only surveillance is the person left; they're not
4	there, what are you doing going in until you confirm he's
5	back
6	MR. SOKOLOFF: When or
7	JUDGE RIVERA: or did I misunderstand the
8	record?
9	MR. SOKOLOFF: When the police got there at 6
10	o'clock in the morning, he was already back. So
11	JUDGE RIVERA: They had confirmed that before
12	they went in?
13	MR. SOKOLOFF: No, they didn't confirm that, but
14	it wouldn't have changed anything.
15	JUDGE RIVERA: So that's a fortunate
16	circumstance?
17	MR. SOKOLOFF: Well, yes. I mean, had they
18	stayed there until 2 o'clock in the in the morning,
19	when he got there, and said, all right, well, now we know
20	he's in there, that wouldn't have changed the outcome of
21	this, not one bit.
22	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: They could have arrested him when
24	they saw him, right, at 9 o'clock at 3 in the
25	afternoon, whatever time it was, 6, whatever time it was?

MR. SOKOLOFF: But - - - but there are already cases from this court that say that that's not a cause of action: you could've arrested somebody earlier.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, your rebuttal?

MR. GENIS: Thank you. Quick points. First, yes, Binghamton spearheaded this whole thing. Chief Zikuski was in charge. It was a Binghamton operation.

MR. SOKOLOFF:

Two, one of the things he just talked about that was - - he admits there was no discussion about the sufficiency of the surveillance because there was no discussion. There was no discretion exercised here. It was never even a topic. They abdicated absolutely, to use the word "abdicate."

Third, it's a nonissue because we already have affirmed facts by the Second Circuit that the jury found. In the special duty counsel - - - cases counsel was just referring to in response to your question about shooting it through a crowd, special duty did not even come up in those cases, except in one of the cases in the context of somebody should have prevented an officer from shooting a third party. Here, we're not saying they should have prevented it. They actually caused the shooting.

The last point is there was no - - - the Second



1	Circuit did not ask for general appellate review. They
2	asked for a specific review on a specific certified
3	question.
4	Any other questions for me? And I'll gladly tak
5	them.
6	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.
7	(Court is adjourned)
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## CERTIFICATION I, Cheryl Odom, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Ferreira v. City of Binghamton, No. 10 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Clean Odom Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 Date: February 11, 2022

