On August 1, 2024, at approximately 6:00 PM, inside of 109 Greene Street, New York, New York, complaining witness, T.M., received an email from an address that she did not recognize, containing a nine-page memorandum that included multiple intimate images of her body. The complainant recognized that her boyfriend, defendant, Matteo Prandoni, sent the images because defendant took three of the photographs, and she sent another two photographs only to defendant. The complainant has an Order of Protection against defendant issued from New York City Family Court.

Detective John Huerta, of the 74th Precinct of the New York City Police Department (NYPD), reviewed subpoena returns from Google that revealed that the nine-page memorandum was sent to at least fifty individuals and that minutes before the email was sent, a blank email was sent from the sender to an email address bearing defendant's first and last name.

For these acts, defendant was subsequently arrested and charged in New York City Criminal Court with one count of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree (Penal Law [PL] 215.50[3]), and one count of Unlawful Disclosure of an Intimate Image (Administrative Code [AC] 10-180[b][1]).

Now, in papers dated January 9, 2026, defendant, through counsel, moves this Court for an Order dismissing the accusatory instrument on facial insufficiency grounds. He specifically argues that the factual allegations in the accusatory instrument fail to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator and fails to support the charges. The People oppose in papers dated February 26, 2026.

After a thorough review of the parties' moving papers, along with the annexed exhibits [*2]therein, the court file, and the court minutes, the Court's Opinion is as follows:

An information is jurisdictionally sufficient where it states facts of an evidentiary character supporting the charges (Criminal Procedure Law [CPL] § 100.15[3]), and the factual allegations, together with any supporting depositions, provide "reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged." CPL § 100.40(1)(b). In order for the reasonable cause standard to be met, the factual allegations in the instrument must be sufficient to show that it is reasonably likely that a crime was committed, and that the defendant committed it. People v Hightower, 18 NY3d 249, 254 (2011).

In addition, the information and supporting depositions must include "[n]on-hearsay allegations" that "establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof." CPL § 100.40(1)(c); People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 (2000). This is referred to as the "prima facie case requirement." People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 229 (2009) (citations omitted). The prima facie case requirement in an accusatory instrument "is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial, nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial." People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1066 (2015) (citations omitted).

A court reviewing an accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency must assume that the factual allegations are true and must consider all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them (CPL §§ 100.40 and 100.15; People v. Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 747 [2012]; see also People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]). However, "[f]acial sufficiency, by definition, limits the Court's analysis to the four corners of the accusatory instrument" (People v Williams, 21 Misc 3d 678, 684 [City Ct Albany City 2008] citing People v Thomas, 4 NY3d 143, 146 [2005]). When the factual portion of the information, together with any accompanying supporting deposition and viewed in the light most favorable to the People, fails to establish every element of the offense charged, the information is jurisdictionally defective and must be dismissed (see People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354 [2000]; People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]).

In this case, the information charges violations of AC § 10-180(b)(1) and PL § 215.50(3). AC § 10-180(b)(1) provides that, "[i]t is unlawful for a covered recipient to disclose an intimate image, without the depicted individual's consent, with the intent to cause economic, physical or substantial emotional harm to such depicted individual, where such depicted individual is or would be identifiable to another individual either from the intimate image or from the circumstances under which such image is disclosed." AC § 10-180(b)(1). The statute defines "covered recipient" as, "an individual who gains possession of, or access to, an intimate image from a depicted individual, including through the recording of the intimate image." Id. Next, PL 215.50(3) makes it unlawful to engage in intentional disobedience to the lawful mandate of a court in other than a labor dispute. PL § 215.50(3).

The accusatory instrument, sworn by Detective John Huerta, specifically alleges:

I am informed by Ms. T.M., of an address known to the District Attorney's Office, that on August 1, 2024, at approximately 6:00 PM, she received an email from "[email protected]" containing a 9-page memorandum. I am further informed by T.M. that she reviewed the above-mentioned memorandum and observed that it contained multiple intimate images of T.M., including three images of her bare breasts, one image of her vagina, and one image of her buttocks.

I am further informed by T.M. that she knows that the defendant was the individual who sent the above-described images for the following reasons: (i) three of the above-[*3]described images were from a video that she knows the defendant took and (ii) two of the images were taken by T.M. and sent only to the defendant. I am further informed by T.M. that she is the protected party in the below-described Order of Protection.

I reviewed subpoena returns from Google that showed: (i) the above-mentioned memorandum was sent to at least 50 other individuals and (ii) minutes before the abovementioned email was sent, a blank email was sent from "[email protected]" to an email address bearing the defendant's first and last name, [email protected].

The defendant's conduct is in direct violation of a valid Order of Protection, issued in New York County Family Court by Hon. Judge Jonathan H. Shim on 4/12/2024, in conjunction with Docket #0-04746-23. The order expired on 9/23/2024, and orders the defendant to stay away from Ms. T.M.. The Order of Protection was served on the defendant.

The People filed and served a supported deposition for the complaining witness, T.M., and an Order of Protection.

Here, the accusatory instrument is facially insufficient to support count of Unlawful Disclosure of an Intimate Image for several reasons. Firstly, the accusatory instrument fails to make out the harm element as the information is devoid of any suggestion that the dissemination of the images was done with the intent to cause economic, physical, and substantial emotional harm to the complainant, nor does the information allege that the complainant suffered such harm. See People v Marvel B., 84 Misc 3d 430 (Crim Ct Kings Co 2024). Secondly, the instrument fails to allege that the complainant would be identifiable to another individual based on the intimate images or from the circumstances under which the images were sent. The only factual allegation in this vein is that the images were sent to at least fifty individuals with a nine-page memorandum. Nowhere in the accusatory instrument does it establish that any of these individuals are able to identify the complainant based on the images and/or memorandum received or from the circumstances of the mass email itself. See People v Christopher H., 87 Misc 3d 387 (Dist Ct Nassau Co 2025).

Moreover, the information alleges that the complainant received an email from an unknown recipient containing a nine-page memorandum with many of her intimate images, and that she knew that defendant took three of them and that she sent two of them only to defendant. Aside from the fact that these allegations establish defendant is a "covered recipient" as to those five images only and not the rest, these allegations also do not provide reasonable cause to believe that defendant sent the email. See People v Ahmed, 64 Misc 3d 601 (Crim Ct NY Co 2019). The only factual contention in support of this notion is that the same email address that was used to send the email also sent a blank email to defendant immediately before the mass email. While this fact does provide some semblance of a nexus between the sender email address and defendant, even with the benefit of every reasonable inference, this fact alone does not establish that defendant committed the charged crime by distributing the images. Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above, the count of Unlawful Disclosure of an Intimate Image (AC § 10-180[b][1]) is dismissed as facially insufficient.

In light of this determination, the remaining count of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree (PL § 215.50[3]) must also be dismissed. Defendant is solely charged with violating an Order of Protection protecting the complaining witness with respect to this incident. Accordingly, the count of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree (PL § 215.50[3]) is also [*4]dismissed.

As there are no remaining facially sufficient counts, defendant's motion is granted, and the accusatory instrument is dismissed. CPL §§ 170.30(1)(a); 170.35; 100.40 (1); 100.15. The Court declines to address the parties' remaining contentions. Sealing is stayed for thirty days.

The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order of the Court.