Appeal from (1) an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, Fourth District (Stephen L. Ukeiley, J.), dated January 13, 2009, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered February 6, 2009 (see CPLR 5512 [a]; Neumann v Otto, 114 AD2d 791 [1985]), and (2) an order of the same court (Kevin J. Crowley, J.) dated March 24, 2009. The judgment, entered pursuant to the order dated January 13, 2009 granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $4,136.99. The order denied defendant's motion for leave to reargue plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs; and it is further,

ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated March 24, 2009 is dismissed.

Plaintiff hospital brought this action to recover for medical services rendered, and based on an account stated, seeking the balance allegedly due it for services rendered to defendant on October 25, 2005 and June 17, 2006. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, which motion defendant opposed, alleging that the services plaintiff had rendered to him on June 17, 2006 were unnecessary and ineffective to treat his symptoms. Defendant also claimed that during the night which he spent in plaintiff's emergency room, he was deprived of such basic services as a blanket or drinking water. By order dated January 13, 2009, the District Court granted plaintiff's motion. A judgment was entered on February 6, 2009 in favor of plaintiff. Thereafter, defendant appealed from the order dated January 13, 2009. We deem the appeal to be from the judgment (see CPLR 5512 [a]; Neumann v Otto, 114 AD2d 791 [1985]).

"In general, an agreement to pay for medical services may be implied, whether characterized as a contract implied-in-fact or a contract implied-in-law . . . . The performance and acceptance of services can give rise to an inference of an implied contract to pay for the reasonable value of such services" (Huntington Hosp. v Abrandt, 4 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004] [internal citations omitted]; accord Mount Vernon Hosp. v Brennan, 21 Misc 3d 140[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52358[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]; Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr. v Budhu, 20 Misc 3d 131[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51436[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]).

Plaintiff demonstrated through affidavit testimony, and defendant conceded, that defendant had received medical treatment and services at plaintiff's facility. The affidavit of plaintiff's representative was also sufficient to establish that the amount plaintiff charged defendant was reasonable and customary. Plaintiff, thus, made out a prima facie case establishing its entitlement to summary judgment on its first cause of action. Defendant's conclusory and self-serving affidavit was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact to defeat the motion (see Mount Vernon Hosp. v Brennan, 21 Misc 3d 140[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52358[U]; Huntington Hosp. v Abrandt, 4 Misc 3d 1). We therefore conclude that the District Court properly granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with respect to the first cause of action for services rendered and affirm the judgment entered in plaintiff's favor. [*2]

Defendant's appeal from the order of the District Court dated March 24, 2009 is dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying a motion for leave to reargue (see e.g. Degliuomini v Degliuomini, 45 AD3d 626, 627 [2007]; Bellantoni v Kelligrew, 26 AD3d 401 [2006]; Toussaint v Divine Bros. Co., 280 AD2d 664 [2001]).

Nicolai, P.J., LaCava and Iannacci, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 15, 2011