This matter is before the court on the parties' joint application to determine the proper scope of redaction and sealing of confidential information contained in certain exhibits annexed to Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (motion sequence no. 6) and Plaintiff's opposition to the Diocese of Brooklyn's (the Diocese) motion for partial summary judgment (motion sequence no. 7).

On March 12, 2020, Plaintiff commenced this action under the Child Victims Act (CVA) (see [*2]CPLR 214-g) by e-filing the summons and complaint with the Kings County Clerk (NYSCEF Doc No. 1). The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was repeatedly sexually abused as a minor by Father S., who was employed by the defendants.

On September 18, 2020, the former Deputy Chief Administrative Judge issued a Confidentiality Order, pursuant to Section IX of Case Management Order (CMO) No. 2 (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 7, 13). A Second Amended Confidentiality Order, which remains in effect, was issued on July 10, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc No. 27).

According to the Diocese, the clergy file for the alleged abuser, Father S., was produced to Plaintiff on or about May 15, 2023. On May 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed the note of issue and certificate of readiness for trial.

On September 12, 2025, Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment (motion sequence no. 6), initially filing certain documents publicly on NYSCEF that had been designated as confidential by the Diocese. These documents were removed from the public e-filing system and submitted to the court for in camera review. The parties conferred on September 22, 2025, in an attempt to resolve the dispute concerning public filing of the materials designated confidential. The parties were unable to reach a resolution, and the aforementioned papers were filed.

The Diocese contends that the challenged documents were properly designated as confidential pursuant to the Second Amended Confidentiality Order governing CVA litigation. The Diocese argues that the materials at issue are part of a clergy file, which it characterizes as the functional equivalent of a personnel file containing sensitive employment information such as "assignment history, performance analyses, financial information, health insurance information, investigations into misconduct, and records related to termination" (Diocese's Memo at 3). The Diocese further asserts that certain documents include confidential health or treatment-related information of non-party Father S. and internal ecclesiastical communications, which it maintains warrant protection from public disclosure. According to the Diocese, permitting public filing of these materials would contravene the confidentiality order applicable to CVA cases, the First Amendment, and the Diocese's longstanding adherence to Canon Law which requires confidential documents to be "safely guarded" (Diocese's Memo at 3-5). The Diocese therefore requests that the court uphold the Diocese's confidential designation and maintain the challenged materials under seal.

On the other hand, Plaintiff contends that the Diocese's request to maintain the challenged documents under seal is contrary to well-settled New York law governing public access to court records. Plaintiff argues that the Diocese improperly seeks blanket confidentiality based solely on its unilateral designation of materials as "confidential" during discovery or based upon the inclusion of said materials in a priest's clergy or personnel file. According to Plaintiff, the court must independently determine whether good cause exists to seal or redact each record, and confidentiality is the exception rather than the rule. In support, Plaintiff emphasizes that "what a party labels as 'confidential' when parties exchange discovery is categorically irrelevant to what a court can seal or redact when an issue is presented to the court" (Plaintiff's Memo at 6). Plaintiff further asserts that many of the challenged documents are not inherently private, include materials already in the public domain or consist of non-sensitive correspondence. For example, Plaintiff highlights that the Diocese seeks to permanently seal or redact Father S.'s parish assignments "even though the Diocese itself has publicly listed those assignments on its website" (Plaintiff's Memo at 11). Permitting wholesale sealing, Plaintiff submits, would undermine the public's right to understand the basis for the court's decisions. Plaintiff maintains that any legitimate privacy concerns can be addressed through limited redactions of personal information and protected medical information pursuant to court rules.

In this case, the Diocese designated the entirety of Father S.'s clergy file as confidential during discovery and Plaintiff submitted certain documents in connection with the parties' motions for summary judgment. The issue before the court is whether materials contained within Father S.'s clergy file may remain under seal pursuant to the Second Amended Confidentiality Order, or whether they may be publicly e-filed.

The Second Amended Confidentiality Order permits a producing party to designate discovery materials, in whole or in part, as "Confidential Information" when that party believes in good faith that such materials "need protection from disclosure under federal, state, or local privacy law" because the materials contain confidential information or confidential health information, as defined in the order (Second Amended Confidentiality Order § III[1]). When, as is the case here, the receiving party submits materials containing Confidential Information in connection with a motion or other court filing, those materials must initially be submitted directly to the court and not publicly e-filed pending a judicial determination (id. at § VI[1]).

Next, the parties are required to "meet and confer in good faith" to attempt to resolve any dispute concerning appropriate redactions or sealing (Second Amended Confidentiality Order § VI[2]). If no agreement is reached, the dispute must be presented to the court by joint letter or further briefing as directed, at which point the court determines whether the materials, or any portion thereof, should be sealed or redacted (id. at §§ VI[2]—[3]).

"New York law presumptively favors broad access by the public and the press to judicial proceedings and court records, placing the burden on the party favoring sealing to show a compelling interest that likely would be harmed by granting public access" (O'Reilly v Klar, 167 AD3d 919, 920 [2d Dept 2018]; O'Reilly v McPhilmy, 167 AD3d 922, 923 [2d Dept 2018]). The presumption of public access to court records may be rebutted upon the court making an independent determination that good cause exists to seal or redact court records (see 22 NYCRR 216.1[a] ["a court shall not enter an order in any action or proceeding sealing the court records, whether in whole or in part, except upon a written finding of good cause"]; Mancheski v Gabelli Group Capital Partners, 39 AD3d 499, 502 [2d Dept 2007] ["the court must make an independent determination of whether to seal court records in whole or in part for 'good cause' "]). To determine good cause, the court "must weigh the competing interests of the public and the parties, authorizing the sealing only in the prudent exercise of the court's discretion" (Klar, 167 AD3d at 920; McPhilmy, 167 AD3d at 923; Mancheski, 39 AD3d at 502 [good cause must be determined on a case-by-case analysis in the prudent exercise of the court's discretion]). The producing party bears "the burden of justifying the propriety of its designation," but the confidential designation remains in effect unless and until the court directs otherwise (Second Amended Confidentiality Order § IV[4]).

Here, the Diocese makes four arguments in favor of sealing the clergy file: (1) it is confidential because it is a personnel record; (2) it is protected from public disclosure under the First Amendment; (3) it contains confidential personal health information; and (4) Plaintiff is not harmed by the Diocese's confidential designations.

The Diocese first seeks to maintain the challenged materials under seal on the ground that they are contained within a clergy personnel file and therefore constitute confidential employment or personnel records. While New York courts recognize that certain personnel records may implicate legitimate privacy interests, there is no per se rule that personnel files are categorically exempt from public disclosure. Rather, sealing is the exception, not the rule, and must be justified by a particularized showing of good cause as to the specific materials sought to be sealed (see Mancheski, 39 AD3d at 502; Matter of Hofmann, 284 AD2d 92, 94 [1st Dept 2001]). Thus, the analysis turns on the nature and content of the documents, not the manner in which the materials are maintained. For example, good cause is demonstrated where i) genuine trade secrets may be disclosed (see Bernstein v On-Line Software Intern., Inc., 232 AD2d 336, 337 [1st Dept 1996]), ii) the "identities of persons legitimately exposed to violence" may be revealed (Danco Labs., Ltd. v Chem. Works of Gedeon Richter, Ltd., 274 AD2d 1, 8 [*3][1st Dept 2000]), or iii) to prevent "impingment upon the privacy interests and welfare of [] minor children" (McPhilmy, 167 AD3d at 924). Sealing is not proper where disclosure would merely result in embarrassing allegations being made public (Matter of Hofmann, 284 AD2d at 94) or damage to defendants' reputations caused by plaintiff's allegations of unethical and criminal conduct (Liapakis v Sullivan, 290 AD2d 393, 394 [1st Dept 2002]).

The Diocese's position that the materials at issue should be sealed in its entirety merely because it is contained within a clergy file is contrary to court rule and jurisprudence on this issue. It is axiomatic that the court, in having to conduct an independent, document-by-document analysis prior to ruling on a sealing application, may not order a wholesale sealing of a file merely because the producing party labeled it as a "personnel file" (see Danco Labs., Ltd., 274 AD2d at 8 [conclusory sealing of entire record is improper without individualized finding]; see also Mancheski, 39 AD3d at 502). Instead, the appropriate method to be employed when the producing party seeks to seal any court record is for the court to conduct an in camera review and direct redactions where appropriate (see Danco Labs., Ltd., 274 AD2d at 8). Further, the Diocese's reliance on the Second Amended Confidentiality Order's definition of "Confidential Information" as including employment records is misplaced. The Second Amended Confidentiality Order governs the designation and exchange of materials during discovery and does not mandate sealing once such materials are submitted to the court for adjudication of a motion.

The Diocese's First Amendment argument is equally unavailing in this context. While the First Amendment prohibits courts from resolving disputes that require interpretation of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical law, it does not immunize religious institutions from the application of neutral principles of civil law, including rules governing discovery and public access to court records (see Jones v Wolf, 443 US 595, 602 [1979]; Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v Kahana, 9 NY3d 282, 286-287 [2007]). Here, this court is not asked to evaluate religious doctrine or internal theological principles, but to determine whether documents submitted in connection with summary judgment motions may be sealed under generally applicable civil court rules. The Diocese has not sufficiently demonstrated how public filing of these materials would require the court to intrude into ecclesiastical matters since, contrary to the Diocese's assertion, the court need not apply Canon Law to determine this application. Moreover, in the First Amendment context, access and reporting on judicial proceedings along with "the operation of the judicial system itself, is a matter of public interest" (Landmark Communications, Inc. v Virginia, 435 US 829, 839 [1978]).

To the extent the Diocese argues that Plaintiff is not prejudiced by the continued confidentiality designations, or that certain documents may contain health-related or other sensitive personal information, those concerns are more appropriately addressed through an independent, document-by-document review by the court conducted in camera. A careful in camera review permits the court to assess whether specific materials warrant limited redaction or sealing without resorting to categorical determinations with no nexus to the contents of the documents themselves.

The court is mindful of the sensitive nature of discovery exchanged in CVA litigation, as well as the seriousness and sensitivity of the allegations underlying these claims. The court agrees with the Diocese that the public disclosure of protected personal information or confidential health information, where present, should be subject to appropriate redaction. At the same time, the breadth of the Diocese's confidentiality designations is underscored by the inclusion within the clergy file of materials such as newspaper articles that were widely disseminated at the time of publication, as well as parish assignment information that was publicly available on the Diocese's own website. These examples illustrate why a blanket approach to confidentiality is incompatible with the court's obligation to independently determine, based on the specific contents of each document, whether good cause exists to restrict public access.

Consistent with the foregoing, the court has undertaken an independent in camera review of all materials designated as confidential by the Diocese that plaintiff seeks to file publicly. The Court's document-by-document rulings and the basis therefor are set forth in an addendum annexed to this decision. Accordingly, except to the extent indicated in the confidential addendum dated January 9, [*4]2026, the documents at issue shall not be deemed confidential and shall be filed on the public docket, subject only to limited, narrowly tailored redactions of appropriate information.

Any issue raised and not decided herein is denied.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.