Wong Fleming, P.C. (Florelee Lyles of counsel), for appellants. Tawana Harris, respondent pro se (no brief filed).

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Jill R. Epstein, J.), entered August 5, 2019. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $4,000.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a judgment in favor of defendants dismissing the action.

In this small claims action, plaintiff seeks to recover the principal sum of $5,000, for damages which arose when her automobile was totaled by a car that was owned by defendant Ralph Eldon and driven by defendant Wayne McNobb. Defendants conceded their liability for the negligent destruction of plaintiff's automobile. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff confirmed that Eldon's insurer had reimbursed her for the automobile's value at the time immediately prior to the accident, but testified that her bank loan on the automobile exceeded its value at the time of the accident by $4,000, which sum she sought to recover in this action. Following the trial, the Civil Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $4,000.

At the outset we note that, in a small claims action, this court's review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (CCA 1807; see CCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]).

"As a general rule, when property is wrongfully damaged through a defendant's negligent [*2]acts, the tort law goal is to indemnify the owner for the pecuniary loss which is the actual, reasonable and proximate result of the act complained of" (Lee S. Kreindler et al., New York Law of Torts § 21:89 [West's NY Prac Series, August 2023 update]). It is a fundamental principle of tort law that defendants are only responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their actions, and not those consequences which are remote and indirect (see Palsgraf v Long Is. R.R. Co., 248 NY 339 [1928]; see also 103 NY Jur 2d, Torts § 10; 36 NY Jur 2d, Damages § 11).

"Where [an] automobile is totally destroyed the measure of damages is its reasonable market value immediately before destruction" (Gass v Agate Ice Cream, Inc., 264 NY 141, 144 [1934]; see also Owens v State of New York, 96 AD2d 630, 631 [1983]; Senatore v Wellington, 47 Misc 3d 145[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50700[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2015]; Sholder v Gordon, 14 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50053[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]). The amount by which a loan on a car exceeds its reasonable market value before destruction does not fall within the zone of foreseeability for which a defendant in a negligence action is held to be accountable (see Rowan v Skorobahaty, 55 Misc 3d 135[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50489[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2017]; Senatore v Wellington, 2015 NY Slip Op 50700[U]). Consequently, we find that the judgment in favor of plaintiff failed to render substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see CCA 1804, 1807).

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a judgment in favor of defendants dismissing the action.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and HOM, JJ., concur.