1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	MATTER OF APPELLATE ADVOCATES,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- NO. 91
7	NYSDOCCS,
	Respondent.
9	92 Franklin Stree Buffalo, New Yor November 15, 202
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
15	Appearances:
16	
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25	Official Court Transcribe



THE BAILIFF: All please rise. Judges are in the 1 2 court. 3 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Good afternoon. The next 4 matter on the calendar is the Matter of Appellate Advocates 5 v. DOCCS. 6 Counsel? 7 MR. LAZEBNIK: Good afternoon. May it please the 8 I'm Ron Lazebnik on behalf of Appellate Advocates. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Sorry, could you speak into that 10 mic? Certainly. Sorry, Your Honor. 11 MR. LAZEBNIK: 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you. 13 MR. LAZEBNIK: Ron Lazebnik on behalf of 14 Appellate Advocates. I'd like to reserve three minutes of 15 rebuttal time. 16 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I'm sorry, how many minutes? 17 MR. LAZEBNIK: Three minutes. 18 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes. 19 Thank you. The issue before the MR. LAZEBNIK: 20 court are an agency's broad use of the attorney-client 21 privilege and FOIL interagency exemption to withhold 22 disclosure of certain training materials, such as a 23 collection of favorable cases to the agency, which 24 according to Judge Lynch at the Appellate Division, are 25 devoted solely to informing the Board of Parole of its duly



codified statutory and regulatory duties and with other fact-specific discussion.

The supreme court's and Appellate Division's extension of this court's precedents, starting with Priest

v. Hennessy and Spectrum, create an incentive for

government attorneys to insert themselves into - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: And so when you're talking about Spectrum, are you asking us to apply a different attorney-client privilege standard in this context than we would in any other?

MR. LAZEBNIK: No, Your Honor. I'm asking for you to clarify one of the bounds of it. What this court has said in Hennessy and in Spectrum - - - repeated in Spectrum - - - is that, at all times, the application of the attorney-client immunity should always be consistent with its purpose.

JUDGE GARCIA: So the rule we promulgate here would apply to an attorney-client dispute involving discovery in any context?

MR. LAZEBNIK: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE GARCIA: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So if a client asks counsel, could you send me a set of favorable cases instead of unfavorable cases for the - - - the bear on either conduct I've taken or I'm about to take, why wouldn't that be

protected?

MR. LAZEBNIK: So that - - - that could be protected, Your Honor. But that's different than what occurred in this case. Because in the first instance, the hypothetical you've just posed is client-initiated request.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay. So let's take it the other way. Suppose that you are in-house counsel, and you provide your employer, and you're in the legal department, with a set of unfavorable cases that relate to a course of conduct the employer is thinking about taking.

MR. LAZEBNIK: So again, it's slightly different than the issue in this case, and could potentially be the - - the question there in the context of whether the attorney-client privilege should apply is what is that course of conduct, in the sense of, is it a course of conduct that everybody knows this - - - in your - - - in your hypothetical corporation would be taking or is this something that is currently being considered by - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Let's suppose - - - let's suppose it's a course of conduct that the business has already taken. They have decided to deploy a fleet of self-driving cars, and they've deployed them. And there are some unfavorable cases out there, and counsel says, I want to send you some unfavorable cases having to do with your liability for the self-driving cars.



MR. LAZEBNIK: So I would say, at that moment, that's when the question arises as to what does the privilege - - - what does the privilege serve when it's asserted. Because I think it is important to recognize that there are two moments in time.

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There's the moment in time when the communication occurs, and that's always covered by the confidentiality that a lawyer would adhere to. And then there's the moment in time when somebody is requesting the documents, and the lawyer or the client bring forth the privilege. And that's the moment that the court is supposed to look at whether the person asserting the privilege has met the burden to say this is something that needs to be protected.

And in doing so, we ask this court to remind the court below is that the purpose has to serve the under - - - the - - - the immunity there has to serve the underlying purpose of the privilege. And the purpose of the privilege, as stated in Hennessey and reiterated in - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Is the government entitled to less protections of a privilege? The ability to consult freely with their counsel than others?

MR. LAZEBNIK: I don't believe so, Your Honor.

But there is a little bit of a hitch there. And it's brought out by the amici, the Coalition for Open Government.



And the - - - the hitch is that, when this court discussed how the role of an attorney who's in house is a little bit different than an outside attorney, because often the - - - the attorney works on both business matters and legal matters, some of the things the attorneys will say are not covered and some of the things the attorney will say will be covered.

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But when we're talking about a government agency, as the amici points out, the business of the agency is the law that it's supposed to enforce and - - - and practice, and so - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And comply - - - and they consult their counsel to make sure they're in compliance with the law. Isn't that what is fostered by an attorney-client privilege? The ability to freely communicate with your attorney?

MR. LAZEBNIK: That is part of the purpose of the privilege. But the question is: is the agency asking counsel for advice regarding, in the case of the Board of Parole, a particular hearing or appeal, or is it asking for advice on how it's supposed to act at all times?

JUDGE HALLIGAN: It's your view that - - - that the privilege only extends to the first category, in other words, that - - - that it has to be with respect to some specific interaction. And - - - and if so, where, in the



case law, do you see that constraint?

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MR. LAZEBNIK: So I think that's a little narrow than I need - - need to say.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Please tell me what to mean. I didn't mean to put words in your mouth.

MR. LAZEBNIK: So in the first instance, the attorney - - - this court has indicated, right, that the attorney-client privilege is covering statements made by the client seeking legal advice. And then a natural extension of that - - - that that is discussed in - - - in Priest, Hennessey - - - Priest, Spectrum, and Rossi is that some communications from counsel to the client also need to be protected to shield those confidences.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Including, I think, Spectrum says where the communication is intended to guide the client's course of conduct. And so what I'm grappling with here is, it seems to me, if you agree, as I think you said you do, that we would judge this under the same standard that we would judge invocation of the privilege in another circumstance.

But there are a lot of attorney-client relationships where the attorney is well aware of the ongoing business of the client and - - - and the choices that they have to make every day, and may provide guidance, not always at the explicit request, but under the

understanding that that is their role. So what do we do with that?

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MR. LAZEBNIK: So in those instances, this is where the - - - the federal courts commentaries are helpful. But also, there was at least one lower court here in New York that - - - that kind of touched on this. When the attorney is merely reciting the legal standard, right? That - - and reciting it does not reveal any of the client's confidences beyond what is already known by the public, and this is especially true in the case of an agency, there is no function served by shielding that communication because you are not revealing the client's confidences when you're talking about the fact that the Board of Parole has to adhere to the laws passed by the legislature. That's too broad of a category. What - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: You think that it has to reveal the client's confidences as opposed to telling the client, given that the law is X, in other words, here's a decision, you should consider whether and how to conform your specific conduct accordingly?

MR. LAZEBNIK: I think the - - - I'm trying to parse the hypothetical you just posed, Your Honor, to make sure I understand it correctly. And what - - - what I'm saying is that when it's at a level where the lawyer doesn't have to recite any special - - - any legal position

other than to say, for instance, you are a pharmaceutical company, the FDA has passed a new law that you have to adhere to, that is a very high level. And in fact, most of the time, firms - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, is some judgment there about whether the client does have to adhere to that new law?

MR. LAZEBNIK: There - - - there might be some judgment, but that go - - - but that is why we're not pushing for this redefinition of what is the professional skills or legal advice. It's whether or not the legal advice or professional skill rises to the - - - to the level that it needs to be protected to shield the client's previous communications. Because at the core, this immunity is about making sure that the client feels comfortable coming to an attorney with both good and bad facts, not just when something has occurred, but in planning.

JUDGE CANNATARO: So Counsel, going back to this idea of list, if - - - if - - - if you were to list a series of adverse decisions, and as the attorney reviewing those decisions, highlight the conduct that the court found objectionable, you know, to - - - to make it an adverse decision, that, to me, seems to have a sort of cautionary tone to it, which is, these are the things that you should

not do in the conduct that - - - that is part of your business. What is the problem with that under your role or is there no problem?

MR. LAZEBNIK: So - - - so I'm not sure that there is a problem. But I would point out that I don't know exactly what the - - - the packet of cases looks like in this case. Judge Lynch's description of them was that

the only legal advice associated with it was that it was
essentially packeted as unfavorable cases in one hand and

10 | favorable cases in the other.

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hypothetical because I don't want to - - - I don't want to violate any confidentiality or anything like that. But if you were to - - - if the attorney were to do some interpretive gloss on the - - - on the precedent, the case and say, you know, these are the things that the court didn't like, without - - without saying, do it, don't do it, avoid it or anything like that, would you agree that there's sort of a - - -

MR. LAZEBNIK: Yeah.

JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - cautionary aspect to that?

MR. LAZEBNIK: There - - - there is. And I think the tests we're asking for still allows for protection in that instance versus how Judge Lynch described the



documents here. The - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: What is fostered by it being required that they give you their legal research?

MR. LAZEBNIK: You mean, why does the court advocates want that?

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Let's just say that you've informed your client, this - - - this is a case law; you review it. Why - - - what public policy is encouraged by that?

MR. LAZEBNIK: So the - - - in the first instance, I would point out that these documents are issued because the agency itself identified them as training materials for the board.

And what the petitioner in the case requested was, what are the documents that you use to help train the board? Now, the - - - technically, FOIL does not require a petitioner to actually say why they want the documents.

FOIL just provides a mechanism for the petitioner to request them.

But here, on the public policy side, as - - - as we discussed and as the amici parole prep indicate further, the parole system is one that has a lot of discretion in the board's decisions and not a lot of review. And that's because, for a person to appeal a parole decision, they have to first appeal within the agency and then file an

Article 78 petition.

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And what often happens is, by the time the

Article 78 petition is heard and considered, a new parole
hearing is scheduled because there's a twenty-four-month
period. And so the person has to decide - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: The point is?

MR. LAZEBNIK: The person has to decide whether or not they're going to continue the appeal or - - - or sit for a new hearing because sitting for a new hearing often moves out the petition. And the reason - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And how is that impacted by what is disclosed or not disclosed?

MR. LAZEBNIK: So the - - - the parole - - - the individuals who are seeking parole don't have the right of counsel in that moment. They - - - the only thing they can do is prepare in advance for the hearing. And the way that they can prepare is to understand better how the Parole Board is going to consider them. That is, what conduct can they begin to consider or to bring up, that they have done, during a hearing for parole that - - - that might persuade the board that they can - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but that just means that a person who doesn't have counsel is in a difficult position of having to, in this - - - in this example, persuade a group of people based on the law that that group

of people has to abide by.

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So I'm not really sure how having the in-house counsel, as you've referred to the lawyer - - lawyers' training material matters because it's - - or - - or helps or pushes this public policy that, I think, you're trying to refer to when it's - - it's the status of the law. You make your argument, if - - again, if you think that the parole violation or the - - excuse me, the denial of parole violates the law, then you have the legal arguments.

MR. LAZEBNIK: Well, it would - - - what it would help, though, is both in the moment of preparation, but also in - - - to the extent that they are denied parole.

It puts them in a better position to consider whether there is a claim that the parole board acted against the - - - the guidance.

That even though they were on notice that they were supposed to follow certain factors or not - - - not consider certain factors, something in either their decision on parole or decision on appeal does not conform with that. And it creates more room for people, both who are incarcerated and seeking parole, those who want to be watchdogs of whether the Board of Parole is too lenient, and those who want to make sure that the - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: You see. That's why I'm having



difficulty with this argument. All that means is that a lawyer has advised the board members - - - the commissioners - - - as to the state of the law based on the lawyer's opinion, what's the state of the law, and the persons denied parole wants to argue that they're not in compliance with the law. That's your argument. They're not in compliance with the law.

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MR. LAZEBNIK: Well, that's the argument with regard to the particular document. Such an analysis would have to occur for each of the documents. And there are additional policy considerations that might be considered or - - or weighed differently, but yes. So this court can find that public policy does not require.

But separate from public policy, there is the question of, is the immunity actually served by shielding these documents in the first place? That is, does - - - is the Board of Parole harmed by having the fact that their attorney let them know that this case exists, in some way, affects their confidence in being able to come up to their attorney and ask a question.

JUDGE RIVERA: But is that the question of whether the free flow between the attorney and the client is going to be chilled by the fact that something like these materials have been made available - - -

MR. LAZEBNIK: You're - - -



JUDGE RIVERA: - - - pursuant to this FOIL request?

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MR. LAZEBNIK: The more recent cases refer to it as a free flow conversation. The original purpose laid out in Hennessy is more about - - is more client focused and about thinking about whether the client would be chilled in seeking it. Which makes sense, because at the end of the day, the purpose of the privilege is to incentivize the client to speak to the attorney. The coverage of what the attorney says to the client is ancillary to that goal.

argument scares me as somebody who was responsible for the production and receipt of hundreds of millions of pages of documents and determinations, probably, of millions of documents over thirty years in private practice. The thought that I would have to have people examine the public policy implication, which turns on the substance of what's in those documents, rather than simply, was it a communication made by an attorney for the purpose of conveying legal advice is really frightening.

MR. LAZEBNIK: But Your Honor, it doesn't actually - - - what we're pushing for is, one, not to change what's already made clear by your precedent, because in most instances, most of the documents that Your Honor probably reviewed were communications where the client



asked the question and the lawyer answered that question. 1 2 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: No. 3 MR. LAZEBNIK: The lawyer knowing something - - -4 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: No. At least a large number 5 or maybe more were where the lawyer initiated, you know, 6 said I'm advising you about something. 7 MR. LAZEBNIK: So - - - so if the lawyer - - -8 the precedent, both in federal court and I think by this 9 court, is if the lawyer is acting on facts that they know 10 that are specific to this client and letting them know the -- a legal position, that's all the privilege log has to 11 12 say is: providing legal advice regarding x based on 13 previous communications, right? The question that is posed 14 15 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I mean, I, myself, have sent 16 memoranda to - - - legal memoranda to a former client or 17 clients saying there's a new statute or a new regulation 18 and it may affect what you do the following way, and you should be careful with the following things. 19 20 MR. LAZEBNIK: So - - - so what's interesting 21 about that hypothetical is something very similar occurs 22 very frequently by firms here in New York all the time. 23 They send circulars to their client - - -24 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: There's a difference. Those 25 are public and then there's no confidentiality.



MR. LAZEBNIK: Well, if you think about it, though, right? If this was truly legal advice that was important to their client, the duty of confidentiality would say, no, don't make that public. You have to - - - you have to send each one of them that - - - in - - - in secret to let them know. But the very fact that we say, oh, this is public, this is - - - it's - - - it's for this very reason, Your Honor. It's at a level of generality that we're not concerned about when the lawyers say, oh, here's a new obligation by the SEC.

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: Aren't you creating a potential where the client wouldn't want this information because you're going to use it against them as opposed to, prospectively, again, being in compliance with the law.

You are making everything they do subject to disclosure and discovery by people outside of that attorney-client relationship. Why should they bother to take those proactive measures?

MR. LAZEBNIK: So I'm not sure that laying out instances where an attorney knows that - - - and again,

I'll use the pharmaceutical industry example, right? That the attorney knows a client in the pharmaceutical industry and, you know, a drug manufacturer.

The attorney becomes aware FDA publishes a new - - - a new - - - a law, right? I - - - I don't know that



the client wouldn't want the attorney to send them, oh, by
the way, here's an update, regardless of whether or not
that - - - that communication is a privilege.

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Well, the follow up, though, the - - - the question that the client then asks the attorney, so what does that mean to me, right? And - - and asks, so what does this mean about this new product we were thinking about? That, we agree, is a privileged conversation at that point. The question - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So again then, you get a heads up on what they've conveyed - - - the attorney has conveyed to his client. Here's information. I've collected these cases. And you're saying that you're entitled to all of that.

MR. LAZEBNIK: In - - - in certain instances, yes. If all the attorney did is say, oh, here's a new case that relates to you, I don't think that this court's guidance on when the immunity should apply rises to that level. That is - - - that is too high of a level of generality.

JUDGE GARCIA: Let's say it's an accounting fraud case from the SEC with a specific problem in it with a internal employee doing something. And you say, here, you know, this case may apply to you. You get that?

MR. LAZEBNIK: I'm sorry, did - - -



JUDGE GARCIA: So you send the case over, and like the Chief Judge, I've had these types of client relationships where you send advisory materials out and new decisions. But let's say you send one of those out, it's an SEC decision or whatever, enforcement decision, and it says specific facts on an internal control failed. There was a particular individual with a title that committed some type of conduct that the SEC found it had a problem with. And I send that to my client, and I say, you really want to look at this one; this may apply to you.

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MR. LAZEBNIK: So if you say you may really want to look at this one; this could apply to you, and it's just because that they are in the industry that the SEC regulates, that's too high of a level.

JUDGE GARCIA: So who makes that decision? So then I would have to submit all that to a judge, and a judgment would then conduct some type of inquiry to see how far that aligns with what you're doing?

MR. LAZEBNIK: To some extent, yes, Your Honor.

But - - - but that's the whole point - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Aren't you creating them even greater unreasonable burden upon trial courts? I've been in a position where banker boxes have filled my office on a single case. How can the court ever, in a timely manner, resolve all of those?



MR. LAZEBNIK: So it's a fair question, Your

Honor. But the issue is - - - and it's important to

remember that, ultimately, it's not that the court makes

these decisions in a vacuum. It is the party that's

asserting the privilege that has the burden to convince the

court - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Right. But you're talking about an in-camera review. If there's a dispute, you create a privilege log, there's an in-camera review process, and ultimately, each side's saying it represents one thing or the other. You're creating an - - an extra onerous burden. I will tell you, trial judges hate in-cameras, but it is a process that they're required to. But what you're suggesting here seems even more difficult - - -

MR. LAZEBNIK: So I - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - or unnecessary, arguably.

MR. LAZEBNIK: I would say to Your Honor that, one, I don't think attorneys like in camera or privilege log reviews any more than judges do. But the - - - the thing to highlight there is that the in-camera review becomes necessary.

This is often when it's come up at the Appellate Division level. The in-camera review is noted as necessary when the party, in their privilege log and affirmations to support the privilege log, have not supplied the court with



sufficient information to say - - -1 2 JUDGE GARCIA: My hypothetical, would the company 3 have to come in and make a representation, yeah, our CFO 4 was doing the same thing? 5 MR. LAZEBNIK: So they - - - if - - - if they 6 said that the - - - if the attorney in this hypothetical 7 said, you know - - -8 JUDGE GARCIA: Well, the attorney just sends it 9 over and says, look, you might want to look at this case. 10 And it involves a CFO who's committing some type of what the SEC considers an improper act. And then the company 11 12 would have to come into a judge and say, yeah, our CFO is 13 doing the same thing. 14 MR. LAZEBNIK: So if the attorney sends it to the 15 company sua sponte without knowing any worries about the 16 CFOs conduct a priori, that communication does not - - -17 JUDGE GARCIA: Let's say there's nothing on the 18 face that indicates that one way or another. 19 So that original communication MR. LAZEBNIK: 20 from the attorney to the client wouldn't need to be 21 covered. The follow-ups by the clients to the attorney 2.2 would be covered. 23 JUDGE SINGAS: But that's punishing the lawyer 24 who's being proactive in serving their client by saying, 25



look, I'm anticipating what the issues are here.

this relationship. It's been ongoing for years. I know 1 2 what - - - you know, I know what your concerns are. 3 what we've dealt with before. And here's this case. 4 you - - - you should look at it. 5 MR. LAZEBNIK: So I don't - - - I don't think we 6 are because, again, the only question is if the knowledge 7 that the attorney sent it to the client somehow chills the 8 client from following up, that is when the immunity is 9 triggered, right? It is not a punishment of the attorney, 10 right? It is - - - and that is why attorneys often at - -11 12 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But there's still - -13 MR. LAZEBNIK: - - - the high level say - - -14 JUDGE TROUTMAN: There's still the free flow of 15 information. Attorneys who have an ongoing retainer 16 agreement are going to be reluctant to just send over 17 things because of the rule that you're proposing. It seems

MR. LAZEBNIK: If the attorney is basing it just on a high-level generality of this is a person in this industry and therefore this law applies to it, that is not something that this court should endorse as something that

like everything is subject to being turned over.

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JUDGE RIVERA: No, no. I think - - - I may have misunderstood my colleagues' hypotheticals, but I'll say



I'm understanding this back and forth as, you have a 1 client. You understand the needs of the client. You've 2 3 made a legal assessment as to whether or not some bit of 4 information, whether it be a recent statute or regulation, 5 cases, whatever it may be, that somehow may affect that 6 client's conduct. And you're - - - you're putting them on the alert about that. They may follow up, but they may 7 8 not. 9 MR. LAZEBNIK: So in those instances, right? 10 This goes to your - - - this court's precedent to say, what 11 the attorney's advice in that moment is is based on past 12 confidences, and that is still covered by the privilege, 13 right? If - - - if - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: How do you prove that then on a case-by-case basis? The client would have to come in and tell a judge, yeah, they knew my CFO was committing fraud. You kind of win the battle there, but I'm not sure about the war.

MR. LAZEBNIK: If the - - - if the attorney had previously had conversations with the client saying we're concerned about - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So - - but then do you have to just - -

MR. LAZEBNIK: I think that the - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: The question is: do you



	have to disclose that either on the privilege log or in
2	court to be able to sustain the privilege?
3	MR. LAZEBNIK: Right.
4	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Because you say it's an
5	element of what you have to prove.
6	MR. LAZEBNIK: I think on the privilege log, you
7	do have to say that the communication from the attorney to
8	the client is connected to something, right? Otherwise -
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10	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: You can't say that. You
11	have to say not connected to something. That's not going
12	to be enough, right?
13	MR. LAZEBNIK: Though, there's some
14	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Connected
15	MR. LAZEBNIK: there's something
16	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Connected to the possibility
17	of securities fraud under section 20, right?
18	MR. LAZEBNIK: So so
19	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Which is exactly that then
20	breaches the privilege.
21	MR. LAZEBNIK: I I think the I
22	if you go at that granularity, yes. But you could say
23	_
24	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: If you don't, the log is
25	going to be insufficient. And then you got to go to court
	· ·



with an affidavit saying the same thing, and maybe file that under the seal. But this is a huge labor.

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MR. LAZEBNIK: The log could say advice sent to client based on previous conversations related to accounting.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: But that alone, my guess is that happens once, and a client will be very reluctant to share a range of information which an attorney might find very useful in terms of guiding compliance on the front end.

MR. LAZEBNIK: I disagree, Your Honor, because - and this is maybe when it's helpful to go back to the - the documents here versus the broader question because
the documents here suggest - - - for instance, the
interview checklist, right? Is something that everybody
knows the Board of Parole conducts the interviews.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Let's take the example you just gave us, right? If in a privilege log I say, you know, advice provided relating to conversation with respect to accounting, I can guess what one of the questions in a deposition is going to be. And it's going to be, you know, exploring that particular entry in a privilege log.

So, you know, even at some level of generality, it seems there is a real risk that you may chill the kind of communication that can actually be very, very beneficial because it can help an attorney guide compliance,



especially on the front end.

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MR. LAZEBNIK: So I would say, part of it is only if the client and the attorney want to withhold that original communication to say, like, oh, the fact that the attorney sent over a document saying, you know, that here's a law about fraud.

Somebody had to make the call to say, you know what? That's something we want protected. And then it gets into this quandary of, well, what can we say to protect it? But I want to highlight that what we're talking about is instances where there is no fact-specific issue, right? That the - - - the lawyer is sending over information to the client without it being related to a known legal position.

nonsensical to me. We're talking about Board of Paroles.

The lawyer knows what the Board of Paroles' duties and obligations are, just as the commissioners, hopefully, know what their duties and obligations are under the law. And the lawyer is making decisions based on that to advise commissioners how to comply with the law to do exactly what I understand you are concerned about, right? The proper determinations of these parole applications. So I'm not really understanding - - -

MR. LAZEBNIK: So - - - so - - -



JUDGE RIVERA: - - - this argument right now.

MR. LAZEBNIK: So - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: It sounds like - - - if I may, it sounds to me like you're saying, if the lawyer had communicated to one or more commissioners about a particular application about a particular parolee interview that's in a parole, that would be covered. Yeah. But if the lawyer, knowing that this is the - - - the duty and responsibility of the members of the board, determines in - - in their analysis based on their legal skill, based on their understanding of the law, that there's something that they wish to provide to the board, vis-a-vis that particular duty and obligation, somehow that is not covered. And I'm - - I'm having great difficulty understanding - -

MR. LAZEBNIK: So - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that. I can't find anything. You're - - - you're right. Of course, if it's an individual case, yes, the privilege applies. But I - - I can't find anything in the law that says if it's not with respect to a particular case but about the work of this particular board, that somehow all of a sudden, they are stripped of the privilege.

MR. LAZEBNIK: So this is where Coastal Gas and Tax Analysts and the other federal cases are helpful, Your



Honor. Because what - - - what it highlights is the 1 2 concept of agency policy, which doesn't necessarily apply 3 in in-house positions, right? Where the lawyer is 4 assisting in the crafting of not just advising the - - -5 the client about a particular matter, but actually the 6 policy that the agency is going to follow. And that does 7 have a heightened level of interest by the public and 8 should be more scrutinized than, you know, a typical 9 communication even though - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: Policy versus individual determinations? 11 12 The individual determination is MR. LAZEBNIK: 13 14

also protected. The - - - but in the context of an agency counsel telling the agency how to conduct itself - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Can you give me an example of - -- of how you would distinguish those two? Give me -

> MR. LAZEBNIK: They're not - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: - - - a hypothetical example. course, you haven't seen the documents.

MR. LAZEBNIK: Yeah. So - - so I - - to me, they're not ones that I have to distinguish. But I - - but I guess, like, in one instance, you have, you know, a pending hearing or appeal, and counsel says, okay, given the facts and circumstances of this particular appeal, we recommend the following to the board, right? That is the



1 prototypical conversation between attorney and client that 2 we all agree is protected. 3 The - - - the other one that - - - case is like 4 Coastal Gas are about is when the agency is saying how am I 5 supposed to conduct myself at all times? And what the 6 federal courts have said is that when you're looking at how 7 the agency is supposed to conduct itself at all times, 8 privilege doesn't trump the - - - the need for the public 9 to know what's going on there. And the immunity isn't 10 served by a person knowing the - - - the - - - the neutral contours of how an officer of the agency is supposed to - -11 12 13 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And this under FOIA is sort 14 of the working law of the agency doctrine, right? That 15 that's discoverable under - - - under FOIA. But we're not 16 under FOIA. 17 MR. LAZEBNIK: We are under FOIA. 18 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: We're under FOIL. 19 Well, so - - - I apologize here. MR. LAZEBNIK: 20 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But the statute is different 21 in that regard. 2.2 So this court has previously said MR. LAZEBNIK: 23 that the guidance of FOIA is very instructive to FOIL. 24 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right.



MR. LAZEBNIK: This is apparently not an issue

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that has come up before the court. The other issues that have come up before the court, the - - - the court has found how the federal - - -  $\frac{1}{2}$ 

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: How is the statute is different in this regard?

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MR. LAZEBNIK: The statute is different in this regard in that the two sections of FOIL that were cited by the government here are actually one statute under FOIA. They are Exemption 5 under FOIA, whereas here, it's 87(g)(a) and 87 - - 87(2)(a) and 87(2)(g). But under FOIA, the - - those two are actually the same because they treat the - - the claim of privilege and inter agency exemptions as one kind of potential thing that we have to be concerned about.

And in those instances, the courts have said both the - - - the attorney-client privilege and the interagency exemption does not cover the neutral analysis of an agency's obligation under the law.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: The federal - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel, can I go back, I'm sorry, very quickly to your distinction between policy and case advice, which I appreciated. It was easy to understand. I want to try to put it in the middle of that. If counsel is aware that there's a recurrent issue that arises in cases, but is not, at the moment, thinking of

some specific case, but is offering advice to - - -1 2 curative to whatever that recurring issue is so that it 3 could be applied in some future case. Assuming the problem 4 arises with some frequency, where are we then? Are we 5 making policy or are we giving advice? 6 MR. LAZEBNIK: So - - - so in the first - - - so 7 you - - - you could say that if counsel is merely pointing 8 out a suggestion and not an instruction of how things are 9 supposed to - - -10 JUDGE CANNATARO: It's more like, I know this has 11 been a problem in the past that comes up a lot. Here's 12 something that you should know, and - - - and this - - -

MR. LAZEBNIK: So if the Board of Parole would then follow that guidance, that in that moment, is creating a new agency policy.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Okay.

this might help you deal with this problem.

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: In the federal cases, can you point me toward anything with respect to whether or not the attorney-client privilege, as it's set forth under exemption 5, is contiguous with the privilege that it otherwise applies in any dispute outside of the FOIL context?

MR. LAZEBNIK: I think the - - - the way Coastal Gas treats it and whatnot, they - - - they all go from the



same Supreme Court cases they - - - they started - - -2 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Upjohn, et cetera, you mean? 3 MR. LAZEBNIK: They start with Upjohn, and then -4 - - and then they apply the same kind of attorney-client 5 privilege test as far as I understand it. 6 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you, Counsel. 7 MR. LAZEBNIK: Thank you. 8 MR. BRADY: Good afternoon, Your Honors. 9 please the court. Frank Brady on behalf of the respondent 10 in this case. 11 The documents that lie at the center of this case 12 go to the heart of the attorney-client privilege. As this 13 court said in Spectrum systems, legal advice is not only 14 given during the course of litigation or to - - - in 15 response to a concrete, real-world legal problem, but legal 16 advice is also given to avoid litigation, to facilitate 17 compliance with the law, or to guide a client's course of 18 action. 19 And that's exactly what these documents do. 20 - - - the word decisions regarding release of adults and 21 minor offenders are - - - are - - - involve a complex set 2.2 of statutes and regulations, and are governed by a lot of decisional law. 23 24

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MR. BRADY: And so

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Counsel, can I ask you - - -

1	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Can I ask you a few hypothetica
2	questions about the decisions, not with respect to anythin
3	specifically here? But if counsel were to forward all
4	decisions from a particular court, say, the US Supreme
5	Court, any court, to a client on a broad topic, so for
6	example, to a pharmaceutical company for anything involvin
7	pharmaceutical companies with no commentary, just forwarde
8	everything, would that be protected in your view?
9	MR. BRADY: It would because I think the
10	selection of the the legal materials or legal
11	authorities involves professional judgment.
12	JUDGE HALLIGAN: What if I'm simply using a
13	search term such as pharmaceutical? Take something very
14	broad. Or let's say it's a tobacco company, and every
15	decision that has the word tobacco in the syllabus, I
16	forward.
17	MR. BRADY: If the intent was to confidentially
18	advise the client, and the selection of the the
19	selection of the materials was relevant to that advice, I
20	would say that would
21	JUDGE HALLIGAN: If there's
22	MR. BRADY: that would be covered. There'
23	no
24	JUDGE HALLIGAN: If there's no culling



MR. BRADY: Excuse me.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: If there's no culling of - - - of decisions which is reflective of advice.

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MR. BRADY: If there was no culling of decisions which was reflective of advice, then it wouldn't be advice, and it wouldn't be covered by the attorney-client.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: And if I am forwarding in separate buckets every case in which there is an affirmance and every case in which there is a reversal, what I'm trying to understand is, at what point do we start to see some legal advice, not with respect to anything here, but more generally?

MR. BRADY: I think that's a - - - it's a difficult hypothetical because normally when an attorney is giving, whether it be case law or statutory law to a client, it comes in the context - - - if it's a - - - it comes in the context of giving legal advice. It's - - - it's not - - - it's not for nothing.

So you know, I - - - I - - - as an attorney, I would not want it to be disclosed what - - - what authorities I had chosen to give my client on any particular issue. Because really, that - - - the - - - what I choose to provide my client is a window into what advice or what I'm thinking about his position or what they should do or how they should comply with the law. So I think it's very - - - it's a very close question, Your

Honor.

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JUDGE RIVERA: What if it's not - - - what if it's not a material that deals with a substantive issue?

And take it this way. Let's - - - let's take this hypothetical. Let's say I'm on the New York City

Commission for Human Rights, and counsel - - - in-house counsel, let's call it that; counsel for the commission provides a book that contains the statutes that create the commission and sets out how commissioners are appointed.

And again, this is not related to this board. I'm making a hypothetical.

And said this is the statutes - - - these are the statutes that apply to you, so - - - and in no way contains any analysis. It's different from what I think you were trying to work through with Judge Halligan, which is, there is particular legal reasoning that's going behind, let me choose these cases; let me not choose those cases. Let me call these favorable; let me call those unfavorable. This is just - - - this is the law that deals with you and your work.

MR. BRADY: I would say that's the working law of the agency. That's not attorney-client privilege. You know, that's - - - that's a, you know, manual or something that's for generically - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So that book could be turned over.



1 MR. BRADY: Yes. I don't - - - it wouldn't 2 contain legal advice. It - - - it simply would be the 3 working law of the agency, you know. JUDGE RIVERA: Now, what if within that book, as 4 5 I've described it, you do have sections that can be 6 completely compartmentalized that do include some legal 7 analysis. MR. BRADY: Well, then I think it would - - -8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: You'll just redact them? 10 MR. BRADY: Well, this counsel was giving it to 11 who? 12 JUDGE RIVERA: To - - - I'm sorry. 13 14 15

MR. BRADY: In - - - in that hypothetical, I'd have to know what the context was, you know, that that was happening. It's not just the content, it's also the context, it's the circumstances, you know. All these cases are very fact intensive. And they - - - they turn on unique facts as we apply these - - - these general principles.

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JUDGE GARCIA: I also have a different type of question. So we've heard from the appellant that we're applying the same standard for attorney-client privilege in this context, as we would Spectrum and the other cases, right? And we all agree on that. But does the fact that this is a FOIL proceeding have any bearing on the way we



approach these issues? Because FOIL, obviously, is very strong policy in this state, right? Strong policy in disclosure, different in ways than civil discovery. So how do we factor that in?

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MR. BRADY: Well, you know, FOIL, obviously, is supposed to be narrowly construed because of the important public policy interest in transparency. And the attorney-client privilege itself is supposed to be observed cautiously.

So we have two of these kind of yellow lights, if you will. But that doesn't - - - but the - - - so I mean, you approach it that way. You will have to be cautious about it because there is an obvious tension between the - - - the liberal discovery in the state and the attorney-client privilege. But the - - - this court has been pretty robust in saying that the attorney-client privilege conserves important interest in allowing unfiltered conversations to go on between attorneys and their clients.

And in fact, in a government context, that is in the public's interest to - - - to enhance compliance with the law. When there are issues that an agency is struggling with or that - - - you know, it's very important that they can have this unfiltered, unfettered conversations with counsel about the different topics that the agency has to address.



JUDGE SINGAS: Doesn't the public - - -1 2 JUDGE GARCIA: And I suppose agencies do hire 3 outside counsel, right? 4 MR. BRADY: I think they do in specific - - -5 JUDGE GARCIA: Even federal government, I think 6 they do. MR. BRADY: I think they maybe do for special 7 8 projects. 9 JUDGE GARCIA: Thank you. 10 JUDGE SINGAS: Doesn't the public have an interest in - - - in knowing how policy is come to in these 11 12 agencies? Like, how does that fit in your analysis? 13 public has a right to know how the government agencies make 14 their determinations. And I think it enhances, you know, 15 their desire to see how government functions, and I think 16 we should be accommodating of that. 17 MR. BRADY: Well, I think there's - - - there's 18 obviously, a competing interest in transparency and - - -19 and - - - and the public having a right to know. But, you 20 know, the public - - - and - - - and the petitioners have 21 pointed out that, you know, people who appear before the 22 Parole Board have a special interest in - - - in - - - you 23 know, they want to learn what the advice that counsel is -24 - - is giving to the board about their statutory duties,



you know, I - - - I understand that.

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But I think there's a more important public - - - public policy interest on the other side, and that is to ensure - - - to encourage these kind of conversations to go on between agency counsel and the people who operate the agency so they can get unfiltered advice so they can discuss what the statutory and regulatory structure requires them to do. And that's a very important public policy interest.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So the federal - - - the federal law around FOIA doesn't restrict working law of the agency to statutes, right? It actually, will include, if I understand it correctly, internal memoranda prepared by lawyers that say, here is how the agency is going to proceed. And if the agency actually does - - - does, in fact, proceed that way and follows that guidance, those are deemed producible under FOIA.

So, you know, to take the first item on the list here, which is, if I believe it, and I'm not - - - I don't think revealing anything, is a checklist of what should be reviewed by a parole officer - - - parole board member in evaluating an application. Why isn't that - - - if it is law at all, which I'm not sure about, why isn't that sort of the working law of the agency that should be disclosed?

MR. BRADY: Well, it's not the working law of the agency because it's not binding on anybody. It's just



advice that counsel is giving to the board. The board isn't obligated to follow any of this advice. The board can do as it pleases. You know, this doesn't divest the board of discretion, and this is not a final agency policy.

It's not - - - it's not - - - it doesn't instruct anybody what they must do to comply with some kind of internal agency law. There's no secret agency law here.

These are - - - this is just advice about how to - - - how to - - - how to conduct these hearings and - - - and

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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So you don't have anything that - - - there's no internal documentation, at least, that's being withheld here that you would say is it a policy that is regularly followed by the Parole Board?

prepare for them in a way that's going to comply with their

statutory duties, and - - - and perhaps create a record

that will withstand judicial scrutiny.

MR. BRADY: No. This is advice. This is advice. Nothing requires the - - - the counsel is - - - is hired by the board to provide advice. Counsel cannot make the board follow any of this advice.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: So the relationship, I take it, you're saying is similar, you know, to - - - to the relationship between a general counsel and a CEO?

MR. BRADY: Yes. Yes. And that's, you know - - and as petitioner was suggesting, I thought that there



had to be some kind of initial communication from the client to the attorney in order to kind of start the attorney-client privilege ball rolling. And - - - and that's just not true under this court's precedents. This court in - - in Rossi says that - - - that the communication need not begin with the client. It can start with the lawyer in the course - - - when there's an ongoing professional relationship. And that's exactly what we have here.

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I know that - - - and I just wanted to say that the fact that there's, otherwise, non-privileged materials, and I think I may have covered this, but, you know, the fact that there may be statutory law or decisional law in there doesn't destroy the privilege. It's the foundation of the legal advice that's being provided. And counsel selection of those materials are a window into the legal advice that's being provided. I think it's very important to - - - as a matter of public policy, that agency counsel be allowed or be permitted to have these unfiltered discussions with, in this case, the Board of Parole.

JUDGE RIVERA: Although I thought in - - - in my hypothetical, it was just a book that contains the statutes that sets up my hypothetical, the commission, I thought you said that does get turned over. I understand your argument about the decisional law.



1	MR. BRADY: I'm sorry, Your Honor.		
2	JUDGE RIVERA: No, you said statutory or		
3	decisional or decisional law.		
4	MR. BRADY: Well, I tried		
5	JUDGE RIVERA: It's in your response to my		
6	hypothetical.		
7	MR. BRADY: So your hypothetical, basically,		
8	sounded to me like you're you're somebody		
9	somebody has created a manual about the history of the		
10	agency, and how the laws that govern how the agency		
11	operates. And it sounds to me, like, a public or almost		
12	semi-public sort of manual about how		
13	JUDGE RIVERA: So but in my hypothetical,		
14	the commission didn't make that public.		
15	MR. BRADY: Well, I I maybe they		
16	should. You know, it it was it was the working		
17	law of the agency		
18	JUDGE RIVERA: Fair enough. Fair enough.		
19	MR. BRADY: It was the working law of the		
20	agencies, you know, it's a manual, you know. There		
21	there are manuals that the parole has or		
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, yes.		
23	MR. BRADY: or are are out there.		
24	JUDGE RIVERA: But your position, of course, is		
25	that none of these documents fit that fit that		



description?

MR. BRADY: No, I think - - - you know, Your

Honors have the material. You can see the context that - 
- which this material was provided. It was to - - - you

know, it was to - - - it was advice. It was to - - - it

was to encourage, inspire a discussion. It was to get them

to - - the board to hopefully, follow the law and - - 
when they're implementing statutes and making release

decisions, writing decisions, conducting the interviews.

So I mean, I - - - I think it's - - - I think this goes to the heart - - - to the heartland of the attorney-client privilege.

Unless the court has any other questions, I'm prepared to rest.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

MR. LAZEBNIK: I did go longer than - - - than intended.

MR. LAZEBNIK: Thank you, Your Honor. So just a --- a few points that I want to clarify. First, on --- on the record of this case, I --- I think if you look at the affirmation of attorney Kiley, that's record page 161,

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: You have your three minutes.

one of the things that counsel just said that I want to

push against is the context here.

One is the affirmation makes clear that these



documents were created in connection with training 1 2 sessions. And often in the affirmation for one, two, 3 three, several of them, they are labeled as how-to's, not 4 necessarily, oh, you know, maybe you want to follow this, 5 maybe you don't. The context here is important. And one 6 of the other things to point out about that - - -JUDGE RIVERA: What if they're how to comply - -7 8 - I'm not saying that's what it says, but given the back 9 and forth between the two of you, how to comply with the 10 law, in my opinion, as the lawyer? 11 MR. LAZEBNIK: So that - - - that is not

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MR. LAZEBNIK: So that - - - that is not sufficient to overcome the agency policy issue - - - the work - - - the working law of the agency. And the reason is because in addition to everything that attorney Kiley said, she would have also had to say, and they did not follow this, right? Because once they - - - if - - - right? If - - - if the burden is on the government to say

JUDGE RIVERA: So you mean the privilege turns on whether or not your client follows your advice?

MR. LAZEBNIK: The working law of the agency turns on whether or not the agency has actually adopted it or chosen not to adopt it.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But to protect the privilege, the lawyer has to file an affidavit saying, I



advised my client to follow the law, and they didn't follow it.

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MR. LAZEBNIK: They don't have to say I advised my client to follow the law. I advised my client regarding X, and - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: They didn't follow it.

MR. LAZEBNIK: They didn't follow it. And this wouldn't be an issue in the civil context. But in - - - in the agency context, that is actually something that - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But doesn't that chill the idea of being proactive? If you're going to - - - if you're going to later say, and I didn't follow it, what client is going to - - - going to consult an attorney to set them up to lose during litigation that is most likely than not to follow, especially when there's certain agencies that are sued with regularity.

MR. LAZEBNIK: So I think the - - - that question invokes this court's opinion in Fink v. Lefkowitz, which there - - - the issues were documents about how to conduct audits. And what - - - and what this court said is that there's a difference between documents that tell the agency how to conduct the audit versus documents that tell the agency this is the law you're supposed to enforce, and go do it. And the reason this court raised that is because - - right - - it said, "Such information in the hands of



the public does not impede the agency. On the contrary, such knowledge actually encourages voluntary response." JUDGE TROUTMAN: But when you're an agency that's sued with regularity, consulting your attorney is a necessary thing. MR. LAZEBNIK: Yes. And if the - - - if the 

agency - - - if the attorney that the agency is consulting with is not being followed, that is actually something of public import, right? That is a - - - a breach of the public's trust. They are being told this is how you're supposed to comply with the law, and you're not. Yes, that is exactly the kind of situation that we should, from a public policy - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Okay.

MR. LAZEBNIK: --- standpoint, know that something wrong is occurring within the agency.

JUDGE RIVERA: That is - - - can I just clarify something here? I may have misunderstood you. I take it that you're saying if the client goes to the lawyer and says, tell me what statute applies to the work that I have to do, and the lawyer provides it, are you saying that that is privileged? I thought you were.

MR. LAZEBNIK: If - - if it's a general - - - if it's a high level, that's the - - - the area that's a little tricky, but in general, I think that probably is



covered in privilege, which goes to another - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Well, how is that different from the lawyer providing the statute without being asked?

MR. LAZEBNIK: So - - - so this is why I think it's beneficial to - - - to return to the court's primary inquiry, right? Is the purpose of the privilege being served? What is the reason that we need to shield that particular communication? And I would say, when it's the high level, at times, you can't - - right - - - the court should - - should consider that that kind of communication doesn't rise to the level of needing protection.

The other thing that I want to raise here is that this court has, on several occasions, found - - - has already contoured legal advice that is not protected, right? And it has created two guideposts related to that.

One is when the parties don't treat it as confidential, even though it might be legal advice, it isn't protected by the privilege. And another is, when the lawyer - - - when the lawyer and the person are not in actual client-attorney relationship, even if the lawyer espouses what is legal advice, we don't consider that privilege.

This court has made those separate elements that are part of the four. But the point is that there are instances where legal advice does not get protected. And



what we're saying here is that, in the instance where it's a communication from counsel to client that doesn't reveal any kind of confidences by the client, you should be skeptical. And then based on - - - since the court has a - - - a review of this documents, if you do not feel that the purpose of the privilege is met, those documents should be released.

Likewise, most of these documents, based on the description, are not covered by the interagency exemption because they were created in the context of - - of instruction to train - - to train those. And as posted - - pointed out in Coastal Gas, the - - - the purpose of such an exemption is to make sure that a statement that is not followed by the agency isn't released as though it is the position of the agency.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. LAZEBNIK: Thank you.

(Court is adjourned)



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