The motion by the plaintiff for an order, inter alia, granting him a declaratory judgment on the issue of his termination by the defendants, and the cross motion by the defendants for an order compelling the plaintiff to arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503[a] and dismissing the action, are determined as follows: [*2]

This action arises out of the plaintiff's termination by the defendants as Rabbi of the Bellmore Jewish Center. The parties entered into an employment contract on July1, 2007, for a five (5) year term. The agreement provides in relevant part:

4. Term and Termination

(d) Termination. This agreement may be terminated for cause on notice by either party which material breach and/or violation by the other continues after the expiration of ten (10) days' [sic] from receipt of written notice of termination to the other. The term "cause" shall include the material breach of this Agreement, material failure of the Rabbi to adhere to any reasonable policy prescribed by the Synagogue, gross negligence, fraud or other willful misconduct by the Rabbi, the willful violation by the Rabbi of any law or regulation thereunder, religious or civil, governing his activities or the breach of any fiduciary duties the Rabbi may have with respect to congregational or Synagogue funds and/or property.

10. Miscellaneous

(b) Resolution of Disputes: Any controversy between the Synagogue and the Rabbi concerning its relationship shall be referred to the United Synagogue, who shall attempt to bring about an amicable resolution of the controversy. If such approach fails, the parties shall submit the controversy in question to the United Synagogue's Committee on Congregational Standards for mediation and binding arbitration under its procedures and policies then in effect.

On July 29, 2011, the defendants gave the plaintiff written notification of his termination based, at least in part, upon information appearing in a New York Post article indicating that the plaintiff had sexual encounters with prostitutes.

The plaintiff asserts in this action that because the alleged incidents occurred years prior to entering into the employment agreement, they can not serve as a basis for his termination. The defendants assert that the mandatory arbitration clause precludes the plaintiff from commencing this action.

The law is well settled that arbitration is a favored method of dispute resolution and the courts will enforce broad, mandatory arbitration clauses in valid contracts (see Matter of 166 Mamaroneck Ave. Corp. v 151 E. Post Rd. Corp., 78 NY2d 88 [1991]; Dazco Heating and Air Conditioning Corp. v CBC Indust., Inc., 225 AD2d 578 [2d Dept. 1996]). Here, the arbitration clause is broad and would cover the plaintiff's claims asserted in this action. Therefore, the issues raised may be determined in arbitration (see M.H. Kane Const. Corp. v URS Corp. Group Consultants, 42 AD3d 512 [2d Dept. 2007]; Vitals986, Inc. v Healthwave, Inc., 15 AD3d 571 [2d Dept. 2005]).

Accordingly, the motion is denied, the cross motion is granted, the plaintiff is directed to proceed with arbitration pursuant to the contract and the complaint is dismissed.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: January 19, 2012Angela G. Iannacci, J.S.C.

[*3]