Caro v Marsh USA, Inc.
2012 NY Slip Op 09021 [101 AD3d 1068]
December 26, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, February 6, 2013

Olga Caro, Appellant,
Marsh USA, Inc., Respondents.

[*1] K.C. Okoli, P.C., New York, N.Y., for appellant.

Paul Hastings LLP, New York, N.Y. (Allan S. Bloom of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for employment discrimination, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Saitta, J.), dated November 17, 2011, as granted those branches of the defendants' motion which were to have all further depositions in the action conducted at the Supreme Court courthouse under the supervision of a special master or referee at the expense of her attorney, to the extent of directing that all further depositions in the action be conducted at the offices of the defendants' attorney, and be video recorded at the expense of her attorney.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as directed that the video recording of all future depositions be at the plaintiff's attorney's expense is dismissed, as the plaintiff is not aggrieved by that part of the order (see CPLR 5511); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants.

"The supervision of discovery, and the setting of reasonable terms and conditions for disclosure, are within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court" (Ito v Dryvit Sys., 5 AD3d 735, 735 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Downing v Moskovits, 58 AD3d 671 [2009]). "The Supreme Court's discretion is broad because it is familiar with the action before it, and its exercise should not be disturbed on appeal unless it was improvidently exercised" (Provident Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v Brittenham, 284 AD2d 518, 518 [2001]; see Wander v St. John's Univ., 67 AD3d 904, 905 [2009]). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its broad discretion in directing that all further depositions in this action be held at the offices of the defendants' attorney and be video recorded. The parties' respective submissions on the motion, while conflicting in some respects, both established that the plaintiff's attorney struck the defendants' attorney during a deposition; hence, an evidentiary hearing on the issue was unnecessary (see generally Matter of Fewell v Koons, 87 AD3d 1405, 1405-1406 [2011]; Matter of Gordon v Marrone, 202 AD2d 104, 111 [1994]).

Moreover, "[g]enerally, a court may, in its discretion, 'grant relief that is warranted [*2]by the facts plainly appearing on the papers on both sides, if the relief granted is not too dramatically unlike the relief sought, the proof offered supports it, and there is no prejudice to any party' " (Clair v Fitzgerald, 63 AD3d 979, 980 [2009], quoting Frankel v Stavsky, 40 AD3d 918, 918-919 [2007]; see Emigrant Mtge. Co., Inc. v Fisher, 90 AD3d 823, 824 [2011]; Matter of Myers v Markey, 74 AD3d 1344, 1345 [2010]). Here, the relief granted by the Supreme Court closely approximated that sought by the defendants in their motion, and fulfilled the goal of having future depositions conducted in a controlled, monitored environment. Additionally, the relief was amply supported by the proof and neither surprised nor prejudiced the plaintiff, who was afforded a full and fair opportunity to argue against it. Accordingly, there is no basis in the record to disturb the court's exercise of discretion. Mastro, J.P., Dickerson, Lott and Austin, JJ., concur.