People v Coleman
2008 NY Slip Op 10431 [57 AD3d 1519]
December 31, 2008
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, February 11, 2009

The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lekia Coleman, Appellant.

[*1] Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Mary P. Davison of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John J. Brunetti, A.J.), rendered December 18, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed, and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Onondaga County, for proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (5).

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1], [12]) and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (§ 265.02 [1]). Contrary to defendant's contention, the record of the suppression hearing supports Supreme Court's determination that defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights by "cooperating with his . . . interrogation" (People v Sirno, 76 NY2d 967, 968 [1990]; see People v Gill, 20 AD3d 434 [2005]). Thus, the court properly refused to suppress physical evidence seized from defendant's residence as the alleged fruit of the poisonous tree (see generally People v Watts, 309 AD2d 1256, 1257 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 582 [2003]; People v Cline, 192 AD2d 957, 957-958 [1993], lv denied 81 NY2d 1071 [1993]). We reject defendant's further contention that the testimony of the People's witnesses at the suppression hearing was not credible and thus that the court erred in determining that the stop of defendant's car was lawful. The court's credibility determination is entitled to great deference (see People v Edwards, 55 AD3d 1337 [2008]), and we conclude that the testimony "was not so inherently incredible or improbable as to warrant disturbing the . . . court's determination of credibility" (People v Walters, 52 AD3d 1273, 1274 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 795 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Fahey, Peradotto and Pine, JJ.