On June 19, 2025, at approximately 4:15 PM, defendant, Ralph Louis, ordered and consumed food and drinks at Hurley's Restaurant & Bar, New York, New York, amounting to a total bill of $89.28, which defendant did not pay for. Defendant did not have permission or authority to order and consume food and drinks without paying. The following day, on June 20, 2025, at approximately 2:52 PM, defendant returned to the restaurant and broke several potted plants causing approximately five-hundred dollars ($500) worth of damage, without permission or authority to do so. The restaurant owner called 911 and officers from the New York City Police Department (NYPD) responded. Defendant also made admissions to police officers.

For these acts, defendant was arrested and charged in New York County Criminal Court with two counts of Criminal Mischief in the Fourth Degree (Penal Law [PL] §§ 145.00[1], [3]), and one count of Theft of Services (PL § 165.15[2]).

Defendant was arraigned before the Honorable Jay L. Weiner, on June 21, 2025. The case was adjourned to Part C for supporting deposition on August 13, 2025. Defendant was represented by Mr. Eric Williams of the Legal Aid Society (LAS).

On August 13, 2025, Ms. Dionysia Quizon of LAS appeared in court for defendant, informing the parties that she was taking the case over from Mr. Williams. The People were not ready for trial but filed and served a supporting deposition. The court deemed the criminal court complaint an information and the case was adjourned to October 6, 2025, for trial and for the People to file a Certificate of Compliance (COC) and Statement of Readiness (SOR).

On August 14, 2025, the prosecutor shared initial discovery via eDiscovery, a platform accessible to all LAS attorneys, to the attention of Mr. Williams.

On August 25, 2025, Ms. Quizon filed a Notice of Appearance off-calendar with the court via the Electronic Document Delivery System (EDDS).

On September 5, 2025, the People filed a COC and SOR off-calendar with the court and defense counsel, Mr. Williams, after obtaining and disclosing discovery with Mr. Williams. The assigned prosecutor had obtained discovery by reaching out to coordinate with the many different departments and liaisons within the New York County District Attorney's Office established to streamline communication and effectuate obtaining discovery from law enforcement agencies, such as a Body Worn Camera (BWC) Unit, a Law Enforcement Disclosure (LED) Unit, and a Litigation Support Unit (LSU). From agencies, the People obtained and disclosed approximately one-hundred (100) files with defense counsel. These disclosures consisted of New York City Police Department (NYPD) paperwork, DA paperwork, photographs, prisoner movement slip, prisoner holding pen roster, BWC videos, 911 calls, radio runs, civilian witness contact information, law enforcement witness information including NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) paperwork and Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) paperwork, miscellaneous items, and more.

At the October 6, 2025 calendar call, Ms. Quizon appeared for defendant. The People maintained their readiness for trial, informing the court and counsel that a COC/SOR had been filed and served as of September 5, 2025. Ms. Quizon inquired as to the method of service and the People forwarded the emails originally sent to Mr. Williams, containing the People's COC/SOR. The People also shared discovery via the eDiscovery platform to Ms. Quizon's attention. Ms. Quizon then asked for the instant motion schedule, which this Court granted.

Now, in papers dated October 27, 2025, defendant, through counsel, moves this Court for an Order deeming the People's COC/SOR invalid and illusory, on the ground that he has been denied a speedy trial. Specifically, defendant contends that because People's SOR had been served on Mr. Williams, rather than Ms. Quizon, that the September 5, 2025 SOR was ineffective to stop the speedy trial clock. Defendant argues that, consequently, the People are attributable with more than the 90 chargeable days allowable to them, and that the case must be dismissed pursuant to speedy trial. Defendant also contends that the People's COC was invalid as the People failed to supply witness information and trial designation.

Defendant also moves this Court, in an omnibus motion, to suppress evidence, for a voluntariness hearing, for preclusion, for a Sandoval hearing, for bifurcation, for further motions, and for any other relief the Court deem just and proper.

The People oppose in papers dated November 12, 2025. The People argue that the September 5, 2025 service of the COC/SOR was effective and valid as it was served on the same agency, LAS. The People further contend that defendant's motion as to the validity of the COC should be denied as waived for failing to conform to procedural requirements, but the COC was nevertheless valid, filed in good faith after exercising due diligence. The People additionally oppose defendant's omnibus motion.

After a thorough review of the parties' moving papers, along with the annexed exhibits therein, the court file, and the court minutes, the Court's Opinion is as follows:

Defendant moves this Court to dismiss this action on the basis that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial, claiming that the People have exceeded their statutory speedy trial allowances under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 30.30. He argues that the People are attributable with well over their 90 day limit, with 107 chargeable days, because the People's [*2]September 5, 2025 COC/SOR was served upon the wrong attorney. Defendant argues that the People's service error was unreasonable and ineffective as current counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and made court appearances putting the People on notice of the representation before the People attempted to serve their COC/SOR. Defendant argues that he therefore did not promptly receive notice of the People's SOR on September 5, 2025, and that the People's SOR was accordingly not in effect until actually received by current counsel on October 6, 2025, 31 days later. Defendant relies on People v Telemaque, 43 Misc 3d 138(A) (App Term, 2d Dept 2014) (statement of readiness served on original counsel ineffective to toll speedy trial period where People present in court when private counsel announced that he had been retained and filed a notice of appearance) and People v Calvin Y., 86 Misc 3d 1270(A) (Crim Ct NY Co 2025) (Coleman, J) (statement of readiness filed on attorney who appeared on actual counsel's behalf when actual counsel filed notice of appearance and made appearances not reasonable and 13 day delay not prompt notification) to support his arguments.

The People oppose, contending that they have not exceeded their statutory allowances and are within their 90-day window, with only 76 chargeable days. The People argue that the September 5, 2025 COC/SOR was validly served on defense counsel because Mr. Williams and Ms. Quizon are both assigned to the same institutional agency, LAS. Thus, the only issue the Court must decide, here, is the validity of service.

To prevail on a motion to dismiss under CPL §30.30 (1)(a), a defendant must present sworn allegations of fact establishing an unexcused delay that exceeds the statutory limit. People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41 (2016); People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215-216 (1992); People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 (1986); People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351, 357 (1980). At a minimum, the defendant must claim that the People failed to announce their readiness for trial within the statutorily prescribed period to meet their initial burden. People v Beasley, 16 NY3d 289, 292 (2011); People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41 41 (2016); People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71 (1995). Once the defendant has asserted that more than the statutorily prescribed time period has elapsed since the commencement of a criminal action without a valid declaration of readiness from the People, the People bear the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay. People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 (1980).

Pursuant to CPL §30.30(1)(b), the People must be ready for trial within "ninety days of the commencement of the criminal action" where a defendant is charged with "a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months " See CPL §30.30(1)(b). Here, the criminal action commenced, on a misdemeanor with a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months, on June 21, 2025, where the accusatory instrument was filed and defendant arraigned the same day, so speedy trial began to run the same day with an allowable ninety-days.

At all times until the People announce that they are ready for trial, the People are chargeable with the time that elapses unless they can show that the specific delay is not chargeable to them pursuant to an exception enumerated in the statute. CPL §§ 30.30(1), (4); People v Torres, 205 AD3d 524, 525-26 (1st Dept 2022). Moreover, under the newly enacted discovery laws defined in CPL Article 245, the People's valid compliance with their discovery obligations is now a prerequisite to asserting trial readiness. See CPL §§ 245.50(3); 30.30(5). Once the People have met this statutory predicate by filing a proper COC, an accompanying statement of readiness is "presumed truthful and accurate and that a defendant who challenges such a statement must demonstrate that it is illusory" People v Brown, 28 NY3d 392 (2016). [*3]Thus, "[i]n the absence of proof that [a] readiness statement did not accurately reflect the People's position ..., the People [have] discharged their duty under CPL 30.30" People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795 (1998).

A valid statement of readiness requires "either a statement of readiness by the prosecutor in open court, transcribed by a stenographer, or recorded by the clerk or a written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk, to be placed in the original record." People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 (1985). When the People file an off-calendar statement of readiness, they must also promptly notify the defense (Kendzia, 64 NY2d at 337; People v Anderson, 252 AD2d 399, 400 [1st Dept 1998]). While what constitutes prompt notification may vary (e.g., People v Collins, 186 Misc 2d 818, 821 [Crim Ct, Richmond County 2000] [five day delay not prompt]; People v. Bloodworth, 173 AD3d 1838, 1840 [4th Dep't 2019] [17 days not prompt]), if the People do not promptly notify the defense, the statement of readiness is not effective until the defense receives actual notice of their statement. People v Bonilla, 94 AD3d 633, 634 [2d Dept 2012]).

But service of a statement of readiness incorrectly served to the wrong attorney or address will not always implicate the prompt/actual notification rule. In such an instance, the statement of readiness is still effective despite incorrect service on a defense attorney if the People' actions were made in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances. See People v McClure, 80 Misc 3d 238, 241 (Crim Ct Bronx Co 2023) (citing Kendzia, supra) ("[i]t is the filing of the statement, not service, that is critical, and all that is required is 'prompt' notice to defense counsel"). For instance, in People v Telemaque, 43 Misc 3d 138(A) (App Term, 2d Dept 2014), the case defendant relies upon, the prosecution's statement of readiness was ineffective because it was unreasonable for the People to have served their statement of readiness on defendant's former counsel, a LAS attorney, when private counsel filed a notice of appearance and made court appearances. Whereas, in cases such as People v Vaughn, 36 AD3d 434 (1st Dept 2007) and People v Nina, 291 AD2d 294 (1st Dept 2002), it was reasonable for the People to have mailed their statements of readiness to defense counsel's former address. Similarly, a statement of readiness sent to the wrong attorney of the same institution is both reasonable and effective, if made in good faith. People v Osorio, 39 AD3d 400 (1st Dept 2007) (statement of readiness effective when sent to LAS attorney who formerly represented defendant when current attorney was also of LAS). Indeed, "institutional defenders are responsible for routing documents that the prosecution serves on their office to the individual defense attorneys they assign on a case". People v Aucanzhala, 2024 NY Slip Op 51737(U) (Crim Ct, Queens Co 2024). So too, here, it is legally irrelevant that the People served their COC/SOR on former counsel when both former and current counsel work for the same institutional defender, LAS, and there is no contention that the People's actions were made in bad faith. Therefore, the People's SOR was validly served on counsel and effective to toll the speedy trial period.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth, the People are chargeable with 76 days, well within their statutory window. Defendant's motion is denied as meritless.

Defendant moves this Court to invalidate the People's COC on the basis that he was not provided discovery because the People served discovery on defendant's former counsel from the same organization. Defendant also contends that while the People supplied him with witness contact information, that counsel was never given access to the program, WitCom, that would [*4]allow for communication. Defendant further takes issue with the witness and trial designation list that the People provided. The People oppose, arguing that defendant's motion should be denied as it fails to conform with the procedural requirements noted in CPL 245.50(4). The People additionally request clarification as to the substantive nature of defendant's claims, noting that defendant never informed them of any WitCom issue but are trying it again nevertheless, and that they are unsure as to what defendant specifically takes issue with regarding their witness list. The People argue that, in any event, their COC was valid, filed in good faith after exercising due diligence, and defendant's motion should be denied.

As recently amended, effective August 7, 2025, Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) article 245 requires the People to disclose to a defendant "material and information in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or under the prosecution's direction and control," and provides a non-exhaustive list of materials subject to "automatic" disclosure. CPL § 245.20(1). Under CPL § 245.20(2), the People are required to "make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of material or information discoverable under [CPL § 245.20(1)] and to cause such material or information to be made available for discovery where it exists but is not within the prosecutor's possession, custody or control." The People are not required, however, "to obtain material or information if it may be obtained with the use of a subpoena duces tecum where the defense is able to obtain the same material with the use of a subpoena duces tecum." CPL § 245.20(2).

The People must also certify their discovery compliance in writing by filing a COC. Importantly, the People may file their COC even if they have not yet disclosed all automatically discoverable items provided that they have "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the discovery required by [CPL § 245.20(1)]." CPL§ 245.50(1). The COC must "state that, after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery, the prosecution has disclosed and made available all known material and information it has obtained subject to discovery." CPL § 245.50(1). The COC must also identify "the items provided" and "the items that the prosecution is required to disclose and of which the prosecution is aware but has been unable to obtain despite the exercise of due diligence as evaluated under this section." CPL § 245.50(1). If the People provide additional discovery in connection with their ongoing obligations outlined in CPL § 245.60, they must file "a supplemental certificate" that "identif[ies] the additional material and information provided." CPL §245.50(1). A SCOC will not impact the validity of the original COC if filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence or when the additional discovery did not exist when the initial COC was filed. CPL §245.50(1-a).

Once the People file a COC, a defendant must notify the People of any potential deficiencies in the COC by making "good faith efforts to confer with the [prosecution] regarding the specific and particularized matters" regarding the allegedly missing discovery. Then, if "no accommodation can be reached," the defense may file a motion to invalidate the People's COC provided that: (1) they do so within thirty-five days of the service of the People's COC; and (2) they file an accompanying affirmation of conferral stating that the defense "conferred in good faith or timely made good faith efforts to confer with the [prosecution] regarding the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for such challenge, that efforts to obtain the missing discovery from the [prosecution] or otherwise resolve the issues raised were unsuccessful, and that no accommodation could be reached." CPL § 245.50(4)(b)-(c). Significantly, the statute [*5]further specifies that "the court may grant a remedy or sanction for a discovery violation as provided in [CPL § 245.80]." CPL § 245.50(1). Any such remedy or sanction must be "appropriate and proportionate to the prejudice suffered by the party entitled to disclosure." CPL §245.80(1).

To determine the validity of the People's COC, a reviewing court must assess the People's due diligence. As the Court of Appeals held in People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023), due diligence is a "flexible standard that requires the People to make reasonable efforts to comply with statutory directives." Bay, 41 NY3d at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Reasonableness, then, is the touchstone—a concept confirmed by the statutory directive to make 'reasonable inquiries.'" Id. at 211-12. Moreover, the Court recognized that, "[a]lthough the relevant factors for assessing due diligence may vary from case to case, courts should generally consider, among other things:" (1) "the efforts made by the prosecution and the prosecutor's office to comply with the statutory requirements;" (2) "the volume of discovery provided and outstanding;" (3) "the complexity of the case;" (4) "how obvious any missing material would likely have been to a prosecutor exercising due diligence;" (5) "the explanation for any discovery lapse;" and (6) "the People's response when apprised of any missing discovery." Id. at 212. These six factors are now part of the statutory due-diligence analysis under CPL § 245.50(5)(a). This section also requires courts to consider whether: (1) "the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied;" (2) "the omission was corrected;" (3) "the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention;" and (4) "whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial." CPL § 245.50(5)(a). A reviewing court must "look at the totality of the party's efforts to comply with the provisions of [article 245], rather than assess the party's efforts item by item." CPL § 245.50(5). The statute further directs that "[t]he court's determination shall be based on consideration of all factors listed in [CPL § 245.50(5)(a)] and no one factor shall be determinative." CPL § 245.50(5)(b).

Indeed, the Bay decision made clear that, in assessing the validity of a COC, the reviewing court should engage in a "holistic assessment of the People's efforts to comply with the automatic discovery provisions, rather than a strict item-by-item test that would require [a court] to conclude that a COC is improper if the People miss even one item of discovery." People v Cooperman, 225 AD3d 1216, 1220 (4th Dept 2024); see also People v Williams, 224 AD3d 998, 1006-07 (3d Dept 2024) (People's COC was valid even though three discoverable items had not been disclosed where People provided "extensive" discovery before filing COC, identified missing items when they filed the COC, and acknowledged their duty to provide missing items upon receipt). Notably, "[a]rticle 245 is not intended for use as a 'sword,' whereby [ADAs] are expected to run themselves ragged in at times futile or near-futile attempts to procure material in which defense counsel has no substantive interest beyond exhausting the People's statutory speedy trial time or hoping that the People, in frustration, opt to abandon the prosecution." People v Barrios, 82 Misc 3d 606, 613 (Crim Ct Bronx Co 2024); see also People v Thompson, 79 Misc 3d 1220(A), *2 (Crim Ct Kings Co 2023) (article 245 "does not require the impossible; it does not demand that every scrap of discoverable information be turned over before the People may file a [COC]") (internal quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, certain delays or discovery issues should not invalidate a COC that was made in good faith, after the exercise of due diligence and efforts made by the prosecution to [*6]comply with statutory obligations. Bay at 210-213. If the delay is a result of oversights in the production of material, delayed discovery of the existence of certain items, a good faith position that the material in question was not discoverable, or voluminous files, the Bay decision clearly posits that a court should apply a "holistic assessment" of the efforts made by the People to comply with their discovery obligations when evaluating the validity of a COC. Id. Moreover, several courts have found that certain delays or discovery issues should not invalidate a COC that was made in good faith, after the exercise of due diligence, and where, for example, the delay was a result of oversights in the production of material, delayed discovery of the existence of certain items, voluminous discovery, non-existent items, or material unrelated to the case. People v Cano, 71 Misc 3d 728 (Sup Ct, Queens County 2020); People v Lustig, 68 Misc 3d 234 (Sup Ct, Queens County 2020) (Zayas, J)(court found the People's certificate of compliance to be valid, since it was clearly filed in good faith under CPL § 245.50(1) and, therefore, no adverse consequence to the prosecution should result from the fact that the certificate was filed prior to the disclosure of the database search results).

As an initial matter, here, this Court declines to entertain defendant's claims finding that they were validly waived. As noted above, under the recent amendments, a defendant must notify the People of any potential deficiencies in the COC, and is required to confer in good faith regarding the "specific and particularized matters forming the basis" of their COC challenge. CPL § 245.50(4)(c). Only then, if "no accommodation can be reached," may the defense file a motion to invalidate the People's COC. CPL§ 245.50(5). The People assert, and this Court accepts, that defense counsel did not reach out to the People to address any qualms as to WitCom or any other witness list issues. This Court further accepts the People's assertion that they have since attempted to rectify the issue by re-adding the witness to the application. This Court further finds, as the People point out, that defendant does not raise a specific factual issue with respect to the witness list and designations. Accordingly, because defendant failed to provide the People with "the specific and particularized" basis of his COC challenge, and therefore, failed to properly and meaningful confer with the People to try to resolve all issues before resorting to motion practice, defendant has waived the right to challenge the People's COC.

In any event, defendant's motion is without merit. Defendant's claim asserting that he was not supplied with discovery on the basis that former counsel was served is denied for the reasons discussed above. Additionally, a thorough "holistic assessment" of the moving papers, court file, and COC demonstrates that the People obtained and disclosed approximately one hundred (100) files with defense counsel. These disclosures consisted of New York City Police Department (NYPD) paperwork, DA paperwork, photographs, prisoner movement slip, prisoner holding pen roster, BWC videos, 911 calls, radio runs, civilian witness contact information, law enforcement witness information including NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) paperwork and Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) paperwork, miscellaneous items, and more, demonstrating good faith and due diligence. In addition, the New York County District Attorney's Office has made considerable and laudable efforts to facilitate discovery compliance, such as a creating BWC, LED, and LSU units and assigning paralegals and support staff to obtain discovery. And contrary to defendant's contention, "[t]he creation of these additional units and allocation of resources to generally address their discovery obligations under CPL Article 245 support a finding of due diligence on the part of the [New York] County District Attorney's Office in fulfillment of their discovery obligation in this case." People v Antunez, 86 Misc 3d 1265(A), *5 [*7](Sup Ct Queens Co 2025) (Yavinsky, J). Taken together, this all demonstrates that the People's initial COC, made in good faith and after exercising due diligence, was valid and defendant is not prejudiced in any way. Accordingly, defendant's motion is denied.

Defendant's motion for the suppression of physical evidence as the fruit of an illegal arrest made without probable cause, or for a Dunaway/Mapp hearing alternatively, is denied.

A combined Dunaway/Mapp hearing tests an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to determine whether physical evidence recovered from defendant, such as a weapon or contraband, should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. A motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful arrest, or for a Dunaway hearing alternatively, must be made in accordance with CPL § 710.60. Pursuant to CPL § 710.60, a defendant must state the legal ground for the motion and must also make sworn allegations of fact supporting the motion. See People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 (1993); People v Smythe, 210 AD2d 887 (1997). A motion to suppress evidence as the product of an illegal arrest can be denied without a hearing when the motion lacks factual allegations to support the conclusion that defendant was unlawfully seized. See People v Brunson, 226 AD2d 1093 (4d Dept 1996); People v Purcelle, 282 AD2d 824 (3d Dept 2001). Conclusory allegations of an unlawful seizure can also result in summary denial of a suppression motion. See People v Toxey, 220 AD2d 204 (1st Dept 1995); People v Lofton, 129 AD2d 970 (4d Dept 1987).

In assessing the sufficiency of the defendant's factual allegations, and whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing, the Court of Appeals in People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 (1993) provided the following guidance: "[T]he sufficiency of defendant's factual allegations should be evaluated by (1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) defendant's access to information." It must also be borne in mind that "[h]earings are not automatic or generally available for the asking by boilerplate allegations." Id. at 422; see also People v Long, 36 AD3d 132, 133 (2006), aff'd. 8 NY3d 1014 (2007).

Here, defendant's moving papers fail to allege a factual basis for relief. Specifically, defendant fails to identify any physical evidence recovered from him that would be the subject of suppression or a Mapp hearing, and the People note that they do not intend to offer at trial any physical evidence seized from defendant (People's Response). Defendant's papers also fail to allege how and when defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated and how and when he was illegally seized. Importantly, defendant does not factually dispute the allegations contained in the complaint or any additional papers. Defendant likewise does not dispute that officers responded to the scene following a 911 call or that defendant made admissions to the police. Thus, defendant does not contest any of the facts giving rise to probable cause for defendant's arrest. Accordingly, defendant's motion does not amount to sworn allegations of fact sufficient to support any ground for suppression, nor does it create any factual issue warranting a hearing. See People v Burton, 6 NY3d 584, 587 (2006); People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 422 (1993).

Moreover, defendant was not arrested pursuant to any police-citizen encounter in the Fourth Amendment context. Instead, defendant was arrested following the complainant calling 911 and reporting the incident. The information previously supplied to police officers regarding the complainant, an identified citizen, is presumed reliable. People v Boykin, 187 AD2d 661 (2d Dept 1992). See People v Burch, 59 AD3d 266 (1st Dept 2009) (summary denial appropriate where defendant failed to raise legal basis for suppression and defendant fully aware that arrest [*8]based on citizen victim complaint). For all of these reasons, defendant's motion is denied.

Defendant's motion seeking suppression of statements as the product of an unlawful arrest and seizure, or a Dunaway/Huntley hearing in the alternative, is denied. A combined Dunaway/Huntley hearing tests an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to determine whether a post-arrest statement from defendant should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. As noted above, a motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful seizure, or for a Dunaway hearing alternatively, must be made in accordance with CPL § 710.60. The motion must state the legal ground for the motion and must also make sworn allegations of fact supporting the motion, which he has failed to do here, as noted supra. See People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 (1993); People v Smythe, 210 AD2d 887 (1997). Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above, defendant's motion for suppression, or for a combined Dunaway/Huntley hearing is denied.

Defendant's motion seeking suppression, or a Huntley hearing in the alternative, to test the voluntariness of defendant's statement is granted to the extent that a Huntley hearing is ordered based upon the allegations contained in counsel's affirmation, entitling him to such relief. CPL §710.60 (3); CPL §60.45). Defendant is not required to set forth specific factual allegations of involuntariness in order to obtain a Huntley hearing. Accordingly, a Huntley hearing is ordered as to the voluntariness of defendant's statements.

Defendant motion for suppression, or Dunaway/Wade hearings in the alternative, of any noticed identification procedure that the People intend to introduce at trial on the ground that it was the tainted fruit of an unlawful arrest and on the ground that the procedures were unduly suggestive is denied. Again, defendant's papers fail to factually demonstrate how and when defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated and how and when he was illegally seized. Defendant has failed to dispute the allegations in the complaint and in additional papers. Furthermore, defendant does not dispute that the police responded to the complainant's 911 call, defendant's admissions to police when they arrived, and also do not dispute that the complainant restaurant owner pointed out defendant in non-police arranged identification procedure when the police responded.

Furthermore, the People assert that there were no police arranged identification procedures utilized in this case as the complainant called the police and identified defendant when they arrived contemporaneously to the incident without police involvement. Defendant is not entitled to suppression or a hearing as the identification was not police arranged. People v Marte, 52 AD3d 737 (2d Dept 2008) (in order to suppress a pre-trial ID on the ground that it was suggestive, defendant must show there was some police involvement in the procedure); People v Coker, 121 AD3d 1305 (3d Dept 2014), lv denied, 26 NY3d 927 (2015) (notice not required and preclusion denied when witness pointed out defendant absent police involvement when officers arrived). See also People v Quinney, 305 AD2d 1044 (4th Dept 2003); People v Rumph, 248 AD2d 142 (1st Dept 1998) (hearing denied where the witness called the police and pointed defendant out to them when they arrived); People v Gillman, 219 AD2d 505 (1st Dept 1995) (hearing denied where the complainant was already in pursuit of defendant when police arrived and witness identified defendant a short distance away). The mere fact that the People did serve Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) §710.30 notice on defendant in an abundance of caution does not transform it into an identification procedure. People v Allen, 162 AD2d 538 (2nd Dept 1990); [*9]People v Twitty, 223 AD2d 744 (2nd Dept 1996). Accordingly, defendant's motion for suppression of identification evidence is summarily denied. Defendant's additional contentions in this branch are also denied.

The branch of defendant's motion for a pre-trial "voluntariness" hearing regarding unnoticed statements sought to be used solely on cross-examination of the defendant pursuant to CPL §60.45; CPL §710.20(3); and CPL §710.40(3), is denied, as premature, with leave to renew if it is determined that such statements exist. The determination as to whether a statement was properly noticed is left to the sound discretion of the hearing or trial judge.

The branch of defendant's motion for a pre-trial "voluntariness" hearing regarding statements made by the defendant to civilian(s) is denied. The defendant has not asserted that the defendant made any voluntary or involuntarily statements pursuant to CPL §60.45. Accordingly, the defendant's request for a voluntariness hearing is denied.

The branch of defendant's motion to preclude the offering of any unnoticed statement evidence or unnoticed identification evidence pursuant to CPL §710.30, is denied as premature as the People have not sought to offer any such evidence.

Defendant seeks the preclusion of using defendant's prior bad acts and/or prior convictions at trial pursuant to People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901), People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981), and People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974) on the People's direct case or upon cross-examination.

Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible where it is offered solely to raise an inference that a defendant has a criminal propensity. People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901); People v Wright, 288 AD2d 409 (2d Dept 2001). Such evidence may be admitted, however, if it helps to establish a defendant's motive, intent, identity, knowledge, common scheme or plan, lack of mistake or accident, to complete the narrative of the crime, or provide the jury with background information. See People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901); People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981); People v Lewis, 69 NY2d 321 (1987); People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 (1979); People v. Davis, 169 AD2d 774 (2d Dept 1991). In order to use this evidence, the People are required to notify the court and defendant, prior to jury selection, of their intent to introduce the evidence as part of the case-in-chief and identify the basis upon which they consider it admissible. People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981). Once a showing is made that the evidence is relevant, a trial court may admit the evidence as long as its probative value outweighs its potential prejudice. People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55 (1988); People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241-42 (1987). The permissible scope of such evidence rests largely, if not completely, with the trial court. See People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55 (1988). Accordingly, defendant's motion as to prior bad act evidence is deferred to the trial court.

Should he testify, defendant, like any other witness, places his credibility in issue. Although a witness may not be questioned about an arrest per se, it is a provident exercise of the Court's discretion to permit cross-examination concerning any immoral, vicious, dishonest and or criminal act, even if defendant was not formally charged with it. People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 373 (1974); People v Rockwell, 18 AD3d 969 (3d Dept 2005); People v Di Bella, 277 AD2d 699 (3d Dept 2000); People v Connolly, 259 AD2d 1039 (4d Dept 1999); People v Maiolo, 122 [*10]AD2d 586 (4d Dept 1986); Prince, Richardson on Evidence, 11th Ed., 6-406. A witness may also be impeached by instances of conduct demonstrating a "willingness ... to place his self-interest ahead of principle or the interests of society." People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 461—462 (1994).

The People's disclosure obligation is governed by People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974), which directs the People to notify the defendant, prior to the commencement of jury selection, of the acts which they will seek to use for impeachment purposes. However, it is defendant who must demonstrate that the prejudicial effect of such evidence so far outweighs its probative worth that it must be excluded, as it is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion. See People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 378 (1974). The permissible scope of such impeachment evidence rests largely, if not completely, with the trial court. People v Gray, 84 NY2d 709, 712 (1995); People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 459 (1994). Accordingly, defendant's motion as to prior convictions is therefore deferred to the trial court. People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974).

Defendant's motion seeking a bifurcation of hearings and trial so as to allow him the opportunity to adequately request and review hearing minutes is deferred to the trial court.

Defendant's application for an extension of time to file additional motion is denied subject to rights under CPL § 255.20(3) to move for further leave upon good cause shown.

Defendant's remaining requests are denied as duplicative, premature, moot, unsupported by the record, or without merit.

The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order of the Court.