People v Caldavado
2010 NY Slip Op 08591 [78 AD3d 962]
November 16, 2010
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, January 19, 2011


The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v
Alma Caldavado, Also Known as Alma Calderaro, Appellant.

[*1] Brafman & Associates, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Mark M. Baker of counsel), for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Nicoletta J. Caferri, and William H. Branigan of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (McGann, J.), rendered April 1, 2009, convicting her of assault in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in permitting a PowerPoint presentation as to the injuries associated with shaken baby syndrome and in allowing an expert witness to shake a doll in order to demonstrate the force necessary to inflict shaken baby syndrome, as the probative value of the presentation outweighed its prejudicial effect (see People v Sulayao, 58 AD3d 769, 770 [2009]; People v Mora, 57 AD3d 571, 572 [2008]; People v Yates, 290 AD2d 888, 889-890 [2002]). Moreover, any prejudice was minimized by the court's limiting instructions to the jury (see People v Sulayao, 58 AD3d at 770).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).

The defendant's remaining contention is without merit. Prudenti, P.J., Covello, Florio and Belen, JJ., concur.