1	COURT OF APPEALS				
2	STATE OF NEW YORK				
3					
4	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK				
5	Respondent,				
6	-against- NO. 14				
7	ANGELO BURGOS,				
8	Appellant.				
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York February 9, 2022				
10	Before:				
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE				
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA				
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS				
14	ASSOCIATE GODGE MADELINE SINGAS  ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO  ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN				
15	Appearances:				
16					
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- 1				
1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Number 14, the People of			
2	the State of New York v. Angelo Burgos.			
3	We'll wait a moment, Counsel, before you start.			
4	We'll allow your colleague to leave the courtroom.			
5	MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Your Honor.			
6	MR. LEVINSTEIN: Apologies, Your Honor. Thank			
7	you.			
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome.			
9	Counsel?			
10	MR. GOSNELL: Wayne Gosnell for appellant, Angelo			
11	Burgos. I'd like to reserve three minutes for rebuttal			
12	time.			
13	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir.			
14	MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Your Honor. May it			
15	please the court, throughout his career, Andres Aranda			
16	neglected vulnerable clients, lied to courts, and lied to			
17	disciplinary bodies when he wasn't simply ignoring them.			
18	Ten weeks before appellant's trial, Aranda's pervasive and			
19	lengthy history of serious misconduct led the Second			
20	Circuit to suspend him for reasons that bore upon his			
21	qualification, competence, and moral character.			
22	After considering Aranda's serious misconduct, it			
23	concluded there was little assurance that Aranda could			
24	conform his conduct to expected professional norms.			

JUDGE RIVERA: So Counsel, I'm - - - I'm on the

screen. Hello.

MR. GOSNELL: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE RIVERA: Good afternoon, yes. So I don't think there's a dispute about the content and the intent of the Second Circuit's determination and discipline. So the question is - - - as I view it, the question is whether or not, since during the trial, the - - - the trial counsel was still admitted in New York, whether that, as you argue in the first instance, that's now a - - - a constructive suspension; he's per se unable to actually represent him. If you could address that, because he is still admitted in New York during the trial.

MR. GOSNELL: He - - his license is on the wall, yes, that is true. But the defect in his character and his qualifications and his competency existed and had been adjudicated by the Second Circuit, which is different from - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but - - - but it has no application to - - - until the Appellate Division renders a decision, right, the Grievance Committee. Until that moment, he - - - he's still licensed to practice in New York.

MR. GOSNELL: Well, there are two responses to that. First, the First Department, when they imposed reciprocal discipline, they imposed that reciprocal



discipline for the exact same serious and substantive reasons that the Second Circuit did. And they also made a considered decision about when the effective date of that reciprocal discipline would take effect.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But Counselor, they made that

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: But Counselor, they made that determination after the attorney was afforded due process.

MR. GOSNELL: Well, the attorney had been afforded due process on multiple occasions. First, he had been afforded due process in - - - by the Second Circuit, and there had been - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Right, but he is - - -

MR. GOSNELL: - - - an actual adjudication.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - entitled to due process in New York, correct?

MR. GOSNELL: He is also entitled to due process. But if you look at the disciplinary rules, and if you look at where the disciplinary rules flow from, which is from a case that's more than a century - - - year - - - old by the Supreme Court, Selling v. Radford, where the Supreme Court talks about when there is a defect in an attorney's personal and professional conduct, wherever committed, that operates everywhere and must furnish adequate reason in every jurisdiction for taking away the right to continue to be a lawyer.

JUDGE GARCIA: So - - - so Counsel, what - - -



what would this attorney do during this interim? It may take the First Department - - - busy department, it may take them a while to adjudicate. So they can't practice?

MR. GOSNELL: That - - - that's not exactly what would happen. In terms of - - -  $\!\!\!$ 

JUDGE GARCIA: What, exactly?

MR. GOSNELL: For criminal cases, because you have a Constitutional right as a criminal defendant, that - - in that instance, you cannot be counsel under the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and the New York State Constitution.

JUDGE GARCIA: So they can take no criminal cases, even if later they're exonerated and there turns out to be some procedural defect, whatever it is. They say no, we're not suspending you. For that period, as long as it takes them to adjudicate that grievance, that allegation, this attorney cannot practice criminal law in the State of New York?

MR. GOSNELL: Well, I think the facts that you're - - as you're sort of describing them are different than the case we have here, because what we have here - - and going back to the prior question, there was additional due process given the attorney, where he was then adjudicated by the First Department as being suspended. But the date of the suspension, the effective date of the suspension - -



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JUDGE GARCIA: But you're not going to know that.

MR. GOSNELL: - - - was back to May '15.

JUDGE GARCIA: The attorney's not going to know that at the time. So what I'm asking about is before that happens - - - that may take a while - - - that attorney cannot practice on the fear that they may impose discipline, and they may impose discipline nunc pro tunc; they may do it effective earlier. So you're, I think, saying that as a matter of ethics, that attorney is unable to practice criminal law in the State of New York until the Appellate Division determines what sanction and whether it's going to be retroactive?

MR. GOSNELL: Well, in that - - in the instance that - - - that you're describing, where there has not - - where we're - - - we're putting aside what the First Department or what an Appellate Division does, the obligation on the attorney is to inform his client.

JUDGE GARCIA: That's a different issue. That's your second issue, I think.

MR. GOSNELL: It is, but the - - - the two of them are related because what we're dealing with under the facts of this case for the right to counsel, per se, is that you have a decision by an Appellate Division, imposing reciprocal discipline that relates back to a time that was



1 before the trial, so - - -2 JUDGE GARCIA: You're not going to know that is -3 - which is - - -4 MR. GOSNELL: Correct. 5 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - my concern here. You're not 6 going to know that at the time. So you're going to have to, in an excess of caution, on the potential that they're 7 8 going to do this, suspend your practice pending imposition 9 of the discipline? 10 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And to Judge Garcia's 11 point, perhaps the First Department decides it's not a 12 disciplinable offense. What - - - where would the due 13 process be? 14 MR. GOSNELL: Well, it - - - first off, the - -15 the due process that is - - - that is actually at issue 16 here and the Constitutional right, the Constitutional 17 obligations, relate solely to Mr. Burgos, not to Mr. 18 Aranda. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Well, just get - - - um-19 20 hum. 2.1 MR. GOSNELL: But - - - but to your point, Your 22 Honor, the - - - the fact of the matter is - - - is that 23 what could have happened here, what should have happened here is that Mr. Aranda should have made a disclosure to 24

his client and to the court because -

JUDGE CANNATARO: And Counsel, the - - - the - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Where is that obligation?

MR. GOSNELL: That obligation flows from the

Constitution, and it flows from the ethics rules.

JUDGE CANNATARO: But it doesn't flow from the Second Circuit's decision because the Second Circuit specified who needed to be notified of their suspension.

And your client was not included in that group of people, was he?

MR. GOSNELL: He was not, Your Honor. And - - - and in fact - - - but the Second Circuit, when they are imposing discipline, their concern and their obligation is to impose discipline upon the attorney. They are not concerned with and shouldn't be - - and it wasn't before them - - about what Constitutional rights others may have who may be represented by Mr. Aranda.

JUDGE CANNATARO: I understand that you are concerned with your client's rights, as you should be. But I think what you're hearing from the bench is that there's a balancing. Mr. Aranda had some due process rights here too. And it seems as if we're testing the limits of what those rights are by, say, suggesting that he needs to withdraw from all criminal representations, while he still has a valid New York license, because he's been subject to

discipline in another jurisdiction.

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MR. GOSNELL: Well, but that gets into - - - and respectfully, that gets into the right to counsel of choice issue, that he has an obligation to inform his client.

What he did here, by hiding the fact that he had been suspended from his client, is he was the one who made the decision about who Mr. Burgos would have represent him.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, so Counsel - - - I'm on the screen. So if I'm understanding this part of the argument, just to clarify, unlike the first part of your argument, which is right per se, he cannot represent him, the - - - you have to stop the process, and a new trial - - - and a new attorney is either retained or assigned, period.

As I understand this argument, this argument is he had - - - the attorney had a duty to disclose this disciplinary action because there might be reciprocal action, and he might be then suspended in New York State, so that the defendant could decide whether or not to move forward - - I just want to be clear - - with this lawyer? Is that your - - is that the argument?

MR. GOSNELL: Yes. So - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: You're not saying it's per se.

The - - - the - - - the - - -

MR. GOSNELL: So - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - the defendant could choose,



with this knowledge, to proceed with this person as his lawyer; is that your argument?

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MR. GOSNELL: The - - - I believe that what - - - what we've talked about in our brief and - - - and what I'm saying here is that it - - - the first thing that needs to happen is Mr. Aranda needs to tell his client. And then the client needs to make an informed decision, a knowing and intelligent and voluntary decision about whether to continue with Mr. Aranda as his attorney, which is done in

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Let's say - - 
MR. GOSNELL: - - - nearly every other

constitution - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Let's say we - - - let's say we agreed with you. Did - - - did the lawyer have to disclose to the court, which I thought was your position? And if so, does that mean that regardless of what the defendant would do, if the court decides that this lawyer simply cannot proceed in the case, then defendant loses his right to choice if he wanted to proceed with this lawyer?

MR. GOSNELL: Well, it wouldn't be that he loses his right to counsel of choice. The right to counsel of choice has always been viewed by this court and other courts as a qualified right. So for example, in this particular instance, because of the fact that no one knows



when the First Department is going to impose reciprocal 1 2 discipline - - - it could happen on the first day of trial 3 4 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But Counselor, you said the - -5 - the truth of the matter is no one knows that the - - -6 the First Department or any Appellate Division will 7 actually impose reciprocal discipline until they do or if 8 they don't. 9 MR. GOSNELL: Respectfully, I don't think that's 10 actually true in this case because you had, in this case, the only - - -11 12 JUDGE TROUTMAN: No. 13 MR. GOSNELL: - - - defense is - - -14 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Counselor, you - - - with 15 respect to reciprocal discipline, are you saying that the 16 Appellate Division must impose reciprocal discipline, or do 17 they have the right to make that decision for themselves 18 after their process is completed? 19 MR. GOSNELL: Well, there's sort - - - there's 20 two pieces of an answer here. Is first, the - - - the 2.1 first - - - the - - - the Appellate Division has to follow 22 the disciplinary rules - - -23 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Correct. 24 MR. GOSNELL: - - - about what are defenses. 25 so the only defenses that are available to a person who has

3	insufficient, or that the conduct that was being			
4	disciplined is not disciplinable in New York.			
5	JUDGE TROUTMAN: And New York also			
6	MR. GOSNELL: There was no question that			
7	JUDGE TROUTMAN: There is also mitigation that			
8	can be offered to determine what actual discipline is			
9	imposed.			
LO	MR. GOSNELL: Yes, but but what we			
L1	what we're dealing with here on the per se argument is t			
L2	it doesn't matter what could have happened or what may ha			
L3	happened. What actually happened is the fact that the			
4	First Department suspended him, and they made its effect			
L5	retroactive.			
L6	JUDGE TROUTMAN: So your rule is if a if a			
L7	foreign jurisdiction disciplines an attorney in a a			
18	criminal attorney, he cannot as it was stated earlie			
19	by one of my colleagues, he can't practice criminal law?			
20	MR. GOSNELL: Well, so I think what you need to			
21	look at is first off, is what's the suspension for,			
22	if it's a substance serious and substantive			
23	suspension, as opposed to a technical suspension.			
24	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Who determines that?			
25	MR. GOSNELL: Well, this court in in the			

been disciplined by a foreign jurisdiction are that they

didn't receive due process there, that the evidence was

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Kieser case, this court cited to a lower court case that sort of sets out what that is, which is the Chin Min Foo case, where if you have a technical violation, such as failure to pay bar dues or things like that, it's not something - - it's not a situation where you need to reapply to the bar to then be allowed to practice. You pay your fine. You pay your - - your dues or whatever it is. You update your address. And you're back to practicing law.

When you have a serious and substantive suspension, that's a suspension that goes directly to the core of what it means to be a lawyer, that you don't have the competence to be a lawyer or the qualifications or the moral character. And in order to have that license back, you have to go back through the - - - essentially, the admissions process and be adjudicated by that body as now being - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, I'm sorry. Counsel, if I can just interrupt you on - - - on this analysis of Kieser. It does strike me that - - - that there is a difference between saying we're going to look at the nature of the suspension and make a decision what its impact might have, and this case, where - - excuse me - - and in Kieser, where that is - - that jurisdiction, where there's the temporary suspension, is the only jurisdiction in which the

person is barred.

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Here, this individual's actually barred in New York State. So regardless of the way one identifies the Second Circuit's discipline, the fact of the matter is the counsel during the trial was indeed still barred in New York State. He had not yet been disciplined. So I - - - I - - I understand what you're trying to do with Kieser, but it doesn't seem to me to work.

MR. GOSNELL: But Your - - Your Honor, if

you're - - if you're going to read - - if you're going

to read every word and give effect to every word of the

First Department's suspension of Andres Aranda, you have to

give effect to the fact that they made the - - - the

suspension effective nunc pro tunc. They made the

suspension effective as of May of 2015, which is ten weeks

prior to Mr. Aranda representing appellant at trial. So -

JUDGE CANNATARO: But no - - - nobody knew that during the trial. That had not happened during the pendency of the trial. So you know, you - - - you just proposed a - - - a process with a hearing to determine the nature of the violation. But none of that had happened, at least as far as the First Department was concerned, until - - I think it was a week or two after the trial had concluded, right?



MR. GOSNELL: Yes. But that goes to the right to counsel of choice issue, of whether there should be a hearing, whether or not Mr. Burgos should have been informed of those facts so that he - - - JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, I'm sorry.

MR. GOSNELL: - - - could make an informed decision.

MR. GOSNELL: Yes.

JUDGE GARCIA: One - - - one last thing.

JUDGE GARCIA: It seems like your two points are somewhat in tension because let's say there's a disclosure, full disclosure to the client, and the client's - - - and both your rules are true; both points you want to make are - - - we accept. Client says, you know what? You've gotten me great deals. You're going to get me a great deal here. I'm confident. I want you. And then, you know, say, you can't have me because I can't practice criminal law in this state because I might get suspended nunc pro tunc.

So which one do you want? Do you want a per se bar, where the client can't choose and you can't practice, or do you want a full and fair disclosure of the facts and circumstances, and the client has the right to choose?

Because I fear the next case, then, would be I wanted that lawyer; he was barred in New York; he hadn't been



suspended, but you wouldn't let me have him.

MR. GOSNELL: Well, I - - - I think that Your

Honors can - - can resolve this case under the per se

rule because the specific facts of this case, you have an
adjudication by the First Department that was made

retroactive to a date that preceded the trial, just as if
at that moment in time Mr. Aranda had not been admitted,
had never been admitted, just like in Felder or - - or

some other cases of this court or the Novak case, where the
defects - - - the adjudication occurred before and was
given effect before.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But Counsel, what about the fact that a - - quite frankly, applying it nunc pro tunc, the Appellate Division is taking into consideration mitigation, whether they want the time to count or add to that which was originally imposed by the other jurisdiction? So in other words, as opposed to saying, I'm going to suspend you eighteen months from the date of this order, they're simply giving him credit for time that he was suspended in the other jurisdiction.

MR. GOSNELL: Well, in doing that, again, you're

- - - you're - - - you would have to add words and subtract

words from the First Department decision. The First

Department decision didn't say, we'll run the time in which

we're counting for the eighteen months back there. What it

said was, the suspension is nunc pro tunc to May of 2015. 1 2 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So the suspension, in your 3 mind, is not just a timing back. It's a substantive 4 suspension during that period, correct? 5 MR. GOSNELL: Well, yes, because if - - - even 6 if, under this court's prior jurisprudence, if it had been a technical violation, that wouldn't qualify. But here, 7 8 you have a serious and substantive violation or a - - a 9 discipline. 10 JUDGE WILSON: So the - - - so the rule - - - the rule you want, then, if I - - - the per se rule - - - let's 11 12 just stick with that - - -13 MR. GOSNELL: Yes. 14 JUDGE WILSON: - - - that you want is for what 15 you're calling a substantive violation. If a foreign 16 jurisdiction has suspended someone from practice for that 17 reason, representation of a criminal defendant in New York 18 State by that person is ineffective, per se; is that the 19 rule you want? MR. GOSNELL: No. It's - - - it has nothing to 20 21 do with ineffective assistance of counsel, Your Honor. 22 JUDGE WILSON: Well, then what's - - - why does 23 the convert - - - conviction get reversed? 24 MR. GOSNELL: The conviction gets reversed 25 because he was without counsel within the meanings of the

Constitution. 1 2 JUDGE WILSON: Okay. Well, all right. As you -3 4 MR. GOSNELL: But - - - but - - - so - - -5 JUDGE WILSON: Fine. So then it's a reversal in 6 that circumstance. Then I don't - - -7

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MR. GOSNELL: Yes.

JUDGE WILSON: - - - have Judge Garcia's concern that that quy's not going to be able to make a whole lot of money. If I were a criminal defendant, I would seek - - -I would look at the - - - at the foreign jurisdiction's suspension and hire somebody because if I'm acquitted, double jeopardy prevents my reconviction. And if I'm found guilty, I get a reversal because I had no counsel.

MR. GOSNELL: Well, this - - - this court's jurisprudence is also - - - it - - - it has not resolved the question of what occurs if - - - for example, in Felder or other cases, what occurs if you're represented by someone who you are aware of and you're sort of setting the trap for the courts, to - - - to set a trap for a deprivation of counsel issue.

And I think that this court has dealt with those issues in the context of conflict of interest cases, where you've talked about the fact that, you know, right before trial, you can't sort of put the - - - the trial court in a

position where either choice that they go with, there's 1 2 going to be an appeal. The - - - the trial courts are 3 given great discretion in those instances. And I think in 4 this instance, you would have - - - first off, you would 5 have great discretion to deny that if that were the case -6 7 JUDGE WILSON: What - - - what you really want -8 9 MR. GOSNELL: - - - but that's not this case. 10 11

JUDGE WILSON: What you really want is an ethical rule, I think, requiring disclosure. That sounds like what you want.

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MR. GOSNELL: I certainly think that that would be helpful. But the - - - the rule, the obligation flows from the Constitution. If you look at the - - - the ethics rules when it comes to conflict of interest, that's - - those are there so that the client is informed of it. And it's to avoid issues of unwaived conflicts of interest, which don't - - - don't have an - - - well, they - - - they impact the ethical rules, but they're a Constitutional violation for the defendant.

And so what the court has tried to do and what the - - - the Appellate Divisions have tried to do with the ethics rules is to try to avoid situations where there is an unwaived conflict in which the standard is much lower



for a reversal. If somebody discloses it, and then the court has a hearing and the - - - the issue is waived, and it was a waivable issue, then there would be no issue on appeal, no reversible issue on appeal, with respect to that.

But respectfully, if a court was faced with these facts, the - - - the language of the Second Circuit opinion and Mr. Burgos saying - - - which would be contrary to the actual evidence here - - - Mr. Burgos saying, I want him to be my attorney, I don't think any judge, any trial judge would - - would be exercising appropriate discretion to allow Mr. Aranda to do that when they have no idea when - - when discipline is going to be imposed, but everybody knows it's coming. It could happen before the verdict; it could happen in the middle of jury selection.

JUDGE SINGAS: Counsel, that's not necessarily true. The - - - the First Department might say, we're not going to discipline him. So then what?

MR. GOSNELL: Well, in that instance, that would be like the - - - the conflict cases that we cite to, where in - - - you know, if the conflict never actually arises during trial, so long as the court looked - - - the trial court, in that instance, looks at the totality of the circumstances and makes a reasoned decision - - - it doesn't just make an arbitrary decision - - - that decision

by the court will be upheld, because again, the right to counsel of choice is a qualified right.

You don't get to, you know, demand a new attorney the night before trial just to delay the trial. You don't get to demand con - - conflicted counsel. And the courts have to - - trial courts regularly make these decisions in determining how to do this.

JUDGE RIVERA: So Counsel - - - Counsel, I'm on - - I'm on the screen. Let me - - it'll be my last
question. It sounds to me like in - - let's say - - let's say we adopt, in terms of your second argument, this
- - this rule that it - - it's a rule of disclosure.

I'm not sure about whether or not it's the Constitution. I
know you argued Professional Rule 1.4. But in any event,
let's say we agreed with that, disclosure to the client but
also disclosure to the court.

It seems to me, based on what you're saying now, that, you know, the discipline could come at any time. It might throw the entire criminal proceedings into chaos as a consequence, that this would, in - - in effect, encourage, incentivize trial judges to remove counsel, play it on the safe side. You know, why - - why am I going to move forward, and then this person's going to get discipline, or we're going to be back, perhaps, months later doing this, right?



MR. GOSNELL: Absolutely. And that is, in fact —

- those are the considerations that the trial court

discussed in the Hersh case. And in fact, the trial court

there deemed that the failure of the lawyer to disclose

this impending discipline, reciprocal discipline, was akin

to a misrepresentation to the court because the court was

trying to set a trial schedule.

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And just like here, there was no indication as to when discipline may be imposed. And there were multiple instances where Mr. Aranda could have disclosed it. He was suspended in May of 2015. There were ten weeks that went by before the trial began. He could have disclosed it then. He submitted his paperwork to the First Department. He could have disclosed it then.

The petition by the Grievance Committee to impose reciprocal discipline, where they made clear they're looking for an eighteen-month suspension, is filed and served on him two weeks before the verdict. He could have disclosed it then. He could have disclosed it at the time of the verdict. He could have disclosed it in any time in the five months that went on between there - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. We understand the point.

MR. GOSNELL: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You'll have your rebuttal



time.

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MR. GOSNELL: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?

MS. BAUTISTA: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May it please the court, my name is Sheila Bautista, and I represent the People in this case.

Your Honors, defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were satisfied in this case when he received meaningful representation from his attorney. Based on his inability to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance below, in the lower courts below, he is now claiming his attorney violated his rights under novel theories that would not require a showing of prejudice.

But no legal or professional requirements - - - with no legal or professional requirements to disclose suspension, defendant - - -  $\!\!\!$ 

JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel? Counsel, I'm on the screen. Why - - - why doesn't Rule 1.4 apply, right, that it's material? Don't you think it's material to know that the attorney's been suspended in another jurisdiction, and as a consequence, he is subject to reciprocal discipline? May not occur, but it might occur, and that would mean that the criminal proceedings are going to be thrown off course.

MS. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, that rule doesn't - - doesn't impose a duty because suspension on its own



doesn't impact the - - - doesn't - - - pending suspension doesn't impact the ability of an attorney to represent the client, as was demonstrated here. This attorney provided - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but I - - - I - - - I
understand your point. In fact, I don't disagree with that
at all. That was where I started with - - - with - - with your adversary. The point is the potential for the
discipline to occur during the trial, doesn't that require
some duty to the client or at - - at least to the court?

I mean, the attorney is an officer of the court.

Don't you have to tell the court, look, this is - - - this might be coming. It's - - look. If I'm on a trial,

don't I have to tell the court, Your Honor, I - - I've got surgery in three days that I cannot - - I cannot postpone; it's a - - I have to do this surgery, so I'm not going to be available? I mean, we - - we do that all the time. Why wouldn't you do this? Why wouldn't you disclose this?

MS. BAUTISTA: Well, in this situation, there was no requirement for the disclosure. The Second Circuit order did not require it. The court's rules did not require it. So the defendant's claiming that his attorney violated - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But my point - - - my point on



this is I - - - it's a little circular what you're saying.

My point on this is, don't you have to disclose that

because it may impact the criminal proceedings? You know

that for a fact that it may. You don't know that it will,

but you know that it may because the Appellate Division may

indeed impose reciprocal discipline while the - - - the

case is ongoing.

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MS. BAUTISTA: Respectfully, Your Honor, in this case, that's not necessarily certain because the discipline that might be - - - that might be imposed in this case might not necessarily be a suspension. The rule is whether or not the attorney should be disciplined in the Appellate Division, but it's - - - it's not a foregone conclusion that suspension would actually be the result.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, again, I don't think anyone is disagreeing with this point about we don't know what the Appellate Division would do; it might do something else.

The - - - the point is, shouldn't the court at least - - - and - - - and perhaps the client - - - I understand these arguments are slightly different - - be informed of something that may indeed have impact on the criminal proceedings, to try and take some preventative measures?

MS. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, it sounds like a reasonable requirement. I have three reasons why this court should not create such a require - - - or find such a



requirement in this case, and this case would be an improper vehicle to create such a requirement.

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At the time of the trial, the defense attorney had no legal or professional duty to disclose. And so defendant's trying to show that his attorney violated his rights. But absent that duty, this defense attorney did not violate anything.

Also on the record, defendant can't show that he actually would not have chosen this - - - this attorney. The record demonstrates that this defendant, he - - - he hired this attorney twice before and received favorable outcomes in those cases and received meaningful representation in this case.

So based on that, number one, this would be an improper vehicle for such a rule. Number two, the proper vehicle for such a rule would be the court system, which promulgates the rules of professional conduct and attorney discipline. Such a new rule would raise a lot of questions, and these deliberative bodies could debate and discuss those questions, such as what should the scope of attorney disclosure be; what situations trigger disclosure; and should there be any limitations.

As this court recognizes, the right to choice of counsel is a qualified right. These issues and these questions weren't - - - weren't properly raised in the



440.10 below - - - 10 court below, so they - - - they weren't properly explored by the judge.

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And number three, another reason why such a rule isn't required in this case is because the defendant has existing protections. Interim suspension is available.

It's - - it's available form of relief if the attorney - - based on a suspension in the foreign jurisdiction, if his conduct rises to the level that he really shouldn't be representing this client in state court, interim suspension is something that can be taught - - sought by the Attorney Grievance Committee.

And of course, defendant could also seek relief under ineffective assistance of counsel claims. If his attorney is truly not able to represent the defendant below, he can - - he can show that there was an actual impact on the quality and the ability of his attorney to represent him at trial, which this attorney wasn't - - which this - - which this defendant is - - was not able to show below.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And so do you argue that the ineffective assistance of counsel route is the better route if there was an actual impact on the ability to represent?

MS. BAUTISTA: Yes, Your Honor. That's the proper - - - that's the proper course for this court to examine this issue because the defendant is talking about

1 something his attorney didn't do. He's talking about his 2 attorney's conduct. And that is more - - - most properly 3 assessed under ineffective assistance of counsel, where an - - - where defendant has to show there was some 4 5 detrimental impact to his attorney's ability to try this 6 case or the quality of his representation. And he can't 7 show either things under existing law. This defense 8 attorney provided - - -9 JUDGE WILSON: Suppose the - - -10 MS. BAUTISTA: - - - meaningful representation. 11 JUDGE WILSON: Suppose the Appellate Division had 12 suspended Mr. Aranda right in the middle of the trial. 13 would you - - - how would you propose that would be

handled?

MS. BAUTISTA: Well, in that case, the rules require the attorney to inform his client. So in that case

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JUDGE WILSON: Well, at that point, he can't continue, can he? He's suspended from practice in New York.

- - - in that case - - -

MS. BAUTISTA: Under - - - under the rules, the attorney would be required to tell his client that he's been suspended and advise his client to seek substitute counsel. In this case, he was still licensed when he represented his client.



1	So so so yes, so we we			
2	we urge this court to find it under ineffective			
3	assistance. This attorney provided deficient performance			
4	sorry, provided effective performance. He was licens			
5	to practice at the time that he represented the defendant			
6	in this case.			
7	As the Appellate Division found the			
8	Appellate Division was the court that issued the			
9	suspension, and the Appellate Division ruled in this case			
10	that at the time of the trial, this attorney was still			
11	licensed to practice in New York. And as as as			
12	this court has been pointing out in some of its questions,			
13	at the time of the trial, nobody knew what, exactly, the			
14	suspension would be in in this case.			
15	And finally, with respect to the right to choice			
16	of counsel claim, we argue that this would not be the			
17	proper vehicle for it, based on the defendant's inability			
18	to show that his attorney violated anything in this case.			
19	JUDGE WILSON: I'm not sure			
20	JUDGE RIVERA: So Counsel, if if I'm			
21	sorry. If we disagreed with you on that point			
22	MS. BAUTISTA: Yes.			
23	JUDGE RIVERA: that there was no ethical			
24	violation			
25	MS. BAUTISTA: Right.			



1	JUDGE RIVERA: do you does doe			
2	the defendant then get a new trial? Is he right			
3	MS. BAUTISTA: Well, he would still have			
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel?			
5	MS. BAUTISTA: He would still have to show that			
6	he actually would not have chosen this attorney. And on			
7	this record on the existing record, he can't show			
8	that. This			
9	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, how how, other than			
10	saying if I knew that, I would certainly have never gone			
11	forward with this individual, given given the nature			
12	of what the Second Circuit concluded, what what else			
13	would he what else could he possibly have said?			
14	MS. BAUTISTA: He made that			
15	JUDGE RIVERA: What else could he do?			
16	MS. BAUTISTA: He made that claim, but it was			
17	undermined by the longstanding relationship he had with			
18	this same attorney. This same attorney represented him			
19	twice before and received favorable outcomes for this same			
20	defendant.			
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Oh. So you mean it's it's			
22	one rule if it's an attorney that just got assigned to me;			
23	I don't know anything about them, and then there			
24	there's this pending discipline, versus someone who I've			

had for a long time, and you know, perhaps my trust has

been betrayed because they've been not complying with the 1 2 professional standards? 3 MS. BAUTISTA: These are just the facts of the 4 The facts of this - - case. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: I know they're the facts of the 6 case. 7 MS. BAUTISTA: Right. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: My question is how it impacts on 9 the legal conclusions we're - - - we're asked to decide 10 here to resolve the issue before us. 11 MS. BAUTISTA: And these facts show that this 12 particular defendant didn't - - - his rights to choice were 13 not violated. The - - - the attorney that he chose was an 14 attorney who had performed well for him before and 15 performed well for him in this case. So - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, I understand. But one would 17 - - - one would assume that a client would not choose a 18 attorney who they thought was deficient. One would choose 19 an attorney who you thought is going to represent me well, 20 especially if they had a track record in the past. 21 this is not about his past. It's about the lawyer's past. 22 JUDGE WILSON: Let me try Judge Rivera's question 23 a little bit differently. Suppose he could prove to your satisfaction that he would not have continued with Mr. 24

Aranda had that been disclosed. Has he then been denied

2 MS. BAUTISTA: Well, in this case -3 JUDGE WILSON: No, no. Suppose he could prove 4 that, hypothetically. Forget him for the moment. 5 MS. BAUTISTA: Okay. Okay. 6 JUDGE WILSON: Suppose a defendant could prove, 7 if I had known that this lawyer was suspended, I never 8 would have continued with this. Take that as a given. 9 know that's not this case. Take that as a given. 10 circumstance, has that person been denied his Constitutional right to choose counsel? 11 12 MS. BAUTISTA: Without a legal or professional 13 requirement for the attorney to make the disclosure, no, he 14 has not shown it because he has to show two things. He has 15 to show that his attorney violated something. He'd have to 16 show that his attorney violated a legal or professional 17 duty, one. And two, he'd have to show that he actually 18 would not have chosen this attorney. This defendant can't 19 show either of those things, so he would not prevail on his 20 right to choice of counsel claim in this case. 21 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. 22 MS. BAUTISTA: Thank you. 23 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, your rebuttal? 24 MR. GOSNELL: Yes. And getting back to the - - -25 the court's inquiry that was just posed to my adversary, on

his Constitutional right to counsel? And if not, why not?



page 408 of the record, the facts are crystal clear that Mr. Burgos would not have allowed Mr. Aranda to continue as his attorney, had he known about it. What he says is, in his affidavit, "Had I known what I know now," referring to the suspension, "I would not have agreed to have my case tried by the court without a jury. I would also not have permitted Mr. Aranda to remain as my attorney."

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: So your argument is his word alone is sufficient to establish that he would have chosen a new attorney?

MR. GOSNELL: Yes. That is the only evidence that's before the court. That's the only evidence that would be pertinent to that issue.

And getting back to Judge Rivera's question posed earlier, her statement earlier that we don't know about what the Appellate Division would have done, that applies in an instance where there has been counsel removed; there's a - - - a choice of counsel sort of proceeding that's occurred. And at the time of the removal of the attorney, the trial court doesn't know what's going to happen.

That's not this case. We know exactly what the Appellate Division would have done because they did it.

They suspended Mr. Aranda. They made that suspension retroactive to a date that preceded appellant's trial, that



1	flowed throughout the trial, throughout his sentencing,			
2	throughout the verdict. He did not have counsel, with			
3	- within the meaning of the Constitution, based upon that			
4	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.			
5	MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Your Honors.			
6	(Court is adjourned)			
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1	CERTIFICATION			
2				
3	I, Cheryl Odom, certify that the foregoing			
4	transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of the			
5	People of the State of New York v. Angelo Burgos, No. 14			
6	was prepared using the required transcription equipment and			
7	is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.			
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