Petitioner brings this CPLR article 78 special proceeding to challenge the Commissioner of Education's determination that upheld a restriction of his access to Copenhagen Central School District property. Schools are entrusted with both the physical safety of children and the maintenance of an appropriate pedagogical environment for their education. This critical role has long-led courts to recognize the deference afforded to local school boards to exercise ultimate authority for access to students, school buildings and school property. This court will not depart from that well-grounded history.

For the reasons elaborated upon below, respondents' determinations were neither made in violation of lawful procedure nor affected by an error of law and were not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the petition is denied and dismissed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner was involved in a series of interactions with Respondent Superintendent of the Copenhagen Central School District in November 2024 and January 2025. In November 2024, petitioner, then an employee of an after-school program held on school grounds, became concerned regarding a consequence imposed by the gym teacher upon students for failing to put equipment away following an afterschool activity. Petitioner then went unannounced to Respondent Superintendent's office to confront him regarding that incident. Respondent Superintendent asserts that petitioner "demonstrated a lack of professionalism when discussing this issue" and "was very disrespectful towards [him] during that meeting," including raising his voice. Respondent Superintendent requested that the afterschool program send a different employee going forward. Notably, petitioner "strongly disagree[s] with the characterization of [his] behavior as 'wholly inappropriate,'" however, does not specifically challenge that an unannounced visit and confrontation occurred.

On January 13, 2025, petitioner returned to school grounds to set up a table to promote a nonprofit organization that he founded. Petitioner asserts that the school's guidance office had provided prior approval for his activities. Still, shortly after signing into the school, Respondent Superintendent and the school resource officer informed petitioner that he had to immediately leave the premises. The parties dispute the events that followed.

Petitioner asserts that he questioned why he had to leave and was told that it was because of the previous incident. Petitioner states that he continued to ask for clarification about why he was being asked to leave and attempted to speak with the guidance counselor. Additionally, petitioner asked for the resource officer's supervisor and requested that the resource officer call for the state police. The resource officer called his supervisor and allowed petitioner to speak with that person directly. Petitioner states that he told Respondent Superintendent to stop interrupting him as he spoke with the resource officer's supervisor and said that if he was trespassing, the resource officer should issue a trespass notice or arrest him. Petitioner left the school grounds after being issued trespass papers.

In stark contrast to Petitioner' calm and controlled version of events, Respondent Superintendent paints an entirely different picture of what took place. Respondent Superintendent asserts that the incident was immediately confrontational with petitioner saying, "It's public property. You can't tell me to leave. You're going to have to arrest me." This [*2]interaction took place in close proximity to students during the school day. Respondent Superintendent asserts that during the incident, petitioner "escalated the situation by raising his voice in the presence of students and staff" and refused to leave the property. Respondent Superintendent asserts that he was forced to request the resource officer charge petitioner with trespassing and to escort him off the premises.

On January 15, 2025, petitioner was provided a letter stating he was prohibited from entering upon any Copenhagen Central School District property without express prior written consent from the office of Respondent Superintendent. The letter stated that petitioner "had to be arrested to be removed from school district property." The letter further stated that petitioner could request, in writing, permission to be on school property three days prior to any event. Finally, the letter informed petitioner of his right to appeal to Respondent Betty A. Rosa, Commissioner of Education.

On February 4, 2025, petitioner appealed to Respondent Commissioner (8 NYCRR part 275). Petitioner requested that District Respondents "acknowledge that the claims made in the January 15, 2025, letter (specifically the claim that [he] was 'arrested') are false and that the actions taken by [Respondent Superintendent] on January 13, 2025, violated [his] rights and were highly improper." Petitioner also requested that Respondent Commissioner affirm his right to access district property for lawful purposes, such as attending school board meetings or engaging in authorized nonprofit activities, without undue restrictions. Further, petitioner asked that Respondent Commissioner ensure that he is not retaliated against in the future for filing an appeal or for any lawful requests to access district property, and that Respondent Commissioner recommend the removal of Respondent Superintendent. Finally, petitioner sought a letter from the Respondent District that he "can present to potential employers or professional relationships, explaining that the claims made in the January 15, 2025, letter were false and that the trespass ban was improperly issued."

District Respondents answered the appeal to Respondent Commissioner on March 27, 2025. In addition to Respondent Superintendent's account of the events, District Respondents submitted the affidavit of the school resource officer, Luke Monnat, a Deputy Sheriff with the Lewis County Sheriff's Department. Deputy Sheriff Monnat, consistent with Respondent Superintendent's account, described petitioner as acting immediately confrontational. Monnat further swore that petitioner refused to leave the school grounds, insisting it was public property and he could not be required to leave. District Respondents also submitted the affidavit of a school custodian and a food service worker who described the incident as confrontational with petitioner refusing to leave and telling the resource officer and Respondent Superintendent that he was going to call the police. Finally, District Respondents submitted the affidavit of a school nurse who also described the incident as confrontational.

In reply, petitioner submitted copies of various youth services certifications that he has received as well as an affidavit from his sister, who was present for the January incident. Petitioner's sister swore that petitioner and Respondent Superintendent argued and both raised their voices. She further swore that petitioner "sometimes does not realize when his voice is getting louder."

Respondent Commissioner ultimately dismissed petitioner's appeal on June 16, 2025. Respondent Commissioner determined that the restriction on petitioner's access to district property was reasonable and petitioner's other contentions were without merit. Respondent Commissioner noted that while petitioner generally suggested that his conduct was justified, [*3]Respondent Superintendent's objection was to petitioner's unprofessional and aggressive tone, not his ability to raise those concerns. Respondent Commissioner further noted that petitioner's frustration did not excuse "his obstinacy" in refusing to leave, particularly during the school day, and, at least partially, in the presence of students.

Petitioner then commenced this special proceeding on June 30, 2025.^[FN1] While the petition raises several constitutional and labor law issues, they are not asserted as claims in this proceeding. The petition solely requests that the court vacate Respondent Commissioner's determination and remand the matter "with a direction to re-evaluate the appeal in light of the requirements of the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Labor Law § 740 and Education Law article 2, §§ 10-18."

After an adjournment of the return date, respondents joined issue by filing answers on September 25, 2025, and September 26, 2025. Respondents argue that the restrictions imposed on petitioner with regard to his access to district property were within the discretion of the school district and respondents' determinations were not made in violation of lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, or arbitrary. ^[FN2]

II. Standard of Review

"Where, as here, an administrative determination is made where an evidentiary hearing is not required by law, this [c]ourt's review is limited to whether the determination had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious" (Matter of Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist. v New York State Educ. Dept., — AD3d —, —, 2025 NY Slip Op 04214 *5 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see CPLR 7803 [3]). "A determination is arbitrary and capricious when it is without sound basis and reason and generally taken without regard to the facts" (Matter of Jefferson v New York City Bd. of Educ., 146 AD3d 779, 780 [2d Dept 2017], citing Matter of Wooley v New York State Dept. of Corr. Servs., NY3d 275, 280 [2010]; see Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale and Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 231 [1974]).

III. Discussion

Courts have "repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to [*4]prescribe and control conduct in the schools" (Tinker v Des Moines School District, 393 US 503, 507 [1969]). "It cannot be disputed that the State has a public policy in favor of protecting children, and that a school has a duty to ensure the safety of its students in its physical custody or orbit of authority" (Matter of Santer v Board of Educ. of E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 23 NY3d 251, 265 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Matter of Lujan v Carranza, 63 Misc 3d 235, 241 [Sup Ct, Rensselaer County 2019, McGrath, J.]). To that end, Education Law empowers school districts to "adopt reasonable regulations for the use of . . . schoolhouses, grounds or other property" (Education Law 414 [1]).

Notably, there is a "long-standing [judicial] deference afforded local school boards to exercise ultimate authority for access to students, school buildings and school property" (Matter of Lloyd v Grella, 83 NY2d 537, 547 [1994]; see Education Law 414 [1]). "It is not the judiciary's prerogative 'to second-guess with hindsight the judgment of school administrators'" (Roth v Farmingdale Pub. School Dist., US Dist Ct, ED NY, 14CV6668JFBARL, *17, Bianco, J., 2017, quoting DeFabio v E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F Supp 2d 461, 481 [ED NY 2009], affd 623 F3d 71 [2d Cir 2010]). "Access to school grounds . . . is not a protected liberty or property interest" (Jones v Bay Shore Union Free School Dist., 947 F Supp 2d 270, 279 [EDNY 2013]). At least one federal court found no support for the proposition that citizens enjoy "any right of access to school property" (Hone v Cortland City School District, 985 F Supp 262, 272 [ND NY 1997]). "Even where a school board member was denied access to schools except to perform his limited function, the Second Circuit found no right had been violated" (Pearlman v Cooperstown Cent. School Dist., US Dist Ct, ND NY, 3:01-CV-504 *3, McAvoy, J., 2003, citing Silano v Sag Harbor Union Free School District Board of Education, 42 F3d 719, 724 [2d Cir 1994], cert denied 515 US 1160 [1995]). Likewise, courts have upheld the denial of access to parents where school officials found a safety risk (see Matter of Cina v Waters, 9 AD3d 550, 551 [3d Dept 2004]; Matter of Lujan v Carranza, 63 Misc 3d at 241). "While there may be a protected interest in attending school board meetings," such interest is not implicated where the district only requires advance notice and any interest in attending board meetings without providing advance notice is "de minimis and insufficient to sustain a due process claim" (Jones v Bay Shore Union Free School Dist., 666 Fed Appx 92, 94-95 [2d Cir 2016]).

In Matter of Macula v Bd. of Educ., the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that a school district may reasonably restrict who sets up a promotional table on school grounds, noting that schools are generally "a nonpublic forum" and the administrations thereof "may therefore control access to the School based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral" (75 AD3d 1118, 1119 [4th Dept 2010] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 15 NY3d 712 [2010]).

Respondent Commissioner has consistently held that schools may impose reasonable restrictions on individuals' access to school property (compare Appeal of Anonymous, 48 Educ Dept Rep 503, Decision No. 15,931 [reasonable restrictions upheld], and Appeal of Anonymous, 44 Educ Dept Rep 260, Decision No. 15,167 [same], with Appeal of Anonymous, 48 Educ Dept Rep 266, Decision No. 15,855 ["total ban" for indefinite period of time annulled]). Here, District Respondents implemented a requirement that petitioner must request written permission from Respondent Superintendent at least 72 hours in advance of entering school property based upon two documented confrontations. This requirement is subject to annual review at petitioner's [*5]request. Significantly, petitioner has neither sought, nor been denied, permission from Respondent Superintendent to enter school property.

Respondent Commissioner's determination noted the evidence before her, including multiple accounts of petitioner's confrontational behavior while students were present. Respondent Commissioner "acknowledge[d] petitioner's frustration" with the second confrontation, noting that petitioner may have had reason to believe it was permissible to be on school grounds, however, she assessed the papers set forth by petitioner and ultimately found "respondent's affidavits more persuasive in capturing the tone and tenor of petitioner's interactions with the superintendent." Notably, even petitioner's sister described the second incident as including an argument with raised voices.

The restriction was notably upheld based upon conduct, not the content of any speech. As Respondent Commissioner held, petitioner's belief that he was entitled to a better explanation at the time of his ejection from school grounds, even if meritorious, does not justify his obstinacy — particularly with students present. Therefore, Respondent Commissioner's determination was not made in violation of lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, or arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the petition must be denied and dismissed (Matter of Jefferson v New York City Bd. of Educ., 146 AD3d at 780).

IV. Conclusion

With the great statutory authority bestowed upon our schools also comes the equally great responsibility to protect students and to promote an environment conducive to their education. The court recognizes, and commends, petitioner on his apparent commitment to assisting youth in his community. Still, in the interest of those same youth, the law makes clear that an unfettered right to access school grounds does not exist. While petitioner asserts positive motives to his actions, Respondent Betty A. Rosa, the Commissioner of Education, rationally determined that the school district's decision to require that petitioner obtain written permission from its superintendent before he can enter school grounds, particularly where the restriction is subject to annual review at petitioner's request, is entirely appropriate under the circumstances. That determination was not made in violation of lawful procedure, was not affected by an error of law, and was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that Petitioner's application to waive court costs, fees, and expenses is granted; and it is further

ORDERED, that Petitioner's motion for leave to file is denied; and it is further

ORDERED, that the petition is hereby denied and dismissed.

This shall constitute the Decision, Order and Judgment of the court. This Decision, Order and Judgment is being returned to the attorney for respondents. All original supporting documentation is being filed with the Albany County Clerk's Office. The signing of this Decision, Order and Judgment shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provision of that rule relating to filing, entry and notice of entry.