

**Report of the  
Surrogate's Court  
Advisory Committee**

to the Chief Administrative Judge of the  
Courts of the State of New York

January 2003.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAG</u>
<u>E</u>	
I. INTRODUCTION .....	3
II. LEGISLATION	
A. NEW MEASURES	
1. JURY TRIALS AND LIFETIME TRUSTS (SCPA 502) .....	5
2. HARMONIZING INCONSISTENT DISTRIBUTIONS (EPTL 3-3.3) .....	9
B. MODIFIED MEASURES	
1. DISQUALIFICATION OF A TENANT BY THE ENTIRETY (EPTL 4-1.7) .....	12
C. PREVIOUSLY ENDORSED MEASURES	
1. NOMINATED FIDUCIARY'S STANDING TO FILE OBJECTIONS (SCPA 709) .....	15
2. DISQUALIFICATION OF A SURVIVING SPOUSE (EPTL 5-1.2(A)) .....	17
3. AUTHORIZING A TRUST GRANTOR TO PERMIT TRUSTEES TO MAKE DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS TO THEMSELVES AS BENEFICIARIES (EPTL 10-10.1) .....	20
4. APPOINTMENT OF STANDBY GUARDIAN	

	(SCPA 1726) .....	23
5.	LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN BORN TO A MARRIED COUPLE USING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION TECHNIQUES (DRL 73) .....	39
6.	RENUNCIATION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS PURSUANT TO POWER OF ATTORNEY (EPTL 2-1.11; GOL 5-1502(G)) .....	44
7.	THE EFFECT ON INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF ADOPTION BY AN UNRELATED PERSON (DRL 117; EPTL 2-1.3(A)(1)) .....	48
III.	FUTURE MATTERS .....	50

## I. INTRODUCTION

THE SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE IS ONE OF THE COMMITTEES ESTABLISHED, PURSUANT TO SECTION 212(1)(Q) OF THE JUDICIARY LAW, BY THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS TO ASSIST HIM IN THE EXECUTION OF HIS OFFICE. THE COMMITTEE ANNUALLY RECOMMENDS TO THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR RELATED TO THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW, THE SURROGATE'S COURT AND LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SURROGATE'S COURT. THESE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE BASED ON THE COMMITTEE'S OWN STUDY OF DECISIONAL LAW AND SUGGESTIONS RECEIVED FROM THE BENCH AND BAR. IN RECOMMENDING ITS OWN ANNUAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM, THE COMMITTEE COMMENTS ON OTHER PENDING LEGISLATIVE MEASURES CONCERNING ESTATES AND OTHER MATTERS (E.G., ADOPTIONS, GUARDIANSHIPS) THAT ARE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE SURROGATE'S COURTS.

DURING THE 2002 LEGISLATIVE SESSION, THE COMMITTEE HAD ONE BILL ENACTED:

CHAPTER 457: AMENDS SECTIONS 711, 719, 2205, AND 2206 OF THE COURT PROCEDURE ACT TO COMBINE THE PROCEDURE FOR COMPULSORY AND OTHER STATUTORY REMEDIES INTO A SINGLE PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK TO PROVIDE AN EXPEDIENT REMEDY WHEN DEALING WITH FIDUCIARIES WHO FAIL TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR DUTY BY NOVEMBER 1, 2002.

THE COMMITTEE AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED HAS 25 MEMBERS. ITS MEMBERS ARE DIVIDED INTO THE AREAS OF LEGISLATION, ADOPTION, GUARDIANSHIP, COURT RULES, FORECLOSURE, TECHNOLOGY, WITH THE FOLLOWING FOUR SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE COMMITTEE ON EACH OF THESE SUBJECTS:

SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION  
CHAIR, GENEVIEVE L. FRAIMAN, ESQ.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADOPTIONS  
CHAIR, HON. JOSEPH S. MATTINA

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GUARDIANSHIP  
CHAIR, HON. ROBERT L. NAHMAN

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES, FORMS AND TECHNOLOGY  
CHAIR, JOHN SCHAEFER, ESQ.

IN THIS REPORT, THE COMMITTEE SETS FORTH ITS LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL  
PROJECTS THAT ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN.

AS PART OF ITS EFFORT TO FOCUS ITS WORK ON AREAS WHICH WOULD  
THE LEGISLATURE, COURTS, BAR AND LITIGANTS, THE COMMITTEE WELCOMES  
SUGGESTIONS. INQUIRIES SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO:

HON. RENEE R. ROTH, CHAIR  
SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION  
25 BEAVER STREET, SUITE 1170  
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10004

## II. LEGISLATION

### A. NEW MEASURES

#### 1. JURY TRIALS AND LIFETIME TRUSTS (SCPA 502)

SUBDIVISION 1 OF SECTION 502 OF THE SURROGATE'S COURT PROCEDURE ACT PROVIDES THAT A PARTY TO A PROCEEDING IN SURROGATE'S COURT IS ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL IN ANY CASE PRESENTING A CONTROVERTED QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHICH PARTY TO THE PROCEEDING ENJOYS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL. SUBDIVISION 1 OF SECTION 502 OF THE SURROGATE'S COURT PROCEDURE ACT PROVIDES THAT A PARTY TO A PROCEEDING IN SURROGATE'S COURT IS ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL TO PROBATE PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH A CONTROVERTED QUESTION OF FACT ARISES.

THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS THAT SUBDIVISION 1 BE AMENDED TO EXTEND THE RIGHT AS WELL TO PROCEEDINGS TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF A REVOCABLE LIFETIME TRUST WHERE SUCH PROCEEDINGS ARE COMMENCED AFTER THE DEATH OF THE TESTATOR. SUCH PROCEEDINGS RAISE A CONTROVERTED QUESTION OF FACT.

IN RECENT YEARS, NEW YORKERS HAVE UTILIZED THE REVOCABLE LIFETIME TRUST AS A SUBSTITUTE IN ORDER TO AVOID PROBATE AND TO MAINTAIN PRIVACY OF THE ESTATE. SUCH A TRUST IS COUNTERPART RECEPTACLE TO A POUR-OVER WILL PURSUANT TO SECTION 5-2.1 OF THE ESTATE POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, SUCH A TRUST IS CREATED AT THE SAME TIME THE WILL IS EXECUTED, SO THAT PROOF PRESENTED TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF THE WILL OR TO MAKE THE WILL OR TO PROVE THE EXERCISE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE ON THE TESTATOR IS SIMILAR, OR EVEN IDENTICAL, TO THE PROOF OFFERED WHERE THE TRUST IS CHALLENGED. THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTEMPORANEOUSLY-CREATED REVOCABLE LIFETIME TRUST IS PUT IN QUESTION OR UNDUE INFLUENCE IS ALLEGED IN A COMPANION PROCEEDING. HOWEVER, WHILE THERE IS A STATUTORY RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN THE CHALLENGE TO THE WILL, THERE IS NO COMPANION STATUTORY RIGHT IN THE CHALLENGE TO THE TRUST.

THE TRIAL COURTS HAVE DIVIDED ON THE QUESTION WHETHER SUCH A STATUTORY RIGHT OTHERWISE EXISTS.

IN *MATTER OF ARONOFF* (171 MISC. 2D 172 (SUR. CT. NY COUNTY, 1996)), THE COURT HELD THAT OBJECTANTS TO PROBATE OF A WILL ALSO SOUGHT TO INVALIDATE A REVOCABLE LIFETIME TRUST. A DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL WAS MADE IN BOTH PROCEEDINGS. HOWEVER, THE COURT HELD THAT THE CONTESTANT OF A REVOCABLE TRUST HAS NO RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.

THAT SUCH A RIGHT EXISTS ONLY "WHERE [IT] IS PROVIDED BY STATUTE OR CONSTITUTION (SCPA 502(L); CPLR 4101)." WHILE A PARTY TO A PROBATE PROCEEDING HAS THE RIGHT TO DEMAND A JURY TRIAL BY SCPA 502(L), THERE IS NO EQUIVOCAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN A PROBATE PROCEEDING TO INVALIDATE A LIFETIME TRUST. MOREOVER, A PROBATE PROCEEDING TO INVALIDATE A LIFETIME TRUST IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE, WAS TRIABLE HISTORICALLY BY A COURT OF EQUITY, AND WAS THEREFORE ACCORDED NEITHER A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOR A STATUTORY RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. ALTHOUGH THE OBJECTANT'S DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL IN A PROBATE PROCEEDING TO INVALIDATE A LIFETIME TRUST SINCE THE ISSUES AS TO CAPACITY AND UNDUE INFLUENCE IN THE PROBATE PROCEEDING TO INVALIDATE INSTRUMENTS (EXECUTED WITHIN A YEAR OF THE WILL'S EXECUTION) WERE RAISED IN THE PROBATE PROCEEDING, THE SURROGATE RULED THAT THE PROBATE PROCEEDING WOULD SERVE AS AN *ADVISORY JURY* PURSUANT TO SCPA 502(L). THE SURROGATE OBSERVED THAT LEGISLATION WOULD BE REQUIRED TO GRANT A RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN PROBATE PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT TO INVALIDATE A LIFETIME TRUST.<sup>1</sup>

BY CONTRAST, IN *MATTER OF TISDALE* (171 MISC. 2D 716 (SUR. CT. NY COUNTY, 1997)), AND *MATTER OF SOLOMON* (NYLJ, SEPT. 9, 1997, P.28, COL. 3 (SUR. CT. NY COUNTY, 1997)), THE TRIAL COURTS, RECOGNIZING THE SIMILARITY OF WILL SUBSTITUTES OR RECEPACLES FOR POUR-OVER TRUSTS TO A TRIAL BY JURY IN THE PROCEEDINGS TO INVALIDATE A REVOCABLE TRUST, IN *TISDALE*, THE DECEDENT'S DISTRIBUTEES FILED OBJECTIONS TO PROBATE PROCEEDING TO INVALIDATE THE PROBATE ESTATE INTO A REVOCABLE TRUST EXECUTED ON THE PROBATE ESTATE. BOTH INSTRUMENTS WERE DRAFTED BY THE SAME ATTORNEY WHO WAS NAMED AS ATTORNEY UNDER BOTH INSTRUMENTS. THUS, BOTH PROCEEDINGS RAISED EXACTLY THE SAME ISSUES AS TO A TRIAL, NAMELY, DUE EXECUTION, CAPACITY, UNDUE INFLUENCE AND FRAUD. IN *SOLOMON*, THESE COGENT REASONS LED THE SURROGATES TO RECOGNIZE A RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL:

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<sup>1</sup> TO THE SAME EFFECT (EXCEPT THAT THE JURY IN THE PROBATE PROCEEDING TO INVALIDATE A LIFETIME TRUST AS AN ADVISORY JURY IN THE PROCEEDINGS TO INVALIDATE THE LIVING TRUST IN *MATTER OF STRALEM*, NYLJ, JULY 14, 1997, P. 30, COL. 5; MOD. NYLJ, DEC. 10, 1997, P. 36, COL. 1 (SUR. CT. NASSAU COUNTY); *MATTER OF EDSON*, NYLJ, JULY 14, 1997, P. 31, COL. 1 (SUR. CT. NY COUNTY); *MATTER OF RICARDINO*, NYLJ, OCT. 1, 1997, P. 30, COL. 3 (SUR. CT. NY COUNTY); *MATTER OF BUSCHER*, NYLJ, JULY 10, 1998, P. 35, COL. 5 (SUR. CT. NY COUNTY).

- BOTH REVOCABLE LIFETIME TRUSTS AND WILLS ARE AMBULATORY “THAT [SPEAK] AT DEATH TO DETERMINE THE DISPOSITION OF THE PROPERTY”;
- BOTH PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT AFTER THE TESTATOR’S OR CREDITOR’S DEATH PRESENT SIMILAR OR IDENTICAL ISSUES. SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS WOULD BE AWKWARD.
- SCPA 502(L) PERMITS JURY TRIALS IN PROBATE PROCEEDINGS IF THE RELIEF REQUESTED IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE.
- IN PROCEEDINGS BY FIDUCIARIES TO RECLAIM PROPERTY ON BEHALF OF A BENEFICIARY, A RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL EXISTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE. *WILSON* (252 NY 155 (1929) [“DISCOVERY PROCEEDING”]); *MATTER OF RICHMAN* (NYLJ, APR. 26, 2000, P.31, COL. 6 (SUR. CT. QUEENS COUNTY) [GRANTING THE DECEDENT’S ESTATE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A DISCOVERY PROCEEDING TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE ASSETS OF AN IRREVOCABLE TRUST, WHICH NECESSITATED A DETERMINATION OF THE TRUST’S VALIDITY]). *SEE ALSO, MATTER OF SCHNEIER* (74 AD2D 22 (4<sup>TH</sup> JUD. DEP’T, 1980) [“REVERSE DISCOVERY PROCEEDING”, A PROCEDURAL DEVICE THAT OBJECTANTS COULD UTILIZE TO RECLAIM ASSETS BELONGING TO THE FIDUCIARY IS UNWILLING TO DO SO.]

TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT AMONG THE COURTS, SCPA 502(L) SHOULD GRANT A STATUTORY RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL, IF DULY DEMANDED, IN A PROBATE PROCEEDING AFTER THE CREATOR’S DEATH TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF A REVOCABLE LIFETIME TRUST.

PROPOSAL:

AN ACT TO AMEND THE SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEDURE ACT, IN RELATION TO PROBATE PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF REVOCABLE LIFETIME TRUSTS.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEMBLY,

ENACT AS FOLLOWS:



SECTION 1. SUBDIVISION 1 OF SECTION 502 OF THE SURROGATE'S CODE IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

1. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL. A PARTY IS ENTITLED TO TRIAL BY JURY, IF DURING ANY PROCEEDING IN WHICH ANY CONTROVERTED QUESTION OF FACT ARISES IN WHICH A PARTY HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY [AND], IN ANY PROBATE OF A WILL IN WHICH [SUCH] A CONTROVERTED QUESTION OF FACT IS DEMANDED] AND IN ANY PROCEEDING COMMENCED AFTER THE DEATH OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHOSE REVOCABLE LIFETIME TRUST TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF SUCH TRUST IS THE SUBJECT OF SUCH A CONTROVERTED QUESTION OF FACT ARISES.

2. THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY AND SHALL APPLY TO ANY PROCEEDING TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF A REVOCABLE LIFETIME TRUST PENDING ON OR COMMENCED ON OR AFTER SUCH EFFECTIVE DATE.

## 2. HARMONIZING INCONSISTENT DISTRIBUTIONS (EPTL 3-3.3)

THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS THIS MEASURE TO ELIMINATE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN EPTL 3-3.3 AND EPTL 2-1.2 WITH RESPECT TO TESTAMENTARY CLASS GIFTS TO THE TESTATOR'S BROTHERS, OR SISTERS, AND TO HARMONIZE THE TREATMENT OF SUCH GIFTS WITH THE RESULT THAT WOULD OCCUR IN INTESTACY UNDER EPTL 4-1.1. THIS MEASURE WOULD ELIMINATE THE EFFECT OF EPTL 3-3.3 WHICH TREATS TESTAMENTARY CLASS GIFTS TO THE TESTATOR'S BROTHERS OR SISTERS AS THOUGH SUCH GIFTS WERE MADE TO SPECIFICALLY NAMED INDIVIDUALS. SUCH GIFTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF "BY REPRESENTATION" FOR THE RESULT THAT EACH SURVIVING MEMBER OF THE CLASS WOULD RECEIVE AN EQUAL SHARE OF THE PROPERTY, OTHER SURVIVING MEMBERS OF THE SAME GENERATION, *I.E.*, THE SAME RESULT WOULD OCCUR UNDER EPTL 4-1.1.

UNDER PROVISIONS OF EPTL 3-3.3 AND 2-1.2, A CONFLICT CAN ARISE WITH RESPECT TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY TO THE TESTATOR'S "ISSUE" OR TO THE TESTATOR'S "BROTHERS AND SISTERS."

SUPPOSE, FOR EXAMPLE, A TESTATOR'S WILL DISPOSED OF HIS OR HER ESTATE TO HIS OR HER "ISSUE," AND THE TESTATOR WAS SURVIVED BY ONE CHILD, A, BY A GRANDCHILD, B, BY THE TESTATOR'S PREDECEASED CHILD, B), AND BY GRANDCHILDREN, GC2, GC3, AND GC4 (CHILDREN OF THE TESTATOR'S PREDECEASED CHILD, C). IN SUCH A CASE, UNDER EPTL 2-1.2, A WOULD TAKE 1/3, GC1 WOULD TAKE 1/3, AND GC2, GC3, AND GC4 WOULD EACH TAKE 1/6. UNDER EPTL 3-3.3, A WOULD TAKE 1/2, GC1 WOULD TAKE 1/6, GC2, GC3, AND GC4 WOULD EACH TAKE 1/6. THIS RESULT UNDER EPTL 2-1.2 IS ALIGNED WITH THE RESULT THAT WOULD OCCUR UNDER EPTL 4-1.1, IF SUCH TESTATOR HAD DIED INTESTATE.

SIMILAR DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE RESULT UNDER EPTL 3-3.3, AND EPTL 2-1.2 AND 4-1.1, CAN ARISE WHERE A DECEDENT IS SURVIVED ONLY BY GRANDCHILDREN. IN A HYPOTHETICAL, THE TESTATOR WERE SURVIVED ONLY BY GC1, GC2, GC3, AND GC4. UNDER EPTL 3-3.3 WOULD BE 1/2 TO GC1 (AS THE ONLY CHILD OF PREDECEASED B), GC2, GC3, AND GC4, WHEREAS UNDER EPTL 2-1.2 (OR UNDER 4-1.1, IF THE TESTATOR HAD DIED INTESTATE) GC1, GC2, GC3, AND GC4 WOULD EACH TAKE 1/4.

THE SAME DISPARITIES CAN OCCUR WHEN THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION IS TO THE TESTATOR'S BROTHERS OR SISTERS, RATHER THAN TO ISSUE.

THESE DISPARITIES ARE NOT JUSTIFIED BY ANY DELIBERATE LEGISLATION. CONTRARY, SINCE ALL THREE STATUTORY PROVISIONS (EPTL 2-1.2, 3-3.3, 4-1.1), I.E., CAPABLE OF BEING OVERRIDDEN BY THE TESTATOR'S WILL, THE RESULTS WOULD BE THE SAME SINCE, AS STATED BY SURROGATE HOLZMAN IN ESTATE OF LAMBIASE, NYLJ 100 (1991) (BRONX COUNTY), IN ENACTING SUCH STATUTES "THE LEGISLATURE STEPS BACK FROM SUCH A DISPOSITION BASED UPON THE PRESUMPTION THAT THIS IS THE DISTRIBUTION THE TESTATOR WOULD WANT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES."

THIS MEASURE WOULD AMEND EPTL 3-3.3 SO THAT THE RESULTS OF IT WOULD BE THE SAME AS THEY WOULD BE UNDER 2-1.2 (OR 4-1.1 IN CASE OF INTESTACY). THE PURPOSE OF THIS IS TO HARMONIZE THE RESULTS THROUGH THE USE OF THE EPTL 1-2.16 PRINCIPLE OF "EQUAL REPRESENTATION," A PRINCIPLE WHICH CURRENTLY IS PRESENT IN ALL THE OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND WHICH REFLECTS THE LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT THE LEGISLATURE PREFER THAT RELATIVES OF THE SAME GENERATION SHARE EQUALLY.

PROPOSAL:

AN ACT TO AMEND THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW, IN RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTIONS TO ISSUE OR BROTHERS OR SISTERS OF TESTATOR

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEMBLY,

AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. SUBDIVISION (A) OF SECTION 3-3.3 OF THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW, AS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

(A) UNLESS THE WILL WHENEVER EXECUTED PROVIDES OTHERWISE:

(1) INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER FIRST, NINETEEN HUNDRED NINETY-NINE, WHENEVER A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION IS MADE TO THE ISSUE OR TO A BROTHER OR SISTER OF THE TESTATOR, AND SUCH BENEFICIARY DIES DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE TESTATOR SURVIVING SUCH TESTATOR, SUCH DISPOSITION DOES NOT LAPSE BUT VESTS IN THE

ISSUE, PER STIRPES. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS PARAGRAPH SHALL APPLY TO  
ISSUE, BROTHERS OR SISTERS AS A CLASS, AND SUCH ISSUE, BROTHERS OR S  
STIRPES.

(2) INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED ON OR AFTER SEPTEMBER FIRST, NINETE  
TWO. WHENEVER A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION IS MADE TO THE ISSUE C  
OF THE TESTATOR, AND SUCH BENEFICIARY DIES DURING THE LIFETIME O  
ISSUE SURVIVING SUCH TESTATOR, SUCH DISPOSITION DOES NOT LAPSE B  
SURVIVING ISSUE, BY REPRESENTATION. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS PARAG  
DISPOSITION MADE TO ISSUE, BROTHERS OR SISTERS AS A CLASS, AND SUCH  
SISTERS SHALL TAKE BY REPRESENTATION.

[(3) THE PROVISIONS OF SUBPARAGRAPHS (1) AND (2) APPLY TO A DISPO  
BROTHERS OR SISTERS AS A CLASS AS IF THE DISPOSITION WERE MADE TO T  
INDIVIDUAL NAMES, EXCEPT THAT NO BENEFIT SHALL BE CONFERRED HER  
SURVIVING ISSUE OF AN ANCESTOR WHO DIED BEFORE THE EXECUTION O  
DISPOSITION TO THE CLASS WAS MADE.]

2. THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY.

## B. MODIFIED MEASURES

### 1. DISQUALIFICATION OF A TENANT BY THE ENTIRETY (EPTL 4-1.7)

MODIFIED SLIGHTLY TO CLARIFY THE NATURE OF THE EXCLUDED PROVISION. THE PROVISION WOULD ADD A NEW SECTION 4-1.7 TO THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW. A PERSON WHO HOLDS PROPERTY AS A TENANT BY THE ENTIRETY WITH HIS OR HER SPOUSE RECEIVING ANY SHARE IN SUCH PROPERTY OR MONIES DERIVED THEREFROM IS DISQUALIFIED IF CONVICTED OF MURDER IN THE FIRST OR SECOND DEGREE, OR MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, OF HIS OR HER SPOUSE. HE OR SHE MAY, HOWEVER, RECEIVE HIS OR HER PORTION OF PROPERTY CONTRIBUTED BY HIM OR HER FROM HIS OR HER SPOUSE, EXCEPT THAT SUCH CONVICTED SPOUSE SHALL NOT BE ENTITLED TO MORE THAN A LIFE ESTATE IN ONE-HALF OF SUCH PROPERTY HELD AS TENANT BY THE ENTIRETY.

IN NEW YORK, IT HAS BEEN LONG HELD THAT ONE WHO WRONGFULLY KILLS ANOTHER IS NOT PERMITTED TO PROFIT THEREBY (*SEE, RIGGS V. PALMER*, 11 NY 513 (1888)). A CONVICTION OF A PERSON FOR ANY CRIME, HOWEVER, DOES NOT WORK AS A BAR TO PROPERTY, REAL OR PERSONAL, OR ANY RIGHT OR INTEREST THEREIN. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW SECTION 79-B.

IN THE CASE OF *MATTER OF HAWKIN'S ESTATE*, 213 NYS2D 188 (SUR. CT. QUEENS COUNTY 1961), THE COURT RECOGNIZED THAT A SURVIVING TENANT BY THE ENTIRETY SPOUSE MAY NOT ENLARGE HER INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY HELD AS TENANT BY THE ENTIRETY AS A RESULT OF THE HOMICIDE. HOWEVER, IT FURTHER DECIDED THAT THE SURVIVING SPOUSE IS ENTITLED TO THE COMMUTED VALUE OF THE NET INCOME OF ONE-HALF OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE'S LIFE-EXPECTANCY, BASED UPON FORMER SECTION 512 OF THE PENAL LAW, AND THE FORFEITURE STATUTE. THIS HOLDING WAS CONTINUED IN THE CASES *MATTER OF PINNOCK*, 83 MISC.2D 233 (SUR. CT. BRONX COUNTY 1975), *MATTER OF BUSA*, 83 MISC.2D 567 (SUR. CT. NASSAU COUNTY 1980) AND *MATTER OF NICPON'S ESTATE*, 83 MISC.2D 619 (SUR. CT. ERIE COUNTY 1980).

THIS HOLDING WAS HELD TO BE A "LEGAL FICTION" AND WAS REJECTED IN *CITIBANK V. GOLDBERG*, 178 MISC.2D 287 (SUP. CT. NASSAU COUNTY 1998). THE COURT HELD THAT THE INTENTIONAL SLAYING OF A SPOUSE BY THE OTHER ACTS AS A REPUDIATION OF THE ESSENCE OF AN OWNERSHIP BY THE ENTIRENESS, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE SURVIVING SPOUSE FROM ANY INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY. THE COURT FOUND THAT SECTION 79-B OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW NEVER ADDRESSED SHARED INTERESTS.

CREATION OF NEW AND DIFFERENT INTERESTS FROM THOSE THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME.

THE ROCKLAND COUNTY SURROGATE'S COURT IN THE *MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MARY MATHEW*, NYLJ, APRIL 26, 1999, P. 32, COL. 5, *REVERSED* 270 AD2D 411, HAS ADOPTED THE HOLDING REACHED BY THE COURT IN *CITIBANK V. GOLDBERG*. THE COURT DISAGREED WITH THE CONCLUSION REACHED BY THE COURTS IN *MATTHEW* AND THE SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS UPHOLDING THE GRANTING TO THE SURVIVOR WHO KILLED THE OTHER SPOUSE, A LIFE ESTATE IN ONE-HALF OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE LIFE EXPECTANCY.

THIS PROPOSED ADDITION TO THE EPTL WOULD NOT ALLOW ANYONE TO SUCCEED TO PROPERTY AS THE RESULT OF HIS OR HER OWN WRONGFUL ACT OR THE ACT OF THE CONVICTED SPOUSE TO HIS OR HER FRACTIONAL PORTION OF SEPARATELY CONTRIBUTED BY HIM OR HER. FURTHERMORE, THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 4-1.6 OF THE EPTL, WHICH PROVIDES THAT IF ONE JOINT TENANT OF A BANK ACCOUNT IS CONVICTED OF MURDER OF THE OTHER JOINT TENANT, THE MURDERER FORFEITS ALL OF THE ACCOUNT EXCEPT THOSE MONIES HE OR SHE CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCOUNT.

PROPOSAL:

AN ACT TO AMEND THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW, IN RELATION TO THE DISQUALIFICATION OF TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETY IN CERTAIN INSTANCES.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEMBLY,

ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW IS AMENDED BY ADDING A

SECTION 4-1.7 TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

4-1.7. DISQUALIFICATION OF TENANT BY THE ENTIRETY IN CERTAIN INSTANCES.

NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISION OF LAW TO THE CONTRARY,

ENTIRETY IN REAL PROPERTY, OR IN A COOPERATIVE APARTMENT AS DEFINED IN SECTION 4-1.7.

SECTION 6-2.2 OF THIS CHAPTER, WHERE THE SPOUSES RESIDED OR ANY R  
SPOUSES, WHO IS CONVICTED OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE AS DE  
OF THE PENAL LAW, OR MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE AS DEFINED IN SEC  
PENAL LAW, OR MANSLAUGHTER IN THE FIRST DEGREE AS DEFINED IN SUB  
OF SECTION 125.20 OF THE PENAL LAW OR MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECON  
SUBDIVISION ONE OF SECTION 125.15 OF THE PENAL LAW OF THE OTHER S  
ENTITLED TO ANY SHARE IN SUCH REAL PROPERTY OR MONIES DERIVED T  
ANY FRACTIONAL PORTION THEREOF CONTRIBUTED BY THE CONVICTED  
HER SEPARATE PROPERTY AS DEFINED BY PARAGRAPH D OF SUBDIVISION C  
SECTION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW,  
CONVICTED SPOUSE SHALL NOT BE ENTITLED TO MORE THAN THE VALUE  
HALF OF SUCH PROPERTY HELD AS TENANT BY THE ENTIRETY OR MONIES

2. THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY.

## C. PREVIOUSLY ENDORSED MEASURES

### 1. NOMINATED FIDUCIARY'S STANDING TO FILE OBJECTIONS (SCPA 709)

SECTION 709 OF THE SURROGATE'S COURT PROCEDURE ACT PROVIDES THAT A CO-FIDUCIARY MAY FILE OBJECTIONS TO THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OR THE APPOINTMENT OF A CO-FIDUCIARY TRUSTEE. AT PRESENT, SECTION 709 PROVIDES THAT "ANY PERSON INTERESTED IN THE ESTATE MAY FILE OBJECTIONS. UNDER SECTION 103(39) OF THE ACT, A "PERSON INTERESTED IN THE ESTATE" INCLUDE ANY PERSON "ENTITLED OR ALLEGEDLY ENTITLED TO SHARE AS A CO-FIDUCIARY OF AN ESTATE...". A LITERAL READING OF THE STATUTE PRECLUDES A CO-FIDUCIARY FROM FILING OBJECTIONS TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF HIS OR HER CO-FIDUCIARY.

HOWEVER, THAT INTERPRETATION IS INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER SECTIONS OF THE ACT WHICH PERMIT A CO-FIDUCIARY TO SEEK TO REMOVE A CO-FIDUCIARY (SECTION 711) AND A CO-FIDUCIARY THE RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS TO PROBATE UPON OBTAINING LETTERS FROM THE COURT (SECTION 1410). RECENTLY, IN *MATTER OF PATTERSON*, NYLJ, JUNE 11, 2001, P. 32, COL. 3 (SUR. CT. WESTCHESTER COUNTY), THE COURT, NOTING SUCH A READING HELD THAT A NOMINATED CO-EXECUTOR UNDER A PROPOUNDED WILL HAS THE RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS TO THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TO ANOTHER NOMINATED CO-FIDUCIARY.

THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS THAT SECTION 709 BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE THAT A NOMINATED CO-FIDUCIARY HAS STANDING TO FILE OBJECTIONS TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A CO-FIDUCIARY.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT SIMPLY ADDS A NOMINATED FIDUCIARY TO THE LIST OF PERSONS WHO MAY MAKE SEEK RELIEF UNDER SECTION 709. THE AMENDMENT WOULD CONFORM SECTION 709 WITH THE PROVISIONS FOR OBJECTION OF ELIGIBILITY TO THE 1995 AMENDMENT OF SECTION 711 WHICH PROVIDES STANDING TO A CO-FIDUCIARY TO COMMENCE A REMOVAL PROCEEDING. THE AMENDMENT PROVIDES THAT A CO-FIDUCIARY CAN COMMENCE A PROCEEDING TO REMOVE A CO-FIDUCIARY HAS BEEN APPOINTED, BUT MAY LACK STANDING TO OPPOSE SUCH AN APPOINTMENT IN THE FIRST PLACE, WOULD BE ELIMINATED.



PROPOSAL:

AN ACT TO AMEND THE SURROGATE'S COURT PROCEDURE ACT, IN RELATION TO AN OBJECTION TO THE GRANT OF LETTERS TO A FIDUCIARY OR TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A LIFETIME TRUSTEE.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEMBLY,

ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. SECTION 709 OF THE SURROGATE'S COURT PROCEDURE ACT AND CHAPTER 514 OF THE LAWS OF 1993, IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

709. OBJECTION TO GRANT OF LETTERS OR APPOINTMENT OF LIFETIME TRUSTEE TO A PERSON INTERESTED, INCLUDING A NOMINATED FIDUCIARY, BEFORE LETTERS TO OR THE APPOINTMENT OF ANOTHER FIDUCIARY OR THE SURROGATE'S COURT APPOINTS A TRUSTEE OR TRUSTEES, ANY PERSON MAY FILE OBJECTIONS SHOWING HIS OR HER INTEREST IN THE ESTATE AND IN THE MORE OF THE LEGAL OBJECTIONS SET FORTH IN SECTION 707 TO GRANTING OR THE APPOINTMENT OF ONE OR MORE OF THE PERSONS ABOUT TO RECEIVE LETTERS TO OR APPOINTED. WHERE SUCH OBJECTIONS ARE FILED THE COURT MAY STAY THE GRANTING OF LETTERS TO OR THE APPOINTMENT OF THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM THE OBJECTIONS ARE FILED UNTIL THE MATTER IS DETERMINED.

2. THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY.

2. DISQUALIFICATION OF A SURVIVING SPOUSE  
(EPTL 5-1.2(A))

THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS THAT SECTION 5-1.2(A) OF THE ESTATES AND TRUSTS LAW BE AMENDED TO DISQUALIFY AS SURVIVING SPOUSES PERSONS WHO FOR A PERIOD PRIOR TO A DECEDENT'S DEATH WERE MARRIED TO THE DECEDENT AND

THIS MEASURE WOULD AMEND SECTION 5-1.2(A) OF THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW, BY ADDING A SUBDIVISION 7 TO PROVIDE FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A SURVIVING SPOUSE IF THE DECEDENT AND THE SURVIVOR HAD LIVED SEPARATE AND APART FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE DECEDENT'S DEATH AND THE TOTAL TIME THAT THEY COHABITED DID NOT EXCEED THE TOTAL TIME THAT THEY LIVED SEPARATE AND APART EXCEEDED THE TOTAL TIME THAT THEY COHABITED. DISQUALIFICATION UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WILL NOT OCCUR, HOWEVER, IF THE SURVIVOR CAN SHOW ANY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING: THE REASON THAT THE COUPLE LIVED SEPARATE AND APART WAS DUE TO AN ILLNESS OR INJURY WHICH REQUIRED THAT ONE OF THEM RESIDE FOR IN A FACILITY; OR THAT THE SURVIVOR DEPARTED FROM THE MARITAL HOME OF THE DECEDENT HAD ABUSED THE SURVIVOR OR ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE MARITAL HOME; OR THAT, AS A RESULT OF VOLUNTARY, CONTRACTUAL OR COURT-ORDERED SEPARATION, THE RELATIONSHIP CONTINUED BETWEEN THE SPOUSES NOTWITHSTANDING THE SEPARATION. THE SURVIVOR WILL BE ALLOWED TO TESTIFY ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS OR TESTIMONY OF THE DECEDENT EVEN THOUGH SUCH TESTIMONY WOULD OTHERWISE BE BARRIED BY SECTION 5-1.2. THE SURVIVOR MIGHT BE THE ONLY PERSON WHO CAN ESTABLISH THAT THE SEPARATION WAS CAUSED BY ABUSE OR THAT THE DECEDENT VOLUNTARILY PROVIDED SUPPORT TO THE SURVIVOR.

THIS MEASURE IS INTENDED TO PRECLUDE "LAUGHING" SURVIVING SPOUSES WHO FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME PRIOR TO THE DECEDENT'S DEATH WERE MARRIED TO THE DECEDENT IN NAME ONLY, FROM BEING UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY HAVING AN INTESTATE SHARE OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE UNDER SECTION 4-1.1 OF THE EPTL OR AN INTESTATE SHARE UNDER SECTIONS 5-1.1 OR 5-1.1-A OF THE EPTL. AS IS THE CASE WITH SPOUSES DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTION 5-1.2, THESE "LAUGHING" SPOUSES WILL BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTIONS 5-1.3, 5-3.1 AND 5-4.4.

UNDER PRESENT LAW, A SPOUSE WOULD NOT BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTION 5-1.2 IF THE SPOUSES HAD CONSENTED TO THEIR SEPARATION ONE WEEK AFTER THEIR SEPARATION AND CONTINUED TO LIVE SEPARATE AND APART UNTIL THE DECEDENT DIED 70 DAYS AFTER THEY SEPARATED. THE REASON THAT THIS WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A DISQUALIFICATION UNDER SECTION 5-1.2 IS BECAUSE THERE ARE NO GROUNDS OF ABANDONMENT UNDER SUBDIVISION 5 IS BECAUSE THERE ARE NO GROUNDS OF ABANDONMENT UNDER SUBDIVISION 5 IF THE DEPARTURE WAS WITH THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE (*SCHMIDT*).

N.Y.2D 113; *SOLOMON V. SOLOMON*, 290 N.Y. 337; *MATTER OF MAIDEN*, 284 N.Y. 429). FURTHERMORE, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE ESTATE TO PROVE OTHER THAN CONSENSUAL BECAUSE DEATH HAS SEALED THE DECEDENT'S FREQUENTLY IS NO ONE ELSE WHO WITNESSED THE EVENTS LEADING TO T

THE PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTING THE AMENDMENT IS THAT, IF THE S WILLING TO LIVE FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME PRIOR TO THE DECEDENT HAVING HAD ANYTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH THE DECEDENT, THE S WILLING TO DO WITHOUT ANY RIGHTS TO THE DECEDENT'S PROPERTY AFTER DEATH. THE DISQUALIFICATION ONLY APPLIES TO SPOUSES WHO VOLUNTARILY DO WITH THE DECEDENT FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME. THERE IS NO EXEMPTION IF THE SEPARATION WAS CAUSED BY ABUSE, OR THE NEED OF AT LEAST ONE CHILD TO BE CARED FOR IN A FACILITY DUE TO INJURY OR ILLNESS. THERE IS ALSO NO EXEMPTION AFTER THE SEPARATION, THERE WAS VOLUNTARY, CONTRACTUAL OR COURT-ORDERED. THIS MEASURE WILL RESULT IN REDUCED LITIGATION BECAUSE IN NUMEROUS CASES, PRESENTLY A QUESTION OF WHETHER AN ABANDONMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED. UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH 5, IT WILL NOW BE CLEAR THAT THE SPOUSE IS DISQUALIFIED FROM INHERITING.  
7.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT WOULD TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY AND APPLY TO THE ESTATES OF DECEDENTS DYING ON OR AFTER ITS EFFECTIVE DATE.

PROPOSAL:

AN ACT TO AMEND THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW, IN RELATION TO ABANDONMENT AS A SURVIVING SPOUSE.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEMBLY,

ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. PARAGRAPH (A) OF SECTION 5-1.2 OF THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW, AS AMENDED BY ADDING A NEW SUBPARAGRAPH (7) TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

(7) THE SURVIVOR AND THE DECEDENT HAVE CONTINUOUSLY LIVED FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE DECEDENT'S DEATH; THE TOTAL TIME THAT THEY HAVE LIVED SEPARATE AND APART EXCEEDS THE TOTAL TIME THAT THEY COHABITED AS A MARRIED COUPLE, UNLESS THE SURVIVOR CAN ESTABLISH ONE OF THE FOLLOWING: THE REASON THAT THE PARTIES LIVED SEPARATE AND APART WAS A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INJURY WHICH REQUIRED ONE OR BOTH OF THE SPOUSES TO NEED THE CARE OF THE SURVIVOR WHO WAS ACTUALLY RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM, OR PAYING SUPPORT TO, THE DECEDENT OR WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM THE DECEDENT UNDER A COURT ORDER OR AGREEMENT; OR, THAT THE ABUSE OF THE DECEDENT TOWARD THE SURVIVOR OR ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE HOUSEHOLD WAS THE REASON THAT THE SURVIVOR WAS NOT COHABITING WITH THE DECEDENT. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS SUBPARAGRAPH, A COURT SHALL ACCEPT SUCH EVIDENCE AS IS RELEVANT AND COMPETENT, WHETHER OR NOT THE SURVIVOR IS OFFERING SUCH EVIDENCE WOULD OTHERWISE BE COMPETENT TO TESTIFY TO SUCH FACTS.

2. THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY AND SHALL APPLY TO THE ESTATES OF DECEDENTS DYING ON OR AFTER ITS EFFECTIVE DATE.

3. AUTHORIZING A TRUST GRANTOR TO PERMIT TRUSTEES TO MAKE DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS TO THEMSELVES AS BENEFICIARIES (EPTL 10-10.1)

MODIFIED BY THE SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO INCORPORATE THE CHANGES SUGGESTED BY MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. THIS MEASURE WOULD AMEND SECTION 10-10.1 OF THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW TO ALLOW THE GRANTOR OF A TRUST, BY EXPRESS PROVISION IN THE TRUST INSTRUMENT, TO PROVIDE THAT A TRUSTEE MAY MAKE DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS, OF THE TRUST INCOME, TO HERSELF OR HIMSELF AS A BENEFICIARY.

EPTL 10-10.1 NOW PROVIDES THAT A TRUSTEE (OTHER THAN THE GRANTOR OF A REVOCABLE TRUST) IS DISQUALIFIED FROM EXERCISING A DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTION OF TRUST INCOME OR PRINCIPAL TO HERSELF OR HIMSELF AS BENEFICIARY. IF THE TRUST IS TRUSTED ON TWO OR MORE TRUSTEES, IT CAN BE EXERCISED BY A TRUSTEE WHO IS NOT A TRUSTEE, OR, ABSENT SUCH A TRUSTEE, BY THE SURROGATE'S OR SUPREME COURT.

THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF SECTION 10-10.1 IS TO PREVENT A GRANTOR FROM INADVERTENTLY CAUSING THE INCLUSION OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE TRUST IN THE GROSS ESTATE OF THE TRUSTEE FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES UNDER THE GENERAL APPOINTMENT PROVISIONS OF SECTION 2041 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.

ALTHOUGH THIS PURPOSE CONTINUES TO BE DESIRABLE, THE PRESENT PROVISIONS OF SECTION 10-10.1 ARE UNNECESSARILY RESTRICTIVE OF TRUST GRANTORS. IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT A TRUSTEE MAY NOT, UNDER SECTION 10-10.1, EXERCISE A DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTION TO INVADE CORPUS FOR HIS "MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT" (*MATTER OF SULLIVAN'S ESTATE*, 58 A.D.2D 72 [2<sup>ND</sup> DEP'T 1977]) EVEN THOUGH THE POSSESSION OF SUCH PROPERTY WOULD NOT REQUIRE INCLUSION OF THE PROPERTY UNDER IRC 2041 [SECTION 2041].

IN RECOGNITION OF THE ABOVE CONCERN, SEVERAL STATES WHICH HAVE A PROVISION COMPARABLE TO EPTL 10-10.1 (E.G., CALIFORNIA, FLORIDA, WISCONSIN) PERMIT GRANTORS OF THE POWER IN THE ABOVE SCENARIO AND PERMIT GRANTORS, BY SPECIFIC PROVISION IN INSTRUMENT, TO VARY THE NORMAL PROHIBITIONS OF THE STATUTE. THIS MEASURE WOULD FOLLOW THIS APPROACH AND WOULD THEREBY RETAIN THE PROHIBITIONS OF THE STATUTE FOR AN UNWARY GRANTOR, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PROPERLY INCORPORATE THE INTENTIONS OF AN INFORMED GRANTOR.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE INSTANT MEASURE DOES NOT PERMIT A TRUSTEE OR HIS OR HER SPOUSE TO MAKE DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS TO HERSELF OR HIMSELF FROM A QUALIFIED TERMINABLE INTEREST TRUST UNLESS THE TRUST INSTRUMENT EXPRESSLY OVERRIDES THIS PROHIBITION. THIS IS TO PREVENT AN INTENDED QUALIFIED TERMINABLE INTEREST TRUST FROM BEING INADVERTENTLY CONVERTED TO A GENERAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT TRUST.

PROPOSAL:

AN ACT TO AMEND THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW, IN RELATION TO THE POWER OF A GRANTOR OF A TRUST TO CONFER UPON TRUSTEES THE POWER TO MAKE DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS TO THEMSELVES AS BENEFICIARIES

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEMBLY,

ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. SECTION 10-10.1 OF THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

READ AS FOLLOWS:

10-10.1. POWER TO DISTRIBUTE PRINCIPAL OR ALLOCATE INCOME; REVOCABLE TRUSTS. EXERCISE. [EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF A TRUST WHICH IS REVOCABLE BY SUCH PERSON DURING HIS OR HER LIFETIME, A POWER CONFERRED UPON A PERSON IN HIS OR HER CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF AN EXPRESS TRUST TO MAKE DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTION OF EITHER PRINCIPAL OR INCOME TO HIMSELF OR HERSELF OR TO MAKE DISCRETIONARY ALLOCATIONS IN HIS OR HER ACCOUNT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RECEIPTS OR EXPENSES AS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND INCOME, CANNOT BE EXERCISED BY SUCH PERSON] A POWER HELD BY A PERSON AS TRUSTEE OF AN EXPRESS TRUST TO MAKE DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTION OF EITHER PRINCIPAL OR INCOME TO SUCH PERSON AS A BENEFICIARY

MAKE DISCRETIONARY ALLOCATIONS IN SUCH PERSON'S FAVOR OF RECEIPT  
BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND INCOME, CANNOT BE EXERCISED BY SUCH PERSON  
PERSON IS THE GRANTOR OF THE TRUST AND THE TRUST IS REVOCABLE BY  
LIFETIME OR (2) THE POWER IS A POWER TO PROVIDE FOR SUCH PERSON'S  
MAINTENANCE OR SUPPORT WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTIONS 2041 AND  
REVENUE CODE, OR ANY OTHER ASCERTAINABLE STANDARD, OR (3) THE TR  
EXPRESS REFERENCE TO THIS SECTION, PROVIDES OTHERWISE. IF THE POW  
TWO OR MORE TRUSTEES, IT MAY BE [EXECUTED BY THE] EXERCISED BY THE  
WHO ARE NOT SO DISQUALIFIED. IF THERE IS NO TRUSTEE QUALIFIED TO  
POWER, ITS [EXECUTION] EXERCISE DEVOLVES ON THE SUPREME COURT OR  
COURT, EXCEPT THAT IF THE POWER IS CREATED BY WILL, ITS [EXECUTION]  
THE SURROGATE'S COURT HAVING JURISDICTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE

2. THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY.

#### 4. APPOINTMENT OF STANDBY GUARDIAN (SCPA 1726)

A SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR VERSION OF THIS MEASURE, WHICH SEEKS APPOINTMENT OF STANDBY GUARDIANS, WAS INTRODUCED AT THE RECO SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE IN 2000. THE EARLIER VERSIO BY THE LEGISLATURE, BUT WAS NOT SIGNED BY THE GOVERNOR, PRIMARI IN TRANSITION ACT OF 2000 ALSO AMENDED SECTION 1726 OF THE SURRO PROCEDURE ACT. THE MEASURE HAS NOW BEEN MODIFIED TO INCORPOR THOSE CHANGES TO THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE.

NEW YORK STATE'S STANDBY GUARDIANSHIP STATUTE, SECTION L726 COURT PROCEDURE ACT, ALLOWS A PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUS CARETAKER WHO SUFFERS FROM A FATAL OR DEBILITATING ILLNESS TO PR GUARDIANSHIP OF A CHILD IN THE EVENT OF INCAPACITY, DEBILITATION THAT THERE ARE VARYING DEGREES OF DISABILITY, THE LEGISLATURE HAS EXCLUSIVE STANDBY GUARDIANSHIP PROCEDURES. THOSE WHO ARE CAPA PETITION THE COURT FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A STANDBY GUARDIAN Y BECOMES EFFECTIVE UPON THE INCAPACITY, DEATH OR CONSENT OF THE BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THEIR ILLNESS, CANNOT OR OTHERWISE PRE ADVANTAGE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS MAY DESIGNATE A STANDBY GUAR INSTRUMENT. A DESIGNATED GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY BECOMES EFFECTI INCAPACITY OR DEBILITATION AND CONSENT OF THE PARENT OR LEGAL C CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE C

THIS PROPOSAL ADDS TWO SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS TO THE STATU ADDITION OF SUBDIVISION (4)(B)(IV) TO SECTION L726, IS A SAVINGS PROV WILL SAVINGS STATUTES. IT PROVIDES THAT A DESIGNATION OF STANDBY EFFECTIVE, EVEN IF MADE IN ANOTHER STATE, AS LONG AS IT WAS VALIDLY JURISDICTION: (1) WHERE THE PARENT OR GUARDIAN WAS DOMICILED AT (2) WHERE IT WAS EXECUTED OR (3) WHERE THE PARENT OR GUARDIAN IS I THE DESIGNATION BECOMES EFFECTIVE. THE SECOND PROVISION, AN AM (4)(F), ADDRESSES THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING DESIGNATIONS, INCLUD TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENT, BY PROVIDING THAT THE MOST RECENT DE EFFECT.



IN ADDITION TO THESE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS, THIS MEASURE SU  
DEFINITIONS FOR “LEGAL GUARDIAN” AND “CHILD(REN)”<sup>2</sup> AND ALSO MAKE  
AMENDMENTS TO SECTION L726. SUBDIVISIONS L(A)(II) AND 4(B)(III) ARE A  
DEATH AS ONE OF THE TRIGGERING EVENTS FOR A STANDBY GUARDIAN’S  
SUBDIVISIONS 3(D)(II), 3(E)(II), 4(C)(III), 4(D) AND 4(D)(II) ARE EITHER ADDE  
COMPORT WITH THE RECENTLY ENACTED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1726(4  
DEATH. SECTION L726(3)(B)(I) CURRENTLY OMITTS PETITIONER’S CONSENT A  
MAY TRIGGER THE AUTHORITY OF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN TO ACT PURSU  
ADDITION, THE LAST SENTENCE OF SECTION 1726(3)(D)(II) IS DELETED BECA  
CONFUSING WHEN READ IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS  
THIS LANGUAGE IS CONTRARY TO THE STATUTORY SCHEME ALLOWING TH  
GUARDIAN THE OPTION OF SPECIFYING WHICH ONE OR MORE OF THREE  
PETITIONER’S CONSENT, WILL TRIGGER THE PARENT OR GUARDIAN’S AUTH  
PROVISIONS ARE INTENDED TO ADD CLARITY OR TO ADDRESS INCONSIST  
OCCASIONED BY PRIOR AMENDMENTS, AND TO ENSURE INTERNAL CONSIS  
THE TERMS LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN, AND PRIMARY CARETAK

PROPOSAL:

AN ACT TO AMEND THE SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEDURE ACT, IN RELATIO  
OF STANDBY GUARDIANS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE A

AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. SECTION 1726 OF THE SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEDURE A  
CHAPTER 290 OF THE LAWS OF 1992, IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

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<sup>2</sup> OF PARTICULAR NOTE IS THE NEW REFERENCE TO GUARDIAN (AS PART  
OF “PARENT”) AS THE “GUARDIAN OF AN INFANT’S PERSON.” PRESENT LAW, WHEN  
THE TERM, “LEGAL GUARDIAN” AS A PERSON WHO COULD PETITION FOR OR DES  
GUARDIAN. “LEGAL GUARDIAN,” HOWEVER, IS NOT A TERM OF COMMON USAGE,  
IN THE SCPA OR THE EPTL. INASMUCH AS SCPA 1726 IS CONCERNED PRIMARILY V  
OF CHILDREN, IT IS REASONABLE THAT THE STATUTE BE LIMITED TO INDIVIDUA  
IN REGARD TO THE CHILD’S PERSON.

1726. STANDBY GUARDIANS. 1. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION:

(A) "STANDBY GUARDIAN" MEANS (I) A PERSON JUDICIALLY APPOINTED PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION THREE OF THIS SECTION AS STANDBY GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON OF AN INFANT WHOSE AUTHORITY BECOMES EFFECTIVE UPON THE INCAPACITATION OF THE INFANT'S PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER OR UPON THE CONSENT OF THE PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER OR (II) A PERSON DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION FOUR OF THIS SECTION AS STANDBY GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON OF AN INFANT WHOSE AUTHORITY BECOMES EFFECTIVE UPON THE DEATH OR INCAPACITATION OF THE LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER OR UPON THE CONSENT OF THE PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER.

(B) "LEGAL GUARDIAN" MEANS THE COURT-APPOINTED GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON AND/OR PROPERTY.

(C) "ATTENDING PHYSICIAN" MEANS THE PHYSICIAN WHO HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TREATMENT AND CARE OF THE [PETITIONER] INFANT'S PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER. WHERE MORE THAN ONE PHYSICIAN HAS SUCH RESPONSIBILITY, OR WHERE A PHYSICIAN IS ACTING ON THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN'S RESPONSIBILITY, SUCH PHYSICIAN MAY ACT AS THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION. WHERE A PHYSICIAN HAS SUCH RESPONSIBILITY, ANY PHYSICIAN WHO IS FAMILIAR WITH THE PHYSICIAN HAS SUCH RESPONSIBILITY, ANY PHYSICIAN WHO IS FAMILIAR WITH THE PHYSICIAN HAS SUCH RESPONSIBILITY.

PARENT'S, LEGAL GUARDIAN'S, LEGAL CUSTODIAN'S OR PRIMARY CARETAKER  
MAY ACT AS THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION.

[(C)] (D) "DEBILITATION" MEANS A CHRONIC AND SUBSTANTIAL INABILITY OF A  
DEPENDENT INFANT, AS A RESULT OF (I) A PROGRESSIVELY CHRONIC OR IRREVERSIBLE  
OR (II) A PHYSICALLY DEBILITATING ILLNESS, DISEASE OR INJURY. "DEBILITATED"  
MEANS HAVING A DEBILITATION.

[(D)] (E) "INCAPACITY" MEANS A CHRONIC AND SUBSTANTIAL INABILITY OF A  
PERSON, DUE TO MENTAL IMPAIRMENT, TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES  
CONCERNING THE CARE OF ONE'S DEPENDENT INFANT, AND A CONSEQUENT INABILITY  
TO CARE FOR SUCH INFANT. "INCAPACITATED" MEANS THE STATE OF HAVING AN INCAPACITY.

2. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS [CHAPTER] ARTICLE RELATING TO GUARDIANSHIP OF  
STANDBY GUARDIANS, EXCEPT INsofar AS THIS SECTION PROVIDES OTHERWISE.

3. (A) A PETITION FOR THE JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT OF A STANDBY GUARDIAN OF THE  
PERSON AND/OR PROPERTY OF AN INFANT PURSUANT TO THIS SUBDIVISION MAY BE FILED BY  
A LEGAL GUARDIAN OF THE INFANT OR A LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE INFANT IF THE INFANT  
IS NOT RESIDING WITH A PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN OR LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE INFANT.  
SATISFACTION OF THE COURT, SUCH PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN OR LEGAL CUSTODIAN  
MUST BE LOCATED WITH DUE DILIGENCE, THE PRIMARY CARETAKER OF SUCH INFANT.  
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT OF SUCH STANDBY GUARDIAN. APPLICATION FOR

AS A PRIMARY CARETAKER SHALL BE UPON MOTION TO THE COURT UPON THE COURT MAY DIRECT.

(B) A PETITION FOR THE JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT OF A STANDBY GUARDIAN SHALL, IN ADDITION TO MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION SEVEN OF THIS ARTICLE:

(I) STATE WHETHER THE AUTHORITY OF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN IS TO BE EXERCISED UPON THE PETITIONER'S INCAPACITY, UPON THE PETITIONER'S DEATH, UPON THE PETITIONER'S CONSENT, OR UPON WHICHEVER OCCURS FIRST;

(II) STATE THAT THE PETITIONER SUFFERS FROM (A) A PROGRESSIVELY AND AN IRREVERSIBLY FATAL ILLNESS AND THE BASIS FOR SUCH STATEMENT, SOURCE OF A MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS, WITHOUT REQUIRING THE IDENTIFICATION OF A QUESTION.

(C) THE PETITIONER'S APPEARANCE IN COURT SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED IF THE PETITIONER IS MEDICALLY UNABLE TO APPEAR, EXCEPT UPON MOTION AND FOR GOOD CAUSE.

(D) (I) IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PETITIONER SUFFERS FROM A PROGRESSIVELY AND AN IRREVERSIBLY FATAL ILLNESS AND THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE PETITIONER ARE PROMOTED BY THE APPOINTMENT OF A STANDBY GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON, THE COURT MUST MAKE A DECREE ACCORDINGLY.

(II) SUCH DECREE SHALL SPECIFY WHETHER THE AUTHORITY OF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN IS EFFECTIVE UPON THE RECEIPT OF A DETERMINATION OF THE PETITIONER'S INCAPACITY, UPON RECEIPT OF THE CERTIFICATE OF THE PETITIONER'S DEATH, OR OTHER SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT MAY BE SATISFACTORY TO THE COURT, OR UPON WHICHEVER OCCUR FIRST. THE DECREE MAY PROVIDE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN MAY EARLIER COMMENCE UPON THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PARENT PURSUANT TO SUBPARAGRAPH (III) OF THIS SECTION OR SUBDIVISION. [SUCH DECREE SHALL ALSO INDICATE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN IS EFFECTIVE UPON THE PETITIONER'S CONSENT.]

(III) IF AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN THE COURT FINDS THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF SUBPARAGRAPH (II) OF THIS SECTION ARE NO LONGER SATISFIED, IT MAY RESCIND SUCH DECREE:

(E) (I) WHERE THE DECREE PROVIDES THAT THE AUTHORITY OF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT OF A DETERMINATION OF THE PETITIONER'S INCAPACITY, THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY SHALL COMMENCE UPON THE STANDBY GUARDIAN RECEIVING A DETERMINATION OF INCAPACITY MADE PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION SIX OF SECTION 103. THE STANDBY GUARDIAN SHALL FILE A COPY OF THE DETERMINATION OF INCAPACITY WITH THE COURT THAT ISSUED THE DECREE WITHIN NINETY DAYS OF THE DATE OF RECEIPT OF THE DETERMINATION OR THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY MAY BE RESCINDED BY THE COURT.

(II) WHERE THE DECREE PROVIDES THAT THE AUTHORITY OF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN SHALL COMMENCE UPON RECEIPT OF A CERTIFICATE OF THE PETITIONER'S DEATH, OF DEATH THAT MAY BE SATISFACTORY TO THE COURT, THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY SHALL COMMENCE UPON THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S RECEIPT OF A CERTIFICATE OF THE PETITIONER'S DEATH, EVIDENCE OF DEATH AS MAY BE SPECIFIED IN THE DECREE. THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY SHALL COMMENCE UPON RECEIPT OF A CERTIFICATE OF THE PETITIONER'S DEATH, CERTIFICATE OF DEATH, OR OTHER SUCH EVIDENCE OF DEATH, WITH THE DECREE WITHIN NINETY DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE PETITIONER'S DEATH. IF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY MAY BE RESCINDED BY THE COURT.

(III) NOTWITHSTANDING SUBPARAGRAPHS (I) AND (II) OF THIS PARAGRAPH, THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY SHALL COMMENCE UPON THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S RECEIPT OF THE PETITIONER'S WRITTEN CONSENT TO SUCH COMMENCEMENT, SIGNED BY THE PETITIONER IN THE PRESENCE OF TWO WITNESSES AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, OTHER THAN THE STANDBY GUARDIAN, WHO SHALL ALSO SIGN THE WRITING. ANOTHER PERSON MAY SIGN THE WRITING IN CONSENT ON THE PETITIONER'S BEHALF AND AT THE PETITIONER'S DIRECTION IF THE PETITIONER IS PHYSICALLY UNABLE TO DO SO, PROVIDED SUCH CONSENT IS SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PETITIONER AND THE WITNESSES. THE STANDBY GUARDIAN SHALL FILE THE WRITING WITH THE COURT THAT ISSUED THE DECREE WITHIN NINETY DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OR THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY MAY BE RESCINDED BY THE COURT.

(F) THE PETITIONER MAY REVOKE A STANDBY GUARDIANSHIP CREATED BY THIS SUBDIVISION BY EXECUTING A WRITTEN REVOCATION, FILING IT WITH THE COURT THAT ISSUED THE DECREE, AND PROMPTLY NOTIFYING THE STANDBY GUARDIAN OF THE REVOCATION.

(G) A PERSON JUDICIALLY APPOINTED STANDBY GUARDIAN PURSUANT TO THIS SUBDIVISION MAY AT ANY TIME BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF HIS OR HER AUTHORITY AS STANDBY GUARDIAN BY EXECUTING A WRITTEN RENUNCIATION AND FILING IT WITH THE COURT THAT ISSUED THE DECREE, AND PROMPTLY NOTIFYING THE PETITIONER OF THE RENUNCIATION.

4. (A) A PARENT, A LEGAL GUARDIAN, A LEGAL CUSTODIAN, OR PRIMARY CARETAKER OF A CHILD MAY DESIGNATE A STANDBY GUARDIAN BY MEANS OF A WRITTEN DESIGNATION IN THE PRESENCE OF THE LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER IN THE PRESENCE OF THE COURT AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, OTHER THAN THE STANDBY GUARDIAN DESIGNATED IN THE WRITING. ANOTHER PERSON MAY SIGN THE WRITTEN DESIGNATION ON BEHALF OF THE LEGAL GUARDIAN'S, LEGAL CUSTODIAN'S OR PRIMARY CARETAKER'S BEHALF AND AS DIRECTED BY THE LEGAL GUARDIAN'S, LEGAL CUSTODIAN'S OR PRIMARY CARETAKER'S DIRECTION IN THE WRITING IF THE LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER IS PHYSICALLY UNABLE TO SIGN. THE DESIGNATION IS SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER AND THE WITNESSES.

(B) (I) A DESIGNATION OF A STANDBY GUARDIAN SHALL IDENTIFY THE GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER, THE INFANT AND TO BE THE STANDBY GUARDIAN, AND SHALL INDICATE THAT THE PARENT, CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER INTENDS FOR THE STANDBY GUARDIAN TO BE THE INFANT'S GUARDIAN IN THE EVENT THE PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER EITHER: (A) BECOMES INCAPACITATED; (B) BECOMES DEBILITATED; (C) COMMENCEMENT OF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY; OR (C) [DIED]; OR (D) COMMENCEMENT OF A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING TO APPOINT A GUARDIAN OF THE PROPERTY OF AN INFANT.

(II) A PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER SHALL DESIGNATE AN ALTERNATE STANDBY GUARDIAN IN THE SAME WRITING, AND BY THE SAME WRITING AS THE DESIGNATION OF A STANDBY GUARDIAN.

(III) A DESIGNATION MAY, BUT NEED NOT, BE IN THE FOLLOWING FORM:

DESIGNATION OF STANDBY GUARDIAN

(NOTE: AS USED IN THIS FORM, THE TERM "PARENT" SHALL INCLUDE A PARENT, A COURT-APPOINTED GUARDIAN OF AN INFANT'S PERSON OR PROPERTY, A LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR A PRIMARY CARETAKER AND THE TERM "CHILDREN" SHALL INCLUDE THE DEPENDANT INFANT OF A PARENT, COURT-APPOINTED GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER



I (NAME OF PARENT) HEREBY DESIGNATE (NAME, HOME ADDRESS AND STANDBY GUARDIAN) AS STANDBY GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON AND PROPERTY (NAME OF CHILD(REN)).

(YOU MAY, IF YOU WISH, PROVIDE THAT THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY EXTEND ONLY TO THE PERSON, OR ONLY TO THE PROPERTY, OF YOUR CHILD(REN) "PERSON" OR "PROPERTY", WHICHEVER IS INAPPLICABLE, ABOVE.)

THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY SHALL TAKE EFFECT [IF AND WHEN MY DOCTOR CONCLUDES IN WRITING THAT I AM MENTALLY INCAPACITATED, UNABLE TO CARE FOR MY CHILD(REN); [OR] (2) IF MY DOCTOR CONCLUDES IN WRITING THAT I AM DEBILITATED, AND THUS UNABLE TO CARE FOR MY CHILD(REN) AND I COME TO THE ATTENTION OF TWO WITNESSES, TO THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY TAKING EFFECT.]

IN THE EVENT THE PERSON I DESIGNATE ABOVE IS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO SERVE AS GUARDIAN FOR MY CHILD(REN), I HEREBY DESIGNATE (NAME, HOME ADDRESS AND PHONE NUMBER OF ALTERNATE STANDBY GUARDIAN), AS STANDBY GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON AND PROPERTY.

I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT MY STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY WILL COMMENCE ON THE DATE AFTER COMMENCING UNLESS BY SUCH DATE HE OR SHE PETITIONS THE COURT TO REVOKE HIS GUARDIAN.

I UNDERSTAND THAT I RETAIN FULL PARENTAL, GUARDIANSHIP, CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS EVEN AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S DUTY. I CAN REVOKE THE STANDBY GUARDIANSHIP AT ANY TIME.

SIGNATURE:

ADDRESS:

DATE:

I DECLARE THAT THE PERSON WHOSE NAME APPEARS ABOVE SIGNED THIS INSTRUMENT IN MY PRESENCE, OR WAS PHYSICALLY UNABLE TO SIGN AND ASKED ANOTHER TO SIGN FOR ME WHO DID SO IN MY PRESENCE. I FURTHER DECLARE THAT I AM AT LEAST 18 YEARS OLD AND AM NOT THE PERSON DESIGNATED AS STANDBY GUARDIAN.

WITNESS' SIGNATURE:

ADDRESS:

DATE:

WITNESS' SIGNATURE:

ADDRESS:

DATE:

(IV) NOTWITHSTANDING PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OF THIS SUBDIVISION, A STANDBY GUARDIAN SHALL BE EFFECTIVE AS IF MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH (A) OF THIS SUBDIVISION IF IT WAS VALIDLY MADE: (A) WHERE THE PARENT, LEGAL

CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER WAS DOMICILED AT THE TIME IT WAS EXECUTED OR (C) WHERE THE PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER IS DOMICILED AT THE TIME THE DESIGNATION IS EFFECTIVE.

(C) THE AUTHORITY OF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN UNDER A DESIGNATION OF STANDBY GUARDIAN UPON EITHER: (I) THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S RECEIPT OF A COPY OF A DETERMINATION OF DEBILITY OR INCAPACITY MADE PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION SIX OF THIS SECTION; [OR] (II) THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S RECEIPT OF (A) A COPY OF A DETERMINATION OF DEBILITY OR INCAPACITY PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION SIX OF THIS SECTION AND (B) A COPY OF THE PARENT'S, LEGAL GUARDIAN'S, LEGAL CUSTODIAN'S OR PRIMARY CARETAKER'S WRITTEN CONSENT TO SUCH COMPLETION OF THE DESIGNATION BY THE PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER AND TWO OTHER WITNESSES AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, OTHER THAN THE STANDBY GUARDIAN, WHO ALSO SIGN THE WRITING. ANOTHER PERSON MAY SIGN THE WRITTEN CONSENT ON BEHALF OF THE LEGAL GUARDIAN'S, LEGAL CUSTODIAN'S OR PRIMARY CARETAKER'S BEHALF IF THE LEGAL GUARDIAN'S, LEGAL CUSTODIAN'S OR PRIMARY CARETAKER'S DIRECT WRITTEN CONSENT AND THE LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER IS PHYSICALLY UNABLE TO SIGN. SUCH CONSENT IS SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER AND THE WITNESSES; OR (III) THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S RECEIPT OF A CERTIFICATE OF DEATH, FUNERAL HOME RECEIPT OR OTHER SUCH DOCUMENT.

THE PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER  
GUARDIAN SHALL FILE A PETITION PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH (D) OF THIS  
DAYS OF THE DATE OF ITS COMMENCEMENT PURSUANT TO THIS PARAGRA  
GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY SHALL CEASE AFTER SUCH DATE, BUT SHALL RECC  
FILING.

(D) THE STANDBY GUARDIAN MAY FILE A PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT  
RECEIPT OF EITHER: (I) A COPY OF A DETERMINATION OF INCAPACITY MADE  
SUBDIVISION SIX OF THIS SECTION; OR (II) (A) A COPY OF A DETERMINATION  
PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION SIX OF THIS SECTION AND (B) A COPY OF THE  
GUARDIAN'S, LEGAL CUSTODIAN'S OR PRIMARY CARETAKER'S WRITTEN COPY  
PARAGRAPH (C) OF THIS SUBDIVISION; OR (III) A CERTIFICATE OF DEATH, COPY  
OF DEATH THAT MAY BE SATISFACTORY TO THE COURT. SUCH PETITION MUST  
MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION SEVENTEEN HUNDRED FOUR C

(I) APPEND THE WRITTEN DESIGNATION OF SUCH PERSON AS STANDBY

(II) APPEND A COPY OF [EITHER]: (A) THE DETERMINATION OF INCAPACITY  
LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER; OR (B) THE  
DEBILITATION AND THE PARENTAL, GUARDIAN'S, CUSTODIAN'S OR CARETAKER'S  
COPY OF THE PARENT'S, LEGAL GUARDIAN'S, LEGAL CUSTODIAN'S OR PRIMARY  
CERTIFICATE, OR OTHER SUCH EVIDENCE OF DEATH THAT MAY BE SATISFACTORY

(III) IF THE PETITION IS BY A PERSON DESIGNATED AS ALTERNATE STANDBY GUARDIAN, THAT THE PERSON DESIGNATED AS STANDBY GUARDIAN IS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO SERVE AS STANDBY GUARDIAN, AND THE BASIS FOR SUCH STATEMENT.

(E) IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE [PERSON] PETITIONER WAS DULY DESIGNATED AS STANDBY GUARDIAN, THAT [A DETERMINATION OF INCAPACITY, A DETERMINATION OF DEATH, PARENTAL OR GUARDIAN'S CONSENT OR A DOCUMENT INDICATING THAT THE PERSON IS A STANDBY GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER OF THE INFANT IS DEBILITATED AND CONSENTS OR HAS DIED, [SUCH] AS ESTABLISHED BY A COURT ORDER, A DEATH CERTIFICATE OR [A FUNERAL HOME RECEIPT OR OTHER SUCH DOCUMENT INDICATING DEATH AS MAY BE SATISFACTORY TO THE COURT, THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE INFANT ARE PROMOTED BY THE APPOINTMENT OF A STANDBY GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON AND THAT, IF THE PETITION IS BY A PERSON DESIGNATED AS ALTERNATE STANDBY GUARDIAN, THAT THE PERSON DESIGNATED AS STANDBY GUARDIAN IS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO SERVE AS STANDBY GUARDIAN, IT MUST MAKE A DECREE ACCORDINGLY.

(F) THE PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER OF THE INFANT MAY DESIGNATE A STANDBY GUARDIANSHIP CREATED UNDER THIS SUBDIVISION: (I) BY EXECUTIVE ORDER OR DESIGNATION OF GUARDIANSHIP PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OF SECTION 1710 OF THE STATUTES (II) NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 1710 AND 1711 OF THE STATUTES OF A STANDBY GUARDIAN WHOSE AUTHORITY BECOMES EFFECTIVE UPON THE DEATH OF THE INFANT.

LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER OF THE INFANT  
DESIGNATION OF STANDBY GUARDIAN SET FORTH IN A WILL OF THE PARENT  
LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER, OR (III) BY NOTIFYING THE STANDBY  
VERBALLY OR IN WRITING OR BY ANY OTHER ACT EVIDENCING A SPECIFIC  
STANDBY GUARDIANSHIP PRIOR TO THE FILING OF A PETITION[; AND (II) IF A  
PETITION HAS ALREADY BEEN FILED, BY EXECUTING A WRITTEN REVOCATION  
COURT WHERE THE PETITION WAS FILED, AND PROMPTLY NOTIFYING THE COURT  
OF  
THE REVOCATION.

5. THE STANDBY GUARDIAN MAY ALSO FILE A PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT  
IN  
ANY OTHER MANNER PERMITTED BY THIS ARTICLE OR ARTICLE SIX OF THE  
CONSTITUTION. NOTICE TO THE PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY  
CARETAKER, OR (III) BY NOTIFYING THE STANDBY GUARDIAN  
APPEND A DESIGNATION OF STANDBY GUARDIAN TO THE PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT  
COURT IN THE DETERMINATION OF SUCH PETITION.

6. (A) A DETERMINATION OF INCAPACITY OR DEBILITATION MUST: (I) BE  
MADE BY AN ATTENDING PHYSICIAN TO A REASONABLE DEGREE OF MEDICAL CERTAINTY;  
(II) BE IN WRITING; AND (III) CONTAIN THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN'S OPINION REGARDING THE CAUSE OF  
[PETITIONER'S] INCAPACITY OR DEBILITATION AS WELL AS ITS EXTENT AND  
DURATION. THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN SHALL PROVIDE A COPY OF THE DETERMINATION

DEBILITATION TO THE STANDBY GUARDIAN, IF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S  
THE PHYSICIAN.

(B) IF REQUESTED BY THE STANDBY GUARDIAN, AN ATTENDING PHYSICIAN'S  
DETERMINATION REGARDING THE [PETITIONER'S] PARENT'S, LEGAL GUARDIAN'S  
OR PRIMARY CARETAKER'S INCAPACITY OR DEBILITATION FOR PURPOSES OF

(C) THE STANDBY GUARDIAN SHALL ENSURE THAT THE [PETITIONER'S]  
GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER IS INFORMED OF THE  
THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY AS A RESULT OF A DETERMINATION OF  
THE [PETITIONER'S] PARENT'S, LEGAL GUARDIAN'S, LEGAL CUSTODIAN'S OR  
RIGHT TO REVOKE SUCH AUTHORITY PROMPTLY AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DETERMINATION OF  
INCAPACITY, PROVIDED THERE IS ANY INDICATION OF [THE PETITIONER'S] ABILITY TO  
COMPREHEND SUCH INFORMATION.

7. THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE STANDBY GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY AS A RESULT OF A  
DETERMINATION OF INCAPACITY, DETERMINATION OF DEBILITATION, OR DETERMINATION OF  
ITSELF, DIVEST THE [PETITIONER] PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN'S  
CARETAKER OF ANY PARENTAL, [OR] GUARDIANSHIP, CUSTODIAL OR CARETAKER'S  
CONFER UPON THE STANDBY GUARDIAN CONCURRENT AUTHORITY WITH THE STANDBY GUARDIAN.

8. (A) THE CLERK OF ANY COUNTY UPON BEING PAID THE FEES ALLOWED BY LAW SHALL  
SHALL RECEIVE FOR FILING ANY INSTRUMENT APPOINTING OR DESIGNATING A STANDBY GUARDIAN.

PURSUANT TO SECTION SEVENTEEN HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX OF THIS CHAPTER, THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF DOMICILIARY OF THE COUNTY, AND SHALL GIVE A WRITTEN RECEIPT THEREFOR UPON DELIVERING IT. THE FILING OF AN APPOINTMENT OR DESIGNATION OF STANDBY GUARDIAN SHALL BE FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF SAFEKEEPING AND SHALL NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE APPOINTMENT OR DESIGNATION.

(B) THE APPOINTMENT OR DESIGNATION SHALL BE DELIVERED ONLY TO THE APPLICANT, LEGAL GUARDIAN, LEGAL CUSTODIAN OR PRIMARY CARETAKER WHO APPOINTED THE STANDBY GUARDIAN: (II) THE STANDBY GUARDIAN OR ALTERNATE STANDBY GUARDIAN OR A PERSON DESIGNATED AS STANDBY GUARDIAN OR ALTERNATE STANDBY GUARDIAN OR A PERSON DIRECTED BY THE COURT.

2. THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT ON THE FIRST DAY OF JANUARY NEXT FOLLOWING THE DATE ON WHICH IT BECOMES A LAW.



5. LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN BORN TO A MARRIED COUPLE  
USING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION TECHNIQUES  
(DRL 73)

SECTION 73 OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW RECOGNIZES THE LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN BORN TO MARRIED COUPLES BY MEANS OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS THAT SECTION 73 BE AMENDED TO EXTEND SUCH RIGHTS TO CHILDREN WHO ARE BORN TO MARRIED COUPLES BY MORE ADVANCED METHODS OF REPRODUCTION, SUCH AS IN VITRO FERTILIZATION.

SECTION 73 OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW NOW PROVIDES THAT A CHILD BORN TO A MARRIED WOMAN BY MEANS OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION . . . [BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE HUSBAND] WITH THE CONSENT IN WRITING OF THE WOMAN AND HER HUSBAND, SHALL BE THE LEGITIMATE, NATURAL CHILD OF THE HUSBAND AND HIS WIFE FOR ALL PURPOSES. A CHILD CONCEIVED BY A MARRIED WOMAN WITH THE SPERM OF A PERSON OTHER THAN THE HUSBAND WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE THE HUSBAND'S LEGITIMATE, NATURAL CHILD IF THE REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED BY SECTION 73 WERE FOLLOWED.

RECENT ADVANCES IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, HOWEVER, HAVE EXPANDED THE OPPORTUNITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR MARRIED INFERTILE COUPLES TO HAVE CHILDREN THROUGH METHODS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, INCLUDING IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (IVF), GIFT (INTRAFALLOPIAN TRANSFER (GIFT) THAT MAY INVOLVE DONATED GAMETES AND EMBRYOS (FERTILIZED EGGS). USE OF DONATED SEMEN AND EGGS COULD RAISE QUESTIONS OF RIGHTS, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DONOR (BIOLOGICAL PARENT) UNDER PRESENT LAWS.<sup>3</sup> MOREOVER, CRYOPRESERVATION ALLOWS FROZEN GAMETES AND EMBRYOS TO BE IMPLANTED IN A MARRIED WOMAN FOR THIS PURPOSE EVEN AFTER THE DEATH OF THE DONORS.<sup>4</sup> ACCORDINGLY, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT SECTION 73 OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW INCLUDE CHILDREN BORN BY ANY METHOD OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION.

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<sup>3</sup> FOR EXAMPLE, UNDER ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW, SECTION 2-1.3(A)(2) OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW PROVIDES THAT A CHILD BORN TO A MARRIED WOMAN BY MEANS OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION . . . [BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE HUSBAND] WITH THE CONSENT IN WRITING OF THE WOMAN AND HER HUSBAND, SHALL BE THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF THE HUSBAND AND HIS WIFE FOR ALL PURPOSES. HIS ISSUE WOULD INHERIT FROM HIS FATHER AND HIS PATERNAL KINDRED. IF A PATERNITY BLOOD GENETIC MARKER TEST HAD BEEN ADMINISTERED TO THE FATHER AND THE CHILD AND THE RESULTS WITH OTHER AVAILABLE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES PATERNITY BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.”

<sup>4</sup> UNDER SECTIONS 2-1.3(A)(2), 5-3.2 AND 6-5.7, CHILDREN OF THE DONOR OF A GAMETE OR EMBRYO TO A MARRIED PARENT BORN AFTER HIS OR HER DEATH MAY HAVE CERTAIN RIGHTS.

DEVELOPED IN THE FUTURE, SO THAT THESE CHILDREN WILL BE DEEMED THE NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE WIFE AND HER CONSENTING HUSBAND, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEIR OWN OR DONATED GAMETES OR EMBRYOS ARE USED.

AFTER AN INTENSIVE, COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, APPOINTED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER, ISSUED ITS REPORT, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY IN APRIL 1998,<sup>5</sup> RECOMMENDING, INTER ALIA, AT P. XXV:

NEW YORK'S DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW SHOULD BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE THAT WHEN A MARRIED WOMAN UNDERGOES ANY ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE PROCEDURE USING DONOR SEMEN, THE WOMAN'S HUSBAND IS THE LEGAL FATHER OF ANY CHILD WHO RESULTS, PROVIDED THE PROCEDURE WAS PERFORMED BY A LICENSED PHYSICIAN WITH THE HUSBAND'S CONSENT.

\* \* \*

NEW YORK LAW SHOULD PROVIDE THAT A WOMAN WHO GIVES BIRTH TO A CHILD IS THE CHILD'S LEGAL MOTHER, EVEN IF THE CHILD WAS NOT CONCEIVED WITH THE WOMAN'S EGG.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION 73 OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW SHOULD PROVIDE THAT A MARRIED WOMAN AND HER CONSENTING HUSBAND WILL BE DEEMED THE NATURAL PARENTS OF THE CHILD FOR ALL PURPOSES, WHETHER THE CHILD IS CONCEIVED WITH THE HUSBAND'S SEMEN, EGG OR EMBRYO DONATED BY PERSONS THEN LIVING OR WHO HAVE DIED, AND HIS OR HER ISSUE WOULD ALSO BE DEEMED THE LEGITIMATE, NATURAL ISSUE OF THE HUSBAND AND HIS WIFE AND THE LEGITIMATE, NATURAL ISSUE OF THE REPRODUCING PARTNER OF THE HUSBAND OR HIS WIFE FOR PURPOSES OF INTESTACY AND CLASS DESIGNATIONS IN OTHER INSTRUMENTS.

THE PROPOSAL WOULD ALSO CLARIFY THAT THE DONOR OR DONORS OF THE REPRODUCTIVE MATERIAL (AND THEIR FAMILIES) WOULD BE RELIEVED OF ALL PARENTAL DUTY AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND WOULD HAVE NO RIGHTS OVER THE CHILD OR TO INTERFERE WITH THE CHILD FROM OR THROUGH SUCH CHILD BY INTESTACY OR CLASS DESIGNATIONS IN OTHER INSTRUMENTS.

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<sup>5</sup> SEE ALSO, CHAPTER 12, "DETERMINING PARENTAL RIGHTS AND POSSESSION."

THE TERM "CLASS DESIGNATIONS IN WILLS OR OTHER INSTRUMENTS DEFINED TO INCLUDE, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE DISPOSING DESIGNATION UNDER A WILL, TRUST INDENTURE, DEED, AN INSTRUMENT APPOINTMENT, A BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION OR CONTRACTUAL ARRANG THE DISPOSITION OF A BANK OR BROKERAGE ACCOUNT, INSURANCE, PEN STOCK BONUS OR PROFIT-SHARING PLAN OR ANY OTHER INSTRUMENT DI PERSONAL PROPERTY.

THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE DESIRE OF INFERTILE MARRIED COUPLES TO HA ANY AVAILABLE TECHNIQUE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, AND RECOGNIZ AS THE NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE MARRIED WOMAN AND HER HUSBANDI CONVERSELY, THE DONOR OR DONORS OF GENETIC MATERIALS AND THEI DIVESTED OF ANY RIGHTS, DUTIES OR RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO

THE PROPOSAL WOULD APPLY TO CHILDREN DESCRIBED IN SECTION RELATIONS LAW WHETHER BORN BY ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, IN VITRO OTHER TECHNIQUE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION BEFORE, ON OR AFTER T THE ACT.

PROPOSAL:

AN ACT TO AMEND THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW, IN RELATION TO CHIL MARRIED COUPLE BY ANY MEANS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AN

ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. SECTION 73 OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW IS AMEND FOLLOWS:

73. LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN BORN BY [ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION REPRODUCTION. 1. ANY CHILD BORN TO A MARRIED WOMAN BY MEANS C

INSEMINATION, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION OR ANY OTHER TECHNIQUE OF REPRODUCTION, WHETHER WITH THE GENETIC MATERIAL OF THE WOMAN WITH GENETIC MATERIAL DONATED BY OTHERS, PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JURISDICTION WHERE SUCH ASSISTED REPRODUCTION OCCURS BY A PERSON DULY AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE MEDICINE OR BY ANY OTHER PERSON OR PERSON UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A PERSON DULY AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE MEDICINE, A CHILD AS SET FORTH IN WRITING OF THE WOMAN AND HER HUSBAND, SHALL BE DEEMED THE CHILD OF THE HUSBAND AND HIS WIFE FOR ALL PURPOSES. SUCH CHILD SHALL BE DEEMED THE LEGITIMATE, NATURAL ISSUE OF THE HUSBAND AND HIS WIFE AND THE LEGITIMATE, NATURAL ISSUE OF THE RESPECTIVE ANCESTORS OF THE HUSBAND AND HIS WIFE FOR ALL PURPOSES, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE AND TAKE POSSESSION OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY BY INTESTACY AND CLASS DESIGNATIONS IN WILLS OR OTHER INSTRUMENTS. SUCH CHILD AND HIS OR HER ISSUE SHALL HAVE NO RIGHTS TO RECEIVE AND TAKE POSSESSION OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM AND THROUGH THE DONOR OR DONORS OF GENETIC MATERIAL AND THEIR RESPECTIVE KINDRED BY ANY MEANS, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION CLASS DESIGNATIONS IN WILLS OR OTHER INSTRUMENTS.

2. THE DONOR OR DONORS OF GENETIC MATERIAL SHALL BE RELIEVED OF ALL LEGAL DUTIES TOWARD AND OF ALL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SUCH CHILD, AND THE CHILD AND HIS OR HER ISSUE AND THEIR RESPECTIVE KINDRED SHALL HAVE NO RIGHTS TO RECEIVE REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM AND THROUGH THE DONOR OR DONORS OF GENETIC MATERIAL AND THEIR RESPECTIVE KINDRED BY ANY MEANS, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION CLASS DESIGNATIONS IN WILLS OR OTHER INSTRUMENTS.

PROPERTY FROM AND THROUGH SUCH CHILD BY ANY MEANS, INCLUDING BY INTESTACY AND CLASS DESIGNATIONS IN WILLS OR OTHER INSTRUMENTS.

3. THE PHRASE "CLASS DESIGNATIONS IN WILLS OR OTHER INSTRUMENTS" SHALL APPLY TO ANY INSTRUMENT WITHOUT LIMITATION UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE DISPOSING INSTRUMENT. THIS PHRASE SHALL INCLUDE DESIGNATION UNDER A WILL, TRUST INSTRUMENT, DEED, AN INSTRUMENT OF APPOINTMENT, A BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION OR CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT, A DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY OF AN IRVING PLAN, A DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY OF A PENSION PLAN TO THE DISPOSITION OF A BANK OR BROKERAGE ACCOUNT, INSURANCE, PENSION PLAN, STOCK BONUS OR PROFIT-SHARING PLAN, OR ANY OTHER INSTRUMENT OR PERSONAL PROPERTY.

4. THE [AFORESAID] WRITTEN CONSENT REQUIRED BY SUBSECTION 1 OF SECTION 73 SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THE HUSBAND AND THE WIFE AND THE PHYSICIAN WHO PERFORMS THE TECHNIQUE. IF THE PHYSICIAN HAS DIED OR IS UNAVAILABLE, ANY PERSON WHO ASSISTED THE PHYSICIAN IN PERFORMING THE TECHNIQUE OR ANY PERSON WHO PERFORMED THE TECHNIQUE UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE PHYSICIAN SHALL CERTIFY IN WRITING THAT HE OR SHE HAD RENDERED THE SERVICE AND PLACE SET FORTH IN THE CERTIFICATION.

2. THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY AND SHALL APPLY TO ALL CHILDREN DESCRIBED IN SUBDIVISION ONE OF SECTION 73 OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS ACT WHO ARE BORN PURSUANT TO THIS ACT, WHENEVER HE OR SHE IS BORN.



6. RENUNCIATION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS  
PURSUANT TO POWER OF ATTORNEY  
(EPTL 2-1.11; GOL 5-1502(G))

THE SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS THAT THE ESTATES POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW (EPTL) BE AMENDED TO CLARIFY THE UNDER WHICH AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT MAY RENOUNCE A PROPERTY INTEREST OF A NON-DISABLED PERSON AND SPECIFY THE INSTANCES IN WHICH PRIOR COURT APPROVAL IS REQUIRED.

SECTION 2-1.11(C) OF THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW, WHICH GOVERNS RENUNCIATION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS CREATED UNDER A WILL OR TRUST FOR INFANTS, INCOMPETENTS, CONSERVATEES AND DECEASED PERSONS, NOW GOVERNS RENUNCIATION BY A GUARDIAN, COMMITTEE, CONSERVATOR OR PERSON. IT IS APPROPRIATE, PROVIDED COURT APPROVAL FIRST IS OBTAINED. THIS MEANS AMENDING THE STATUTE TO PROVIDE THAT, SUBJECT TO PRIOR COURT APPROVAL, A RENUNCIATION MAY BE MADE: (1) ON BEHALF OF A PERSON UNDER DISABILITY BY HIS OR HER GUARDIAN; (2) BY A PERSON WHO HAS HAD A GUARDIAN APPOINTED UNDER ARTICLE 81 OF THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW; OR (3) BY HIS OR HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT PURSUANT TO A DULY EXECUTED POWER OF ATTORNEY. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD CLARIFY THAT AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT MAY RENOUNCE ON BEHALF OF A NON-DISABLED PERSON, WITH NO NEED FOR COURT APPROVAL EXCEPT WHERE THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, OR THE SPOUSE OR ISSUED BY THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, WILL BENEFIT THEREFROM AND THE INSTRUMENT OF HIS OR HER RENUNCIATION INCLUDES NO EXPRESS AUTHORIZATION FOR SUCH RENUNCIATION.

THIS PROPOSAL RECOGNIZES THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 17-A OF THE SURROGATE'S COURT PROCEDURE ACT, WHICH GOVERNS GUARDIANS OF MENTALLY RETARDED AND DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS, AND RECENTLY-ENACTED ARTICLE 81 OF THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, WHICH GOVERNS GUARDIANS OF PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY. ARTICLE 81 HAS SUPERSEDED THE PROVISIONS OF THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW GOVERNING GUARDIANS, COMMITTEES AND CONSERVATORS. THE COURTS HAVE AUTHORIZED RENUNCIATIONS BY FIDUCIARIES AND, INDEED, ARTICLE 81 OF THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT A COURT MAY PROVIDE A GUARDIAN WITH POWER TO RENOUNCE. *SECTION 81.21*; *MATTER OF CARVELLI*, NYLJ, JUNE 3, 1993, P. 26, COL.5, NASSAU COUNTY CO. [INVOLVING RENUNCIATION BY AN ARTICLE 17-A GUARDIAN]; *MATTER OF CARVELLI*, NYLJ, NOVEMBER 6, 1992, P.26, COL.2, KINGS CO.; AND *MATTER OF LISLE*, NYLJ, JUNE 1994, P.27, COL.4, NASSAU CO. [INVOLVING RENUNCIATIONS BY ARTICLE 81 GUARDIANS].

ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT OF PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY OR THOSE OF P  
DISABILITY WHO, THEMSELVES, WOULD BENEFIT FROM A RENUNCIATION S  
IN THE CLASS OF FIDUCIARIES WHO MUST SEEK COURT APPROVAL BEFORE  
RENUNCIATION. AS DETERMINED BY SURROGATE ROTH IN *MATTER OF KU*  
MISC.2D 672 (N.Y. CO. 1994), SOME SCRUTINY OF THE ACTIONS OF THE ATTO  
NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE WELL-ESTABLISHED JURISDICTION OVER THE  
FIDUCIARIES AND THE COURT'S NEED TO BE ASSURED THAT THE RENUNCI  
IMPAIR, AS IN THAT CASE, THE PRINCIPAL'S MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY AND ST  
AT THE SAME TIME, LIKE SCRUTINY CERTAINLY IS APPROPRIATE WHERE AN  
A PERSON WHO IS NOT UNDER DISABILITY INTENDS TO EXECUTE A RENUN  
PERSON'S BEHALF WHERE THE RESULT IS TO BENEFIT THE ATTORNEY-IN-FA

THIS MEASURE ALSO WOULD AMEND SECTION 5-1502G(3) OF THE GEN  
LAW, WHICH REGULATES THE LANGUAGE AND EFFECT OF THE NEW YORK S  
ATTORNEY WITH RESPECT TO AN AGENT ENTERING INTO "ESTATE TRANSA  
SECTION CONSISTENT WITH THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO EPTL 2.1-11(C

PROPOSAL:

AN ACT TO AMEND THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW AND THE GEN  
LAW, IN RELATION TO RENUNCIATIONS OF CERTAIN PROPERTY INTER  
PARAGRAPH (C) OF SECTION 2-1.11 OF THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRU  
THERETO

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE A

ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. PARAGRAPH (C) OF SECTION 2-1.11 OF THE ESTATES, POWER  
REPEALED AND A NEW PARAGRAPH (C) IS ADDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

(C) A RENUNCIATION MAY BE MADE BY:



(1) THE GUARDIAN OF THE PROPERTY OF AN INFANT, WHEN SO AUTHORIZED BY THE COURT HAVING JURISDICTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE INFANT.

(2) THE COMMITTEE OF AN INCOMPETENT WHEN SO AUTHORIZED BY THE COURT THAT APPOINTED THE COMMITTEE.

(3) THE CONSERVATOR OF A CONSERVATEE, WHEN SO AUTHORIZED BY THE COURT THAT APPOINTED THE CONSERVATOR.

(4) A GUARDIAN APPOINTED UNDER ARTICLE EIGHTY-ONE OF THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION, WHEN SO AUTHORIZED BY THE COURT THAT APPOINTED THE GUARDIAN.

(5) THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF A DECEDENT, WHEN SO AUTHORIZED BY THE COURT HAVING JURISDICTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT.

(6) AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, WHEN SO AUTHORIZED UNDER A DULY EXECUTED WRITING BY THE PERSON UNDER DISABILITY, PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY RENUNCIATION BY AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF A PERSON UNDER DISABILITY SHALL NOT BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS IT IS FURTHER AUTHORIZED BY THE COURT WITH WHICH THE RENUNCIATION MUST BE FILED UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH (B) OF THIS SECTION, AND PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT A RENUNCIATION BY AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF A PERSON NOT UNDER DISABILITY MAY BE MADE WITHOUT COURT AUTHORIZATION, UNLESS THE PROPERTY WHICH WOULD HAVE PASSED UNDER THE RENUNCIATION IS, BY REASON OF SAID RENUNCIATION, DISPOSED OF IN WHOLE OR IN PART TO THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OR THE SPOUSE OR ISSUE OF SUCH ATTORNEY-IN-FACT.

RENUNCIATION SHALL NOT BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS EITHER (A) THE INSTRUMENT  
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZES A RENUNCIATION IN FAVOR OF THE  
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OR THE SPOUSE OR ISSUE OF SUCH ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, OR (B) SUCH  
RENUNCIATION HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE COURT WITH WHICH THE RENUNCIATION MUST  
BE MADE.  
SUBPARAGRAPH TWO OF PARAGRAPH (B).

2. SUBDIVISION 3 OF SECTION 5-1502G OF THE GENERAL OBLIGATION ACT  
SHALL BE AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

3. [TO] SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH (C) OF SECTION 5-1502G  
OF THE GENERAL OBLIGATION ACT, TO ACCEPT, TO REJECT, TO RECEIVE, TO RECEIPT,  
TO ASSIGN, TO RELEASE, TO PLEDGE, TO EXCHANGE, OR TO CONSENT TO A REVISION OR  
MODIFICATION OF, ANY SHARE IN OR PAYMENT FROM ANY ESTATE, TRUST, OR

3. THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT SEPTEMBER 1, 2003.

7. THE EFFECT ON INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF  
ADOPTION BY AN UNRELATED PERSON  
(DRL 117; EPTL 2-1.3(A)(1))

THIS MEASURE WOULD AMEND SECTION 117 OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW, SECTION 2-1.3(A)(1) OF THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW, TO ENSURE THAT AN ADOPTIVE CHILD CONTINUES TO RESIDE WITH THE NATURAL PARENT, AS IN THE CASE OF PARENT ADOPTIONS AND ADOPTIONS PURSUANT TO *MATTER OF JACOB AND ANNE* AND *MATTER OF DANA*, 86 N.Y.2D 651 (1995), SUCH ADOPTIVE CHILD IS NOT PENALIZED FOR LOSING INHERITANCE RIGHTS EITHER FROM HIS OR HER NATURAL PARENT OR FROM A LIFETIME OR TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION FROM HIS OR HER NATURAL MEMBER OF A CLASS UNDER EPTL 2-1.3. THIS AMENDMENT NEITHER ENDORSES NOR REPEALS ANY POLICY ISSUES DISCUSSED IN THE ABOVE CITED CASES.

PROPOSAL:

AN ACT TO AMEND THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW AND THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW, IN RELATION TO THE EFFECT OF AN ADOPTION BY AN UNRELATED PERSON

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEMBLY,

ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. SECTION 117 OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW IS AMENDED BY ADDING SUBDIVISION 4 TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

4. NOTWITHSTANDING SUBDIVISIONS ONE AND TWO OF THIS SECTION, IF A PARENT WHO HAS  
HAVING CUSTODY OF A CHILD CONSENTS THAT THE CHILD BE ADOPTED BY AN UNRELATED  
WHO RESIDES WITH SUCH PARENT, AFTER THE MAKING OF AN ORDER OF ADOPTION,  
CONSENTING PARENT SHALL RETAIN ALL PARENTAL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO SUCH CHILD, AND NEITHER SUCH CONSENT NOR ADOPTION SHALL AFFECT:

(A) THE RIGHTS OF SUCH CHILD TO INHERITANCE AND SUCCESSION THROUGH EITHER NATURAL PARENT, OR

(B) THE RIGHT OF THE CHILD AND HIS OR HER ISSUE TO TAKE UNDER LIFETIME INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED BY EITHER NATURAL PARENT OR NATURAL PARENT.

2. PARAGRAPH (1) OF SUBDIVISION (A) OF SECTION 2-1.3 OF THE ESTATES TRUSTS LAW, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 248 OF THE LAWS OF 1990, IS AMENDED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) ADOPTED CHILDREN AND THEIR ISSUE IN THEIR ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIP SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF [SUBDIVISION (A) AND FOUR] OF SECTION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS ACT.

3. THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY AND SHALL APPLY TO ALL WILLS AND LIFETIME INSTRUMENTS WHENEVER EXECUTED.

### III. FUTURE MATTERS

THE COMMITTEE IS DRAFTING LEGISLATION IN A NUMBER OF AREAS. MATTERS BEING ADDRESSED ARE:

1. EPTL 7-1.14; USE OF A POWER OF ATTORNEY TO CREATE, MODIFY OR REVOKE A LIFETIME TRUST  
GOL 5-1502

THIS MEASURE WOULD CIRCUMSCRIBE THE USE OF THE STATUTORY POWER OF ATTORNEY TO CREATE, MODIFY OR REVOKE A LIFETIME TRUST. CURRENTLY, MANY PEOPLE DO NOT EVEN BE AWARE THAT HE OR SHE IS AUTHORIZING THIS RATHER OBSOLETE PRACTICE WITH RESPECT TO LIFETIME TRUSTS, GIVING RISE TO A POTENTIAL FOR ITS MISUSE BY AN AGENT.

2. EPTL ARTICLE 7 TERMINATION OF UNECONOMICAL SMALL TRUSTS

THIS MEASURE WOULD ADD A NEW SECTION TO ARTICLE 7 PROVIDING FOR THE TERMINATION OF A TRUST (OTHER THAN A CHARITABLE TRUST OR SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUST) TO TERMINATE IF THE TRUST'S ASSETS EXCEED MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS WHEN CONTINUED ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRUST IS ECONOMICALLY IMPRACTICABLE.

3. SCPA 2307 RENUNCIATION OF SPECIFIC COMPENSATION IN FAVOR OF STATUTORY COMMISSIONS

THIS MEASURE WOULD AMEND SCPA 2307 TO PREVENT A FIDUCIARY FROM RECEIVING A WILL'S DIRECTIVE THAT HE OR SHE RECEIVE SPECIFIC COMPENSATION IN ADDITION TO STATUTORY COMMISSIONS. THE PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE THAT WHERE A WILL PROVIDES FOR SPECIFIC COMPENSATION, THE FIDUCIARY WHO ELECTS TO SERVE IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECEIVE STATUTORY ALLOWANCES FOR HIS OR HER SERVICES AS FIDUCIARY.

4. SCPA ARTICLE 4 APPEARANCES ON BEHALF OF PERSONS UNDER A GUARDIANSHIP OR DISABILITY

THIS MEASURE WOULD AMEND SCPA ARTICLE 4 TO CLARIFY AND UPDATE ALLOW GUARDIANS APPOINTED PURSUANT TO SCPA ARTICLE 17-A AND MEE ARTICLE 81 TO APPEAR ON BEHALF OF AN INCAPACITATED PARTY, WHILE ST COURT TO APPOINT A GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR THAT PARTY IF THE COUR PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT THE APPEARANCE OF ARTICLE-81 GUARDIANS O GUARDIAN HAD BEEN GRANTED POWERS UNDER MHL 81.21 AUTHORIZING

5. SCPA 206 NON-DOMICILIARIES; JURISDICTION AND VENUE

THIS MEASURE WOULD CLARIFY THE EXTENT OF THE SURROGATE'S CO-MATTER JURISDICTION IN ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS, IN THE WAKE OF MA N.Y.2D 591 (1998). THE PROPOSAL WOULD AMEND SCPA 206 TO GRANT JUR OF ACTION FOR THE DISCOVERY OR RETURN OF PROPERTY WRONGFULLY WITHIN OR FROM THE STATE. IT WOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE STA JURISDICTION IS CO-EXTENSIVE WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY O SURROGATE'S COURT UNDER SECTION 12(D) OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONSTI DETERMINATION OF WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT SUCH JURISDICTION PARTICULAR CASE BEING LEFT TO THE COURT'S DISCRETION.

6. EPTL 5-1.1-A; INTEREST ON PECUNIARY DISPOSITIONS 11-1.5(D),(E)

THIS PROPOSAL WOULD AMEND EPTL 11-1.5(D) AND (E) AND EPTL 5-1.1-ALIA, THAT INTEREST IS PAYABLE ON PECUNIARY DISPOSITIONS FROM THE NINE MONTHS FROM THE TIME LETTERS ARE GRANTED OR ONE YEAR FROM DECEDENT'S DEATH, WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF LITIGATION BEING COM PAYMENT. CURRENTLY, WHERE THERE HAS BEEN A DELAY IN PAYMENT OF ESTATES PAY INTEREST, WHILE OTHERS, ASSERTING THAT THE LAW IS UNCL

EPTL 11-1.5 ALSO CURRENTLY PROVIDES THAT INTEREST CAN BE PAID I SUED FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE BEQUEST. CONSEQUENTLY, UNNECESSARY LITIGATION IS ENCOURAGED. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION WOULD MAKE IS MANDATORY AND ACCRUES REGARDLESS OF LITIGATION. THE PROPOSAL METHOD OF CALCULATING INTEREST.

7. SCPA 2313

MULTIPLE COMMISSIONS OF EXECUTORS OR TRUSTEES

THIS MEASURE WOULD AMEND SCPA 2313 TO ALLOW, WHERE THE DECEDENT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED OTHERWISE, UP TO THREE COMMISSIONS FOR EXECUTORS RATHER THAN THE PRESENT TWO COMMISSIONS. THIS MEASURE WOULD INCREASE THE NUMBER OF COMMISSIONS ALLOWABLE PRIOR TO 1994. ANY CONCERNS OVER ATTORNEY FEES MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN REDUCING THE NUMBER FROM THREE TO TWO. THIS MAY BE ALLEVIATED BY THE ENACTMENT OF SCPA 2307-A IN 1995. THIS PROPOSAL WOULD HELP TO AVOID DISPUTES THAT CAN ARISE WHEN TWO EXECUTORS ARE DEADLOCKED IN AN ESTATE TO CLAIM AN ADDITIONAL EXPENSE OF ADMINISTRATION ON THE ESTATE.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE LEGISLATION, THE COMMITTEE IS ALSO CONSIDERING LEGISLATION RELATED TO:

1. CHANGING OR ELIMINATING THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.
2. THE TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS IN UNITRUST DISTRIBUTIONS.
3. THE VOIDING OF WILLS OF INCAPACITATED PERSONS BY ARTICLE 17-B.
4. PROTECTION OF BENEFICIARIES OF BANK-RUN MUTUAL FUNDS, TRUSTS, ACCOUNTINGS AND OTHER POSSIBLE PROCEDURES.
5. PERMITTING INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE IN POUR-OVER WILLS.
6. CHARGING A FIDUCIARY'S LEGAL FEES AGAINST A LITIGIOUS BENEFICIARY.
7. A METHOD FOR THE ORDERLY TRANSFER OF ASSETS FROM A GUARDIAN OF AN ESTATE TO AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR.
8. AMENDMENT OF CPLR 4519, THE DEADMAN'S STATUTE.
9. THE USE OF ATTORNEY-CERTIFIED DEATH CERTIFICATES IN VOLUNTARY ESTATE ADMINISTRATIONS.

10. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON POWERS OF EXECUTORS AND TESTAMENTARY TRUSTEES AND THE PRUDENT INVEST



RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

HON. RENEE R. ROTH, CHAIR

SUSAN F. BLOOM, ESQ.    GODFREY H. MURRAIN, ESQ.  
COLLEEN F. CAREW, ESQ.    HON. ROBERT L. NAHMAN  
HON. JOHN M. CZYGIER    MARILYN G. ORDOVER, ESQ.  
GENEVIEVE L. FRAIMAN, ESQ.    JOHN J. REDDY, ESQ.  
CHARLES F. GIBBS, ESQ.    HON. JOHN G. RINGROSE  
CHARLES J. GROPE, ESQ.    LYDIA ROMER, ESQ.  
T. RANDOLPH HARRIS, ESQ.    JOSHUA S. RUBENSTEIN, ESQ.  
JULES J. HASKEL, ESQ.    JOHN P. SCHAEFER, ESQ.  
GREGORY X. HESTERBERG, ESQ.    CHARLES T. SCOTT, ESQ.  
HON. LEE L. HOLZMAN    HON. ALFRED J. WEINER  
PROF. KENNETH F. JOYCE    LAURA WERNER, ESQ.  
HON. JOSEPH S. MATTINA

JOHN J. SULLIVAN, ESQ., COUNSEL