On August 26, 2025, at approximately 8:30 AM, in the subway station at Union Square East and East 14th Street, New York, New York, defendant, Joel Clase, struck Informant 1 on her buttocks over her clothing without her permission or consent.

For these acts, defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of Forcible Touching (Penal Law [PL] §§ 130.52[1], [2]), and one count of Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree (PL § 130.55) in New York County Criminal Court.

Now, in papers dated December 3, 2025, defendant, through counsel, moves this Court for an Order suppressing evidence, precluding evidence, and for further motions. The People oppose in papers dated December 29, 2025, and cross-move for discovery.

After a thorough review of the parties' moving papers, along with the annexed exhibits therein, the court file, and the court minutes, the Court's Opinion is as follows:

Defendant moves for suppression, or hearings in the alternative, of any noticed identification procedure that the People intend to introduce at trial that it was the tainted fruit of an unlawful arrest and on the grounds that the procedures were unduly suggestive is denied. Initially, defendant's papers fail to factually demonstrate how and when defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated and how and when he was illegally seized. Defendant does not lack access to information as he has all the discovery in this case. Moreover, evaluated against the pleadings, defendant was not charged and arrested in any type of police-citizen encounter in the Fourth Amendment context. Rather, defendant is charged with committing specific acts of violence against an identifiable person, who reported the incident. See People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 (1993); People v Burch, 59 AD3d 266 (1st Dept 2009).

In any event, the People assert that there were no police-arranged identification [*2]procedures utilized in this case and that the eyewitness and complainant flagged the police officers at the subway station and pointed defendant out contemporaneously to the incident. Thus, defendant is not entitled to suppression or a hearing as the identification was not police arranged. People v Quinney, 305 AD2d 1044 (4th Dept 2003); People v Rumph, 248 AD2d 142 (1st Dept 1998) (hearing properly denied where the witness called the police and pointed defendant out to them when they arrived); People v Gillman, 219 AD2d 505 (1st Dept 1995) (hearing properly denied where the complainant was already in pursuit of defendant when police arrived and witness identified defendant a short distance away). The mere fact that the People did serve Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) §710.30 notice on defendant does not transform it into an identification procedure. People v Allen, 162 AD2d 538 (2nd Dept 1990); People v Twitty, 223 AD2d 744 (2nd Dept 1996). Accordingly, defendant's motion for suppression of identification evidence is summarily denied.

The People have served notice of their intent to elicit a first time, in-court identification at trial pursuant to People v Perdue, 41 NY3d 245 (2023), and defendant has moved to preclude such testimony on the ground that it would be unduly suggestive. In Perdue, the Court of Appeals held that when the People call a witness who might make a first time in-court identification, the court must ensure that defendant is aware of that possibility and can request alternative identification procedures. Id at 247. Where a defendant explicitly requests such procedures, a trial court may take any measures necessary to reduce the risk of misidentification, and the ultimate determination as to whether to admit a first time in-court identification rests with the trial court. Id at 247-248. The court must balance the probative value of the identification against the dangers of misidentification and other prejudice to a defendant. Id at 248.

Here, defendant was clearly apprised from the People's notice as to the potential first time in-court identification and consequently moved this Court to preclude it or hold a Perdue hearing assessing the probative value against the dangers of misidentification and other prejudice. Thus, a Perdue hearing is to be held before trial to assess the reliability of any potential in-court identification from the complainant.

Defendant's motion seeking suppression of statements as the product of an unlawful arrest and seizure, or a Dunaway/Huntley hearing in the alternative, is denied. A combined Dunaway/Huntley hearing tests an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to determine whether a post-arrest statement from defendant should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. A motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful seizure, or for a Dunaway hearing alternatively, must be made in accordance with CPL § 710.60. The motion must state the legal ground for the motion and must also make sworn allegations of fact supporting the motion, which defendant has failed to do here. See People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 (1993); People v Smythe, 210 AD2d 887 (1997). Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above, defendant's motion for suppression, or for a combined Dunaway/Huntley hearing is denied.

Defendant's motion seeking suppression, or a Huntley hearing in the alternative, to test the voluntariness of defendant's statement is granted to the extent that a Huntley hearing is ordered based upon the allegations contained in counsel's affirmation, entitling defendant to such relief. CPL §710.60 (3); CPL §60.45). Defendant is not required to set forth specific factual allegations of involuntariness in order to obtain a Huntley hearing. Accordingly, a Huntley [*3]hearing is ordered as to the voluntariness of defendant's statements.

Defendant seeks the preclusion of using defendant's prior bad acts and/or prior convictions at trial pursuant to People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901), People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981), and People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974) on the People's direct case or upon cross-examination.

Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible where it is offered solely to raise an inference that a defendant has a criminal propensity. People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901); People v Wright, 288 AD2d 409 (2d Dept 2001). Such evidence may be admitted, however, if it helps to establish a defendant's motive, intent, identity, knowledge, common scheme or plan, lack of mistake or accident, to complete the narrative of the crime, or provide the jury with background information. See People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901); People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981); People v Lewis, 69 NY2d 321 (1987); People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 (1979); People v. Davis, 169 AD2d 774 (2d Dept 1991). In order to use this evidence, the People are required to notify the court and defendant, prior to jury selection, of their intent to introduce the evidence as part of the case-in-chief and identify the basis upon which they consider it admissible. People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981). Once a showing is made that the evidence is relevant, a trial court may admit the evidence as long as its probative value outweighs its potential prejudice. People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55 (1988); People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241-42 (1987). The permissible scope of such evidence rests largely, if not completely, with the trial court. See People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55 (1988). Accordingly, defendant's motion as to prior bad act evidence is deferred to the trial court.

Should he testify, defendant, like any other witness, places his credibility in issue. Although a witness may not be questioned about an arrest per se, it is a provident exercise of the Court's discretion to permit cross-examination concerning any immoral, vicious, dishonest and or criminal act, even if defendant was not formally charged with it. People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 373 (1974); People v Rockwell, 18 AD3d 969 (3d Dept 2005); People v Di Bella, 277 AD2d 699 (3d Dept 2000); People v Connolly, 259 AD2d 1039 (4d Dept 1999); People v Maiolo, 122 AD2d 586 (4d Dept 1986); Prince, Richardson on Evidence, 11th Ed., 6-406. A witness may also be impeached by instances of conduct demonstrating a "willingness ... to place his self-interest ahead of principle or the interests of society." People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 461—462 (1994).

The People's disclosure obligation is governed by People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974), which directs the People to notify the defendant, prior to the commencement of jury selection, of the acts which they will seek to use for impeachment purposes. However, it is defendant who must demonstrate that the prejudicial effect of such evidence so far outweighs its probative worth that it must be excluded, as it is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion. See People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 378 (1974). The permissible scope of such impeachment evidence rests largely, if not completely, with the trial court. People v Gray, 84 NY2d 709, 712 (1995); People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 459 (1994). Accordingly, defendant's motion as to prior convictions is therefore deferred to the trial court. People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974).

Defendant's application for an extension of time to file additional motions is denied subject to rights under CPL §255.20(3) to move for further leave upon good cause shown.

Defendant's remaining requests are denied as duplicative, premature, moot, unsupported by the record, or without merit.

The People seek reciprocal discovery from defendant, namely, information pertaining to alibi. Defendant is hereby directed to supply the People with alibi information and comply with his reciprocal discovery obligations pursuant to CPL §245.20(4), including filing and serving a Defense Certificate of Compliance (DCOC) with the People and the Court.

The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order of the Court.