People v Dwaileebe
2018 NY Slip Op 07244 [165 AD3d 588]
October 30, 2018
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, November 28, 2018


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v
Mark Dwaileebe, Appellant.

Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (John Loran Palmer of counsel), for appellant.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Vincent Rivellese of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bonnie G. Wittner, J.), rendered August 4, 2016, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted grand larceny in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 11/2 to 3 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court providently exercised its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. "[T]he nature and extent of the fact-finding procedures on such motions rest largely in the discretion of the court" (People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 544 [1993]). Here, the parties' written submissions and the plea minutes were sufficient to determine the motion. In his motion, defendant asserted that he had not taken his psychiatric medication on the day of the plea. During the plea colloquy, however, defendant responded appropriately and coherently to the court's inquiries, stating that he was entering the plea of his own free will and that he understood the rights he was waiving by doing so. There is nothing to cast doubt on defendant's competency or the voluntariness of his plea (see e.g. People v Rodriguez, 302 AD2d 317 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 99 NY2d 657 [2003]). Concur—Acosta, P.J., Friedman, Kapnick, Webber, Moulton, JJ.