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Midwood Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v USAA Cas. Ins. Co.
2009 NY Slip Op 52379(U) [25 Misc 3d 139(A)]
Decided on November 19, 2009
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on November 19, 2009
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : RIOS, J.P., PESCE and GOLIA, JJ
2008-2124 K C.

Midwood Medical Equipment & Supply, Inc. a/a/o CATHERINE ALMANZAR, Appellant,

against

USAA Casualty Insurance Company, Respondent.


Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Peter Paul Sweeney, J.), entered May 28, 2008. The order granted defendant's motion for leave to reargue and, upon reargument, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.


ORDERED that the order is affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for leave to reargue its prior motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The prior motion, which was predicated on the ground that neither defendant's insured nor defendant's insured's vehicle was involved in the subject accident, had been denied with leave to renew upon proper papers, on the ground that a certificate of conformity was lacking. In support of its reargument motion, defendant submitted the affidavit of its insured, in which the affiant averred that, although she drove the subject vehicle on the day of the alleged accident, at no time on that day did she "strike a pedestrian while driving." She further stated that even though her vehicle "was stopped at the alleged accident scene along with several other vehicles and pedestrians," "[a]t no time did [her] vehicle come into contact with Catherine Almanzar on that day." In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submitted the affirmation of its attorney, in which the attorney argued, inter alia, that defendant's affidavit was conclusory and did not establish defendant's prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and that the "motion should not be heard prior to defense counsel's adherence to the CPLR disclosure rules." The Civil Court granted leave to reargue and, upon reargument, awarded defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The instant appeal by plaintiff ensued.

Defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment by showing that its insured's vehicle was not involved in an accident in which plaintiff's assignor was allegedly injured. Consequently, in order to defeat defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff had to set forth facts sufficient to demonstrate a triable issue of fact (see Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065 [1979]; Mid Atl. Med., P.C. v Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50736[U] [App Term, 2d, [*2]11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Plaintiff, however, failed to rebut the assertions contained in defendant's insured's affidavit. Accordingly, the Civil Court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Mid Atl. Med., P.C., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50736[U]).

Rios, J.P., Pesce and Golia, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 19, 2009