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For February 14, 2025 through February 20, 2025, the following preliminary
appeal statements were filed:
MATTER OF CLAIM OF CARMODY (228 AD3d 1203):
APL-2025-00009
3rd Dept. App. Div. order of 6/27/24; affirmance; leave to appeal granted by the Court of
Appeals, 1/9/25; Rule 500.11 review pending; Unemployment Insurance--Benefits--
Whether the tribunals below erred in finding that appellant was required to be
totally unemployed in order to be eligible for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance
under the CARES Act; whether the tribunals below erred in holding that a "willful
misrepresentation" penalty could be assessed based on statements which were
unintentional and/or the product of confusion; App. Div. affirmed decision of the
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed February 8, 2023, which ruled, among
other things, that claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits
because he was not totally employed.
ESCOBAR v SEGUNDA IGLESIA (232 AD3d 719):
APL-2025-00040
2nd Dept. App. Div. order of 11/13/24; affirmance; sua sponte examination of whether
the order appealed from finally determines the action and whether a substantial
constitutional question is directly involved in the Appellate Division order;
Constitutional Law--First Amendment Rights--Whether court had subject matter
jurisdiction over sex abuse victim's action against religious organizations; Supreme
Court, Westchester County, in an action, among other things, for personal injuries, denied
those branches of certain defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to
dismiss the causes of action alleging negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision insofar as asserted against them.
GURBANOVA v CITY OF ITHACA (— AD3d —, 2025 NY
Slip Op 00252):
APL-2025-00038
3rd Dept. App. Div. order of 1/16/25; affirmance; Municipal Corporations--Whether
the City's prior written notice statute applied to bar plaintiff's recovery when
plaintiff's injuries were caused by a falling parking bollard; whether plaintiff's
expert witness affirmation failed to raise a triable issue of fact; whether the burden
was properly shifted to plaintiff on whether the bollard was properly installed;
whether plaintiff was required to show that the dangerous condition of the bollard
was "immediately apparent" when it was installed; Supreme Court, Tompkins County,
among other things, granted a motion by defendants City of Ithaca and Ithaca Youth
Bureau for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them; App. Div., with
two Justices dissenting, affirmed.
MATTER OF JENSEN (233 AD3d 1211):
APL-2025-00022
3rd Dept. App. Div. order of 12/12/24; affirmance; Rule 500.11 review pending;
Unemployment Insurance--Whether substantial evidence supports the UIAB's
determination that claimant received a reasonable assurance of reemployment; App.
Div., with two Justices dissenting, affirmed a decision of the Unemployment Insurance
Appeal Board, filed June 2, 2022, which, upon reopening and reconsideration, ruled that
claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits.
PEOPLE ex. rel LOUIS M. v POPIEL (— AD3d —, 2025 NY
Slip Op 00070):
APL-2025-00043
1st Dept. App. Div. order of 1/7/25; affirmance; sua sponte examination of whether a
substantial constitutional question is directly involved in the Appellate Division order;
Habeas Corpus--When remedy available--whether habeas properly denied where
petitioner challenged only conditions of confinement and did not seek immediate
release; Supreme Court, Bronx County, denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
and dismissed the proceeding; App. Div. affirmed.
PEOPLE v MOORE (JAQUAN) (229 AD3d 1193):
APL-2025-00032
4th Dept. App. Div. order of 7/26/24; reversal; leave to appeal granted by Wilson, Ch. J.,
1/29/25; Appeal--Court of Appeals--Whether CPL 450.90(1) permits a defendant to
appeal to the Court of Appeals from an Appellate Division order reversing the
judgment of conviction and remitting for a new trial; whether an order denying
suppression should be considered "an order appealed from" under CPL 450.90(1);
whether a warrantless arrest is unreasonable when one law enforcement agency
misleads another into believing that there is an arrest warrant when requesting that
the other agency conduct an arrest on its behalf; County Court, Monroe County,
convicted defendant upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree and criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts); App. Div. reversed and
granted a new trial on counts 1, 2, and 3 of the indictment.
PEOPLE v WOODS (TRAVIS) (226 AD3d 597):
APL-2025-00033
1st Dept. App. Div. order of 4/25/24; affirmance; leave to appeal granted by Wilson, Ch.
J., 1/29/25; Crimes--Right to Speedy Trial--Whether the State violated the speedy-
trial right (US Const amend. 6; NY Const art I � 6) by delaying--after three trials
resulting in deadlocked juries�the fourth trial by more than three years; Crimes--
Right to Counsel--Effective Representation--Whether fourth-trial counsel was
ineffective under the state and federal constitutions in, among other things, failing to
object to identification and prior-bad-act evidence; whether CPL 310.30, which
requires notice of a deliberating jury's request for "the content or substance of any
trial evidence" or "any other matter pertinent to the jury's consideration of the
case," requires notice of a jury's request for a prosecution trial exhibit, whether
prejudice is presumed under Molina-Martinez v United States, 578 US 189 (2016);
whether the Appellate Division erred in holding that the first trial court's failure to
provide notice of substantive jury notes was harmless; Supreme Court, New York
County, convicted defendant, after the first of two separate jury trials, of conspiracy in the
fourth degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds, and
criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, and sentenced him, as a
second felony offender, to an aggregate term of 9 years and also convicted him, after the
second trial, of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the
second and third degrees, and sentenced him, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate
term of 25 years to life.