Plaintiff, Medical Arts-Huntington LLC ("Medical Arts"), moves, by Notice of Motion, (motion sequence No. 007) for Summary Judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 against all the named Defendants herein on its Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and Thirteenth causes of action, which set forth claims against the named Defendants under the New York Debtor and Creditor Law §§ 273 and 274. Each of the named Defendants herein is a member of an entity, known as 214 Wall Street, LLC ("214 Wall"), which became a judgment debtor of the Plaintiff following a jury trial before this Court. The Defendants herein, with the exception of Robert Rosenberg, Chad Cascadden and Keith Samaroo (each of whom has defaulted on this action) ^[FN1] , oppose Plaintiff's motion and cross-move for Summary Judgment dismissing the very same causes of action. At issue in these competing motions, and indeed the subject matter of this entire action, is the interpretation of and interplay between two contracts: 1) a Survival Agreement entered into between Medical Arts and 214 Wall as part of their real estate closing held on June 21, 2006 and 2) personal guarantees, identical in form, ("Guaranty") executed by each of the named Defendants herein guaranteeing the satisfaction of the contingent obligations of 214 Wall to Medical Arts, all signed between June 30, 2006 and July 14, 2006.

Plaintiff claims that at the time these two agreements were entered into, 214 Wall had contingent obligations to Medical Arts under the Survival Agreement, relating to various construction claims and attorneys' fees, all of which became part of two judgments entered against 214 Wall in amounts exceeding $300,000. Thus, Plaintiff asserts that the obligation entered into by 214 Wall through this Survival Agreement constitutes a "debt" under Article 10 of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law, and under the same document, Medical Arts became a "creditor." However, 214 Wall never paid any monies toward satisfying the two judgments. According to the Plaintiff, 214 Wall distributed $2,750,000 (constituting the sale price of the property sold to Medical Arts which gave rise to the litigation) to its members. In addition, during discovery in this action, one of the members of 214 Wall confirmed that as of the date of the Survival Agreement, the only assets of 214 Wall were its interest in the real property sold to Medical Arts. It was also assertedly demonstrated during discovery that following the distribution of the these moneys to its members on July 12, 2006, 214 Wall was left with $6,768.09 - i.e., insolvent and unable to pay its contingent debt that turned into the two judgments. Plaintiff contends that the Guaranty from each individual member Defendant is not "fair consideration" required by the Debtor and Creditor Law, for 214 Wall's distributions to each of its members. The total amount currently due and owing as per Plaintiff, against all Defendants jointly and severally, up to and including all amounts distributed to such Defendants, is $70,331.88 (based upon the jury verdict against 214 Wall) plus interest at the statutory rate from August 23, 2013; $91,307 (based upon this Court's attorneys' fee award against 214 Wall), plus statutory interest from August 23, 2013; and Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs in connection with the Debtor and Creditor Law litigation.

Medical Arts also seeks Summary Judgment under §§ 273 And 274 of the Debtor and Creditor Law, against the two individual members of Meltzer Rosenberg Development LLC ("MRD") (one of the guarantor distributee members of 214 Wall). The claim against these two members, Meltzer and Rosenberg, is based upon the fact that MRD distributed an amount of what it received from 214 Wall allegedly rendering that LLC also insolvent. In that case, Plaintiff argues that the individual members of MRD, Meltzer and Rosenberg, are liable for the amount distributed to them by their LLC, which was $57,000 to each. In this vein, Plaintiff argues that MRD also became [*2]insolvent, setting forth that it was disclosed during discovery that such entity was left with $961.20 as of March 2007. Again, as there was assertedly no consideration for the conveyances by MRD to Meltzer and Rosenberg, Plaintiff states that it is entitled to judgments against the two members under the Debtor and Creditor Law in the respective amounts set forth, plus interest.

Plaintiff also seeks attorneys' fees against all of the individual guarantors, jointly and severally, based upon a provision in the Guaranty setting forth that in the event the "Buyer" (Medical Arts) is required to bring proceedings against the Guarantor to enforce the Obligations, the Guarantor shall reimburse the Buyer for all expenses and attorneys' fees incurred in connection with such enforcement. This provision states that the term "Guarantor" is a collective reference to all of the separate guarantors.

Defendants both oppose Plaintiff's motion and cross-move for Summary Judgment, seeking to dismiss all those causes of action brought by Plaintiff under the same provisions of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law. Defendants assert that Medical Arts specifically agreed that 214 Wall could transfer all of its assets to its members in return for guarantees by these third-parties of any and all obligations the debtor may have had to the creditor. Thus, according to the Defendants, once such asset transfer was contemplated, accompanied by the fact that each and every member of 214 Wall executed a guaranty, 214 Wall ceased to be a debtor and Medical Arts ceased to be a creditor vis a vis that entity and no provision of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law could apply between such entities. The basis for Defendants' motion lies in paragraph 1E(2) of the Survival Agreement which provides that:

Thus, Defendants assert that it was clear that the Survival Agreement provided the members of 214 Wall the option of taking their share of the proceeds of the sale or, in lieu thereof, depositing their share in escrow. It is the Defendants' claim that this language provides proof that it was contemplated and understood by the parties that 214 Wall was going to distribute its assets, which included the proceeds of its sale to Medical Arts and that once it did so, the members of that LLC would have the option of escrowing their shares or providing for a guarantee of their potential debt. In further support of its interpretation of the Survival Agreement, Defendants refer to statements by one Dr. Goodman, who initialed the relevant portions of the Survival Agreement on behalf of Medical Arts. Thus, they set forth his deposition statement that no one involved with Plaintiff expressed any concern at any time that 214 Wall would be conveying its only asset and have no assets once it sold its building to Plaintiff. Thus, as no one had any concern with regard to this issue, it is Defendants' claim that Plaintiff both knew that there would be no 214 Wall assets following a total distribution and that they would receive the consideration of the personal guarantees in return. In addition, Defendants refer to Plaintiff's Rule 19-a Statement which concedes that:

Since the Survival Agreement recognized that any funds not distributed by 214 Wall would constitute an asset of that LLC and that if 214 Wall distributed all of the proceeds it would have no assets, it could not be considered a debtor under the relevant provision of State law.

In further support of Defendants' position with regard to the understanding of the parties, they provide earlier drafts of the Survival Agreement , one of which stated:

Defendants make the same argument with regard to the distributions of MRD to its members, Meltzer and Rosenberg, setting forth again that it was contemplated by the Survival Agreement that MRD would distribute all of its shares. In the alternative, Defendants on these claims assert that if the Court were not inclined to accept the argument that such was contemplated, there remains an issue of fact for trial as to whether or not the conveyances to Rosenberg and Meltzer by MRD were violations of §§ 273 and 274 of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law.

In reply and in opposition to the Defendants' cross-motion for Summary Judgment, Medical Arts sets forth the language of the Guaranty which it argues clearly belies any contention that Plaintiff waived its rights under the Debtor and Creditor Law:

Thus, it is assertedly clear, as per Plaintiff, that its rights under the Debtor and Creditor Law were and remain preserved. There is no liability limiting language in the Survival Agreement, which merely sets forth, as per Plaintiff, that if 214 Wall could not provide a guaranty from a particular member, it would place funds that might be available for distribution to that member in escrow. In addition, the purpose of the guaranty, as expressed in that document, was to induce Medical Arts to enter into the Survival Agreement by providing additional security against 214 Wall's obligations. Medical Arts asserts that Defendants' arguments that the Guaranty constituted fair consideration for the distributions of assets made by 214 Wall must fail because the language of the Guaranty provides that the moving Defendants "[w]ould derive a substantial benefit from the Survival Agreement" and the Guarantys were signed "[i]n order to induce [Medical Arts] to enter into the Survival Agreement," demanded by Plaintiff in order to close on the purchase of the subject real property. Plaintiff argues, further, that any waiver of Medical Arts' rights under the Debtor and Creditor Law must be expressly and unequivocally stated under relevant case law. Thus, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' attempt to stretch the language permitting the guaranty in lieu of escrowing specific funds, simply does not meet the required test.

Plaintiff also takes issue with references to prior drafts by Defendants of the Survival Agreement, because such agreement contains the following language:

With regard to MRD's argument that the consideration to MRD for its disbursements were the personal guarantees of its two members, Plaintiff points out that nowhere in the guarantees executed by Meltzer or Rosenberg as individual members of 214 Wall is there any reference to any guarantee whatsoever of MRD's obligations under [*4]its own Guaranty.

With regard to the requirement in the Guaranty requiring all guarantors collectively to pay Plaintiff's legal fees in the event Plaintiff is required to bring any proceedings against the Guarantor , Medical Arts points to the provision that states that these proceedings refer to those brought "[t]o enforce the Obligations. . .". The term "Obligations" is defined in paragraph 1 of the Guaranty and includes the Guarantors' individual and collective obligation to guarantee performance of 214 Wall's obligations under the Survival Agreement along with "[a]ll costs incurred by [Medical Arts] in the collection of any amounts due hereunder, or in the enforcement of any of the terms of, the Survival Agreement, including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees."

Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that: 1) it is a creditor under the Debtor and Creditor law; 2) 214 Wall distributed $1,750,000 to its members after it incurred its contingent debt to Plaintiff; 3) after distribution to its members, 214 Wall had assets of $6,7087.09 against a contingent liability of several hundred thousand dollars; 4) MRD disbursed essentially all its funds rendering itself insolvent; 5) no consideration was paid by the members of 214 Wall or MRD for the amount disbursed to them; 6) the expressly stated reason for the Guaranty signed by the 214 Wall members was to induce Medical Arts into signing the Survival Agreement by providing additional security against 214 Wall's obligations; 7) there is no express waiver as required in any agreement of the Debtor and Creditor law remedies; and 8) the Guarantors are collectively responsible for Plaintiff's legal fees in connection with enforcement of the Guarantors' obligations under the Guaranty and the Survival Agreement.

A party moving for Summary Judgment has the burden of making a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, offering sufficient evidence demonstrating the absence of any material facts. Winegrad v New York Univ Med Ctr, 64 NY2d 851, 487 NYS 2d 316, 476 NE 2d 642 (1985); Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 427 NYS 2d 595, 404 NE 2d 718 (1980). Once a prima facie showing has been made by the movant, the burden shifts to the other party opposing the motion to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form, sufficient to establish material issues of fact which require a trial. See, Zayas v Half Hollow Hills Cent. School Dist., 226 AD2d 713, 641 NYS 2d 701 (2d Dep't 1996).

Contracts must be construed in accordance with the parties' intent , the best evidence of which will appear in their written agreement. Schron v Troutman Sanders LLP, 20 NY3d 430, 963 NYS 2d 613, 986 NE 2d 430 (2013); Goldman v White Plains Center for Nursing Care, LLC, 11 NY3d 173, 867 NYS 2d 27, 896 NE 2d 662 (2008). When the words of an agreement are clear, the intent of the parties will be found within the four corners of the relevant instrument(s). Goldman v White Plaints Center for Nursing Care, LLC, supra. A complete clear agreement will then be enforced in accordance with its terms, Schron v Troutman Sanders LLP, supra, without reference to extrinsic evidence outside the four corners of the writing. Goldman v White Plains Center for Nursing Care, LLC, supra. A court may not by construction add or excise terms, nor may it distort the meaning of the terms used and thereby make a new contract for the parties while stating that it is merely interpreting the agreement. Bailey v Fish & Neave, 8 NY3d 523, 837 NYS 2d 600, 868 NE 2d 956 (2007); Reiss v Financial Performance Corp., 97 NY2d 195, 738 NYS 2d 658, 764 NE 2d 958 (2001).

In interpreting a contract, the court will give its primary attention to the purpose of the parties in making the agreement and once determined it will take precedence over all other canons of construction. Greenfield v Philles Records, Inc., 98 NY2d 562, 750 NYS 2d 565, 780 NE 2d 166 (2002) ; Evans v Famous Music Corp., 1 NY3d 452, 775 NYS 2d 757, 807 NE 2d 869 (2004). The focus must be on ascertaining the intention of the parties at the time they entered into the agreement, Evans, supra. All parts of an agreement should be read in harmony to determine their meaning. Bombay Realty Corp. v Magna Carta, Inc., 100 NY2d 124, 760 NYS 2d 734, 790 NE 2d 1163 (2003). Where more than one agreement is entered into contemporaneously between the same parties or entities and relating to the same subject matter, the agreements must be read in tandem and interpreted as part and parcel of the same transaction. Applehead Pictures LLC v Perleman, 80 AD3d 181, 913 NYS 2d 165 (1st Dep't 2010); Gulf Insurance Co. v Transatlantic Insurance Co., 69 AD3d 71, 886 NYS 2d 133 (1st Dep't 2009).

When interpreting a contract involving a business transaction, the court will look to the reasonable [*5]expectation and purpose of the ordinary business person in the factual context in which terms of art and understanding are used, often recognizing the level of business sophistication and acumen of the particular parties. Uribe v Merchants Bank of New York, 91 NY2d 336, 670 NYS 2d 393, 693 NE 2d 740 (1998); Baughman v Merchants Mutual Ins. Co., 87 NY2d 589, 640 NYS 2d 857, 663 NE 2d 898 (1996).

The relevant provisions of the Debtor and Creditor Law state as follows:

"§ 273. Conveyances by Insolvent

"§ 274. Conveyances by persons in business.

These provisions of the Debtor and Creditor Law apply to individual and corporate debtors alike. See, Palermo Mason Const. Inc. v Aark Holding Corp., 300 AD2d 458, 752 NYS 2d 99 (2d Dep't 2002). The sections of the statute make unlawful and term as "fraudulent" those transfers of assets made by a debtor without consideration, rendering the entity insolvent. Zanini v Meisels, 78 AD3d 823, 910 NYS 2d 533 (2d Dep't 2010); Laco X-Ray Systems, Inc. v Fingerhut, 88 AD2d 425, 453 NYS 2d 757 (2d Dep't 1982). The case law describes the prerequisites of a finding of "constructive fraud" under Debtor and Creditor Law § 273 as both "insolvency" and "lack of fair consideration", the burden of proving both resting on the party challenging the conveyance. Joslin v Lopez, 309 AD2d 837, 765 NYS 2d 895 (2d Dep't 2003). Section 274 of the statute deems unlawful a transfer without consideration in those instances where the transferring entity is in the midst of a business transaction leaving the remaining property in its possession in significantly small amounts of capital as to those other entities that become creditors during the continuance of such transaction. See, Laco X-Ray Systems, Inc v Fingerhut, supra. There is, however, no requirement under the law that the challenger demonstrate either actual motive or intent to defraud. American Panel Tec v Hyrise, 31 AD3d 586, 819 NYS 2d 768 (2d Dep't 2006); Gallagher v Kirschner, 220 AD2d 948, 632 NYS 2d 857 (3d Dep't 1995).The Debtor and Creditor Law provides that "fair consideration" exists "[w]hen in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed . . .", or "[w]hen such property, or obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the property, or obligation obtained." Debtor and Creditor Law § 272. Thus, within the ambit of the term "fair consideration" is the concept of the good faith of the transferor and the transferee. American Panel Tec v Hyrise Inc., supra; Studley v Lefrak, 66 AD2d 208, 412 NYS 2d 901 (2d Dep't 1979). Transfers of corporate assets to directors, officers and shareholders of an insolvent corporation in derogation of the rights of the transferor's creditors have been found not to constitute fair consideration under the applicable law. American Panel Tec v Hyrise, supra; see, Matter of .A. Bldg. Corp. v Silverman, 298 AD2d 327, 750 NYS 2d 13 (1st Dep't 2002). It has also been held, in the context of an action brought under Debtor and Creditor Law § 273, that a promise to pay is the equivalent of a promise of future support and that such is insufficient to be considered the fair consideration for property transferred by an insolvent debtor. Schmitt v Morgan, 98 AD2d 934, 471 NYS 2d 365 (2d Dep't 1983).[*6]Where a debtor claims that a creditor has waived its rights under the applicable law, such has been upheld in those instances where the waiver is clearly expressed. Thus, in Terry v Belfort, 70 AD3d 1028, 896 NYS 2d 378 (2d Dep't 2010), the court denied a creditor's claim under the Debtor and Creditor Law, where the plaintiff accepted distribution of funds from a restitution fund consisting of assets forfeited by a judgment debtor on express condition of the creditor's waiver of its rights to enforce judgments against the debtor except as to the restitution fund itself. Accordingly, any limitations on a party's liability set forth under the law will not be merely implied; but, rather, must be clearly and unambiguously expressed in a contract in order to be enforceable. Terminal Cent. v Modell & Co., 212 AD2d 213, 628 NYS 2d 56 (1st Dep't 1995). In addition, a waiver of a contractual provision requires the knowing, voluntary and intentional abandonment of a known right, Fundamental Portfolio Advisors v Tocqueville Asset Management LP, 7 NY3d 96, 817 NYS 2d 606, 850 NE 2d 653 (2006), which, but for the waiver, would have been enforceable, General Motors Acceptance Corp v Clifton-Fine Central School District, 85 NY2d 232, 623 NYS 2d 821, 647 NE 2d 1329 (1995).

Based upon the facts as presented and essentially agreed upon and the law applicable to this case, the Court makes the following findings. Both 214 Wall and MRD were rendered insolvent after the transfer of virtually all their assets. This is borne out via the documents and statements made on behalf of the Defendants during discovery in this action. As the Survival Agreement contemplated, inter alia, by its reference to claims by Medical Arts against 214 Wall, Medical Arts became a contingent creditor and 214 Wall a contingent debtor under the New York Debtor and Creditor Law. The Survival Agreement and the various identical guarantees, comprising what is referred to collectively as the Guaranty, were entered into during the same time period and involved the buyer of real property — Medical Arts; and the seller of real property — 214 Wall, as well as the individual members of the seller LLC. These two agreements refer consistently to each other and must be read in conjunction in order to interpret their terms and meaning.

By its terms, the Guaranty was entered into "[t]o induce the Buyer [Medical Arts] to enter into . . .[the] Survival Agreement', and in consideration thereof, each Guarantor [was] willing to execute [the] Guaranty." Such Guaranty also sets forth that " [t]he Guarantors are members of Seller [214 Wall] and will derive a substantial benefit from the Survival Agreement." In addition, the Guaranty specifies that the remedies afforded the Buyer [Medical Arts] under the Guaranty "[s]hall in no way limit or prejudice any other legal or equitable remedies which Buyer [Medical Arts] may have pursuant to . . . the Survival Agreement." The guarantees were, therefore, the consideration offered and provided Medical Arts in return for its willingness to proceed with the purchase of 214 Wall's real property and entering into the Survival Agreement both of which inured to the benefit of 214 Wall. The wording of the Guaranty belies any claim that the guarantees were given by the members of 214 Wall as fair consideration for the transfer by the entity of its assets to those members, rendering 214 Wall completely and unequivocally insolvent and unable to pay any of its contingent liabilities which turned into judgments. It is important to note the key to the Court's determination herein. What required consideration under the relevant provision of the Debtor and Creditor Law in this case was the transfer of funds by 214 Wall and MRD of virtually all their assets to their individual members. The Guaranty provided by the members of 214 Wall was not in consideration for the transfer by 214 Wall to its members; but, rather, for the Survival Agreement itself in order to induce Medical Arts to go forward with the closing which provided 214 Wall with several million dollars.

Thus, the conveyance by 214 Wall to its own members was not made in good faith nor for fair consideration. The Court's determination in this regard is firmly supported by the clear language of the Guaranty, which states that the remedies afforded Medical Arts by virtue of the Guaranty "[s]hall in no way limit or prejudice any other legal. . . remedies which [Medical Arts] may have pursuant to . . . the Survival Agreement." Moreover, such language clearly belies any claim that Medical Arts somehow waived its rights under the Survival Agreement.

As set forth above, by its transfer to its two individual members, MRD also rendered itself totally insolvent and unable to pay its debt in the form of its Guaranty to Medical Arts. MRD, like the other member of 214 Wall, entered into its Guaranty of the contingent debt to Medical Arts, as an inducement to close the sale of real property and to induce Medical Arts to enter into the Survival Agreement, inuring to its benefit by its very terms. In the case of MRD, there was no guarantee provided by either Meltzer or Rosenberg with regard to MRD's obligations under [*7]the MRD Guaranty. The only guarantees provided by Meltzer or Rosenberg were as individual members of 214 Wall. No consideration whatsoever was given by Meltzer or Rosenberg to their transferor LLC, MRD, in return for the conveyances made to them, rendering their LLC insolvent.

The Guarantee states that it includes a promise of 214 Wall's

Such also states that if Medical Arts is required to bring any proceedings against any of the guarantors , defined in the documents as including each of the guarantors, to enforce obligations either under the guaranty or the Survival agreement:

Therefore, each Guarantor is bound to reimburse the Plaintiff for its legal costs where any of the Guarantors and/or 214 Wall failed to honor its obligations. It is undisputed that 214 Wall never paid any monies to satisfy the judgments or the attorneys' fees previously awarded the Plaintiff; MRD, as well as the defaulting individual members of 214 Wall, have failed to honor their obligations under the Guaranty; and the Defendants have admitted that to the extent the court finds them liable, such shall be in an amount up to the amount of funds distributed to each member. It is also clear from the documentary discovery provided to the Plaintiff by Defendants herein that none of the Defendants have paid an amount to date equaling the total distributed to him/her/it by 214 Wall toward the satisfaction of the outstanding judgments.

It is not disputed that the amounts remaining due and owing on the judgment based on the jury verdict against 214 Wall is $70,331.88; and the amount remaining due and owing on the attorneys' fee award against 214 Wall is $91,307.47, both amounts calculated as of August 23, 2013.

Based upon the above, the Court finds that Medical Arts has demonstrated its entitlement to Summary Judgment under Debtor and Creditor Law § 273 against the members of 214 Wall as well as the members of MRD by demonstrating that both 214 Wall and MRD transferred virtually all their assets rendering both entities insolvent and that there was no consideration for such conveyances. Medical Arts has also demonstrated its entitlement to Summary Judgment under Debtor and Creditor law § 274 against the members of 214 Wall and MRD by showing that there existed no consideration for the conveyances by 214 Wall and MRD to their members; that both 214 Wall and MRD were engaged in a business transaction with Medical Arts when such conveyances occurred; and that such conveyances by 214 Wall and MRD left unreasonably small amounts of capital with those debtors. Plaintiff Medical Arts has also demonstrated, based upon the above findings, that it is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees against the members of 214 Wall and MRD incurred in connection with this action. This determination is based upon the applicable law, including the clear contract language, and upon the shifting of the burden, the Defendants have failed to raise any triable issues of fact. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment on its Fifth, Sixth and Thirteenth causes of action against all the Defendants, jointly and severally, up to and including all amounts distributed to Defendants by 214 Wall as follows: 1) $70,331.88 plus interest at the statutory rate from August 23, 2013; 2) $91,307.47 plus interest at the statutory rate from August 23, 2013; and 3) Medical Art's attorneys' fees, together with the costs of this litigation. Plaintiff is also entitled to Summary Judgment on its Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action against Lewis Meltzer and Robert Rosenberg, each in the amount of $57,000, plus interest from August 23, 2013 and Medical Arts's attorneys' fees in connection with this litigation.

Since the parties have both brought motions for Summary Judgment, the Court has searched the record and finds that the relief granted herein satisfies the relief sought by Plaintiff in its First Cause of Action against MRD (seeking enforcement of the obligation of 214 Wall under the Guaranty); the Second Cause of action (against Robert Rosenberg) against whom the Court has already awarded default judgment; the Third Cause of Action (against Chad Cascadden) against whom the Court has already awarded default judgment; the Fourth Cause of Action (against Keith Samaroo) against whom the Court has already awarded default judgment); the Seventh Cause of action against all Defendants seeking to recover funds distributed to the Guarantors; and the Eleventh Cause of Action against Meltzer and Rosenberg seeking to recover funds distributed to them by MRD. The Eighth cause of Action (against all Defendants) and the Eleventh cause of action (against Meltzer, Rosenberg and MRD), seek to recover funds distributed against all Defendants pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law § 276. While the current Decision already awards the Plaintiff such amounts, those causes of action also seek punitive damages based upon allegations of intentional fraud in the conveyances described. The Court, in its discretion, denies that request for relief, on its own motion, as punitive damages may not be awarded to redress a private wrong, and accordingly are not available in a lawsuit involving private disputes which have no bearing on the public at large. See, Kelly v Defoe Corp., 223 AD2d 529, 636 NYS 2d 123 (2d Dep't 1996). Based upon the above, the Court finds that the relief granted to Plaintiff by granting Summary Judgment on the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and Thirteenth Causes of Action and by granting Plaintiff Default Judgment on the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action satisfies all monetary relief sought by that party (with the exception of the punitive damages request which this Court has denied) and, therefore, in its discretion, dismisses the remaining causes of action (First, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh) as moot.

Submission of Judgment(s) based on the above should be held in abeyance pending the Court's determination of the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded Plaintiff as against all the named Defendants in connection with the current litigation. Counsel for all parties are directed to choose a mutually convenient date for presentation of evidence on the sole issue of such attorneys' fees.

This constitutes the DECISION and ORDERof the Court.