[*1]
Russo v 676 Rental LLC
2026 NY Slip Op 50239(U) [88 Misc 3d 1226(A)]
Decided on January 23, 2026
Supreme Court, Richmond County
Castorina, Jr., J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on January 23, 2026
Supreme Court, Richmond County


Frank Russo, Plaintiff,

against

676 Rental LLC and PAVEL YARMALOVICH, Defendants.




Index No. 150931/2024



Attorney for the Plaintiff:
Albert Cohen
Cohen & Cohen Personal Injury Lawyers, P.C.
10470 Queens Blvd Ste 312
Forest Hills, NY 11375-3694
Phone: (718) 300-0000
E-mail: [email protected]

Attorney for the Defendants
Danitza Ayanna Campbell
Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly
600 Third Avenue Suite 1501
New York, NY 10016
Phone: (212) 967-0080
E-mail: dcampbell@moodklaw.com


Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion Seq. No. 001) numbered 15-22, 40-49, 65 were read on these motions. The motion before the Court is Defendant 676 Rental LLC's motion for dismissal pursuant to CPLR § 3211 and for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212, predicated upon the asserted application of 49 USC § 30106, commonly known as the Graves Amendment. In determining this motion, the Court has considered the Notice of Motion of Defendant 676 Rental LLC, the Affirmation in Support of Danitza A. Campbell, Esq., together with all exhibits annexed thereto; the Affidavit of Orkhan Salimov submitted in support of the motion, together with the rental agreement and annexed exhibits; the Statement of Material Facts submitted pursuant to Uniform Rule 202.8-g; the Affirmation in Opposition of Albert Cohen, Esq., together with all exhibits annexed thereto; Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition; and the Reply Affirmation and Reply Affidavit submitted on behalf of Defendant 676 Rental LLC, together with any exhibits annexed thereto. Oral argument was completed on Motion Sequence No. 001 on the record in court on January 22, 2026.


    II. Findings of Fact

This action seeks damages for alleged personal injuries arising out of an incident occurring on April 12, 2024, at or near Arthur Kill Road and Richmond Avenue, County of Richmond, State of New York. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 19). Plaintiff alleges he was a pedestrian when a vehicle came into contact with him, the vehicle bearing Pennsylvania license plate number MBN5307. (see id). The pleadings and submissions further reflect that the vehicle bearing that plate was a Toyota Prius, and that Defendant 676 Rental LLC is named as a defendant by virtue of its asserted ownership and rental of that vehicle. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 22).

The motion record reflects that on March 26, 2024, the vehicle bearing Pennsylvania plate number MBN5307 was rented by Defendant Pavel Yarmalovich from Defendant 676 Rental LLC pursuant to a rental agreement, and that the rental agreement was in effect on the date of the alleged occurrence. (see id). Defendant 676 Rental LLC asserts that its sole involvement is that of owner and renter of the vehicle in the regular course of its business, and that it did not operate, direct, or control the vehicle during the relevant period. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 18). Defendant further asserts that Defendant Yarmalovich was not employed by 676 Rental LLC and was not its agent, servant, or representative. (see id).

Plaintiff's submissions, including the opposition memorandum and annexed exhibits, contend that Plaintiff's claims against 676 Rental LLC are not limited to vicarious liability, but include allegations of direct negligence in the ownership, operation, management, maintenance, supervision, use, and control of the subject vehicle, and specifically include an allegation that Defendants failed to provide the vehicle with good and sufficient brakes and other necessary appliances and equipment.

In support of the motion, Defendant 676 Rental LLC relies materially upon an affidavit of its co-owner, Orkhan Salimov. (see id). In that affidavit, Mr. Salimov avers that 676 Rental LLC is in the regular business of renting motor vehicles, that the subject vehicle was rented to Defendant Yarmalovich, that 676 Rental LLC did not operate, direct, or control the vehicle at the time of the alleged accident, and that Defendant Yarmalovich was not acting on behalf of 676 Rental LLC and was not its employee or agent. (see id). Mr. Salimov further avers that the vehicle was equipped with certain functioning safety equipment and that his search of company records as of the accident date showed no complaints nor mechanical issues concerning the vehicle, its maintenance, or its [*2]repair. (see id).

The affidavit's jurat reflects that it was sworn in Monroe County, Pennsylvania. The notarial stamp appearing on the document identifies a notary public for the State of New York qualified in Kings County.

Plaintiff opposes the motion and challenges, among other things, the admissibility and probative force of the Salimov affidavit and the sufficiency of Defendant's proof to establish entitlement to Graves Amendment protection. Plaintiff also relies upon deposition testimony of Mr. Salimov and other exhibits described in the opposition papers to contend that 676 Rental LLC lacks the usual indicia of a rental enterprise, that it maintains no formal computerized records, and that its recordkeeping and maintenance practices are insufficiently documented, thereby creating triable issues of fact on threshold and negligence issues. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 44). Plaintiff further contends that 676 Rental LLC is not listed as authorized to do business in the State of New York. (see id).

Defendant submitted reply papers, including a reply affidavit, in further support of the motion.

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment and CPLR §3211 [a] [7]

The Court begins with the applicable standards, to wit: the allocation of burdens, and the quality of proof required. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, available only where the moving party establishes, by evidentiary proof in admissible form, entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, thereby eliminating all material issues of fact from the case (see Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]). The opposing party, to defeat a properly supported motion, must demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact by admissible proof (see Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Critically, however, the motion rises or falls on the movant's prima facie showing: failure to make that showing requires denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). These principles are not aspirational; they are structural. They preserve the line between adjudication on papers and adjudication after trial, and they prevent summary judgment from becoming a substitute for proof.

On the branch of the motion seeking dismissal under CPLR § 3211 [a] [7], the Court's role is more limited. The Court must accept the pleading's factual allegations as true, accord Plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633 [1976]).

B. Graves Amendment Issues

Against that backdrop, the Court turns to the Graves Amendment. As set forth in the parties' submissions, 49 USC § 30106 provides that an owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person shall not be liable under the law of any State, by reason of being the owner, for harm to persons or property arising out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the rental period, provided that the owner is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles and that there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (49 USC § 30106 [a] [1] [2]). The statute thus functions as a preemptive shield against vicarious liability [*3]premised solely upon ownership during a rental, while simultaneously preserving exposure for the owner's own negligence.

As a matter of motion practice, this means that a rental company seeking dispositive relief must do more than recite the statute; it must establish, through competent evidence, the predicate facts that bring it within the statute's protection, and it must negate, or at least eliminate triable issues concerning, any allegations of negligence or criminal wrongdoing by the owner. Where the record reflects allegations of direct negligence in maintenance, the statute itself makes plain that such negligence is not immunized, and the movant must confront that claim with admissible proof sufficient to eliminate factual disputes.

C. The Salimov Affidavit

A threshold issue in this motion is the admissibility of the affidavit of Orkhan Salimov, which constitutes the principal evidentiary submission in support of Defendant 676 Rental LLC's request for dismissal and summary judgment. The Salimov affidavit is not merely collateral; it is the instrument through which Defendant seeks to establish critical factual predicates for application of the Graves Amendment, including that 676 Rental LLC is engaged in the trade or business of renting motor vehicles, that the subject vehicle was rented during the relevant period, that Defendant did not operate or control the vehicle, and that no mechanical or maintenance issues were present. The admissibility of this affidavit therefore bears directly on whether Defendant has met its prima facie burden.

The jurat of the Salimov affidavit expressly recites that the affidavit was sworn in Monroe County, Pennsylvania. The notarial stamp affixed to the same document identifies a notary public commissioned in the State of New York. Plaintiff's opposition correctly notes that a New York notary public is authorized to administer oaths only within the territorial boundaries of the State of New York, as provided in NY Executive Law § 135. Plaintiff further cites Maki v. Travelers Cos., Inc., (145 AD3d 1228 [3d Dept 2016]), for the proposition that where a notary acts outside the scope of territorial authority, the resulting affidavit is of no probative value.

On the face of the document, therefore, the oath was purportedly administered in Pennsylvania by a notary whose commission is limited to the State of New York. The affidavit thus reflects a facially defective jurat. Where an affidavit is not properly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oaths in the jurisdiction where the oath is taken, the document does not constitute a valid sworn statement. As Plaintiff correctly observes, an affidavit so executed is of no probative value and cannot serve as evidentiary proof in support of summary judgment.

This defect is not a hyper technical irregularity. Summary judgment is available only where the moving party tenders evidence in admissible form sufficient to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). The affidavit of Mr. Salimov is the primary evidentiary vehicle through which Defendant attempts to satisfy that burden. Where that affidavit is not a valid sworn statement, Defendant is left without competent evidence on the very issues it must prove to obtain dispositive relief.

The Court further notes that this evidentiary infirmity affects not only the affidavit itself but also the foundational support for exhibits attached thereto. In ordinary motion practice, an affidavit authenticates annexed documents and supplies the testimonial foundation upon which the Court may consider those documents as evidentiary proof. Where the affidavit is not a valid sworn statement, [*4]the probative value of the attached exhibits is correspondingly diminished. At minimum, this reinforces the conclusion that Defendant has not presented an unimpeachable prima facie record in admissible form sufficient to warrant the drastic remedy sought.

Even if the Court were to assume, arguendo, that the affidavit could be considered despite the defective jurat, its contents remain conclusory on material elements. The affidavit states, in general terms, that 676 Rental LLC is in the regular business of renting motor vehicles and that a search of records revealed no complaints or mechanical issues. No documentary corroboration is annexed, and Plaintiff's opposition introduces deposition testimony of the same affiant describing the absence of formal business records and maintenance documentation. These contradictions underscore that credibility determinations would be required to resolve the factual disputes, determinations which are inappropriate on summary judgment.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Salimov affidavit is not a valid sworn statement and is of no probative value. Without that affidavit, Defendant 676 Rental LLC has failed to present evidence in admissible form sufficient to meet its prima facie burden. Under the governing summary judgment standard, failure to make such a prima facie showing requires denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). For this independent reason, Defendant's motion must be DENIED.

The Court further observes that even if the affidavit were considered, its content is largely conclusory on critical elements. The assertion that 676 Rental LLC is "in the regular business of renting motor vehicles" is stated as a conclusion, with no accompanying documentary support in the moving papers that would objectively demonstrate the nature, regularity, or scope of the alleged business operations. Plaintiff's opposition, meanwhile, proffers deposition testimony and other materials describing the absence of the usual indicia of a rental enterprise and includes the affiant's own testimony that the company does not operate as the "usual" rental company. Those submissions raise a credibility-laden factual dispute concerning the threshold statutory element of whether Defendant is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles within the meaning of 49 USC § 30106 [a] [1]. At summary judgment, the Court may not resolve such disputes by choosing between competing narratives, particularly where the movant's proof is conclusory, and the record contains contradictory testimony attributed to the same witness (see Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]).

The notary issue also affects the rental agreement that is attached to the affidavit. In ordinary motion practice, an affidavit frequently serves as the authenticating instrument for exhibits attached to it. Where the affidavit itself is challenged as inadmissible, the ability of the exhibit to be considered as competent proof may be correspondingly impaired. Here, Defendant's motion relies on the rental agreement to establish the existence and temporal scope of the rental period, an element that is material to Graves Amendment analysis, and the affidavit is the primary instrument by which the rental agreement is presented to the Court. The Court need not, and does not, pronounce a categorical rule as to every exhibit in every case; it is enough to observe that the evidentiary infirmity in the affidavit reinforces the conclusion that Defendant has not presented an unimpeachable prima facie record in admissible form sufficient to warrant the drastic remedy sought.

Plaintiff additionally advances a direct negligence theory sounding in negligent maintenance, specifically alleging failure to provide a vehicle with good and sufficient brakes and necessary equipment. The Graves Amendment by its own terms conditions its protective scope on the absence of negligence or criminal wrongdoing by the owner (49 USC § 30106 [a] [2]). Thus, even if [*5]Defendant could prevail on the vicarious liability question, it cannot obtain dismissal of a direct negligence claim by invoking ownership-based preemption. Defendant therefore had the burden to address the negligent maintenance allegations with evidentiary proof sufficient to eliminate triable issues of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]).

Defendant's showing on that point is not sufficient. The Salimov affidavit states, in general terms, that the vehicle was equipped with certain working components and that a search of records revealed no complaints or mechanical issues. But no contemporaneous maintenance logs, inspection reports, service invoices, or other objective documentation are annexed to demonstrate inspection or maintenance practices, much less to address the specific allegation concerning brakes. Plaintiff's opposition, drawing upon deposition testimony and other submissions, asserts that formal maintenance records are not maintained or cannot be produced, and that uncertainty exists concerning the vehicle's service history. On this record, and under the controlling standard, the Court finds that triable issues of fact remain as to whether Defendant 676 Rental LLC was negligent in maintaining the vehicle (see Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]).

Defendant's reply submissions do not alter the analysis. As the parties' own cited standards make plain, a motion for summary judgment must be supported in the first instance by a prima facie showing, and failure to do so requires denial regardless of the opposing papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). A reply may respond to matters raised in opposition, but it cannot be used as a belated substitute for the prima facie evidentiary showing that the moving party was obligated to make in its opening papers. Here, given the evidentiary infirmities identified and the existence of unresolved factual issues on threshold Graves Amendment elements and direct negligence, the reply affidavit cannot supply what the initial motion papers failed to establish in admissible and conclusive form.

D. CPLR § 3211 [a] [7] Branch of the Motion

Finally, on the CPLR §3211 [a] [7] branch, Plaintiff's pleading and bill of particulars allege negligence in maintenance and failure to provide adequate brakes and equipment. Accepting those allegations as true and affording Plaintiff every favorable inference, they state a cognizable claim of direct negligence against 676 Rental LLC (see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633 [1976]). Accordingly, dismissal at this stage is not warranted.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

The Court finds that Defendant 676 Rental LLC has not satisfied the heavy burden required for the drastic remedy of summary judgment. The record presents triable issues of fact concerning whether Defendant 676 Rental LLC is engaged in the trade or business of renting motor vehicles within the meaning of 49 USC § 30106 [a] [1], and triable issues of fact concerning Plaintiff's allegations of direct negligence in maintenance, which are not immunized under 49 USC §30106 [a] [2]. The motion is further undermined by the evidentiary defects identified in the opposition papers concerning the affidavit's execution, including the facial irregularity that the affidavit was sworn in Pennsylvania but notarized by a New York notary, issues which bear on whether Defendant has presented evidence in admissible form sufficient to meet its prima facie burden.

The reply submissions do not cure those deficiencies.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant 676 Rental LLC's motion for dismissal pursuant to CPLR §3211 and for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR §3212 is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the action shall continue as against Defendant 676 Rental LLC.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: January 23, 2026
Staten Island, New York
E N T E R,
HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT