Matter of Zina L. v Eldred L.
2014 NY Slip Op 00510 [113 AD3d 852]
January 29, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, March 5, 2014


In the Matter of Zina L., Also Known as Zinaida L., Appellant,
v
Eldred L., Respondent. Laurie L., Nonparty Appellant.

[*1] Linda C. Braunsberg, Staten Island, N.Y., for petitioner-appellant.

Lisa Lewis, Brooklyn, N.Y., attorney for the child, nonparty appellant Laurie L.

Matthew M. Lupoli, Flushing, N.Y., for respondent.

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the mother and the subject child appeal from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Hepner, J.), dated June 15, 2012, which, after a hearing, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The allegations in a family offense proceeding must be "supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence" (Family Ct Act § 832; see Matter of Khan-Soleil v Rashad, 108 AD3d 544, 545 [2013]; Matter of Jarrett v Jarrett, 102 AD3d 695 [2013]; Matter of Scanziani v Hairston, 100 AD3d 1007 [2012]; Matter of Daoud v Daoud, 92 AD3d 878 [2012]; Matter of Mamantov v Mamantov, 86 AD3d 540, 541 [2011]). The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the Family Court, and the Family Court's determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal (see Matter of Pearlman v Pearlman, 78 AD3d 711, 712 [2010]; Matter of Creighton v Whitmore, 71 AD3d 1141 [2010]; Matter of Gray v Gray, 55 AD3d 909 [2008]; Matter of Charles v Charles, 21 AD3d 487 [2005]).

Here, contrary to the appellants' contention, the record supports the Family Court's determination that the evidence adduced at the hearing was insufficient to establish that the father committed the family offenses of assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree, menacing in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree against either the mother or the child (see Family Ct Act § 812 [1]; Penal Law §§ 120.00, 120.05, 120.15, 240.26; Matter of Khan-Soleil v Rashad, 108 AD3d at 545). Accordingly, the petition was properly dismissed.

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the appellants' remaining contention. Mastro, J.P., Cohen, Miller and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.