The following paper numbered 1 was read on this motion:

The Court has before it the motion of non-party Bruce Lord, as Executor of the Estate of Louise Maceden ("movant"), which seeks (1) leave to intervene as of right in the above-captioned action; or, in the alternative, (2) leave to intervene by permission. The Court notes that movant has sent emails to the Court multiple times in which he asserts that the Court orally granted his motion to intervene. This is not accurate. The Court has not ruled on movant's motion previously, but does so herein.

The following facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff is the wife of movant. She and defendants are sisters and nieces (the nieces are the daughters of two predeceased sisters). Louise Maceden was their mother/grandmother. Movant is the Executor of decedent's estate. Decedent died in 2013. In his motion papers, and in emails that he sent to the Court, movant makes it clear that he accuses defendants of wrongdoing concerning the estate and the three properties at issue in this partition action.

It appears that the period in question is 2003 through 2013 (the period of decedent's life tenancy in the three properties at issue), although it is not entirely clear.^[FN1] However, movant sent a letter and an email to the Court in which he clarified his position. In that letter and email, movant stated that "For clarity, my intervention and authority extend solely to matters during the period from 2003 to 2013 and do not cover any matters occurring after that period." Based on this representation, any causes of action that movant raises in his proposed complaint are untimely, as there is no statute of limitations that would allow claims from that long ago. For this reason alone, the Court determines that movant cannot intervene in this action.

Even if movant had not raised issues from more than a decade ago, the Court would still have to deny the motion to intervene as the motion itself is untimely. "Consideration of any motion to intervene begins with the question of whether the motion is timely." In re HSBC Bank U.S.A., 135 AD3d 534, 534, 22 N.Y.S.3d 448, 449 (1st Dept. 2016). See also U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Bisono, 98 AD3d 608, 609, 949 N.Y.S.2d 652, 653 (2d Dept. 2012) ("Intervention pursuant to either CPLR 1012 or 1013 requires a timely motion."). Plaintiff commenced this action in September 2024, yet movant waited approximately fifteen months, until December 2025, to seek to intervene. This is far too long, since there is no question that movant was well aware of this action from its inception. Rectory Realty Assocs. v. Town of Southampton, 151 AD2d 737, 738, 543 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129 (2d Dept. 1989) (waiting a year to intervene too long to allow it); Vacco v. Herrera, 247 AD2d 608, 608, 669 N.Y.S.2d 228 (2d Dept. 1998) (motion to intervene denied where "They did not move to intervene until seven months after being notified of the commencement of the action.").

Even if the motion to intervene were timely and even if it arose out of recent events — which it is not and which it does not — the Court would still have to deny it. To allow movant to intervene at this late stage would unduly delay the resolution of this action, which, as the Court has noted on the Record before, was already settled at a mediation before plaintiff changed her mind. The Court will not allow any further delay. See Phoenix Cap. Fin. Ltd. v. Axia Realty, LLC, 184 AD3d 539, 540, 124 N.Y.S.3d 194, 195 (1st Dept. 2020).

Finally, the nature of a partition action is different from other actions, in that the Court must first issue an interlocutory judgment (See RPAPL § 911 If "the rights of the parties are not controverted," "the court shall ascertain the rights, shares and interests of the several parties in the property, by a reference or otherwise, before interlocutory judgment is rendered." See also RPAPL § 912 "Before an interlocutory judgment for the sale of real property is rendered the [*2]court shall ascertain, by reference or otherwise, whether there is any creditor not a party who has a lien on the undivided share or interest of any party. . . ." and RPAPL § 915 "The interlocutory judgment shall determine the right, share or interest of each party in the property, as far as the same has been ascertained. Where the property or any part thereof is so circumstanced that a partition thereof cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners, the interlocutory judgment, except as otherwise expressly prescribed in this article, shall direct that the property or the part so circumstanced be sold at public auction.") and then appoint a referee to hold an auction. Although the Court has informed the parties at multiple Court appearances that in a partition auction there is no realtor, no photographs or other typical means of persuading the public to purchase a property, it bears repeating that a sale of property at a partition auction is likely to minimize the revenue obtained by the parties. The Court therefore again urges the parties to consider ways for them to maximize the revenue.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.