People v DiMassi
2014 NY Slip Op 00117 [113 AD3d 632]
January 8, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, March 5, 2014


The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v
Ralph DiMassi, Appellant.

—[*1] Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Winston McIntosh and Kendra Hutchinson of counsel), for appellant.

Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Keith Dolan, and Michael Brenner of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Guzman, J.), rendered July 16, 2010, convicting him of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and burglary in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of burglary in the first degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of burglary in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt of burglary in the first degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The defendant's challenge to the trial court's interested witness charge is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Rivera, 307 AD2d 369, 369-370 [2003]; People v Brown, 209 AD2d 532 [1994]). In any event, the court's charge in this regard was proper (see People v Dees, 45 AD3d 602, 603 [2007]; People v Varughese, 21 AD3d 1126, 1128 [2005]; People v Lopez, 1 AD3d 458, 459 [2003]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Mastro, J.P., Roman, Miller and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.