




credibility. The victim's testimony was extensively corroborated by recorded messages.

M-3225 - *People v Samuel Santana*

Motion seeking leave to file supplemental brief denied.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JULY 6, 2010

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CLERK



prosecution and defense witnesses.

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER  
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JULY 6, 2010



Handwritten signature of David Apolony in cursive script, written over a horizontal line.

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Gonzalez, P.J., Saxe, McGuire, Acosta, Abdus-Salaam, JJ.

2280 &

M-1561

Jose Luis Toledo, as Administrator  
of the Estate of Joaquin Martinez,  
etc.,

Index 25092/03

Plaintiff-Respondent,

-against-

Iglesia Ni Cristo,  
Defendant-Appellant.

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Mauro Goldberg & Lilling, LLP, Great Neck (Barbara D. Goldberg of  
counsel) for appellant.

Edelman & Edelman, P.C., New York (David M. Schuller of counsel)  
for respondent.

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Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Norma Ruiz, J.),  
entered November 6, 2008, in an action for wrongful death,  
insofar as appealed from as limited by stipulation, awarding  
interest on future damages, calculated on the value of those  
damages discounted to the date of death and going forward from  
that date to the date of judgment, unanimously affirmed, without  
costs.

EPTL 5-4.3 provides that "[i]nterest upon the principal sum  
recovered by the plaintiff from the date of the decedent's death  
shall be added to . . . the total sum awarded." The statutory  
term "principal sum" is "simply the discounted sum *without any  
included interest* - i.e., discounted to the date of death"  
(*Milbrandt v Green Refractories Co.*, 79 NY2d 26, 36 [1992]).

Where as here, the award of future damages was discounted by the

court to the date of liability, which is the date of death, the award of interest from that date to the date of judgment was proper (see generally *Rohring v City of Niagara Falls* (84 NY2d 60 [1994]; *Milbrandt v Green Refractories Co.*, 79 NY2d 26, [1992], *supra*).

The Decision and Order of this Court entered herein on March 2, 2010 (71 AD3d 404 [2010]) is hereby recalled and vacated (see M-1561 decided simultaneously herewith).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER  
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JULY 6, 2010

  
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defendant was convicted, and we have considered and rejected defendant's arguments to the contrary.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER  
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JULY 6, 2010

  
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evaluation of alleged motives to falsify and inconsistencies in testimony, and its rejection of defendant's alibi defense.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER  
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JULY 6, 2010

  
CLERK



nonjurisdictional and is waived by a guilty plea (see *People v Casey*, 95 NY2d 354, 362-364 [2000]), a "failure to comply with the 'prima facie case' requirement for facial sufficiency in CPL 100.40(1)(c) and 100.15(3) is a jurisdictional defect . . . ." (*People v Alejandro*, 79 NY2d 133, 139 [1987]), which cannot be waived by a guilty plea. Here, the supporting deposition stated only that an officer observed defendant remove from his waistband a condom containing eight glassines of beige powdery substance, which the officer concluded to be heroin, based on his training and experience, "includ[ing] training in the recognition of controlled substance, and its packaging." No laboratory report was attached, and there was no field test. Such an allegation is facially insufficient to satisfy the prima facie case requirement (see *Matter of Jahron S.*, 79 NY2d 632 [1992]; *People v Kalin*, 17 Misc 3d 131[A] [App Term 2d Dept 2007], lv granted 10 NY3d 865 [2008]). Although in *Jahron S.*, the Court of Appeals declined to establish a per se rule requiring a laboratory report, an officer's conclusory statement that based on his training and experience a substance was an unlawful drug is insufficient to satisfy the prima facie case requirement (see *People v Sweeper*, 15 Misc 3d 138[A] [App Term 2d Dept 2007]).

Since defendant pleaded guilty to menacing under another

accusatory instrument on the promise of concurrent sentences, we vacate that plea and remand for further proceedings (see *People v Fuggazzatto*, 62 NY2d 862 [1984]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER  
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JULY 6, 2010

  
CLERK

Mazzarelli, J.P., Acosta, Renwick, Freedman, JJ.

2146

Diane Babich, et al.,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Index 115521/06

-against-

R.G.T. Restaurant Corp.,  
doing business as Punch, et al.,  
Defendants-Respondents.

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S. John Bate, P.C., Staten Island (S. John Bate of counsel), for appellants.

Mintzer Sarowitz Zeris Ledva & Meyers LLP, New York (Erika L. Omundson of counsel), for R.G.T. Restaurant Corp., respondent.

Thomas D. Hughes, New York (Richard Rubinstein of counsel), for Harold Scher, respondent.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward H. Lehner, J.), entered March 2, 2009, which granted defendant R.G.T.'s motion and defendant Scher's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, modified, on the law, the motion by R.G.T. denied, and the complaint reinstated against that defendant, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

This personal injury action stems from the injured plaintiff's fall down an interior staircase leading to a cellar where the restrooms were located in a building owned by Scher and operated as a restaurant by R.G.T. Following discovery, the restaurant moved for summary dismissal of the claims asserted against it, on the grounds, inter alia, that plaintiffs were unable to identify the cause of the fall and could not show a

defect in the staircase. The owner cross-moved for summary dismissal on these same grounds, as well as the ground that it owed no duty to plaintiff to keep the premises safe as an out-of-possession landlord. Supreme Court granted the motion and cross motion, and dismissed the action on the ground of lack of evidence of a defective condition.

We agree with Supreme Court that the action against the owner should be dismissed, albeit on grounds different from those stated. A landlord is not generally liable for negligence with respect to the condition of property after its transfer of possession and control to a tenant unless the landlord is either contractually obligated to make repairs or maintain the premises, or has a contractual right to reenter, inspect and make needed repairs at the tenant's expense, and liability is based on a significant structural or design defect that is contrary to a specific statutory safety provision (*Johnson v Urena Serv. Ctr.*, 227 AD2d 325, 326 [1996], *lv denied* 88 NY2d 814 [1996]; *see McDonald v Riverbay Corp.*, 308 AD2d 345 [2003]; *Quinones v 27 Third City King Rest.*, 198 AD2d 23 [1993]). Here, the lease between the owner and the restaurant imposes no obligation on the former to make repairs or maintain the demised premises. While the owner retained the right to reenter, inspect and make repairs, there is no triable issue of fact as to whether the allegedly defective condition involved a significant structural

or design defect contrary to a specific statutory safety provision. Accordingly, the out-of-possession landlord is entitled to summary judgment (*Torres v West St. Realty Co.*, 21 AD3d 718, 721 [2005], *lv denied* 7 NY3d 703 [2006]).

We reach a different result with regard to the restaurant, which established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by submitting evidence that the staircase was in compliance with the applicable Building Code provisions (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 27-375[h]). In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from an expert architect who stated that he visited the building in question and observed that the existing stair was "steel with a matte black non-slip finish that is applied to it as required by New York City Building Code," but the "non-slip finish on the nosing of each tread and top platform is severely worn off," thereby "creating an extremely slippery condition at the edge nosing at the top platform and at each stair tread." This expert evidence submitted by plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the tread of the stairs complied with the pertinent regulations of the Building Code. Moreover, the injured plaintiff's testimony that she slipped on the top step of the subject stairway, coupled with her expert's testimony of the slippery condition of such steps due to worn-off treads, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence to raise an issue of fact as

to whether her fall was caused by the allegedly defective condition (see *Garcia v New York City Tr. Auth.*, 269 AD2d 142 [2000]; *Gramm v State of New York*, 28 AD2d 787 [1986], *affd* 21 NY2d 1025 [1968]).

All concur except Freedman, J. who dissents in a memorandum as follows:

FREEDMAN, J. (dissenting)

I concur with the majority that the owner is entitled to summary judgment as an out-of-possession landlord. But in my view, summary judgment is also warranted for defendants because plaintiffs fail to make a prima facie showing that the condition of the stairs caused Diane Babich to fall on them. Accordingly, I would affirm the motion court's order dismissing the complaint.

In support of their motions for summary judgment, defendants submitted affidavits from two professional licensed engineers who had inspected the stairway and had measured both the steps' coefficient of friction (their slipperiness) and the illumination in the stairway (expressed in foot-candles). The engineers found that the stairway's construction and maintenance fully complied with the New York City Building Construction Code, including its requirements about step geometry, handrails, surfacing with non-slip materials, and lighting.

Defendants also submitted Babich's deposition testimony, in which she stated that the accident occurred when she fell from the landing at the top of the stairs. When asked what caused her fall, she stated, "My foot slipped, that's all I can tell you." She indicated that she lost consciousness and did not remember anything further until she later awoke in the hospital. She also stated that she did not know which foot had slipped.

In opposition to defendants' motions, plaintiffs submitted

the expert affidavit of an architect who had visually inspected the staircase after the accident but had not performed any tests on it.<sup>1</sup>

Plaintiffs also submitted an affidavit from Babich, prepared in response to the summary judgment motions, stating that her testimony was "consistent" with the architect's theory as to what caused her fall.

While plaintiffs have raised an issue about the worn finish on the nosing of the landing, Babich's testimony fails to show that the worn finish caused her fall. Causation is critical to establishing a prima facie case (*Telfeyan v City of New York*, 40 AD3d 372 [2007] [a negligence claim must be established by the injured plaintiff's testimony about what caused the accident]; see also *Wilson v New York City Tr. Auth.*, 66 AD3d 602 [2009]). Babich has no idea what made her slip on the landing, and no evidence connects Babich's fall with the alleged worn condition (see *Batista v New York City Tr. Auth.*, 66 AD3d 433 [2009]; *Daniarov v New York City Tr. Auth.*, 62 AD3d 480 [2009]; *McNally v Sabban*, 32 AD3d 340 [2006]).

I disagree with the majority's finding that plaintiffs' expert's affidavit, coupled with Babich's testimony that she "slipped," constituted sufficient circumstantial evidence to

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<sup>1</sup>All three experts examined the staircase in June 2007, some 17 months after the accident.

raise the issue of whether the alleged defect caused the accident. Under the circumstances here, it is equally if not more likely that Babich fell for completely unrelated reasons.

To find for plaintiffs, a factfinder would have to speculate about what caused Babich to slip on the stairs. Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted to defendants.

The Decision and Order of this Court entered herein on March 11, 2010 (71 AD3d 479), is hereby recalled and vacated (see M-1672 and M-2262 decided simultaneously herewith). Cross motion for the imposition of sanctions is denied (see M-2348 also decided simultaneously herewith).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER  
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JULY 6, 2010

  
CLERK

Friedman, J.P., Nardelli, Moskowitz, Freedman, Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.

2958            Encore College Bookstores, Inc.,            Index 101012/08  
M-1677            Petitioner-Respondent-Appellant,

-against-

City University of New York, et al.,  
Respondents-Appellants-Respondents,

Kingsborough Community College Auxiliary  
Enterprises Corporation,  
Respondent.

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Frederick P. Schaffer, New York, for City University of New York,  
appellant-respondent.

Callan, Koster, Bradey & Brennan, LLP, New York (Louis Valvo of  
counsel), for BMCC Auxiliary Enterprise Corporation, appellant-  
respondent.

Dornbush Schaeffer Strongin & Venaglia, LLP, New York (William F.  
Costigan of counsel), for respondent-appellant.

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Appeals from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lewis  
Bart Stone, J.), entered December 10, 2008, which, in an article  
78 proceeding challenging respondents' Pell Grant Purchase  
Advance Program (the Program) at Borough of Manhattan Community  
College (BMCC) and Kingsborough Community College (Kingsborough),  
denied respondents' cross motions to dismiss the petition,  
directed respondents to terminate the Program, and dismissed  
petitioner's Donnelly Act claim, unanimously dismissed, without  
costs, as academic.

Under the challenged Program, Pell Grant funds are  
automatically debited from students' accounts with BMCC and

Kingsborough when they purchase textbooks at the bookstores operated by nonparty Barnes & Noble College Bookstores on the BMCC and Kingsborough campuses. Petitioner, which operates bookstores adjacent to the BMCC and Kingsborough campuses, claims that the Program violates federal regulations promulgated under the Higher Education Act of 1965 pursuant to which the Pell Grant program was established (20 USC § 1070 *et seq.*), causes respondents to violate their fiduciary duties as institutions disbursing federal HEA funds, and constitutes an illegal contract or agreement for monopoly or in restraint of trade in violation of the Donnelly Act, and sought an injunction requiring respondents to terminate the Program at BMCC and Kingsborough.

Respondents voluntarily discontinued the Program at Kingsborough before Supreme Court's decision, which dismissed the petition as against the Kingsborough respondent based on a stipulation of discontinuance, and at BMCC during the pendency of the appeals. Presently, Pell Grant advances are disbursed to students by check or direct deposit, with the result that the funds can be used to purchase textbooks from any vendor, not just the Barnes & Noble campus store.

The appeals are moot and must be dismissed. That respondent CUNY still operates the Program at other campuses, albeit in a modified form requiring prior written authorization from the students or their parents, and the possibility that CUNY and

respondent BMCC Auxiliary Enterprises Corp. may seek to reinstate the program at BMCC in its original or modified form under certain circumstances, the likelihood of which are not clear, are not sufficient reasons to consider the merits of an appeal that no longer involves an actual controversy between the parties in this particular case, and where the issues raised are not such as to typically evade review and are not substantial (see *Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne*, 50 NY2d 707, 713-714, 714-715 [1980]; *Matter of Citineighbors Coalition of Historic Carnegie Hill v New York City Landmarks Preserv. Commn.*, 2 NY2d 727, 729 [2004]).

We have considered the parties' other contentions and find them unavailing.

We have considered the parties' other contentions and find them unavailing.

M-1677 - *Encore College Bookstores, Inc. v City University of New York, et al.*

Motion to supplement the record denied.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER  
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JULY 6, 2010

  
CLERK

JUL 6 2010

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT,

Luis A. Gonzalez, P.J.  
Richard T. Andrias  
David B. Saxe  
Dianne T. Renwick  
Sallie Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.

1432-  
1433  
Index 602081/07

x

Avi Oster, et al.,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

-against-

H. Stephen Kirschner, et al.,  
Defendants,

Philip L. Chapman, etc., et al.,  
Defendants-Respondents.

x

Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court,  
New York County (Charles E. Ramos, J.),  
entered April 23, 2008, which, to the extent  
appealed from as limited by the briefs,  
granted the motion of defendants Philip L.  
Chapman and Lum, Danzis, Drasco & Positan,  
LLC, to dismiss the 7th through 11th causes  
of action as against them; and an order, same  
court and Justice, entered January 23, 2009,  
which granted the aforementioned defendants'  
motion to dismiss the 2nd, 4th and 5th causes  
of action as against them.

Morrison Cohen LLP, New York (Donald H. Chase of counsel), for appellants.

McManus, Collura & Richter, P.C., New York (Scott C. Tuttle, Jillian M. Amagsila and Anne P. Richter of counsel), for Philip L. Chapman, respondent.

Wolff & Samson PC, New York (Russel D. Francisco and William E. Goydan of counsel), for Lum, Danzis, Drasco & Positan, LLC, respondent.

MANZANET-DANIELS, J.

In this case we are presented with the question of whether plaintiffs have adequately alleged claims of aiding and abetting fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion against a law firm that drafted the private placement memoranda (PPMs) soliciting investment in the Cobalt Multifamily entities, an admitted Ponzi scheme, whereby the main defendants, convicted criminals - one of whom was banned from the securities industry by the SEC - were able to perpetrate a fraud resulting in over \$22 million in losses to investors. We hold that at this pre-discovery phase plaintiffs have alleged their fraud-based claims with the particularity required by CPLR 3016(b).

Cobalt raised capital for its operations through the sale of securities to members of the public, including plaintiffs, who claim that as a result of defendants' fraud they lost virtually their entire investment. The scheme collapsed after the prime movers were indicted in March 2006. The complaint named as defendants the various attorneys and law firms who provided legal services to Cobalt, including the Lum firm and one of its partners, defendant Chapman. Specifically, these Lum defendants are accused of playing a key role in perpetrating the fraud by preparing private placement memoranda, as well as furnishing other legal services such as serving as escrow agent for the

transactions. The complaint asserts claims against the professional defendants for conspiracy and aiding and abetting common law fraud (2nd cause of action), conspiracy and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty (4th cause of action), conversion and conspiracy and aiding and abetting conversion (5th cause of action), and violations of New Jersey Statutes Annotated § 49:3-71(a) (7th through 11th causes of action).

Plaintiffs herein allege that they invested \$1.9 million in Cobalt upon reliance on various misrepresentations and material omissions contained in the PPMs. The affirmative misrepresentations include statements in the PPMs that only subscribers who qualified as "accredited investors" within the meaning of Regulation D would be permitted to invest in Cobalt. Individuals who qualify as "accredited investors" under Regulation D include any natural person who individually or together with his or her spouse has a net worth in excess of \$1 million or who individually has an annual income in excess of \$200,000, or jointly with a spouse has an annual income in excess of \$300,000 in each of the last two years and reasonably expects an income (or joint income) in the current year of at least that same amount. Contrary to the representation that the investment was only being offered to "accredited investors" as defined, units in Cobalt were in fact sold to investors who did not meet

the relevant criteria. The PPMs also misrepresented the composition of the management team of Cobalt, asserting that William B. Foster ran the day-to-day operations and (in the December 2004 PPM) that defendant Mark Shapiro was merely a "consultant," when in fact Cobalt was alleged to have been run by Shapiro, a convicted felon, with the assistance of defendant Irving J. Stitsky, an admitted criminal with numerous convictions for securities violations who was banned from the securities industry.

The PPMs failed to disclose Shapiro and Stitsky's respective criminal histories. In December 1998, Shapiro pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit tax fraud, and was sentenced to 30 months. His conditions of parole, upon release on September 24, 2003, included a prohibition against associating with any person convicted of a felony. In August 1998, based upon his involvement in the Stratton Oakmont "boiler room" operation, Stitsky consented to an SEC order finding that he had violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. This order barred him from association with any broker, dealer, investment company, investment advisor or municipal securities dealer and directed that he cease and desist from any future securities law violation. In an NASD regulatory proceeding arising out of Stitsky's misconduct at

Stratton Oakmont, Stitsky consented to be censured and publicly barred from the securities industry. In June 2000, Stitsky was indicted for his role in yet another securities manipulation scheme. In August 2001, Stitsky pleaded guilty to criminal charges including conspiracy to commit securities fraud and was sentenced in connection therewith to 21 months imprisonment and a 3-year period of supervised release. In the SEC administrative proceeding against him in that matter, Stitsky was again found to have violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, ordered to cease and desist from any future securities law violation, and barred from participating in a penny stock offering and associating with a broker or dealer. In August 1999, Stitsky was indicted for conspiracy to commit tax fraud, money laundering and tax fraud. In August 2001, Stitsky pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit tax fraud. That same month, a criminal information was filed against Stitsky for making false statements, to which he pleaded guilty. In February 2002, Stitsky was sentenced to 33 months in prison and a 3-year period of probation for both matters. In November 2003, Stitsky was indicted yet again for securities fraud, money laundering and conspiracy to commit securities fraud, mail fraud and wire fraud. Stitsky was released from prison in the fall of 2004.

Defendant Lum, Danzis is a New Jersey firm which was engaged

by Cobalt to prepare the public placement memoranda used by Stitsky, Shapiro and the other defendants to solicit funds in furtherance of the Ponzi scheme. Defendant Philip Chapman is a partner in Lum, Danzis. The complaint alleges that Lum prepared three versions of the PPM: the first dated December 29, 2003, the second dated July 2004, and the third dated December 15, 2004. The complaint also alleges that following an FBI raid on Cobalt offices in December 2005, an amendment was drafted to the December 2004 PPM and backdated to November 30, 2005 purporting to reveal Shapiro and Stitsky's criminal past. Plaintiffs allege that they received the second and third PPMs and invested in Cobalt based thereon. In addition to drafting the PPMs, the Lum firm served as escrow agent for the subscription documents. Subscribers, pursuant to the terms of the PPM, were required to forward to defendant Philip Chapman, at the Lum firm, certain "investor documents" identified in the PPM. Significantly, these documents contained certain representations concerning the subscriber's suitability for investing in Cobalt.

Plaintiffs allege that the Lum defendants had actual knowledge of the fraud perpetrated by Cobalt and that they substantially assisted in the perpetration of the fraud. The Lum defendants assert that they did nothing more than draft PPMs for a client, and that any misrepresentations contained therein are

irrelevant to the question of whether they had actual knowledge that Cobalt was being operated as a Ponzi scheme. The Lum defendants do not seriously dispute that they had knowledge of Stitsky and Shapiro's criminal backgrounds. Indeed, discovery in the SEC proceeding, to which plaintiffs herein did not have access at the time they drafted the complaint, reveals that it was Shapiro who hired Chapman and the Lum firm and that Chapman was well aware of Shapiro and Stitsky's extensive criminal backgrounds, including the fact that Stitsky was banned from the securities industry. Yet, the Lum defendants claim that knowledge of Shapiro and Stitsky's criminal backgrounds, and knowledge of misrepresentations in the various PPMs - the admitted vehicle by which investment in the Ponzi scheme was carried out - does not sufficiently allege actual knowledge, at this pre-discovery stage, that the Cobalt defendants were engaged in a Ponzi scheme.

We reject any such narrow formulation of the pleading requirements for fraud. A plaintiff alleging an aiding-and-abetting fraud claim must allege the existence of the underlying fraud, actual knowledge, and substantial assistance. This Court has stated that actual knowledge need only be pleaded generally, cognizant, particularly at the pre-discovery stage, that a plaintiff lacks access to the very discovery materials which

would illuminate a defendant's state of mind. Participants in a fraud do not affirmatively declare to the world that they are engaged in the perpetration of a fraud. The Court of Appeals has stated that an intent to commit fraud is to be divined from surrounding circumstances (see *Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP*, 12 NY3d 553 [2009]). This is not, as defendant argues, constructive knowledge, but actual knowledge of the fraud as discerned from the surrounding circumstances. Plaintiffs, at this stage, have more than adequately satisfied the pleading requirements for actual knowledge.

Plaintiffs have also adequately alleged the element of substantial assistance. It is undisputed that plaintiffs drafted three versions of the private placement memoranda, including, significantly, the amendment to the PPM revealing Shapiro's and Stitsky's criminal past that was backdated to November 30, 2005, prior to the December 2005 FBI raid on Cobalt's offices. Preparation of PPMs constitutes "substantial assistance" (see *Nathel v Siegal*, 592 F Supp 2d 452, 470 [SD NY 2008] [applying New York law regarding substantial assistance]).

The case of *National Westminster Bank USA v Weksel* (124 AD2d 144 [1987], *lv denied* 70 NY2d 604 [1987]), relied on by defendants, is distinguishable. In *Weksel*, this Court determined that a plaintiff had not adequately alleged an aiding-and-

abetting fraud claim against a law firm where, inter alia, "the transactions which plaintiff in hindsight describes as 'sham' were, so far as can be gathered from the complaint, completely unobjectionable at the time they were agreed to" (*Weksel*, at 147). The recent case of *Art Capital Group LLC v Neuhaus* (70 AD3d 605 [2010]), may also be differentiated. *Art Capital Group* involved allegations that an attorney had helped facilitate a "conspiracy" to defraud and unfairly compete with the plaintiffs by negotiating loan transactions, offering legal advice and counsel, and performing other acts within the scope of their duties as attorneys. The claims of fraud and aiding and abetting fraud were also deficient for the additional and independent reason that the plaintiffs had failed to allege that any misrepresentations had been made to them. *Weksel* and *Art Capital Group* involved attorneys who had represented parties in transactions later found to be objectionable. Here, on the other hand, investments in Cobalt were from their inception objectionable because Cobalt was offered to investors who did not meet Regulation D criteria, was sold by persons not qualified to do so, and because the company was being run by convicted felons, one of whom was banned from the securities industry.

The PPMs authored by defendant attorneys were the means by which the Cobalt Family entities were able to solicit funds for

what is, by everyone's admission, a Ponzi scheme. The PPM is the very mechanism by which investments such as Cobalt are placed in the marketplace, and the admitted "but for" cause of plaintiff's investment losses. Yet, defendants assert that "loss causation" is lacking because it has not been adequately pleaded that defendant attorneys had actual knowledge that their clients - whom they admittedly knew to be criminals, banned from the securities industry for engaging in fraudulent investment schemes - would operate the Cobalt Multifamily entities as a Ponzi scheme. If the facts and circumstances herein do not support an inference of actual knowledge, then it is doubtful that any action for aiding-and-abetting fraud could be sustained against an attorney, who, like defendant attorneys, consciously chose to look the other way when their clients asked them to prepare the PPM for their next "investment" vehicle. To say that defendant attorneys merely furnished legal services to help solicit investments in the Cobalt Multifamily entities, and did not have knowledge of the fraud they helped perpetrate, is drawing distinctions based on gradations of knowledge that are simply not tenable. This Court cannot and will not endorse what is essentially a "see no evil, hear no evil" approach.

There is no principled distinction between this case and those involving auditors alleged to have falsely represented the

financial health of companies and otherwise to be derelict in their duties as auditors. As this Court reasoned in *Houbigant, Inc. v Deloitte & Touche* (303 AD2d 92, 97-99 [2003]), a case alleging, inter alia, fraud against a company's auditors:

The language of CPLR 3016(b) merely requires that a claim of fraud be pleaded in sufficient detail to give adequate notice . . . Keeping in mind the difficulty of establishing in a pleading exactly what the accounting firm knew when certifying its client's financial statements, it should be sufficient that the complaint contains some rational basis for inferring that the alleged misrepresentation was knowingly made. Indeed to require anything beyond that would be particularly undesirable at this time, when it has been widely acknowledged that our society is experiencing a proliferation of frauds perpetrated by officers of large corporations, for their own personal gain, unchecked by the 'impartial' auditors they hired . . . Accordingly, plaintiffs here need not, at this time, establish the truth of their allegations that Deloitte was aware of severe irregularities in [the company's] financial statements resulting in misstatement of the corporation's net worth. They need only allege specific facts from which it is possible to infer defendant's knowledge of the falsity of its statements. This they have done.

Discovery subsequently obtained from the criminal action brought by the government against the Cobalt defendants buttresses plaintiffs' allegations of aiding and abetting a fraud. As just one example, Kevin S. Tierney, a mortgage banker and workout specialist who had been hired by Mark Shapiro to

conduct due diligence on properties Cobalt was potentially interested in acquiring or investing in, testified to having certain conversations with defendant Chapman in which it is clear that Chapman was aware of Shapiro's and Stitsky's criminal backgrounds, yet chose to look the other way. Tierney apparently testified that he found it "unbelievable" that Shapiro "could be involved with this active role without being disclosed in that document with all of his history . . . Mr. Stitsky in my view was radioactive. . . . I said to this attorney [Chapman], 'I don't know what role he [Stitsky] is involved in but I sure hope to God that you know what his role is and that you know what you are doing.'" During the same conversation, Chapman allegedly "suggested he was going to revise the memorandum because monies were being raised in escrow before the documents were out." Chapman also allegedly admitted to Tierney in this telephone conversation that he was aware of Shapiro's criminal history.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>We recognize that a federal court in the Eastern District of New York has dismissed aiding and abetting claims against the lawyer defendants in a putative class action brought by investors in the Cobalt Multifamily entities (see *Rose Hightower et al. v Robert F. Cohen et al.*, CV 08-3229 (RJD) (ED NY Sept. 30, 2009)). Since the court found that the operative fraud causing the plaintiffs' harm was the Ponzi scheme, it felt constrained to dismiss the aiding and abetting claims against the law firm defendants because plaintiffs had not alleged that the defendants had actual knowledge of the underlying fraud which caused harm to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs herein sufficiently allege actual knowledge of the underlying fraud, i.e., the Ponzi scheme, and

We also reverse the second order appealed from, and reinstate plaintiffs' claims under the New Jersey Statutes Annotated, § 49:3-71(a). At this pleading stage plaintiff has adequately alleged that the Lum firm and Chapman were liable as "agents[] who materially aid[ed] in the sale or conduct" constituting the violation within the meaning of the New Jersey statute (see *Braunstein v Benjamin Berman, Inc.*, 1990 WL 192547 [D NJ 1990] [attorney within the ambit of *Pinter v Dahl* (486 US 622 [1988]) where he was instrumental in negotiating deal and drafted purchase agreement; fact that he did not receive remuneration in excess of legal fees not determinative since "a party may be liable for the fraudulent sale of securities where the party aims to better the financial condition of another"]; see also *Abrahamsen v Laurel Gardens L.P.*, 276 NJ Super 199, 647 A2d 869 [Law Div. 1993] [plaintiffs adequately set forth claim upon which relief might be granted for control liability under parallel provisions in Planned Real Estate Development Full Disclosure Act]).

Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Charles E. Ramos, J.), entered April 23, 2008, which, to the

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substantial assistance. To the extent the federal court took a narrow view of the "actual knowledge" requirement under New York law, we respectfully disagree with the decision.

extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted the motion of defendants Chapman and the Lum firm to dismiss the 7th through 11th causes of action as against them, should be reversed, on the law, with costs, and those causes of action reinstated. The order of the same court and Justice, entered January 23, 2009, which granted the aforementioned defendants' motion to dismiss the 2nd, 4th and 5th causes of action as against them, should be reversed, on the law, with costs, and those causes of action reinstated.

All concur.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER  
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JULY 6, 2010

  
CLERK