[*1]
Dingle v Like Father Like Son Auto Repair, Inc.
2024 NY Slip Op 50392(U)
Decided on March 1, 2024
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on March 1, 2024
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, PHILLIP HOM, JJ
2023-447 Q C

Robert Dingle, Jr., Appellant,

against

Like Father Like Son Auto Repair, Inc., Respondent.


Robert Dingle, Jr., appellant pro se. Stern & Stern, Esqs. (David Lyle Stern of counsel), for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Claudia Lanzetta, J.), entered April 3, 2023. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the action.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover the principal sum of $14,016.50 for "[f]ailure to provide proper services," "[l]oss of use of property," and "[b]reach of contract or warranty." At a nonjury trial, plaintiff testified that, on September 21, 2018, he took his vehicle to defendant's shop to be repaired because the vehicle was making a noise when it was driven. Plaintiff testified that he instructed defendant's employees to rebuild the front differential part of his vehicle, as he believed the noise was related to a problem with that part. He alleged that he never authorized defendant's employees to diagnose his vehicle, and that defendant's employees removed and replaced certain parts without his authorization, but indicated that he allowed defendant's employees to continue repairing his vehicle after he became aware of the unauthorized services on the condition that defendant's services would fix his vehicle.

During cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that he authorized defendant's employees to replace certain parts in the vehicle that he had provided, and he also confirmed that his signature appears on a document produced by defendant dated September 21, 2018 in the space for "Cust. Authorization." Below his signature, "Diag Transmission $195.00" was written. Plaintiff further [*2]testified that the services provided by defendant did not fix the problem with his vehicle, and that he had another unnamed repair shop replace the front differential of his vehicle in the fall of 2019, which solved the problem. Plaintiff produced a receipt for the front differential part that he had purchased, but failed to produce any documentary evidence with respect to the services provided by the repair shop which allegedly installed that part in his vehicle. Plaintiff also submitted an invoice for defendant's services in the amount of $2,777.30, which was signed by him on September 28, 2018 when he picked up his vehicle. The invoice included a statement in which plaintiff "authorize[d] employees or agents of [defendant] to operate [his] vehicle for the purposes of diagnosis, testing, inspecting repair and/or delivery."

The owner of defendant's shop testified regarding defendant's general practices and procedures when a vehicle is brought in to its shop to be repaired or serviced. Defendant's owner testified that a check-in sheet is filled out by the customer identifying his or her concerns, and then defendant's employees and the customer take the vehicle for a test drive. After the test drive, the customer will sign in the "Cust. Authorization" section of the check-in sheet if he or she consents to allowing defendant's employees to diagnose the problem with the customer's vehicle. After obtaining the customer's signature, defendant's employees proceed with diagnosing the vehicle. The check-in sheet bearing plaintiff's signature in the authorization section, which was presented to plaintiff during cross-examination, was admitted into evidence. Following the trial, the Civil Court dismissed the action on the ground that plaintiff lacked credibility.

The determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]; Hamilton v Blackwood, 85 AD3d 1116 [2011]; 34-15 Parsons Blvd., LLC v Ming Hang Zhao, 74 Misc 3d 134[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50283[U], *1-2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]; 5539-181 & 182 Prospect Park W. Brooklyn, LLC v Caseres, 74 Misc 3d 128[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50062[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]).

Upon a review of the record, we find no basis to disturb the judgment. With respect to plaintiff's contention that defendant breached the service contract by performing unauthorized services on his vehicle, the documentary evidence, plaintiff's admissions at trial, and his conduct belie plaintiff's contention. Plaintiff's signature appears in the customer authorization section of the check-in sheet, and on the invoice, which included a statement authorizing the repair shop to operate the vehicle to obtain a diagnosis. Further, he admitted that he authorized defendant's employees to remove and replace parts he supplied, and that he agreed to pay for the rest of defendant's services if defendant fixed the problem with his vehicle. Although plaintiff claimed that his vehicle was still making a noise after defendant serviced it, he did not produce a receipt for the services provided by the repair shop which allegedly resolved the noise issue in the fall of 2019, nor did he call an expert to testify regarding his damages. Given plaintiff's lack of credibility regarding the authorization of services, the Civil Court did not err in generally failing to credit his testimony.

With respect to plaintiff's claim that defendant breached the service contract by failing to rebuild the front differential of his vehicle, we find, based on the testimony and evidence [*3]presented at trial, that defendant never entered into a contract with plaintiff to rebuild the front differential part of plaintiff's vehicle. Indeed, we note that plaintiff never paid defendant to have the front differential part replaced, and it is undisputed that defendant never replaced or repaired it.

Plaintiff's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or lack merit.

In view of the foregoing, the Civil Court properly dismissed the action.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: March 1, 2024