I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 001) numbered 26-35, 46, 48, 50, 55-57, 66 and (Motion No. 002) numbered 36-45, 51, 58-65, 67 were read on this motion. Oral argument was completed on February 5, 2026.

The following papers were read and considered on defendants' motions for summary judgment:

1. Notice of Motion and Affirmation in Support seeking summary judgment on liability, with exhibits;

2. Notice of Motion and Affirmation in Support seeking summary judgment pursuant to Insurance Law §§ 5102 and 5104, with exhibits;

3. Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition, with exhibits;

4. Reply papers, if any.

II. Facts

This action arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on October 5, 2023, at approximately 4:57 p.m., at the intersection of Quintard Street and Mason Avenue in Staten Island, New York. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 28). At the time of the occurrence, plaintiff was proceeding southbound on Mason Avenue (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 34 at page 27) and was subject to a stop sign (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 32 page 27-28; 61), while defendant Arturo Rodriguez was traveling eastbound on Quintard Street, which was not governed by any traffic control device (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 33 at page 20; (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 34 at page 29).

At her deposition, plaintiff testified that she stopped for approximately ten to twenty seconds, looked for oncoming traffic, did not observe any approaching vehicles, and then entered the intersection, whereupon the collision occurred. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 32 at page 29-31). She further testified that she did not see defendant's vehicle until the moment of impact. (see id at page 31-32).

Defendant testified that he was traveling at approximately twenty miles per hour, within the posted speed limit, under clear weather conditions, and attempted to brake upon observing plaintiff's vehicle seconds before impact. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 32 at page 21; 25). With respect to damages, plaintiff alleges injuries to her cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine and both knees. She testified to emergency treatment, followed by chiropractic care, physical therapy, injections, and subsequent cessation of treatment. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 41).

Defendants submitted the affirmed report of Dr. Howard A. Kiernan, who found full range of motion in the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine, no spasm or tenderness, normal neurological findings, and concluded that plaintiff's alleged injuries had resolved. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 44).

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant establishes entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by tender of evidentiary proof in admissible form and demonstrates the absence of any material issue of fact (see CPLR § 3212 [b]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]; Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]).

Once such showing is made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidence in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact (see Piccolo v DeCarlo, 90 AD2d 609 [3d Dept 1982]).

B. Right-of-Way and Stop Sign Obligations

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 [a] provides that a driver approaching a stop sign shall stop and yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard.

A driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that other motorists will obey [*2]traffic laws and has no duty to watch for a driver who may fail to stop (see Jenkins v Alexander, 9 AD3d 286 [1st Dept 2004]; Matt v Tricil, 260 AD2d 811 [3d Dept 1999]). A motorist is obligated to see what is there to be seen through the proper use of his or her senses (see Bolta v Lohan, 242 AD2d 356 [2d Dept 1997]; Anastasio v Scheer, 239 AD2d 823 [3d Dept 1997]).

C. No-Fault Serious Injury Threshold

Insurance Law § 5102 [d] defines "serious injury," and Insurance Law § 5104 limits recovery for non-economic loss to those who meet that threshold. Summary judgment is an appropriate vehicle to determine the existence of a serious injury (see Godden v Carmen, 169 AD2d 812 [2d Dept 1991]; Osowicki v Young, 140 AD2d 898 [2d Dept 1991]).

A defendant meets its prima facie burden by submitting competent medical evidence demonstrating that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury (see Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]; Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]). The mere existence of disc bulges or herniations is insufficient without objective evidence of resulting limitations (see Lee v Troia, 41 AD3d 469 [2d Dept 2007]; Kearse v New York City Tr. Auth., 16 AD3d 45 [2d Dept 2005]; Bernabel v Perullo, 300 AD2d 330 [2d Dept 2002]).

Unexplained cessation of treatment may warrant dismissal (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566 [2005]).

D. Liability

Defendants have established prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on liability.

The undisputed record demonstrates that plaintiff entered the intersection from a stop-controlled street while defendant was traveling on a through street. Plaintiff admitted that she did not observe defendant's vehicle prior to impact. This testimony establishes that plaintiff failed to see what was there to be seen and failed to yield the right-of-way in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 [a].

Defendant testified that he was traveling within the speed limit and attempted to brake upon perceiving plaintiff's vehicle. There is no evidence of excessive speed, distraction, or other negligent conduct.

A driver with the right-of-way is entitled to assume that others will obey traffic control devices (see Jenkins v. Alexander, 9 AD3d 286 [1st Dept 2004], supra; Orellana v Mendez, 208 AD3d 888 [2d Dept 2022]). A driver who has only seconds to react to a vehicle that fails to yield is not comparatively negligent (see Yelder v Walters, 64 AD3d 762 [2d Dept 2009]; Jones v Haifeng Zuo, 220 AD3d 934 [2d Dept 2023]).

Plaintiff offers no competent evidence of comparative negligence. Any claim of excessive speed is speculative, particularly where plaintiff did not observe defendant's vehicle prior to impact (see Rodriguez v City of New York, 31 NY3d 312 [2018]).

Accordingly, defendants have demonstrated that plaintiff's failure to yield was the sole proximate cause of the accident.

Summary judgment on liability is therefore granted.

E. Serious Injury Threshold

Defendants have also established prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the serious injury threshold. Dr. Kiernan's affirmed report documents full range of motion, absence of spasm or tenderness, normal neurological findings, and resolution of plaintiff's injuries. This constitutes competent medical evidence demonstrating the absence of a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102 [d] (see Gaddy v. Eyler, supra; Toure v Avis Rent a Car Sys., supra).

In opposition, plaintiff relies primarily upon her deposition testimony and treatment history. While plaintiff testified to receiving physical therapy and injections, she failed to submit any competent medical evidence in admissible form establishing quantified limitations, permanency, or causal relationship to the accident.

Subjective complaints of pain, unsupported by objective findings, are insufficient (see Lee v Troia, supra; Kearse v New York City Tr. Auth., supra).

Further, plaintiff testified that she discontinued treatment after several months and had not received treatment for approximately one year prior to her deposition. Plaintiff has provided no medical explanation for this cessation. Such unexplained gap in treatment undermines claims of serious injury (Pommells v. Perez, supra). With respect to the 90/180-day category, plaintiff has failed to submit competent medical evidence demonstrating that she was prevented from performing substantially all of her customary activities for the requisite statutory period.

Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact in response to defendants' prima facie showing. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to Insurance Law §§ 5102 and 5104 (Godden v Carmen, supra; Osowicki v Young, supra).

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

The evidentiary record establishes that plaintiff's failure to yield the right-of-way was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The record further establishes that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of the No-Fault Law. No material issues of fact exist requiring trial.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to Insurance Law §§ 5102 and 5104 is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.